Constitutional Validation of Rule 9B: Exclusive Senior Advocate Designation for Retired Delhi HJS Judges

1. Introduction

This case arises from Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2045/2025 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed by Shri Vijai Pratap Singh (“petitioner”) against the High Court of Delhi through its Registrar‑General and another (“respondents”). The petitioner is a retired judicial officer of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (UP‑HJS), who thereafter served as Judicial Member of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and Technical Member of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). He challenged Rule 9B of the High Court of Delhi Designation of Senior Advocate Rules, 2024 (“the Rules”), contending that it arbitrarily confines the privilege of seeking Senior Advocate designation to retired officers of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS) only, thereby discriminating against equally experienced officers from other states. The petitioner claimed violations of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

On 27 March 2025, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela) dismissed the petition. The Court held that:

Rule 9B draws a rational classification: it applies only to DHJS retirees because their service records (ACRs/APARs) and performance appraisals are available to this Court for evaluation.
The distinction has a clear nexus to the objective of a robust, fair selection process for Senior Advocates and does not breach Article 14.
Designation as Senior Advocate is a privilege, not a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g), and its denial does not impede the right to practice.
Administrative control over service records flows from Article 235, reinforcing why only DHJS officers fall within Rule 9B’s ambit.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India, (2017) 9 SCC 766: Traced the historical evolution of “Senior Advocate” status and held that designation under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is a recognition of ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge—an evaluative, not an unfettered, power.
Dr. TANVI BEHL v. SHREY GOEL & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 180: Affirmed that the right to practice cannot be arbitrarily curtailed, reinforcing Article 19(1)(g) protections. The Court here distinguished between fundamental right to practice and privilege of designation.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: Emphasized that state action must satisfy reasoned procedure and fair play; the Delhi Bench applied this to uphold Rule 9B’s reasoned classification.
State Of Uttarakhand v. Sudhir Budakoti & Ors., (2022) 13 SCC 256: Reiterated the test for “intelligible differentia” and “nexus” under Article 14, principles central to upholding Rule 9B.
Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 226: Further elucidated reasonable classification doctrine; cited to confirm Rule 9B’s constitutional soundness.
All India Judges’ Assn. (II) v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288: Prognosticated an All‑India Judicial Service; the Bench noted that such a service has not materialized, distinguishing the present context.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds on several pillars:

Administrative Control (Article 235): The High Court has administrative oversight of courts within its territorial jurisdiction; service records of DHJS officers are centrally maintained, enabling informed evaluation. Officers from other states lack such locally available records.
Intelligible Differentia & Rational Nexus: Rule 9B differentiates DHJS retirees from others based on availability of appraisal data and opportunity for direct assessment by sitting Delhi High Court judges. This bears a reasonable nexus to the objective of selecting competent Senior Advocates.
Privilege vs. Right: The Court reaffirmed that Senior Advocate designation is a mark of professional distinction, not a constitutional right. Denial does not bar one from practicing law.
Practical Feasibility: Without ACRs/APARs or personal appraisal data, it would be impossible for the Bench to assess retired officers from other states, undermining the effectiveness and integrity of the designation process.

3.3. Impact

This decision has the following implications:

It upholds the autonomy of High Courts to frame qualification rules for Senior Advocates under the Advocates Act, 1961.
It provides a template for other High Courts contemplating similar designation rules, reinforcing reliance on administrative records and direct judicial appraisal.
It clarifies that professional designations, though desirable, are subject to procedural safeguards and reasonable classifications.
The judgment shields Rule 9B from future challenges, signaling deference to institutional review mechanisms for legal professional recognition.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 14 – Equality Before Law: Permits reasonable classification if based on intelligible differentia and relevant nexus to objective.
Article 19(1)(g) – Right to Practice: Protects profession choice; does not guarantee elevation to Senior Advocate.
Article 235 – Administrative Control: Empowers High Courts to manage subordinate courts and maintain service records of their officers.
Senior Advocate Designation: A statutory privilege under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, awarded after holistic evaluation of ability, standing, and expertise.
ACRs/APARs: Annual Confidential Reports or Annual Performance Appraisal Reports—official records of judicial officer performance.

5. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in SH Vijai Pratap Singh v. Delhi High Court firmly establishes that Rule 9B’s exclusive application to retired DHJS officers is constitutionally valid. By emphasizing administrative practicality, the availability of appraisal data and the evaluative nature of Senior Advocate designation, the Court has reinforced the principle that professional distinctions must rest on transparent, rational foundations. This judgment will guide High Courts in balancing institutional autonomy with constitutional equality and procedural fairness in recognizing legal excellence.