Co-existence of Section 102 CrPC Seizure Powers with Section 18A PC Act Attachment: Commentary on State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey (2025 INSC 1413)

Co-existence of Section 102 CrPC Seizure Powers with Section 18A PC Act Attachment: Commentary on State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey (2025 INSC 1413)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 INSC 1413 (decided on 10 December 2025), settles an important conflict regarding the powers of investigating agencies to freeze bank accounts in corruption cases.

The central issue was whether, when a case is registered only under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), the police can nevertheless exercise their general power under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to freeze the accused’s bank accounts, or whether they are restricted to the attachment mechanism under Section 18A of the PC Act, which imports the procedure of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944 (the “Ordinance”).

The Supreme Court, speaking through Sanjay Karol, J. (for a Bench also comprising Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.), answered this question by drawing a sharp conceptual and procedural distinction between:

  • “Seizure” under Section 102 CrPC, and
  • “Attachment” and “Confiscation” under Section 18A PC Act read with the Ordinance.

The Court also addressed a related but doctrinally significant issue: whether its earlier decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 16 SCC 287, which had described the PC Act as a “code by itself”, operates as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that it does not, for want of a clear ratio decidendi based on articulated facts and legal reasoning.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and allegations

  • Appellant: State of West Bengal.
  • Respondent: Anil Kumar Dey, father of the principal accused, a retired pensioner.
  • Principal accused: Prabir Kumar Dey Sarkar, son of the respondent, a police officer who rose from constable (1979) to Inspector of Police (2011).

A preliminary enquiry by the Anti-Corruption Branch, West Bengal, alleged that Prabir Dey Sarkar possessed assets vastly disproportionate to his known sources of income during the check period 2007–2017. His net salary was about ₹40,08,090; after presumed household expenditure, his likely savings were around ₹26,72,060. Yet movable and immovable properties and expenditure linked to him and his relatives were valued at about ₹1,49,18,628, with some properties not even included in this computation.

On this basis, an FIR (No. 09/19) was registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(b) PC Act (offence of criminal misconduct through possession of disproportionate assets). During investigation, the police:

  • froze several fixed deposits (FDs) in the name of the respondent, Anil Kumar Dey, often jointly with other family members.

2.2 Proceedings before the Trial Court and High Court

  1. Application for de-freezing before the City Sessions Court (Special Judge, PC Act):
    • The respondent, aged 93 and suffering ailments, sought de-freezing of his FDs.
    • The prosecution opposed, asserting:
      • Prabir had acquired huge disproportionate assets.
      • Benami properties and FDs were held in relatives’ names, including the respondent.
      • The respondent could not satisfactorily explain sources of funds.
    • The Trial Court (order dated 28 March 2023) refused de-freezing, noting:
      • Investigation was ongoing.
      • Respondent had not established legitimate sources for substantial FD amounts.
  2. Charge-sheet and cognizance:
    • Sanction for prosecution against Prabir was granted on 22 April 2024.
    • Charge-sheet (13 May 2024) named four accused: Prabir (son), his wife, his father (respondent), and his brother.
    • Investigating agency recorded that the business and house property income of the respondent and the daughter-in-law could not be substantiated and that they could not explain heavy cash deposits leading to numerous FDs.
    • The Special Court took cognizance on 14 May 2024.
  3. High Court of Calcutta (CRR No. 4511 of 2023; judgment dated 4 October 2024):
    • Allowed the respondent’s revision; set aside the Trial Court’s refusal; directed de-freezing of bank accounts.
    • Reasoning:
      • Bank accounts in a PC Act case must be attached per Section 18A PC Act, i.e., under the Ordinance, not via Section 102 CrPC.
      • Relied on Ratan Babulal Lath, where the Supreme Court had observed that the PC Act is a code complete in itself, holding that freezing via Section 102 CrPC in that case was unsustainable.
      • Concluded that freezing under Section 102 CrPC instead of the Section 18A route was illegal.
  4. Supreme Court appeal:
    • The State of West Bengal appealed.
    • On 27 January 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court’s order.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

