Conviction for Rape Cannot Rest on FIR and Forensic Evidence Alone When the Prosecutrix Turns Hostile: Commentary on Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 1443)

Conviction for Rape Cannot Rest on FIR and Forensic Evidence Alone When the Prosecutrix Turns Hostile: Commentary on Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 1443)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos. 890–891 of 2017, decided on 16 December 2025, addresses a recurring and sensitive problem in criminal trials for sexual offences: what happens when the prosecutrix (victim) and other star witnesses turn hostile, and the prosecution seeks to sustain a conviction largely on the First Information Report (FIR), the testimony of the Investigating Officer, and forensic (FSL) reports.

The judgment lays down and reinforces an important principle: a conviction for rape cannot be sustained solely on the FIR, the investigating officer’s account of it, and questionable forensic evidence, when the prosecutrix turns hostile and other material evidence is weak or unreliable. Equally significantly, the Court holds that:

  • Courts cannot presume, without evidentiary basis, that a hostile witness has been “won over”, and then use that presumption to uphold a conviction.
  • Where panch witnesses disown the seizure panchnamas and the chain of custody is doubtful, forensic results based on such seizures cannot form a safe foundation for conviction.

The case, involving a medical practitioner accused of raping his patient in his clinic, sits at the intersection of (1) the heightened societal concern about sexual offences, and (2) the indispensable requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trials.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. Parties and Allegations

  • Appellant–Accused: Dr. Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel, a medical practitioner running a dispensary/clinic at Himmatnagar, Gujarat.
  • Respondent: State of Gujarat.
  • Victim/Informant (PW-1): Female patient under treatment for stomach pain, regularly visiting the appellant’s clinic.

On 08.05.2001, the victim and her husband (PW-2) went to the appellant’s clinic. According to the prosecution version as recorded in the FIR:

  • The victim was taken first to a screening room, allegedly for medical examination.
  • She was then taken alone to an operation room by the appellant.
  • Under the pretext of examination, the appellant allegedly fondled her and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her, despite her resistance.
  • She allegedly suffered scratches and bruises on the neck due to resistance.
  • She then came out weeping and narrated the incident immediately to her husband.

2. Investigation and Trial

On the basis of the FIR lodged by the victim, police investigation followed:

  • Statements of the victim, her husband, and other witnesses allegedly present at the clinic were recorded.
  • Panchnamas were prepared, including seizure of clothes said to belong to the victim and the accused.
  • The clothes were sent for forensic examination (FSL) to detect semen and determine blood group.
  • A charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

During trial:

  • The prosecution examined nine witnesses, including:
    • PW-1 – the victim/informant,
    • PW-2 – her husband,
    • PW-3 & PW-4 – panch witnesses to recovery of clothes,
    • PW-6 – Dr. Rita Sinha (who examined the accused),
    • PW-7 – Dr. Vinod Kavjibhai Varsat (who examined the victim).
  • Documentary evidence, including panchnamas and FSL report, was produced.
  • The statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC was recorded.

3. Trial Court’s Decision

The Sessions Court:

  • Convicted the appellant under Section 376(2)(d) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (aggravated rape by a person on the management of or employed in a hospital).
  • Sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six years.

This sentence was below the prescribed minimum sentence for rape under Section 376 IPC for the aggravated category, which triggered a State appeal for enhancement.

4. High Court’s Decision

Two appeals were filed before the Gujarat High Court:

  • Criminal Appeal No. 151 of 2003 – by the appellant-accused against his conviction.
  • Criminal Appeal No. 501 of 2003 – by the State, seeking enhancement of sentence.

By its common judgment dated 28/29.11.2016, the High Court:

  • Dismissed the appeal of the accused and upheld his conviction.
  • Allowed the State’s appeal and enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for ten years.

Key to the High Court’s view was its reliance on:

  • The original FIR and the investigating officer’s testimony.
  • The FSL report showing semen stains of blood group ‘B’ on the victim’s petticoat and the accused’s clothing, with the accused’s blood group also being ‘B’.
  • The inference that the victim (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2), who turned hostile, had been “won over” after initially supporting the prosecution version.

