Constitutional Supremacy and the Limits of Legislative Override:
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330

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I. Introduction

The decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330, is the latest and perhaps the clearest pronouncement in a long line of Supreme Court judgments on the constitutional status of tribunals in India and the limits of legislative power to react to, or reverse, judicial decisions.

At its core, this case addresses whether Parliament can, through the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 (the “Impugned Act”), effectively re-enact provisions that have already been struck down or read down by the Supreme Court in earlier judgments—particularly in the Madras Bar Association series and in Rojer Mathew—without curing the constitutional defects identified by the Court.

The petitioners, led again by the Madras Bar Association, challenged key provisions of the Impugned Act governing:

• Qualifications and minimum age for appointment as tribunal Chairpersons and Members;
• Tenure and age of superannuation;
• The composition and functioning of the Search-cum-Selection Committees (SCSCs);
• Salaries, allowances and house rent entitlements of tribunal members; and
• The effect of the new Act on existing tribunal members and pending selections.

The Union of India, represented by the Attorney General, defended the Act on grounds of legislative supremacy within the legislative field, arguing that:

• Courts cannot compel Parliament to legislate in a particular form;
• Judicial directions regarding age, tenure, and conditions of service are, at best, guidelines or policy recommendations;
• Parliament is free to depart from those directions so long as it acts within its legislative competence and does not violate an explicit constitutional prohibition; and
• Abstract principles like separation of powers and judicial independence cannot be used to invalidate a statute absent a direct textual violation of a constitutional provision.

The Bench, comprising CJI B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, unequivocally rejected these propositions. Drawing deeply on the basic structure doctrine, long-standing tribunal jurisprudence and recent decisions in NHPC and Dr. Jaya Thakur, the Court reaffirmed:

• The supremacy of the Constitution over all organs, including Parliament;
• The binding and normative force of the Supreme Court’s constitutional directions under Article 141;
• The limits of “legislative abrogation”—i.e., when and how Parliament may validly respond to a judicial verdict by amending the law; and
• The non-negotiable requirements of judicial independence and separation of powers in the design and functioning of tribunals.

Most significantly, the Court:

1. Held that the key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 are unconstitutional because they are, in substance, a verbatim repetition of provisions earlier struck down in Madras Bar Association (V) and related cases;
2. Declared that, until a constitutionally compliant statute is enacted, the directions and principles in MBA (IV) and MBA (V) shall govern appointments, qualifications, tenure and service conditions of tribunal members and Chairpersons;
3. Directed the Union of India to constitute a National Tribunals Commission within four months; and
4. Protected the tenure and service conditions of certain classes of existing tribunal members, especially those whose appointments were delayed or affected by the intervening legislative changes.

Justice Chandran, concurring, aptly summed up the legislative strategy as: “The Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 is a replica of the struck down Ordinance; old wine in a new bottle, the wine whets not the judicial palette, but the bottle merely dazzle.”

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II. Summary of the Judgment

A. Issues

The principal questions before the Court were:

1. Whether Parliament can validly enact provisions in the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 that are materially identical to provisions of the Finance Act, 2017 (as amended by the Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2021) which had already been struck down in Madras Bar Association (V);
2. Whether the Impugned Act violates the basic structure of the Constitution—especially judicial independence, separation of powers and the rule of law—as well as Articles 14, 21, 50 and the scheme of Articles 323-A and 323-B;
3. Whether Parliament and the Executive can treat the Supreme Court’s directions regarding tribunal tenure, age limits, composition of selection committees and HRA as mere suggestions that can be legislatively overridden; and
4. What transitional protections and interim arrangements should apply to existing and newly appointed tribunal members, pending the enactment of a constitutionally sound framework.

