Court of Inquiry Is Not a Departmental Proceeding: J&K & Ladakh High Court on Simultaneous Criminal Trial, Internal Fact‑Finding and Suspension in the BSF

Court of Inquiry Is Not a Departmental Proceeding: J&K & Ladakh High Court on Simultaneous Criminal Trial, Internal Fact‑Finding and Suspension in the BSF

1. Introduction

In Akhand Prakash Shahi v. Union of India and Another (Border Security Force), decided on 11 December 2025, a Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar (Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Sanjay Parihar) dismissed two intra‑court appeals:

  • LPA No. 275/2025 – challenging the initiation of a Court of Inquiry (CoI) under the Border Security Force Rules, 1969 during the pendency of a criminal trial for rape; and
  • LPA No. 288/2025 – challenging the continued suspension of the appellant from BSF service.

The case arises from allegations by a lady Assistant Sub‑Inspector (Ministerial) of the Border Security Force (BSF) that the appellant, an Assistant Commandant, committed rape. An FIR was registered under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Dwarka (North), New Delhi. After investigation, a charge‑sheet was filed, charges were framed, and the criminal trial is underway.

The BSF authorities, in response to these serious allegations, both:

  • placed the appellant under suspension under Rule 40A(1) of the BSF Rules, 1969; and
  • ordered a Court of Inquiry under Rules 170, 173 and 174 of the BSF Rules to investigate the allegations as potential misconduct.

The appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on two broad grounds:

  1. That allowing a Court of Inquiry / departmental process to proceed in parallel with a criminal trial on the same allegations would seriously prejudice his defence in the criminal case and is legally impermissible; and
  2. That his continued suspension is arbitrary and ought to be revoked, allegedly due to “delay” in departmental proceedings.

The Single Judge dismissed both writ petitions on 14 November 2025. The Division Bench has now affirmed those decisions, articulating two important clarifications:

  1. A Court of Inquiry under the BSF Rules is a fact‑finding exercise and not, by itself, a departmental proceeding. Hence, a challenge to such an inquiry on the ground that “departmental and criminal proceedings cannot go on simultaneously” is premature.
  2. Suspension of a member of a disciplined force can be legitimately continued independently on the basis of a pending criminal trial for a grave offence such as rape; the alleged delay or non‑existence of departmental proceedings is not, in itself, a valid ground for revoking such suspension.

The judgment is approved for reporting, underscoring its precedential value, particularly for uniformed and paramilitary services.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Allegations and Criminal Prosecution

  • The appellant, Akhand Prakash Shahi, was serving as Assistant Commandant, STC Airport Humhama, Srinagar.
  • A lady ASI (Ministerial) of BSF lodged a complaint accusing him of committing rape.
  • On this complaint, FIR No. 108/2022 was registered at Police Station Dwarka (North), New Delhi under Section 376 IPC.
  • Investigation led to a charge‑sheet; the competent criminal court framed charges and the appellant is currently facing trial in Delhi, having been granted bail.

2.2 Administrative Action: Suspension and Court of Inquiry

In parallel with the criminal process, the BSF authorities initiated internal steps:

  • Suspension:
    • By order dated 24 April 2023, the appellant was placed under suspension under Rule 40A(1) of the BSF Rules, 1969, considering the nature and gravity of the allegations.
    • The suspension was confirmed by order dated 15 May 2023 and, as the Division Bench notes, is being periodically reviewed with “informed decisions” taken on its extension.
  • Court of Inquiry:
    • By order dated 28 October 2023, the BSF authorities directed the holding of a Court of Inquiry (CoI) under Rule 173 read with Rules 170 and 174 of the BSF Rules, 1969.
    • The object of the CoI was to investigate the allegations made by the lady officer as potential misconduct, so as to enable the competent authority to decide whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

2.3 Initial Writ Petitions before the Single Judge

  1. WP(C) No. 2871/2023: The appellant first challenged the initiation of the Court of Inquiry order dated 28 October 2023.
    However, this writ petition was disposed of on 22 November 2024 as infructuous on a statement made by counsel for the appellant. The Division Bench does not dwell on the reasons for infructuousness, and that petition does not directly shape the final outcome.
  2. WP(C) No. 3128/2023: The appellant filed a fresh writ petition challenging:
    • the letter of rejection dated 7 November 2023, and
    • the proceedings under Rule 173 (i.e., the Court of Inquiry).
    This petition was premised substantially on the alleged illegality of allowing departmental/disciplinary proceedings to continue simultaneously with criminal proceedings on the same facts.
  3. WP(C) No. 1876/2025: By a separate writ petition, the appellant challenged his continued suspension, contending that unreasonable delay in completing “departmental proceedings” rendered the continued suspension arbitrary and unlawful.

