1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 782) has provided a significant clarification on when consensual sexual relations can, and more importantly cannot, be criminalised as rape on the ground of a subsequently unfulfilled “promise to marry”.

This appeal arose out of the Bombay High Court’s refusal to quash criminal proceedings against the appellant, a 23-year-old agriculture student, accused under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504 and 506 IPC by a 30-year-old divorced woman with whom he had a year-long relationship.

The central issues before the Court were:

• Whether the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet made out a prima facie case of rape under a “false promise of marriage”.
• Whether prolonged consensual intercourse between two adults can later be labelled rape merely because the relationship sours.
• The propriety of High Court’s refusal to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Allowing the appeal and invoking the Bhajan Lal doctrine, the Supreme Court:

1. Quashed FIR C.R. No. 490/2023, the charge-sheet and all proceedings in RCC No. 378/2023.
2. Held that the complainant’s consent was “free, informed and voluntary”; there was no evidence of misconception of fact, coercion or threat.
3. Observed that the relationship had been sustained for 13 months and the complaint was lodged after the appellant distanced himself, rendering the allegation “inherently improbable”.
4. Re-emphasised that a consensual relationship turning sour cannot be ground for prosecuting a person for rape.
5. Classified the case under Bhajan Lal categories 102(5) (absurd/improbable allegations) and 102(7) (mala fide proceedings).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) – Enumerated seven illustrative situations where criminal proceedings may be quashed. The Court placed the present matter in categories (5) and (7).
• Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023 SCC OnLine SC 89) – Warned against treating every breached promise to marry as rape and underlined the need for evidence of fraudulent intent at the time of consent.

Although not expressly quoted, the Court’s reasoning resonates with earlier rulings such as Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) and Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013), all of which insist that the promise must be demonstrably false ab initio.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Consent under IPC §90. The Court reiterated that consent is vitiated only when obtained by fear of injury or misconception of fact. The prosecution failed to show any “inducement or misrepresentation” at the inception of the relationship.
2. Delay & Conduct. A 13-month delay coupled with continuous, voluntary meetings in hotels and lodges suggested the complainant was a willing participant, undermining allegations of compulsion.
3. Illegality of Promise. At the time of the alleged first intercourse, the complainant was still married. An unenforceable promise (inter-faith marriage opposed by parents, and her own subsisting marriage) cannot create a valid misconception of fact.
4. Bogus Threat Allegations. No cogent material indicated criminal intimidation (IPC §506). Relationship breakdown does not convert ordinary emotional friction into “threat to life or limb”.
5. Section 482 CrPC Powers. The Court invoked its own power (Art. 136/142) and emphasised that High Courts must prevent harassment of accused when prosecution is fundamentally flawed.

3.3 Impact on Future Jurisprudence

• Higher Evidentiary Threshold: Prosecutors must now adduce contemporaneous evidence showing that the accused never intended to marry from the outset.
• Protection of Young Accused: Courts are urged to consider the long-term stigma attached to students or early-career professionals if subjected to protracted rape trials on shaky grounds.
• Balanced Gender Justice: While reaffirming the seriousness of sexual offences, the Court seeks to curb their misuse as a tool of vengeance or coercion, thereby reinforcing public faith in criminal law.
• Section 482 Revitalised: The ruling will likely embolden High Courts to intervene earlier in similar fact situations, easing docket burden and saving judicial time.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Consent” (IPC §90) – Consent is legally valid if given voluntarily, without fear, coercion or deception. It becomes invalid only when obtained under a misconception of fact or threat.
• “Misconception of Fact” – A misunderstanding created by the accused about a crucial fact (e.g., intent to marry) that directly causes the victim to consent. The false promise must exist at the very beginning; later change of heart is insufficient.
• Bhajan Lal Categories – A seven-fold guideline laid down in 1992 to identify when criminal proceedings can be quashed. Categories (5) and (7) address inherently improbable allegations and mala fide motives respectively.
• Section 482 CrPC – Provides inherent powers to High Courts to make orders necessary (a) to give effect to any CrPC order, (b) to prevent abuse of process, or (c) to secure the ends of justice.

5. Conclusion

Amol Bhagwan Nehul fortifies a consistent Supreme Court line that criminal law must be shielded from private vendetta when consensual adult relationships collapse. Unless the prosecution can establish that the promise to marry was false at inception and instrumental in procuring sexual consent, courts should refrain from labelling the encounter as rape. The decision also revitalises Section 482 CrPC, encouraging prompt judicial intervention to prevent needless trials that could irreparably damage the accused’s future.

Ultimately, the ruling strikes a nuanced balance between punishing genuine sexual exploitation and protecting individuals—irrespective of gender—from the trauma of unjust prosecution.