B. Holdings

The Court held, inter alia:

• Constitutional Supremacy over Parliamentary Will:
  • India follows a model of constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary sovereignty (paras 110–115).
  • Parliament cannot simply ignore or contradict binding Supreme Court judgments; it may only cure defects identified by the Court through valid “abrogation” legislation (paras 118–120).
• Impermissible Legislative Override:
  • The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 largely repackages provisions already struck down in MBA (V) (paras 135–141).
  • Mere re-enactment of such provisions in a new statute, without removing the underlying constitutional defects, is a colourable and unconstitutional override of judicial pronouncements.
• Key Provisions Declared Unconstitutional (as being identical in substance to those already invalidated):
  • The minimum age bar of 50 years for appointment of tribunal members and Chairpersons (Section 3(1) proviso);
  • The four-year tenure with age caps of 70/67 years (Section 5);
  • The requirement that the SCSC forward a panel of two names for each vacancy, with the Government to decide “preferably within three months” (Section 3(7));
  • The scheme on allowances and benefits in Section 7(1), to the extent it seeks to restore equivalence with civil servants contrary to the Court’s specific HRA directions (though later Rules partly aligned this aspect).
• Continuing Applicability of MBA (IV) and MBA (V):
  • Until a fresh, constitutionally compliant tribunal law is enacted, the principles and directions in Madras Bar Association (IV) and Madras Bar Association (V) shall continue to govern the entire field of:
    • Qualifications and eligibility (including advocates with at least 10 years’ practice);
    • Selection procedures and composition of SCSCs (with judicial primacy and no vote for the parent ministry);
    • Tenure (five years with eligibility for reappointment, with age caps of 70 and 67);
    • HRA and housing entitlements; and
    • Disciplinary mechanisms and timelines for appointments.
• National Tribunals Commission Mandated:
  • The Union is directed to constitute a National Tribunals Commission within four months (para 153).
  • This body must be independent of executive control and designed along the lines indicated in earlier decisions, to oversee appointments, service conditions and administration of all tribunals (paras 78–79, 152–153).
• Protection of Existing and Delayed Appointments:
  • Service conditions of ITAT Members appointed by orders dated 11 September 2021 and 1 October 2021 shall be governed by the old Acts and Rules (para 154).
  • All appointments where the SCSC had completed its recommendations before the commencement of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021—but formal appointment notifications were issued thereafter—shall be governed by the parent statutes and by MBA (IV)/(V), not by the truncated tenure under the new Act (para 155).
• No Reference to Larger Bench:
  • The Attorney General’s request to refer the matter to a larger Bench was rejected, as no new substantial constitutional question arose and extensive precedent already exists (paras 105–109).

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III. Doctrinal Foundations: Constitutional Supremacy, Judicial Review and Legislative Abrogation

A. Constitutional Supremacy vs Parliamentary Sovereignty

The judgment begins by strongly reaffirming that India is a constitutional, not a parliamentary, democracy (paras 110–115). Drawing on:

• Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (Keshav Singh’s case),
• Kesavananda Bharati, and
• State of Rajasthan v. Union of India,

the Court reiterates that:

• The Constitution is “suprema lex”, the paramount law of the land.
• All organs—Parliament, Executive, Judiciary—derive their powers from, and are limited by, the Constitution.
• Unlike the Westminster model, Parliament in India does not enjoy absolute sovereignty; its power to amend or enact laws is itself subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review.

This doctrinal baseline is crucial because the Union’s defence effectively rested on an implied notion of parliamentary supremacy: that Parliament can freely deviate from judicially evolved standards of tribunal independence so long as no express text is violated.

B. Role of the Judiciary: Article 141 and Article 142

The Court clarifies the distinction between:

• Article 141: “law declared” by the Supreme Court, which is binding on all courts and authorities; and
• Article 142: power to do “complete justice” in any cause or matter, through directions tailored to the facts of the case.

In MBA (V), and reiterated here (para 87), the Court makes two critical points:

1. When the Court issues reasoned directions to remove constitutional infirmities in the design of tribunals (e.g., minimum tenure, composition of selection committees, HRA), those directions are part of the law declared under Article 141, not mere case-specific uses of Article 142.
2. Such directions are therefore normative and binding on Parliament and the Executive; they cannot be treated as optional policy suggestions.