On 14 November 2025, a Single Judge dismissed both WP(C) No. 3128/2023 and WP(C) No. 1876/2025, relying on the settled legal position that criminal and departmental proceedings can, in principle, proceed simultaneously and finding no undue prejudice to the appellant.

2.4 The Letters Patent Appeals

Aggrieved, the appellant filed:

  • LPA No. 275/2025 – against the dismissal of WP(C) No. 3128/2023 (challenge to the Court of Inquiry); and
  • LPA No. 288/2025 – against the dismissal of WP(C) No. 1876/2025 (challenge to suspension).

Both LPAs were heard together and dismissed by the Division Bench, which substantially endorsed the Single Judge’s view on the law but introduced a key clarification about the legal status of a Court of Inquiry.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 LPA No. 275/2025 – Challenge to the Court of Inquiry

The Division Bench rejects the appellant’s challenge to the Court of Inquiry with the following core holdings:

  1. Nature of Court of Inquiry: A Court of Inquiry under the BSF Rules, 1969, is a fact‑finding or preliminary inquiry. Its findings are in the nature of a preliminary report, meant merely to aid the competent authority in deciding:
    • whether any disciplinary proceedings should be initiated; and, if so,
    • what form such proceedings should take.
    It is not itself a “departmental proceeding”.
  2. No departmental proceedings yet initiated: As on the date of the Court’s decision, no formal disciplinary or departmental proceedings had been instituted against the appellant. Only the CoI was underway. Therefore, the contention that “departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings cannot go on simultaneously” was held to be premature.
  3. No prejudice to criminal defence: The Court finds that participation in the Court of Inquiry does not cause any real prejudice to the appellant’s defence in the criminal trial because:
    • he cannot be compelled in the CoI to make any self‑incriminating statements;
    • he has the option to remain silent during the CoI; and
    • the CoI itself is confined to fact‑finding.
  4. Opportunity within the CoI: Far from being prejudicial, the CoI is portrayed by the Court as an opportunity for the appellant to persuade the authorities that, in view of the pending criminal trial, it may not be expedient or necessary to initiate disciplinary proceedings on the same allegations.
  5. Prematurity of the writ petition: The Court characterises the writ petition challenging the CoI as premature and without substance, since it sought to prevent a purely fact‑finding exercise, long before any formal departmental action was initiated.

3.2 LPA No. 288/2025 – Challenge to Suspension

On the second appeal, concerning suspension, the Division Bench holds:

  1. Basis of suspension: The appellant’s suspension was justified primarily on account of his being an accused in a pending criminal trial for rape (Section 376 IPC) based on a complaint by a serving lady officer of BSF.
  2. Suspension independent of departmental inquiry: The Court emphasises that the appellant’s suspension is not rooted in, nor dependent upon, any departmental inquiry. The departmental proceedings have not yet been initiated; the only step taken is the CoI, which is preliminary.
  3. Delay in departmental proceedings not a ground: Since there are no departmental proceedings in existence, the contention that “unreasonable delay in completing departmental proceedings” justifies revocation of suspension is held to be misconceived and untenable in law.
  4. Ongoing review of suspension: The Court notes that the suspension order is being periodically reviewed based on “informed decisions”, thereby reinforcing that it is a considered administrative measure, not a mechanical or arbitrary one.
  5. No interference warranted: Given the seriousness of the allegations and the pending criminal trial, the Court finds no legal basis to interfere with the suspension, and dismisses the appeal.

4. Legal Framework and Concepts

4.1 Court of Inquiry under the BSF Rules, 1969

The judgment reproduces Rule 174 of the BSF Rules, 1969, which states, in essence:

  • A Court of Inquiry may be held to investigate any disciplinary matter or any other matter of importance.
  • It must be held in specified situations, including:
    • unnatural deaths within force lines;
    • serious injuries likely to cause disability;
    • financial irregularities, losses, theft/misappropriation of public or force property;
    • loss of secret/classified documents; and
    • damage to private persons or property likely to lead to claims.