5. Appeal to the Supreme Court

Aggrieved by the concurrent finding of guilt and enhancement of sentence, the appellant-accused approached the Supreme Court. The State defended the conviction, relying on the seriousness of allegations, initial history given to the doctor, and forensic evidence.

III. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, speaking through Vipul M. Pancholi, J., (with Sanjay Karol, J. concurring) focused on the following central issues:

  1. Whether a conviction for rape can be sustained when the prosecutrix (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) turn hostile, and do not support the prosecution case in court, despite having lodged an FIR with detailed allegations.
  2. Whether a court is entitled to presume that hostile witnesses have been “won over” by the accused and then, on that basis, convert what was originally a case based on direct evidence into one of circumstantial evidence, to sustain a conviction.
  3. What is the evidentiary value of the FIR and the testimony of the Investigating Officer recounting its contents, when the maker of the FIR does not affirm those allegations during trial?
  4. Whether the forensic evidence (semen stains of blood group ‘B’ on the victim’s petticoat and accused’s clothing), supported by the Investigating Officer’s deposition but contradicted or undermined by hostile panch witnesses and neutralized by medical evidence, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
  5. Whether non-examination of independent material witnesses present at the clinic, and adverse medical findings, vitiate the prosecution case.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted the appellant. It held that:

  • The victim (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2), being declared hostile and not supporting the prosecution case, could not be relied upon for sustaining conviction.
  • The High Court erred in presuming, without proof, that the victim and her husband were “won over” by the accused and then treating the case as one of circumstantial evidence.
  • The evidence of the panch witnesses (PW-3 and PW-4) fatally undermined the reliability of the seizure panchnamas of the clothes of both victim and accused, as they stated that their signatures were taken on papers already prepared by the police and that they were unaware of the contents.
  • In the absence of credible proof of seizure and chain of custody, the FSL report showing semen of blood group ‘B’ on the clothes of the victim and the accused could not be a safe basis for conviction.
  • Medical evidence (PW-6 and PW-7) did not support the prosecution case of recent forcible intercourse, as:
    • No injuries were found on the victim’s private parts.
    • The examining doctor specifically stated that no sign of recent physical intercourse was observed.
  • The non-examination of three independent witnesses present at the clinic at the time of the alleged incident further weakened the prosecution case.
  • Merely because the victim had made allegations in the FIR, and the Investigating Officer narrated those in court, does not mean the allegations stand proved; allegations in the FIR are not substantive evidence and must be proved in court by cogent testimony.
  • In light of these infirmities, the conviction recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed (with enhanced sentence) by the High Court was unsustainable.

Accordingly:

  • The judgment dated 03.02.2003 of the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 68 of 2001 was set aside.
  • The common judgment dated 28/29.11.2016 of the High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 151 of 2003 and 501 of 2003 was set aside.
  • The appellant-accused, already on bail, was acquitted; his bail bonds were ordered to stand discharged.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Statutory Framework

1. Doctrine on Hostile Witnesses

The Supreme Court relied on two of its earlier decisions to articulate the approach to hostile witnesses:

In Bhawani, the Court laid down:

“The fact that the witness was declared hostile by the Court at the request of the prosecuting counsel and he was allowed to cross-examine the witness, no doubt furnishes no justification for rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness. But the court has at least to be aware that prima facie, a witness who makes different statements at different times has no regard for truth. His evidence has to be read and considered as a whole with a view to find out whether any weight should be attached to the same. The court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness and, normally, it should look for corroboration to his evidence…..”

This formulation embodies three ideas:

  1. A hostile witness’s entire testimony is not to be mechanically rejected; parts of it may still be usable.
  2. However, the witness’s credibility is severely suspect; courts must approach such testimony with great caution.
  3. Ordinarily, corroboration is required before relying on the testimony of a hostile witness for conviction.

In Paramjeet Singh, the Court reiterated these principles, emphasizing that a hostile witness does not become “non-existent” but must be carefully evaluated and corroborated.