C. Valid “Abrogation” vs Impermissible Legislative Override

The judgment relies extensively on NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India (para 118–120), which lay down a nuanced test for when and how a legislature may “neutralise” a judicial verdict:

• Permissible: The legislature can retrospectively amend a law to remove the basis of the judgment by curing the defect identified by the court. This is known as legislative abrogation or curative legislation.
• Impermissible: The legislature cannot:
  • Simply re-enact the same provision that was struck down;
  • Use a non obstante clause (“notwithstanding any judgment or law…”) to directly nullify a judicial decision; or
  • Undo a writ of mandamus or final judgment between parties without curing the underlying legal defect.

The Court warns that:

“Simply setting at naught a decision of a court without removing the defect pointed out in the said decision, would sound the death knell for the rule of law.” (NHPC, para 13)

This framework is applied directly to the Impugned Act: by repeating the very features (minimum age, tenure, selection process, allowances) already held unconstitutional in MBA (V), Parliament has not abrogated the judgment but attempted to override it, which is constitutionally impermissible.

D. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence as Enforceable Norms

A key argumentative plank of the Union was that concepts like judicial independence and separation of powers are “abstract” and cannot, in themselves, form the basis for invalidating a statute. The Court, drawing heavily on Justice Ravindra Bhat’s concurrence in MBA (V) (paras 79–90), rejects this:

• Judicial independence and separation of powers are “part of the basic structure” of the Constitution, not airy ideals.
• They are immanent in specific provisions—Articles 32, 136, 141, 226, 227, 50 and the scheme of Articles 323-A & 323-B.
• When Parliament creates alternative adjudicatory forums (tribunals), these structural guarantees directly govern:
  • Who may be appointed;
  • Who appoints them and how;
  • Their security of tenure and conditions of service; and
  • The extent of executive control over them.

Therefore, the constitutionality of tribunal legislation can, and must, be tested against these structural principles—alongside traditional grounds like violation of explicit rights (e.g., Article 14).

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IV. The Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021: Why It Fails Constitutional Scrutiny

A. “Old Wine in a New Bottle” – Verbatim Repetition of Struck-Down Provisions

The heart of the Court’s analysis (Section VII of the judgment) is a detailed comparison between:

• The provisions of the Tribunal Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021, which had amended Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017; and
• The provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, particularly Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7.

A juxtaposition table (para 135) reveals near word-for-word replication. In substance, the Act:

• Retains the minimum age bar of 50 years for all tribunal appointments (Section 3(1) proviso);
• Prescribes a fixed four-year term for Chairpersons and Members, with age caps of 70 and 67 (Section 5);
• Requires the SCSC to recommend a panel of two names per vacancy and allows the Government to act “preferably within three months” (Section 3(7));
• Structures salaries and allowances by tying them to equivalent civil service scales, with an enabling proviso on HRA (Section 7).

All these features had already been judicially examined and struck down or modified in MBA (IV) and MBA (V).

B. Specific Constitutional Defects Reproduced

1. Minimum Age of 50 Years for Appointment

In MBA (V), the Court (particularly Justice Bhat) held that a blanket minimum age of 50:

• Has no rational nexus with the object of securing the most meritorious and competent tribunal members;
• Arbitrarily excludes younger advocates and professionals with deep subject-matter expertise (e.g., in tax, telecom, competition, environmental law);
• Produces absurd results—less experienced older candidates may qualify while more experienced younger ones are excluded; and
• Violates Article 14 and undermines tribunal quality and independence (paras 92–103 of MBA (V), summarised at paras 96–101 here).

The same age bar reappears in Section 3(1) of the Impugned Act. Because Parliament has:

1. Not offered any new rationale or empirical basis; and
2. Not removed the discriminatory effects identified earlier,

this is a straightforward repetition of an unconstitutional provision, and therefore invalid again.