Read with Rules 170 and 173 (composition and procedure of the CoI), the Court emphasises that:

  • A CoI is a fact‑finding mechanism to gather evidence and materials.
  • It enables the competent authority to make a reasoned decision about whether to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings.
  • The CoI’s findings do not impose punishment and are not, by themselves, punitive or quasi‑judicial determinations of guilt.

4.2 Departmental / Disciplinary Proceedings

By contrast, a departmental proceeding (or disciplinary inquiry) is typically initiated when:

  • a formal charge‑sheet or article of charges is served on the delinquent officer;
  • an Inquiry Officer is appointed to conduct a quasi‑judicial inquiry;
  • the delinquent is afforded the right to:
    • inspect documents;
    • cross‑examine witnesses;
    • lead evidence in defence; and
    • make submissions on evidence and findings.
  • a final order may be passed, imposing a penalty (such as dismissal, removal, reduction in rank) if the charges are established.

The crucial doctrinal move in this judgment is the explicit separation of:

  • Pre‑charge, fact‑finding processes (like a Court of Inquiry), from
  • Formal disciplinary proceedings involving the adjudication of charges and imposition of penalties.

4.3 Suspension under Rule 40A(1) of the BSF Rules

Rule 40A(1) (referred to but not reproduced in the judgment) empowers BSF authorities to suspend a member of the force in appropriate circumstances, including where:

  • serious allegations are under investigation or trial;
  • the presence of the officer in active duty may be detrimental to discipline, morale, or fair investigation; or
  • the nature of the alleged misconduct is grave (e.g., sexual offences, corruption, serious violence).

Suspension is a measure of administrative control, not a substantive punishment. It is anticipatory or preventive in nature, meant to:

  • ensure the integrity of the investigation or trial;
  • maintain public confidence and internal discipline; and
  • avoid potential misuse of official position.

The Division Bench underlines that, in this case, suspension is primarily justified by:

  • the pendency of a rape trial under Section 376 IPC, and
  • the fact that the alleged victim is a lady officer serving in the same force.

5. Precedents and Jurisprudence on Simultaneous Proceedings

5.1 Reference to Supreme Court Jurisprudence in the Judgment

The Division Bench notes that the Single Judge had considered “the legal position enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several judgments” on the subject of simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings. Although the Division Bench does not list those cases by name, the area is well‑settled in Indian service law.

5.2 The General Rule: No Statutory Bar to Simultaneous Proceedings

The consistent line of authority from the Supreme Court (reflected in decisions such as State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.) is that:

  • There is no absolute or statutory bar to simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings arising out of the same facts.
  • Both processes serve different purposes:
    • Criminal law addresses offences against the State/society, requiring strict proof beyond reasonable doubt.
    • Departmental proceedings address the officer’s fitness to continue in service, operating on a standard closer to preponderance of probabilities, with more flexible rules of evidence.

Consequently, courts have repeatedly held that departmental proceedings:

  • need not await the outcome of the criminal trial in every case; and
  • can validly be continued unless doing so would cause serious, demonstrable prejudice to the employee’s defence in the criminal case.

5.3 Exceptions: When Departmental Proceedings May Be Stayed

The Supreme Court has, however, recognised limited exceptions where courts may consider staying departmental proceedings:

  • When the charges in both proceedings are identical or “so interlinked” that findings in one will substantially prejudge the other.
  • When the criminal case involves complicated questions of fact and law such that:
    • the departmental inquiry would necessarily traverse the same evidence and factual matrix; and
    • there is a significant risk that the accused’s defence strategy or testimony in the departmental case would be exposed, to their detriment, in the criminal trial.
  • When the employee can demonstrate real, not merely speculative, prejudice to the fairness of the criminal defence.

In each case, the decision to stay departmental proceedings is discretionary, based on the court’s assessment of:

  • the seriousness of the charges;
  • the nature of evidence;
  • the stage of the criminal trial; and
  • the potential impact on the criminal defence.