In the present case, the Supreme Court applied this doctrine to PW-1 (the victim) and PW-2 (her husband). They were declared hostile because they did not support the prosecution’s narrative of rape when examined in court. The Court concluded that:

  • Their deposition did not offer reliable support to the prosecution.
  • The Court should therefore look at other evidence on record to see if it independently established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Other Authorities Cited by the Defence

Counsel for the appellant referred to several decisions to advance general propositions, notably:

These authorities were cited, as indicated in the arguments, for propositions such as:

  • An FIR is not substantive evidence and a conviction cannot rest solely on the FIR or statements made during investigation.
  • Where the prosecutrix’s testimony is unreliable or inconsistent, courts must seek corroboration and cannot convict merely on suspicion.

While the present judgment does not analyse each of these decisions in detail, its reasoning is consistent with these long-standing evidentiary principles.

3. Statutory Provisions Involved

  • Section 376(2)(d), IPC (as it then stood):
    This provision prescribes enhanced punishment for rape when committed by a person being on the management of, or employed in, a hospital, upon a woman in that hospital. The appellant, a doctor in his clinic/dispensary, was prosecuted and convicted under this aggravated category.
  • Section 313, CrPC:
    Provides for the examination of the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in evidence against him. In this case, such examination was conducted, but the conviction did not turn on any inculpatory admission by the accused.

The Supreme Court’s decision does not hinge on the technical interpretation of Section 376(2)(d) (e.g., whether a private clinic is a “hospital”) but squarely on evidentiary sufficiency. The acquittal is grounded not in the definition of the offence, but in failure of proof.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Treatment of the Victim and Husband as Hostile Witnesses

The Court’s starting point was the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2.

  • PW-1 (Victim): In her examination-in-chief, she initially described visiting the clinic with her husband, being called inside around 9:00 a.m., going for screening, her husband waiting outside, and then being taken to the operation room. She stated that she was told to lie down, forceps were inserted in her private part, she jerked up, and the accused caught and threw her down from the stretcher. After this partial account, her testimony was adjourned due to recess and subsequently she sought adjournment on the ground of ill health. Later, she did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile.
  • PW-2 (Husband): He too did not support the prosecution in his deposition and was declared hostile.

Applying Bhawani and Paramjeet Singh, the Court noted:

  • When key witnesses make inconsistent statements, they show prima facie disregard for truth.
  • Their testimony must be looked at with great caution and, typically, corroboration is required.
  • In this case, after they turned hostile, their depositions did not contain reliable incriminating material against the accused.

This compelled the Court to scrutinize the other evidence (seizures, FSL, medical evidence, and non-examined witnesses) to see if the conviction could still be sustained. Importantly, the Court refused to use the initial FIR as a substitute for the prosecutrix’s in-court testimony.

2. Rejection of the High Court’s Presumption of “Winning Over”

The High Court had reasoned that:

  • The victim initially supported the prosecution version.
  • After adjournments, she turned hostile.
  • A compromise agreement was produced before the trial court.
  • From this, it was inferred that the victim and her husband were “won over” by the accused.

The Supreme Court found this approach erroneous:

  • There was no direct evidence on record to prove that the accused had influenced or “won over” the witnesses.
  • Court cannot, in criminal proceedings, rest findings of guilt on speculation or conjecture about why a witness turned hostile.
  • Even if one suspects that the witness changed stance due to some extraneous consideration, the legal requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt remains unchanged.

Thus, the Court held that:

“When the main witness of the prosecution, i.e. the victim herself, has not supported the case of the prosecution, it is not open for the Court to presume that she did not support the case of the prosecution because the appellant-accused has won over the said witness.”

This is a critical clarification: hostility of witnesses may explain the failure of prosecution, but it cannot justify lowering the standard of proof or allowing conviction on a speculative narrative about why the prosecution’s case collapsed.

3. FIR and Investigating Officer’s Testimony: Limited Evidentiary Value

The defence had argued, and the Court accepted, that:

  • The FIR is not substantive evidence of the facts it narrates.
  • It can be used to:
    • Corroborate or contradict the informant (under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act).
    • Explain the origin of investigation.
    but cannot, by itself, prove the occurrence of the offence.
  • The Investigating Officer cannot “indirectly prove what the witnesses have failed to prove.” That is, the IO’s testimony about what the victim told him, when the victim herself does not affirm those facts in court, is not a lawful substitute for direct testimony.