2. Short Four-Year Tenure

Long before this case, in MBA (I), Rojer Mathew and MBA (IV), the Court held that:

• Very short tenures (3 or 4 years) are “anti-merit”: they deter competent candidates from joining tribunals, especially mid-career professionals and younger judges/advocates;
• Short stints undermine institutional independence, as members may be more vulnerable to executive pressure or reappointment considerations; and
• A minimum term of five years, with eligibility for reappointment, is necessary to maintain judicial standards and attract talent (MBA (IV), para 40; MBA (V), para 62).

Despite this, Section 5 of the Impugned Act restores a four-year term (with some transitional protection for those appointed between May 2017 and the “notified date”). This is yet another direct contradiction of settled tribunal jurisprudence and hence invalid.

3. Panel of Two Names & “Preferably within Three Months”

In MBA (IV), the Court held that the SCSC must normally recommend one candidate per vacancy, with only one name on a waiting list as a contingency (paras 65–67). This was to prevent:

• Excessive discretion in the Executive to “choose” between multiple candidates, potentially for extraneous reasons;
• Undue delay in appointments; and
• Executive encroachment into what is essentially a quasi-judicial appointment process where judicial primacy is required.

The Ordinance had sought to undo this by requiring a panel of two names per vacancy and giving the Government broad latitude to act “preferably within three months”. MBA (V) struck this down as an attempt to legislatively overturn the Court’s binding directions.

Section 3(7) of the Impugned Act reproduces the same design. The Court therefore holds it to be:

• An impermissible encroachment into the judicial sphere; and
• Unconstitutional for violating the rule of law and judicial independence (paras 87–89).

4. Salaries, Allowances and HRA

The remuneration framework in Section 7(1) largely mirrors the earlier Section 184(1) second and third provisos of the Finance Act (as amended by the 2021 Ordinance). In MBA (V), the Court had expressed particular concern about:

• Equating tribunal members’ allowances with those of equivalent civil service posts, which tends to undermine the special status and independence of adjudicators; and
• The attempt to roll back the Court’s earlier direction in MBA (IV) that tribunal members be paid a significantly higher HRA (₹1,50,000/₹1,25,000) where government housing is not provided.

While an intervening amendment to the 2020 Rules (the Tribunal (Amendment) Rules, 2021) had brought HRA back in line with the Court’s directives, the underlying statutory provision in the Impugned Act still embodies the same problematic philosophy—viz., treating tribunal members as if they were ordinary civil servants. To that extent, Section 7 is part of the same unconstitutional pattern of replicating provisions judicially invalidated.

C. Effect: Impugned Provisions Struck Down

On this analysis, the Court concludes that the Impugned Act:

• Does not cure the constitutional defects identified in prior judgments; it simply re-enacts them in a stand-alone statute.
• Constitutes a colourable legislative exercise, aimed at nullifying binding Supreme Court directions without engaging with their reasoning.
• Violates:
  • Article 14 (e.g., through arbitrary age and tenure differentials);
  • The basic structure, by undermining judicial independence and separation of powers; and
  • The rule of law, by attempting to sidestep the normative authority of Supreme Court decisions.

Accordingly, the impugned provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 are struck down, and the pre-existing judicial framework in MBA (IV) and MBA (V) is restored as the governing norm.

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V. The Tribunal Jurisprudence: Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The judgment provides a rich, almost textbook-like, survey of tribunal jurisprudence in India (Section IV, paras 17–104). The key decisions and their contributions are:

1. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987)

• Upheld the creation of Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A, but stressed that tribunals must be a “real substitute” for High Courts “in content and de facto”, not merely in form.
• Insisted that:
  • Tribunal Chairpersons be of Chief Justice / senior High Court judge status;
  • Selection of Vice-Chairpersons and Members be done by a high-powered committee headed by a Supreme Court judge nominated by the CJI;
  • Short tenures (five years then) are problematic as they deter talent and undermine continuity.
• Upheld exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in service matters then (subject to retained Supreme Court review), later reversed in L. Chandra Kumar.