3.1 Core holdings

The Supreme Court laid down the following key propositions:
  1. Section 102 CrPC and Section 18A PC Act operate in distinct fields and are not mutually exclusive.
    • Section 102 CrPC deals with seizure by the police to aid investigation—an immediate, executive act to secure property suspected to be stolen or linked to an offence.
    • Section 18A PC Act (read with the Ordinance) deals with attachment and confiscation—a judicial, structured and rights-sensitive process to ultimately deprive a person of property as “ill-gotten gains”.
    • These powers co-exist; the availability of attachment under Section 18A does not impliedly bar or override seizure under Section 102 CrPC.
  2. The decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka is not binding precedent on the issue of the PC Act being a complete code.
    • The statement that the PC Act is a “code in itself” lacked:
      • a proper discussion of the statutory scheme, and
      • a clearly articulated ratio linking the facts to a general principle.
    • Following principles from MCD v. Gurnam Kaur and Jayant Verma v. Union Of India, such an observation is treated as having passed sub silentio and does not bind courts under Article 141.
    • The present Bench expressly refrained from holding either way whether the PC Act, as a whole, is a “self-contained code”; it confined itself to the limited question of interplay between Section 102 CrPC and Section 18A PC Act.
  3. Scope of Section 102 CrPC reaffirmed.
    • Section 102 authorises any police officer to seize property:
      • alleged or suspected to be stolen, or
      • found in circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence.
    • It validly extends to bank accounts and fixed deposits, as settled by State Of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy and subsequent cases.
    • Police cannot use Section 102 to seize immovable property or dispossess someone from such property (Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra).
    • The obligation to report the seizure “forthwith” to the Magistrate (Section 102(3)) is to be construed reasonably: delay may invite departmental action but does not automatically vitiate the seizure (Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen).

3.2 Case-specific outcome

  • The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s approach—treating freezing under Section 102 CrPC as invalid per se in PC Act cases because Section 18A exists—was erroneous in law.
  • It set aside the High Court’s order and restored the Trial Court’s decision refusing de-freezing, thereby validating the use of Section 102 CrPC in this case.
  • However, in view of the fact that:
    • investigation stood completed, and
    • a final report (charge-sheet) had been filed and cognizance taken,
    the Court tailored a pragmatic arrangement:
    • If, during the period when the High Court’s order operated, the frozen amounts had already been released, the respondent must:
      • re-deposit the amount, or
      • furnish tangible security / bank guarantee of equivalent value
      within three weeks.
    • If the amounts had not yet been released, the existing freeze continues, subject to any proceedings the parties may initiate under applicable law.
    • All substantive rights of both sides under the relevant statutes to seek further orders regarding the property were expressly kept open.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework

The decision turns on the interaction between three sets of legal provisions:

  1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
    • Section 13: Defines “criminal misconduct”, including illicit enrichment (disproportionate assets), with a presumption where assets exceed known sources of income.
    • Section 18A (inserted by the 2018 Amendment): Applies the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944 to “attachment, administration of attached property and execution of order of attachment or confiscation” of money or property procured by means of an offence under the PC Act. References to “District Judge” in the Ordinance are to be read as “Special Judge”.
  2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
    • Section 102:
      • Empowers any police officer to seize property:
        • alleged or suspected to have been stolen; or
        • found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence.
      • Requires the officer to report the seizure forthwith to:
        • the officer in charge of the police station (if he is subordinate), and
        • the Magistrate having jurisdiction (Section 102(3)).
  3. Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944 (as applied by Section 18A)
    • Section 3: Authorises the State/Central Government to move an application to the District Judge/Special Judge for attachment of money or property believed to have been procured by commission of a scheduled offence.
    • Section 4: On receipt of the application, the Judge may order ad-interim attachment and issue notice to the affected person and other interested parties to show cause why attachment should not be made absolute.
    • Section 5 and following: Provide for:
      • hearing objections,
      • making attachment absolute or vacating it,
      • administration and enforcement of attachment,
      • provision of security in lieu of attachment, and
      • appeals.