The Court explicitly stated:

“Merely because the victim has levelled allegations against the appellant-accused in the FIR and the investigating officer has deposed before the Court with regard to the contents of the said FIR, it cannot be presumed that the allegations levelled in the FIR are true and correct unless the same is proved during the course of trial by leading cogent evidence.”

This reinforces an orthodox, but occasionally blurred, distinction in criminal trials between:

  • Statements made during investigation (FIR, Section 161 CrPC statements) which are prior statements and not substantive proof of guilt.
  • In-court testimony under oath, subject to cross-examination, which alone can be treated as substantive evidence of the facts asserted.

4. Forensic Evidence and Seizure Panchnamas

The High Court had placed substantial reliance on:

  • The FSL report showing multiple semen stains on the victim’s petticoat and on the accused’s pants and undergarments.
  • The fact that the semen stains were of blood group ‘B’, and the accused’s blood group was also ‘B’.

However, the Supreme Court painstakingly examined the testimonies of the panch witnesses:

  • PW-3: Panch to recovery of the accused’s clothes.
    • Stated that his signature was taken on a written paper at the instance of the police.
    • Denied that it was written that the accused was present and that clothes were produced before them.
    • Effectively, he disowned the panchnama process.
  • PW-4: Another panch witness.
    • Stated that the police took his signature on an already prepared panchnama.
    • He did not know what was written in it.

From this, the Court concluded:

  • The signatures of panch witnesses were obtained mechanically, without their genuine participation in the seizure.
  • Their testimony made it unsafe to accept that the clothes were seized in the manner and at the time suggested by the prosecution.
  • Consequently, the foundational fact required to rely on the FSL report – a credible and lawful seizure and chain of custody – was not established.

The Court therefore held that the High Court erred in heavily relying on:

  • The presence of semen stains on the clothes.
  • The matching blood group ‘B’ of the stains and the accused.

Without trustworthy proof that the stained clothes were indeed those worn by the victim and accused at the relevant time, and without an unimpeached chain of custody, the FSL findings could not safely point to guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Medical Evidence and Its Inconsistency with the Alleged Rape

Two medical witnesses were central:

  • PW-6 – Dr. Rita Sinha (doctor who examined the accused):
    • Recorded that the accused was told to provide semen sample but was unable to do so despite trying; the semen sample could not be obtained.
    • Stated that a certain opinion about physical intercourse (i.e., whether he had recent sexual intercourse) could not be given.
  • PW-7 – Dr. Vinod Kavjibhai Varsat (doctor who examined the victim):
    • Noted abrasions on the left side of her neck (1 cm x 3 cm and 1 cm x 1.3 cm) allegedly caused by nails.
    • Found:
      • No injuries on the victim’s breasts or hands.
      • No injuries on her private parts (external or internal).
      • No semen, blood, or pubic hair on her genital area.
    • Expressly stated that on examination no sign of recent physical intercourse appeared.

The doctor did accept that the neck abrasions could be consistent with some resistance, but crucially:

  • There was no medical corroboration of recent forcible sexual intercourse.
  • The absence of genital injuries, absence of semen or blood in the genital region, and the explicit conclusion of “no sign of recent intercourse” seriously undermined the prosecution version.

It is important in sexual offence jurisprudence to note that absence of injuries does not automatically negate rape. Many decisions recognize that a woman may submit out of fear and still be a victim of rape, or injuries may not occur or be detectable. However, here:

  • Combined with the victim turning hostile,
  • Lack of any reliable ocular testimony,
  • Questionable seizure and forensic evidence, and
  • Active medical opinion of no sign of recent intercourse,

the medical evidence became a powerful factor contributing to reasonable doubt.

6. Non-Examination of Independent Material Witnesses

The Court also noted that:

  • Three independent witnesses, present at the appellant’s clinic at the time of the alleged incident, were cited in the charge-sheet.
  • However, they were not examined during trial.