2. R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993)

• Clarified that tribunals are creatures of statute, not constitutional courts, and cannot claim full equivalence with High Courts.
• Yet emphasised the need for members to have a judicial approach and substantive expertise in constitutional and administrative law.

3. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)

• A seven-judge bench decision of foundational importance.
• Held that:
  • Exclusion of High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 and Supreme Court jurisdiction under Article 32 is unconstitutional—tribunals can supplement but not substitute the constitutional courts.
  • All tribunal decisions remain subject to writ jurisdiction of the High Courts.
  • Suggested creation of an independent nodal body to oversee tribunals and ensure their independence—an idea now concretised as the National Tribunals Commission.

4. Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association – MBA (I) (2010)

• Concerned with the constitutional validity and design of NCLT/NCLAT under the Companies Act.
• Laid down several structural principles:
  • Tribunals must “possess the independence, security and capacity associated with courts”.
  • Members of civil services from sponsoring departments, retaining lien in parent cadres, undermine independence; tribunals must not be extensions of the Executive.
  • Technical Members are justified only where specialised expertise is truly necessary; otherwise, only judicial members should preside.
  • Laid down detailed, binding directions on qualifications, selection process (with judicial dominance) and tenure (minimum prolonged term).

5. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India – MBA (II) (2014)

• Struck down the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 in its entirety.
• Held that:
  • NTT effectively replaced High Courts on substantial questions of law across multiple domains; hence, NTT members must enjoy the same independence and appointment safeguards as High Court judges.
  • Inclusion of Executive Secretaries on the selection committee, when those very departments are litigants before NTT, is unconstitutional.
  • Five-year tenure with reappointment compromises independence.

6. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India – MBA (III) (2015)

• Examined provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 re-establishing NCLT/NCLAT.
• Held that Parliament had impermissibly replicated provisions earlier struck down in MBA (I), especially regarding:
  • Qualification standards (e.g., appointment of Joint Secretaries as Technical Members);
  • Composition of selection committees with executive majority.
• Reaffirmed that earlier directions in MBA (I) were binding and must govern the restructured tribunals.

7. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2020)

• Constitution Bench decision on constitutionality of Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 and the 2017 Tribunal Rules.
• Upheld Section 184 (delegated power to make rules), but struck down the 2017 Rules for:
  • Excessive executive control over appointments and conditions of service;
  • Lack of judicial dominance in SCSCs; and
  • Failure to preserve tribunal independence.
• Justice Chandrachud, in concurrence, emphasised:
  • The need for a National Tribunals Commission;
  • That leaving key aspects of tribunal design to the Executive, without legislative guidance, is destructive of judicial independence.

8. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India – MBA (IV) (2020)

• Struck down or modified key features of the 2020 Tribunal Rules:
  • Insisted on judicial majority on SCSCs, with CJI (or nominee) as Chairperson and casting vote;
  • Directed that SCSCs recommend one candidate per post (plus a waiting list candidate);
  • Mandated minimum five-year tenure with revised age limits (70/67);
  • Directed substantial enhancement of HRA where housing not provided; and
  • Made advocates with 10 years’ practice eligible as judicial members across tribunals.
• Directed the Union to constitute a National Tribunals Commission and, pending that, a dedicated Tribunals Wing in the Ministry of Finance.

9. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India – MBA (V) (2022)

• Reviewed the Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2021 which amended Section 184 FA 2017.
• Struck down:
  • Minimum age of 50 years;
  • Four-year tenure;
  • Panel-of-two requirement and “preferably within three months” clause;
  • HRA and allowance provisions contradicting MBA (IV) directions.
• Clarified, via Justice Bhat’s concurrence, that:
  • Tribunal-related statutes are subject to a higher standard of judicial review than ordinary policy legislation;
  • Structural principles like judicial independence and equal protection (Article 14) justify invalidation even absent a direct textual conflict.