5.4 How the Present Judgment Fits into This Framework

The Division Bench explicitly accepts the general proposition (articulated by the Single Judge) that there is no legal bar to simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings. It even notes that the Single Judge had correctly held:

  • there was no statutory prohibition on departmental proceedings continuing during the pendency of the criminal case; and
  • this was not a case involving complicated questions of fact and law that would justify a stay.

However, the Division Bench does not base its decision solely on this line of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Instead, it goes a step further by:

  • clarifying that a Court of Inquiry is not itself a departmental proceeding at all; and
  • holding that, at present, there are no departmental proceedings against the appellant.

Therefore, the question whether “criminal and departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously” is itself characterised as hypothetical and premature in the facts of this case. This is the key doctrinal nuance that distinguishes this judgment from many earlier cases, which generally assumed the existence of ongoing departmental proceedings.

6. Detailed Legal Reasoning of the Division Bench

6.1 Distinguishing Court of Inquiry from Departmental Proceedings

The central plank of the Division Bench’s reasoning is the conceptual disentanglement

  1. Court of Inquiry (CoI) under Rules 170–174 of the BSF Rules: a preliminary, fact‑finding process; and
  2. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings: a formal adjudicatory process that can culminate in punishment.

The Court underscores that:

  • The CoI is meant “to collect evidence so as to facilitate the BSF authorities in deciding its future course of action”.
  • Its findings are “in the nature of a preliminary report” that may or may not lead to formal disciplinary proceedings.
  • At the stage of the CoI, “there is no departmental proceeding initiated or commenced against the delinquent”.

On this basis, the Court reasons that:

  • Ordering a CoI and even requiring the appellant to appear before it does not amount to initiating departmental proceedings.
  • The appellant’s core argument – that departmental and criminal proceedings cannot go on simultaneously – therefore rests on a false premise, because no departmental proceeding exists as yet.

This clarification provides the decisive ground

6.2 Assessment of Prejudice and the Right Against Self‑Incrimination

The appellant argued that participating in the CoI would:

  • compel him to disclose his defence strategy; and
  • thereby prejudice his stand in the pending criminal trial for rape.

The Division Bench rejects this apprehension as “without any substance”, on two key grounds:

  1. Nature of the CoI: Since the CoI is a fact‑finding inquiry with no punitive consequence by itself, participation in it does not entail the immediate risk of punitive action.
  2. Voluntariness and self‑incrimination:
    • The Court expressly notes that during the Court of Inquiry, the appellant “cannot be forced to make any self‑incriminating statement”.
    • He has the option even to remain silent.

In effect, the Court imports the constitutional safeguard against self‑incrimination (Article 20(3)) into the context of a CoI, holding that:

  • while the appellant may be asked questions, he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself;
  • any participation is subject to this protective umbrella; and
  • the mere existence of such an inquiry does not, in law, amount to prejudicial pressure on the accused.

6.3 CoI as a Potentially Beneficial Opportunity

Interestingly, the Division Bench frames the CoI not as a threat but as a possible benefit to the appellant:

  • The CoI “would thus afford an opportunity to the appellant to put forth his explanation and persuade the authorities not to go for any disciplinary proceedings against him.”
  • If the findings of the CoI suggest that there is insufficient material or that a disciplinary inquiry would be inappropriate pending the criminal trial, the authorities may decide not to proceed further.

Thus, the Court casts the CoI as a safeguard against over‑hasty disciplinary action, rather than a parallel, rival adjudicatory mechanism to the criminal court.

6.4 Prematurity and Maintainability of the Challenge

The Court repeatedly characterises the appellant’s challenge as premature:

  • There is “no departmental proceedings initiated or commenced” at present.
  • The CoI is a “step before” any such proceeding might be considered.
  • Any apprehension about eventual simultaneous proceedings must therefore wait until disciplinary proceedings are in fact initiated.

By branding the writ petition as premature, the Court also implicitly signals that:

  • the appellant retains the liberty to raise appropriate legal contentions – including about simultaneous proceedings or prejudice – if and when a formal disciplinary proceeding is initiated; but
  • pre‑emptive litigation to stall a purely fact‑finding exercise is not maintainable.

6.5 Suspension: Nature, Basis, and Review

In LPA No. 288/2025, the appellant’s sole or principal ground for revocation of suspension was that:

  • there was “unreasonable delay in completing the departmental proceedings”; and
  • this delay made his continued suspension unjustified.