This omission:

  • Deprived the prosecution of potentially corroborative, neutral testimony.
  • Allowed an adverse inference: had they been examined, their evidence may not have supported the prosecution version.

While the judgment does not explicitly refer to Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act (adverse inference for withholding evidence), its reasoning is consistent with that principle.

7. Cumulative Assessment: Standard of Proof Not Met

Taking all these strands together:

  • The prosecutrix and her husband did not support the rape allegation in court.
  • The High Court’s inference that they were “won over” was speculative.
  • The seizure panchnamas were unreliable due to hostile panch witnesses.
  • The FSL report stood on a shaky foundation and could not by itself prove guilt.
  • Medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s story of recent forced intercourse.
  • Independent witnesses, though available, were not examined.

The Supreme Court concluded that:

“Looking at the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed an error by recording the order of conviction of the appellant-accused and therefore, the said orders are required to be quashed and set aside.”

In essence, the prosecution failed to prove the charge of rape beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused was entitled to acquittal.

C. Impact and Significance

1. On Rape Jurisprudence and Hostile Prosecutrix

A recurring challenge in sexual offence cases is that victims may turn hostile due to:

  • Social stigma,
  • Pressure or threats,
  • Informal compromises,
  • Fatigue with lengthy criminal processes.

This decision underscores that:

  • Even in rape cases, where the law is sensitive to the plight of victims, courts cannot lower the evidentiary threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
  • When the prosecutrix completely resiles from her earlier version, and there is no strong, independent incriminating evidence, conviction cannot be maintained merely to send a message or based on suspicion.
  • Courts must resist the temptation to fill evidentiary gaps with assumptions, such as presuming that the witness was “won over” and treating that presumption as proof of guilt.

The ruling balances:

  • The need to treat rape allegations with seriousness and sensitivity, and
  • The fundamental right of the accused to be convicted only on legally admissible, convincing evidence.

2. On Use of FIR and Statements During Investigation

This judgment reinforces the classical position:

  • An FIR starts the investigation but does not end the inquiry.
  • The prosecutrix’s allegations in the FIR, however vivid, cannot themselves convict the accused unless affirmed and proved in court.
  • The Investigating Officer cannot be a conduit to convert unproved prior statements into substantive proof.

Practically, this signals to prosecution agencies:

  • They must secure the victim’s testimony under oath and ensure adequate support and protection to enable her to depose freely.
  • Reliance on documentary statements alone (FIR, Section 161 CrPC statements) is risky if the witnesses later turn hostile.

3. On Forensic Evidence and Chain of Custody

The decision sends a clear message about forensic evidence:

  • Forensic reports are only as good as the integrity of the seizure and chain of custody.
  • When panch witnesses deny proper seizure procedures or say that they merely signed blank or pre-written papers, the foundation for using forensic results is gravely compromised.
  • Courts will not accept forensic findings at face value if seizure procedures are not credibly proved.

Especially in sexual offence cases, where forensic findings (semen, blood, DNA) can be powerful, this judgment reminds prosecutors that:

  • The basic requirements of lawful seizure, sealing, and proper documentation must be scrupulously observed and proved.

4. On Non-Examination of Material Witnesses

By highlighting the failure to examine three independent witnesses present at the scene, the Court emphasizes:

  • Prosecution must present the best available evidence; withholding material witnesses without explanation can weaken the case.
  • Courts may infer that the testimony of such witnesses would not have supported the prosecution’s theory.

5. On Appellate Scrutiny of Concurrent Convictions

The Supreme Court did not hesitate to:

  • Reverse a concurrent conviction by the Trial Court and High Court.
  • Set aside not only the finding of guilt but also an enhanced sentence for a serious offence (aggravated rape).

This underlines that:

  • While deference is generally shown to concurrent factual findings, such deference has clear limits when fundamental evidentiary principles are misapplied.
  • Supreme Court remains ultimate guardian of the standard of criminal proof and will intervene when that standard is diluted, even in high-sensitivity offences.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Hostile Witness

A hostile witness is a witness who:

  • Gives evidence in court that is contrary to what was earlier stated to the police or expected by the party who called them; and
  • Appears unwilling to tell the truth or to support the case of that party.