The present 2025 judgment treats this corpus not as historical background but as binding constitutional doctrine that both constrains Parliament and guides judicial review of the Impugned Act.

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VI. Application of Precedents and Legal Reasoning in the Present Case

A. Binding Nature of Larger Bench Decisions

The Bench explicitly acknowledges that, as a two-judge Bench, it is bound by decisions of Constitution Benches and three-judge Benches (para 104). This is important because:

• The key tribunal cases—Sampath Kumar, L. Chandra Kumar, R. Gandhi, Rojer Mathew, MBA (IV) and MBA (V)—are all larger-bench decisions.
• Any attempt by the Union to relitigate or water down their reasoning before a smaller Bench is institutionally impermissible.

B. Rejection of Attorney General’s Plea for Reference

The Attorney General sought a reference to a larger Bench under Article 145(3), arguing that issues of great constitutional moment were involved. The Court declined, observing that:

• No new substantial question of constitutional interpretation arises;
• The issues have already been settled by several Constitution Bench decisions;
• The request was made late in the hearing, after one side had been fully heard; and
• A reference would further delay much-needed clarity in a field where litigants’ access to justice is already hampered by vacancies and uncertainty (paras 105–109).

C. Distinguishing Judicial Review from Judicial Legislation

A central strand of the Union’s argument was that the Court, in prior MBA cases, had overreached by effectively “legislating” on tenure, qualifications, age etc., and that Parliament is free to depart from such “judicial legislation.”

The Court’s response is nuanced:

• It reaffirms that the judiciary cannot prescribe exact statutory language or compel Parliament to legislate in a specific form (para 121).
• However, once the Court has:
  • Identified a constitutional defect; and
  • Articulated minimum standards necessary to cure that defect,
  any future legislation in that field must conform to those constitutional standards (not necessarily the precise wording).
• By reproducing provisions previously held invalid without addressing the reasoning behind their invalidity, Parliament has failed to exercise its remedial power in a constitutionally permissible way.

D. Structural Review vs Policy Deference

The Court again adopts the distinction articulated by Justice Bhat in MBA (V) (para 90 of that judgment, echoed here at paras 124–134):

• In fields like economic, commercial or financial policy, judicial review is usually deferential; courts avoid second-guessing policy wisdom.
• But in fields concerning the administration of justice and design of adjudicatory institutions, the Court must apply “searching scrutiny”:
  • Because tribunals dispense justice between citizens and the State, or between private parties;
  • Because the Constitution cannot permit “two kinds of justice”—one through courts with strong safeguards, another through tribunals lacking them.

Thus, the Court does not treat the Impugned Act as an ordinary policy statute; it examines it through the lens of equality, basic structure, and the guarantee of effective and impartial adjudication.

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VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Are Tribunals, and Why Do They Matter?

A tribunal is a specialised adjudicatory body created by statute to decide specific categories of disputes—for example:

• Service matters (Central/State Administrative Tribunals);
• Tax disputes (Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, CESTAT);
• Company law (NCLT/NCLAT);
• Telecom regulation (TDSAT);
• Environment (NGT); etc.

Tribunals are intended to:

• Provide specialised expertise in technical areas;
• Ensure speedy justice by easing the burden on regular courts; and
• Offer more flexible procedures.

However, because they often take over functions previously exercised by High Courts or civil courts, they must be designed to be as independent and impartial as those courts—both in appearance and reality.

B. Constitutional Supremacy vs Parliamentary Sovereignty

• Parliamentary sovereignty (as in the UK): Parliament can make or unmake any law; courts cannot strike down Acts of Parliament as unconstitutional.
• Constitutional supremacy (as in India): The Constitution is supreme; Parliament’s laws are valid only if they conform to the Constitution. Courts can strike down laws that violate constitutional provisions or basic structure.

India clearly follows the second model. This judgment reinforces that Parliament must respect judicial interpretations of the Constitution and cannot “trump” them by simple re-enactment.