4.2 “Seizure” vs “Attachment” vs “Confiscation”

The Court devoted considerable effort to clarifying the conceptual distinction between three key terms:

  • Seizure:
    • Ordinary meaning: taking possession quickly, forcibly, or under legal authority.
    • As per legal dictionaries: an act by which an officer takes possession of property under legal process.
    • Function under Section 102 CrPC: A police power exercised during investigation to:
      • secure potential evidence,
      • prevent destruction or dissipation of suspected tainted property,
      • without prior judicial approval, subject to post-facto reporting to the Magistrate.
  • Attachment:
    • Ordinary meaning: legal process of arresting property to secure a claim, often to compel appearance or secure satisfaction of a possible future decree or confiscation.
    • In legal usage (per Black’s Law Dictionary): the act or process of taking property into custody of the law under a judicial order.
    • Function under the Ordinance/Section 18A PC Act:
      • a judicial act, not a unilateral executive act;
      • requires an application by the Government, supported by affidavits;
      • ad-interim attachment by a Judge, followed by notice, hearing and a reasoned order;
      • aimed at securing property believed to be obtained through crime, for eventual confiscation.
  • Confiscation:
    • Ordinary meaning: permanent appropriation of private property by the State under legal authority.
    • Legal meaning: forfeiture of property to the public treasury, usually as a penalty upon conviction or under special confiscation proceedings.
    • In the PC Act context: the final stage after attachment, where property found to be “procured by means of an offence” is permanently vested in the State.

The Court’s central point: seizure under Section 102 CrPC is not the same as attachment under Section 18A / Ordinance, even if in practice both may temporarily restrict a person’s dealings with property. The source of power, purpose, and procedure are distinct.

4.3 Scope and Purpose of Section 102 CrPC

The judgment synthesises prior Supreme Court case law on Section 102 CrPC:

  • Property that may be seized:
    • Property alleged or suspected to be stolen; or
    • Property found in circumstances giving rise to suspicion of the commission of any offence (M.T. Enrica Lexie v. Doramma).
    • Includes bank accounts and fixed deposits when there is a nexus with the alleged offence (Tapas D. Neogy, Suresh Nanda v. CBI, Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat).
  • Purpose:
    • To a id investigation by:
      • preserving evidence, and
      • preventing disappearance, transfer, or tampering with property potentially linked to the offence.
    • Orders of freezing are investigative in character, not final disposals of property (Jermyn Capital LLC v. CBI).
    • Completion of investigation does not automatically entitle release of frozen accounts; affected persons may apply to the competent court, which must decide in accordance with law (Teesta Setalvad).
  • Limitations:
    • Does not authorise police to seize immovable property or dispossess lawful occupants; seizure is restricted to movable property, bank accounts, etc. (Nevada Properties).
    • Police cannot use Section 102 as a general equitable tool to hand over property to whoever they consider the rightful owner (Nevada Properties).
  • Reporting to Magistrate (“forthwith”):
    • Section 102(3) requires the police to report seizure to the Magistrate “forthwith”.
    • Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen clarifies:
      • “Forthwith” means with reasonable speed and expedition, judged contextually.
      • Unreasonable delay may justify departmental action against errant officers.
      • But such delay does not, by itself, invalidate the seizure.