The Division Bench rejects this line of attack as “totally misconceived and untenable in law”, reasoning that:

  1. No departmental proceedings exist: As clarified earlier, only a CoI has been ordered; no charge‑sheet or formal disciplinary inquiry is underway. The suspension is not pegged to such proceedings.
  2. Suspension is anchored to the criminal case:
    • The appellant “has been placed under suspension upon registration of FIR in a serious offence of rape” under Section 376 IPC.
    • He is currently facing trial before a criminal court on these charges.
    • It is this fact – the ongoing trial for a heinous offence within a disciplined force – that justifies continued suspension, not the status of departmental proceedings.
  3. Periodic review:
    • The Court notes that “the order of suspension is being periodically reviewed and an informed decision taken therein for its extension.”
    • This undermines any suggestion that the suspension is mechanical, indefinite, or unreviewed.

Thus, the alleged “delay in departmental proceedings” cannot be invoked where:

  • no such proceedings yet exist; and
  • the real foundation of the suspension is the pending criminal trial for a grave offence.

6.6 Limited Scope of Judicial Review over Suspension

While not extensively elaborated in doctrinal terms, the Division Bench’s refusal to interfere reflects the limited scope of judicial review over suspension orders:

  • Courts typically do not substitute their judgment for that of the competent authority on whether an employee should remain under suspension, especially in disciplined forces like the BSF.
  • Interference is warranted only when suspension is:
    • mala fide;
    • patently arbitrary or disproportionate; or
    • violative of statutory provisions or constitutional rights.
  • In this case, the seriousness of the charge (rape), the status of the alleged victim (a serving lady officer), and the ongoing criminal trial provide a strong rational nexus for continued suspension.

Given these factors, the Court finds that the Single Judge correctly declined to revoke the suspension, and the Division Bench sees “no merit” in the appeal.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Clarifying the Legal Status of Courts of Inquiry

Perhaps the most significant doctrinal contribution of this judgment is its clear statement that, under the BSF Rules:

  • A Court of Inquiry is a fact‑finding body.
  • It is not, by itself, a departmental or disciplinary proceeding.
  • Its findings are preliminary and advisory, not punitive or determinative of guilt.

This clarification has important consequences:

  • Personnel of BSF and other uniformed forces are less likely to succeed in pre‑emptive challenges seeking to quash or stay a CoI merely because a criminal case is pending.
  • Counsel will need to distinguish between:
    • challenges to preliminary fact‑finding (which are generally premature), and
    • challenges to formal disciplinary proceedings or penalties (where full judicial review is available).
  • Internal fact‑finding mechanisms – crucial to institutional discipline and governance – are afforded greater operational space even in parallel with criminal proceedings.

7.2 Reinforcing the Authority to Suspend Personnel Facing Serious Criminal Charges

The judgment reiterates that members of disciplined forces such as the BSF can be:

  • lawfully suspended during the pendency of a criminal trial for serious offences (notably, sexual offences like rape); and
  • such suspension is not automatically rendered illegal merely because departmental proceedings are yet to be initiated or are pending.

This has several practical implications:

  • Authorities can maintain disciplinary standards and public confidence by temporarily benching officers accused of egregious conduct.
  • The judgment also implicitly acknowledges the sensitivities surrounding sexual harassment/assault within the workplace, particularly in a uniformed force, justifying a cautious approach.

7.3 Guidance on “Premature” Challenges

A recurring theme in service litigation is the tendency of employees to challenge:

  • preliminary steps (like preliminary inquiries, show cause notices, or CoIs) before any adverse final action is taken.

This judgment signals that:

  • Courts may treat such challenges as premature and decline interference, especially where:
    • no final decision has yet been taken; and
    • the alleged prejudice is speculative.
  • Judicial review is generally more appropriately invoked after:
    • formal departmental proceedings are initiated; or
    • a punitive order is passed.

7.4 Balancing Fairness to the Accused and Institutional Interests

The judgment illustrates a careful balancing of:

  • the rights of the accused officer (to a fair criminal trial and protection against self‑incrimination); and
  • the institutional interests of the BSF (in ensuring discipline, investigating serious allegations, and maintaining public trust).