C. Legislative “Abrogation” vs Legislative Override

• Abrogation / Curative Legislation:
  • Suppose a court strikes down a law because it, say, discriminates against a class without justification.
  • Parliament can amend the law to remove the discrimination, perhaps by extending benefits to the excluded class.
  • This is a valid curative response that respects the court’s reasoning while altering the law.
• Impermissible Override:
  • If Parliament simply re-enacts the same provision, or adds a clause saying “this law shall operate notwithstanding any judgment to the contrary,” without fixing the defect, it is trying to negate the court’s decision.
  • That undermines the rule of law and judicial review and is unconstitutional.

The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 falls into the second category—it does not fix what the Court found wrong; it merely restates it.

D. Article 141 vs Article 142 – Why It Matters Here

• Article 141: Every law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts and authorities.
• Article 142: Allows the Court to make any order necessary for “complete justice” in any case—often case-specific, equitable directions.

The Union tried to argue that tribunal-related directions (like five-year tenure, higher HRA, composition of SCSCs) were under Article 142 and hence non-binding as general law. The Court clarifies that:

• Where directions are based on reasoned constitutional analysis (independence of judiciary, equality, basic structure), they form part of the “law declared” under Article 141, not mere ad hoc relief under Article 142.
• Such directions must be followed unless and until a larger Bench revisits them.

E. National Tribunals Commission (NTC)

The NTC is conceived as an independent statutory body that would:

• Oversee selection and appointment of tribunal members;
• Monitor their performance and handle disciplinary matters;
• Ensure adequate infrastructure and financial autonomy for tribunals; and
• Shield tribunals from the influence of “parent” ministries that are often parties before them.

Repeatedly recommended in L. Chandra Kumar, Rojer Mathew and MBA (IV), it is now given a concrete deadline: the Union must set it up within four months of this judgment. The idea is to move away from ministry-controlled tribunals to a professionally managed, independent tribunal ecosystem.

F. Structural vs Rights-Based Review

Constitutional review can operate on two levels:

• Rights-based: Does a law violate a specific fundamental right, like free speech (Article 19) or equality (Article 14)?
• Structural: Does a law damage key structural features of the Constitution—like separation of powers, federalism, or judicial independence—even if no single Article is directly infringed?

Tribunal design cases are prime examples of structural review. Here, the Court looks at:

• Whether the law undermines the Courts’ constitutional role;
• Whether it subjects adjudicators to executive dominance; and
• Whether it creates a parallel justice system with inferior safeguards.

This judgment strongly confirms that structural concerns are fully justiciable and can be used to invalidate legislation.

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VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Parliament: Clear Limits on “Second-Guessing” Supreme Court

This judgment sends a firm signal: when the Supreme Court has:

• Declared a statutory provision unconstitutional; and
• Laid down minimum constitutional requirements for a valid statute in that area,

Parliament cannot:

• Re-enact the same provision under a new label (e.g., from Section 184 into Section 3/5 of a new Act);
• Ignore the reasoning of the Court; or
• Use a non obstante clause to say “notwithstanding any judgment…” and thereby nullify those constitutional standards.

Future tribunal legislation must engage seriously with the Court’s tribunal jurisprudence and be drafted in a manner that:

• Respects judicial primacy in selection processes;
• Ensures adequate tenure and independence for members; and
• Avoids equating tribunal adjudicators with ordinary civil servants.

B. For the Executive: Administrative Reorientation and NTC

The Executive is under a dual obligation:

1. Immediate: Fill existing and looming vacancies in tribunals in strict compliance with MBA (IV) and MBA (V);
   • Respect age and tenure limits as reshaped by those judgments;
   • Follow the mandated SCSC composition and procedures;
   • Implement higher HRA or provide suitable housing.
2. Structural: Establish a National Tribunals Commission within four months to centralise and depoliticise tribunal administration.