4.4 Attachment under Section 18A PC Act and the Ordinance

Section 18A PC Act imports the machinery of the 1944 Ordinance into PC Act cases, with the Special Judge in place of the District Judge. The Court, by examining this Ordinance and by analogy other statutes like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and the Income-tax Act, 1961, highlighted the structured, multi-step, judicial nature of “attachment”:

  • Initiation:
    • The Government (State or Central) must have “reason to believe” that a person has committed a scheduled offence and procured money/property thereby.
    • An application under Section 3 is filed before the District/Special Judge, supported by detailed affidavits setting out:
      • grounds for belief,
      • value of property believed to be procured, and
      • information regarding location and possible third-party interests.
  • Ad-interim attachment and notice:
    • The Judge may pass an ad-interim attachment order under Section 4(1), typically without delay, upon finding prima facie grounds.
    • Simultaneously, he must issue:
      • notice to the person whose property is attached, and
      • notice to persons represented as having or likely to claim an interest,
      asking them to show cause why attachment should not be made absolute.
  • Hearing and finalisation:
    • Objections are heard; claims of legitimate title and lawful acquisition are examined.
    • The Judge may:
      • confirm (make absolute) the attachment, or
      • vacate or modify it.
    • The process is akin to civil proceedings, including the possibility of furnishing security in lieu of attachment.
  • Purpose and character:
    • To secure proceeds of crime for potential confiscation on final adjudication.
    • It is a judicial measure with built-in natural justice safeguards, not an immediate investigative step.

By comparing this with analogous schemes under PMLA (Sections 5 and 8) and the Income-tax Act (Section 281B), the Court underscored that attachment is always a considered, multi-layered legal process, not a snap executive act.

4.5 Co-existence of Section 102 CrPC and Section 18A PC Act

This is the heart of the judgment.

The respondent had argued that once Section 18A PC Act (with its attachment mechanism) exists, the police must use only that route to restrain assets in PC Act cases and cannot resort to Section 102 CrPC. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning:

  • Different functions:
    • Section 102 CrPC:
      • a general investigative power delegated to the police;
      • enables quick, responsive action to seize property suspected to be linked to any offence, including PC Act offences;
      • does not require prior judicial sanction, though post-facto reporting is mandatory;
      • its immediate purpose is to secure evidence and suspected tainted property pending further investigation.
    • Section 18A PC Act / Ordinance:
      • a special, more intrusive regime to ultimately attach and confiscate property as the fruits of corruption;
      • involves judicial officers, notice, affidavits, hearings, and appeal mechanisms;
      • is necessarily slower and more deliberative, compatible with civil-process-like safeguards.
  • No inconsistency:
    • Because the two powers operate at different stages and for different immediate purposes, there is no necessary conflict.
    • Seizure under Section 102 may occur before, independent of, or even in addition to attachment proceedings under the Ordinance.
    • The existence of the latter does not impliedly repeal or restrict the former—particularly in the absence of any explicit exclusion in the PC Act.
  • Practical necessity:
    • In corruption cases, especially disproportionate asset matters:
      • Large sums can be moved quickly through bank transfers.
      • Waiting for a full-fledged attachment application and hearing could allow dissipation of suspected tainted assets.
    • Section 102 CrPC serves as a first line of control to secure assets immediately, pending more structured proceedings if required.

The Court therefore expressly held that the powers under Section 18A PC Act and Section 102 CrPC are co-existent; one does not oust the other.

4.6 The Self‑contained Code Argument and Ratan Babulal Lath

The High Court’s reliance on Ratan Babulal Lath was central to its conclusion that Section 102 CrPC was inapplicable. In that case, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court had observed that the PC Act was “a code in itself” and proceeded to invalidate freezing under Section 102 CrPC, on the footing that the special statute’s internal mechanism must be exclusively followed.

The present Bench examined when a statute can properly be called a “self-contained code” or “code complete in itself”. Drawing from earlier decisions concerning:

the Court deduced that a statute is a “self‑contained code” if:

  1. It is comprehensive on its subject, dealing with all aspects arising directly out of or ancillary to the main issue.
  2. It clearly sets out:
    • offences and punishments, or
    • rights and liabilities, and
    • a complete procedural framework for adjudication and remedies,
    such that dependence on general law is minimised.
  3. It ordinarily includes internal mechanisms for:
    • initiation and conduct of proceedings,
    • interim measures, and
    • multi‑tiered appellate review.