Once declared hostile (with the court’s permission), the party who called the witness (often the prosecution) can cross-examine them like an adverse witness. Being hostile does not automatically erase their testimony, but it greatly diminishes its reliability, and courts usually look for corroboration.

2. FIR (First Information Report)

An FIR is:

  • The report given to the police by the victim or any informant, setting the criminal law in motion.
  • Used to:
    • Record the earliest version of events.
    • Guide the initial investigation.

Crucially:

  • It is not evidence by itself to prove that the crime occurred.
  • The person who made the FIR needs to testify in court; only then can the FIR support or contradict that testimony.

3. Panchnama and Panch Witness

A panchnama is a written record prepared by the police describing:

  • Searches, seizures, recovery of articles, site inspections, etc.

It is attested by two or more independent witnesses called panch witnesses, who certify that they saw what is described in the panchnama. If these panch witnesses later say they did not truly witness the seizure and merely signed papers prepared by the police, the panchnama’s credibility collapses.

4. Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Reports

An FSL report provides scientific analysis of samples (e.g., blood, semen, DNA, hair, fibers). In criminal cases, such reports can be powerful, but only if:

  • The sample’s origin (what was seized, from whom, when, where) is reliably established.
  • The chain of custody from seizure to lab is intact and credible.

If the seizure itself is doubtful, the lab result, however scientific, loses probative force.

5. Section 376(2)(d) IPC – Aggravated Rape by Hospital Staff

At the time relevant to this case, Section 376(2)(d) IPC provided enhanced punishment for rape committed by:

  • A person being on the management of, or employed in, a hospital,
  • When he commits rape on a woman in that hospital.

The idea is that certain persons (e.g., doctors, hospital staff) occupy positions of special trust and power; abusing that position through sexual violence is treated as a more serious offence. In the present case, though the charge was under this aggravated provision, the Supreme Court did not reach the stage of discussing its contours because it found that the basic fact of rape itself was not proved.

6. “Won Over” Witnesses

The phrase “won over” is colloquial, meaning:

  • The witness has allegedly been influenced, bribed, threatened, or otherwise persuaded to change their story.

In criminal law:

  • Courts may suspect such influence when witnesses radically change their version.
  • However, **suspicion is not proof**. Courts cannot treat such an assumption as a substitute for evidence.
  • Even if a witness has been “won over”, the prosecution still must prove guilt with legally admissible, reliable evidence.

VII. Conclusion

Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat reinforces key evidentiary principles in criminal trials for sexual offences:

  • Hostile prosecutrix and key witnesses: When the victim and her immediate corroborating witness (her husband) turn hostile, their testimony must be treated with circumspection, and conviction cannot rest on their earlier unproved statements.
  • No conviction on FIR and IO’s testimony alone: Allegations in the FIR and the investigating officer’s narration of those allegations are not a substitute for in-court testimony. They cannot, by themselves, justify conviction.
  • Speculation about “winning over” is impermissible: Courts cannot supply missing links in the prosecution case by presuming that witnesses turned hostile because they were influenced by the accused, and then use that presumption to uphold conviction.
  • Forensic evidence needs a solid foundation: FSL reports on semen or blood are powerful only if supported by credible seizure panchnamas and an unbroken chain of custody. When panch witnesses disown the seizure process, forensic findings cannot safely be relied on.
  • Medical evidence matters, especially when other evidence collapses: In the absence of credible ocular testimony, medical findings inconsistent with recent forcible intercourse contribute to reasonable doubt.
  • Non-examination of material independent witnesses weakens the prosecution: Where neutral witnesses are available but not examined, the case is correspondingly undermined.

The judgment thus sets a clear precedent: even in cases of grave accusations like rape, courts must guard against allowing zeal to convict to override the bedrock requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. While acknowledging the difficulties faced by victims of sexual offences, the Court maintains that criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture, incomplete evidence, or uncorroborated investigative documents. The rule of law demands that every conviction be anchored in reliable, legally admissible evidence, and this decision is an emphatic reaffirmation of that demand.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Vipul Manubhai Pancholi

Advocates

NIKHIL GOELSWATI GHILDIYAL

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