Continued resistance or delay, as the Court notes, not only undermines judicial independence but also contributes to tribunal dysfunction and pendency, harming citizens’ access to justice.

C. For Tribunal Members and Aspirants

The judgment:

• Protects the vested rights of members appointed under earlier regimes, especially where:
  • Selection was completed before the Impugned Act, but appointment orders were issued later; or
  • Appointments were made pursuant to interim directions in cases like Kudrat Sandhu.
• Ensures:
  • Retirement ages of 70 (Chairpersons) and 67 (Members);
  • Substantially improved housing or HRA; and
  • Clear, judicially anchored selection processes.
• Reopens meaningful opportunities for younger advocates (with 10+ years’ experience) to serve as judicial members—critical for infusing tribunals with fresh, specialised legal talent.

D. For Litigants and the Justice System

For litigants, the ruling promises:

• Tribunals staffed by members with greater independence and security;
• Less risk that tribunal composition will be tailored to executive preferences;
• Better assurance that disputes with the government or powerful private entities are adjudicated fairly; and
• In the long run, with NTC and full staffing, possibly quicker and higher-quality adjudication.

However, in the short term, there may be transitional complexity as the Executive recalibrates its appointment processes and Parliament considers afresh how to legislate on tribals within the constitutional constraints reiterated here.

E. For Constitutional Jurisprudence: Strengthening Structural Review

The decision reinforces and extends several trends in Indian constitutional law:

• It deepens the basic structure doctrine as applied to the design of institutions, not just to overt constitutional amendments.
• It clarifies the doctrine of legislative abrogation, drawing a clear line between legitimate curative amendments and unconstitutional overrides.
• It affirms the Court’s role as “ultimate guardian of the Constitution and the rule of law” in matters of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions (para 94).
• It shows a willingness to scrutinise legislative and executive measures cumulatively over time, rather than in isolation, to determine structural impacts on judicial independence.

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IX. Conclusion: Significance of the Judgment

The 2025 decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India is not merely another chapter in the long saga of tribunal reforms; it is a powerful reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy and a decisive warning against attempts to “pervert the Constitution without changing its form”—to borrow Dr. Ambedkar’s words quoted by the Court (para 149).

The judgment:

• Declares that Parliament cannot simply re-enact, in a new statute, provisions already struck down as unconstitutional, especially when the underlying constitutional reasoning remains unaddressed;
• Confirms that Supreme Court directions on tribunal independence, tenure, age limits, HRA, and selection processes are part of binding constitutional law under Article 141;
• Reasserts that structural principles—judicial independence, separation of powers, rule of law and equal protection—are enforceable standards against which tribunal legislation must be measured;
• Mandates the creation of a National Tribunals Commission as a long-delayed institutional reform essential to depoliticising and rationalising the tribunal system; and
• Provides transitional safeguards to protect the expectations and tenures of existing tribunal members, while ensuring continuity of adjudication for litigants.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the judgment is its candid expression of frustration with the Executive’s and Legislature’s recurring non-compliance with judicial directions on tribunals (paras 149–150, 80). Yet, rather than escalating the institutional conflict, the Court frames its intervention as part of a continuing “constitutional dialogue” aimed at ensuring that all three branches act “within their limitations and duties,” as Dr. Ambedkar envisaged.

In that sense, this decision stands as a strong doctrinal marker for future cases:

• Whenever Parliament redesigns tribunal frameworks, it must begin from the constitutional benchmarks set in the Madras Bar Association line and Rojer Mathew, not from a blank canvas.
• Whenever the Executive frames rules or delays appointments, it must remember that tribunal independence is not a matter of administrative convenience but of constitutional command.

The judgment thus secures, for the near term, a more robust and principled foundation for India’s tribunal system, while leaving open the possibility that Parliament, acting within constitutional bounds, may in time craft a comprehensive, coherent, and constitutionally compliant tribunal law—one that finally moves beyond what Justice Chandran evocatively called “old wine in a new bottle.”