The Court then noted that Ratan Babulal Lath had:

  • declared the PC Act to be a code in itself without discussing:
    • the scheme of the PC Act in detail, or
    • how it interacts with the CrPC and other statutes,
  • and without analysing whether the PC Act actually satisfies the tests laid down in earlier “self-contained code” cases.

Accordingly, the present Bench concluded that Ratan Babulal Lath lacked the essential ingredients of a binding ratio on this point and could not be read as precluding Section 102 CrPC in PC Act cases.

4.7 Ratio Decidendi, Obiter Dicta and Decisions Sub Silentio

The Court’s treatment of Ratan Babulal Lath is firmly grounded in a disciplined approach to precedent under Article 141, relying on:

  • MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101:
    • Holds that statements of law made without argument, without reference to statutory provisions, and without citing authorities are not binding.
    • Introduces the concept of a point passing sub silentio when it was neither perceived nor consciously decided.
  • Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745 (Sen, J., dissenting), as adopted in Jayant Verma v. Union Of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743:
    • Identifies three essential ingredients of every precedent:
      1. Findings of material facts (direct and inferential).
      2. Statements of principles of law applicable to those facts.
      3. The final judgment based on the combination of facts and law.

Applying these tests, the Court found that Ratan Babulal Lath did not meaningfully discuss:

  • the factual matrix, and
  • the legal principles concerning the PC Act’s relationship with the CrPC,

and therefore did not generate a binding ratio on the question whether the PC Act is an exclusive, self-contained code displacing general procedural powers like Section 102 CrPC.

5. Precedents Considered and Their Influence

5.1 State Of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy

Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685, is the foundational case extending Section 102 CrPC to bank accounts. There, the Supreme Court held that the expression “any property” in Section 102 is wide enough to include money in bank accounts, enabling police to request banks to freeze accounts linked to alleged offences. At that time, the PC Act did not contain a mechanism akin to Section 18A.

The present judgment affirms that Tapas D. Neogy remains good law and now co-exists with the post-2018 attachment mechanism under Section 18A PC Act.

5.2 Nevada Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra

In Nevada Properties, (2019) 20 SCC 119, a three-judge Bench held that Section 102 CrPC does not extend to immovable property. The police cannot, under colour of seizure, dispossess a person from land or buildings.

The present judgment reiterates this limitation, reinforcing that Section 102 CrPC is primarily about movable property and cannot be used as a shortcut to effect de facto attachment of immovable assets.

5.3 Teesta Atul Setalvad and Jermyn Capital LLC

  • Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 2 SCC 372:
    • Held that freezing accounts under Section 102 CrPC is for investigative needs.
    • Completion of investigation does not automatically entitle de-freezing, but rights of the account holder to seek appropriate orders remain intact.
  • Jermyn Capital LLC v. CBI, (2023) 7 SCC 810:
    • Emphasised that freezing must be connected to the needs of investigation; it is not a punitive measure in itself.

The current decision builds on these cases by emphasising that while the primary purpose of Section 102 is investigative, the mere fact that freezing also has the effect of preventing withdrawal (akin to attachment) does not invalidate its use when the statutory preconditions are met.

5.4 Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen

Shento Varghese, (2024) 7 SCC 23, clarified the obligation under Section 102(3) CrPC to report seizures “forthwith” to the Magistrate. The Court held:

  • “Forthwith” means with reasonable speed and urgency, not necessarily instantaneously.
  • Delay, if unexplained, may warrant departmental action but does not vitiate the seizure.

This reinforces the idea that Section 102 is an operationally flexible tool, designed to prioritise effective investigation over rigid timelines, while still allowing judicial oversight.