By emphasising that:

  • the officer cannot be compelled to make self‑incriminating statements in the CoI; and
  • he retains the option to remain silent;

the Court strives to protect individual rights while still permitting the institution to:

  • conduct internal fact‑finding, and
  • exercise its disciplinary powers in a calibrated manner.

8. Key Concepts Simplified

8.1 What is a “Court of Inquiry”?

In simple terms, a Court of Inquiry in the BSF is:

  • a committee of officers set up to find out the facts about a particular incident or allegation;
  • it can record statements, collect documents, and make a report; but
  • it cannot punish anyone or decide, by itself, that a person is “guilty” under service rules.

Its purpose is to help the authorities decide:

  • whether there is enough material to justify starting a formal disciplinary case; or
  • whether the matter can be closed or dealt with informally.

8.2 What are “Departmental Proceedings”?

A departmental proceeding is like an internal trial conducted by the employer. Here:

  • The employee is formally charged with misconduct.
  • Evidence is presented and examined.
  • The employee gets a chance to:
    • see the evidence against him;
    • ask questions of witnesses; and
    • present his own evidence.
  • The employer then decides whether the charges are proved and, if so, what penalty should be imposed (such as dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, etc.).

8.3 What is “Suspension”?

Suspension means that an employee is:

  • temporarily barred from performing duties and using the powers of his office;
  • usually placed on a subsistence allowance instead of full pay; and
  • kept away from active service while:
    • a criminal case or departmental inquiry is pending; or
    • serious allegations are being examined.

Suspension is not, by itself, a punishment; it is a preventive measure.

8.4 “Prejudice” to Criminal Defence

When an accused claims that a departmental or internal process will prejudice his criminal defence, he usually means:

  • that he might be compelled to reveal his defence strategy prematurely; or
  • that statements made in the departmental forum could be used against him in the criminal trial.

Courts examine such claims carefully, but generally insist on:

  • concrete, specific indications of prejudice; not mere speculation;
  • especially where the employee is free to remain silent and cannot be forced to incriminate himself.

9. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

The decision in Akhand Prakash Shahi v. Union of India & Anr. (BSF) establishes and clarifies important points of law for uniformed and paramilitary services:

  1. Court of Inquiry ≠ Departmental Proceeding A Court of Inquiry under the BSF Rules, 1969, is a preliminary fact‑finding device. It is not itself a disciplinary proceeding and does not, by its mere initiation, give rise to the full panoply of protections and objections typically associated with departmental inquiries.
  2. Simultaneous Criminal Trial and Fact‑Finding Permissible The existence of a criminal trial does not bar the BSF from conducting internal fact‑finding through a CoI. Challenges based solely on the principle that “departmental and criminal proceedings cannot proceed simultaneously” are premature where no departmental proceeding has begun.
  3. Protection Against Self‑Incrimination Applies Even during a CoI, the accused officer cannot be compelled to make self‑incriminating statements and may choose to remain silent. This mitigates the risk of prejudice to his defence in the criminal trial.
  4. Suspension Can Rest on Pending Criminal Trial Alone Particularly in the context of a disciplined force, suspension may validly be grounded on the pendency of a serious criminal trial (here, rape under Section 376 IPC), independent of any departmental inquiry. The absence or delay of departmental proceedings is not, in itself, a ground to revoke such suspension.
  5. Premature Writ Petitions Disfavoured Courts are increasingly reluctant to entertain pre‑emptive challenges to preliminary steps like Courts of Inquiry. Judicial review is more appropriately invoked once formal disciplinary proceedings are initiated or a penal order is passed.

Overall, the judgment fortifies the ability of the BSF – and by analogy, other armed and paramilitary forces – to:

  • conduct internal fact‑finding inquiries even while criminal proceedings are pending; and
  • maintain officers under suspension when they face grave criminal charges, without being constrained by the pace or existence of departmental proceedings.

At the same time, it reaffirms fundamental protections for the accused officer, particularly the right against self‑incrimination, and preserves his right to challenge any eventual disciplinary action at the appropriate stage. The decision thus occupies a balanced position at the intersection of individual rights and institutional discipline, and is likely to be influential in future service law disputes, especially within the uniformed services.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Jammu and Kashmir High Court

Judge(s)

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR

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