5.5 Self-contained Codes: ID Act, IBC, Land Acquisition and SARFAESI

The Court’s comparative analysis of various statutes where “self-contained code” status was recognised plays an important role in rejecting an overbroad reading of Ratan Babulal Lath:

  • Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
    • Premier Automobiles and Rohtas Industries describe it as a code for adjudication of industrial disputes, with limited and specific borrowings from the CPC.
  • Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:
    • Recognised as a comprehensive insolvency resolution framework that overrides inconsistent laws and internally defines what is “fair” and “equitable”.
  • Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
    • Declared a complete code for acquisition of land for public purposes.
  • SARFAESI Act, 2002:
    • Treated as a code in itself governing enforcement of security interests and providing its own remedial structure, including Debts Recovery Tribunals and appellate fora.

By contrasting these with the PC Act, the Court implicitly signals that calling a statute a “code complete in itself” is not a casual conclusion and must rest on rigorous structural analysis.

5.6 MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, Jayant Verma, and Dalbir Singh

These cases supplied the doctrinal tools with which the Court assessed the precedential value of Ratan Babulal Lath:

  • Gurnam Kaur warns against treating unreasoned, unargued observations as binding.
  • Dalbir Singh and Jayant Verma insist that a binding ratio requires:
    • clear factual findings,
    • articulated legal principles, and
    • a judgment expressly based on both.

The current Bench uses these principles to hold that Ratan Babulal Lath did not conclusively decide the “self-contained code” question in a manner binding on subsequent courts.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 What is the difference between seizure, attachment and confiscation?

  • Seizure (Section 102 CrPC):
    • A temporary investigative step.
    • Police take custody or control of property (including bank accounts) suspected to be linked to an offence.
    • Purpose: preserve evidence; prevent immediate misuse or dissipation.
    • Not a final decision on who owns the property.
  • Attachment (Section 18A PC Act & Ordinance):
    • A judicial measure to “lock” property believed to be proceeds of crime.
    • Requires court orders, notice, and opportunity of hearing.
    • Property cannot be freely dealt with during the pendency of proceedings.
    • Attachment may become “absolute” after objections are decided.
  • Confiscation:
    • A permanent deprivation of property, usually after conviction or a specialised confiscation process.
    • Property is transferred to the State; the previous owner loses all rights.

6.2 What is a “self-contained code”?

A statute is called a self-contained code when it:

  • deals comprehensively with a subject matter,
  • creates its own rights, obligations and offences, and
  • provides a complete internal procedure for enforcement, including remedies and appeals.

When a law is truly self-contained, courts are generally slow to import external procedures from general laws (like the CrPC or CPC), except where the special statute expressly adopts them.

6.3 What is “ratio decidendi” and what is “obiter dicta”?

  • Ratio decidendi:
    • The core legal principle on which a court’s final decision is based.
    • It arises from:
      • the facts found, and
      • the rule of law applied to decide those facts.
    • It is binding on lower courts under Article 141.
  • Obiter dicta:
    • Observations or remarks that do not form the essential basis of the decision.
    • They may be persuasive but are not binding.

Sometimes, a point of law is involved in a case but is neither argued nor consciously decided. Such a point is said to have passed sub silentio, and the decision is not authority on that point.

7. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

7.1 Impact on anti-corruption investigations

  • Investigating agencies in PC Act cases can now confidently:
    • use Section 102 CrPC to immediately freeze bank accounts and FDs suspected to hold tainted funds, even though Section 18A exists; and
    • subsequently, if warranted, initiate attachment proceedings under Section 18A and the Ordinance for long-term restraint and eventual confiscation.
  • This dual track:
    • prevents quick dissipation of assets during early investigation, and
    • ensures that any permanent deprivation of property happens through a judicial, rights-respecting process.

7.2 Impact on accused persons and third parties (relatives, joint account-holders)

  • Relatives and joint account-holders may find their accounts frozen under Section 102 CrPC when there is a reasonable link with the suspect’s alleged disproportionate assets.
  • However, they retain safeguards:
    • the seizure must be reported to the Magistrate who can examine its legality and necessity;
    • they can move the Special Court / jurisdictional court for de-freezing or modification, especially after investigation is complete;
    • if formal attachment is sought under Section 18A, they will receive notice and a hearing and can assert independent lawful ownership.
  • Where a High Court has ordered de-freezing and that order is later reversed (as here), the Supreme Court’s direction to provide security or re-deposit funds offers a model for balancing:
    • the need to preserve property for trial, and
    • the reliance interests of the account-holder.

7.3 Guidance for High Courts and subordinate courts

  • High Courts can no longer set aside freezing orders in PC Act cases solely on the ground that:
    • Section 18A exists; and
    • Section 102 CrPC was invoked instead of the Ordinance.
  • Courts must now:
    • examine whether the preconditions of Section 102 CrPC were met (nexus with offence; suspicion of crime-linked property);
    • verify compliance with the obligation to report to the Magistrate; and
    • consider proportionality and the continuing necessity of seizure, particularly after charge-sheet filing.
  • On precedent:
    • Courts are cautioned against treating brief, unreasoned or fact-light orders of the Supreme Court as laying down broad, binding propositions—unless the ratio is clearly extracted in accordance with Gurnam Kaur and Dalbir Singh.

7.4 Broader implications for special criminal statutes

  • This judgment reinforces a general principle:
    • Unless a special criminal statute expressly excludes the application of the CrPC, general powers under the CrPC—such as Section 102—remain available to investigating agencies, subject to the particular statutory scheme.
  • It also underscores that:
    • the mere existence of a special attachment/confiscation mechanism in a statute does not automatically displace general investigative powers, unless the two are irreconcilable, which is not the case here.

8. Case-specific Observations

In the specific facts of State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey:

  • The respondent, though a pensioner and father of the principal accused, was found by the investigating agency to:
    • have numerous FDs, some opened and closed within the “check period”; and
    • be unable to satisfactorily explain substantial cash deposits preceding creation of the FDs.
  • The prosecution case is that these FDs and properties, though standing in the names of the respondent and other family members, were substantially funded by the main accused’s unexplained income, making the relatives possible benamidars or participants.
  • The Trial Court had refused de-freezing during investigation; the High Court overturned this solely on a technical legal ground regarding the choice of power (Section 102 vs Section 18A), without entering into the merits of the necessity or proportionality of the freeze.

By restoring the Trial Court’s order and validating the use of Section 102 CrPC, the Supreme Court:

  • confirmed the legality of freezing in this specific disproportionate assets case, and
  • left it open to the Special Court and other competent fora, in due course, to:
    • consider any fresh applications for de-freezing or modification, and
    • deal with attachment/confiscation under Section 18A and the Ordinance, depending on the evidence led at trial.

9. Conclusion

The decision in State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey makes two doctrinal contributions of lasting importance:

  1. Clarification of powers in PC Act cases:
    • Police may invoke Section 102 CrPC to seize and freeze bank accounts and other movable properties even in cases registered solely under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
    • This investigative power co-exists with the special regime of attachment and confiscation under Section 18A PC Act and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944.
    • Seizure under Section 102 is conceptually and procedurally distinct from attachment; one is not a substitute for or bar to the other.
  2. Reaffirmation of disciplined precedent usage:
    • The Court restrained the tendency to treat broad phrases like “the statute is a code in itself” as dispositive without a careful reading of the underlying reasoning.
    • By holding that Ratan Babulal Lath does not lay down a binding ratio on the exclusivity of the PC Act procedure, the Court emphasised:
      • the need to identify ratio decidendi in terms of facts plus law, and
      • the limits of obiter dicta and decisions rendered sub silentio.

In practical terms, the judgment strengthens the hand of anti-corruption agencies in swiftly securing suspected proceeds of corruption, while preserving the due process safeguards of judicial attachment and confiscation. At the same time, it serves as a reminder to all courts to approach Supreme Court precedents with doctrinal precision, distinguishing binding principles from incidental remarks.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra VaraleJustice Sanjay Karol

Advocates

KUNAL MIMANI

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