Clarifying “False Promise to Marry” in Consensual Relationships: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal

Introduction

In Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal (2025 INSC 458), the Supreme Court of India examined whether a long-term consensual relationship could be construed as “rape on false promise of marriage,” even where the accused was in a subsisting marriage but separated from his spouse. The Appellant, a former judicial officer charged under Sections 376, 417, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sought discharge on the grounds that the complainant willingly participated in the relationship with complete knowledge of his marital status.

This case presented essential questions regarding the nature of consent, the meaning of a promise to marry, and the point at which legal proceedings for alleged offenses such as rape, cheating, or criminal intimidation should be terminated in the interests of justice. The ruling has significant implications for understanding the scope of consent and the threshold for criminal liability in situations where adults willingly enter into relationships with an expectation—real or purported—of marriage.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order refusing the Appellant’s discharge and allowed the criminal appeal. It concluded that:

• The physical relationship between the Appellant and the Complainant had been consensual and continued over a considerable period of time.
• The Complainant was aware from the outset that the Appellant was separated yet still legally married, negating the argument of a “false promise to marry.”
• The essential ingredients for the offenses of rape (Section 376 IPC), cheating (Section 417 IPC), or criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC) were not sufficiently established at the stage of framing charges.
• Given the totality of circumstances, continuing the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law and would unnecessarily prolong the suffering of both parties, who had long since moved on with separate lives.

As a result, the Supreme Court discharged the Appellant on the ground that the relationship did not amount to rape on the basis of a false promise, nor did the prosecution’s evidence support the elements of cheating or criminal intimidation.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court relied on several decisions to differentiate consensual relations from the offense of rape based on a false promise of marriage:

• Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608:
  This judgment clarified that “consent” for the purposes of Section 375 must involve active and reasoned deliberation. It further held that a mere breach of promise to marry, without intention to deceive at the outset, does not automatically lead to criminal liability under Section 376 IPC.
• Prashant Bharti vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2024 SCC Online SC 3375):
  The Supreme Court underscored that it is inconceivable for a woman to remain in a long-term sexual relationship absent voluntary consent on her part, unless there is factual evidence of deception or coercion from the beginning.
• Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46:
  The Court highlighted that consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage, especially when the prosecutrix is of mature age and clearly aware of the circumstances, does not necessarily amount to rape under Section 376 IPC. The judges recommended a case-by-case analysis based on the nature of consent, maturity of the parties, and factual context.

These precedents guided the Supreme Court in determining that, where parties are well aware of each other’s status and voluntarily engage in a relationship, the threshold for “misconception of fact” is not met simply because a dispute arises later.

B. Legal Reasoning

The primary legal reasoning of the Supreme Court centered on the notion of “consent” and “misconception of fact.” The Court emphasized that:

1. Knowledge of the Appellant’s marital status: The Complainant entered into a relationship fully understanding that the Appellant was still legally married (even if separated). Thus, any promise of marriage would be legally suspect, and the Complainant’s decision to continue the relationship could not be labeled as one undertaken under a “misconception of fact.”
2. Limited scope of criminal law at discharge stage: The Court refused to conduct a mini-trial; instead, it looked to the prima facie evidence presented in the FIR and charge sheet. The Court concluded that continuing the proceedings would be unmerited given the available facts.
3. Absence of material to support cheating and criminal intimidation: The Court noted that there were no significant facts to establish the dishonest inducement or conspiracy necessary for Section 417 IPC or the genuine threat required for Section 506 IPC.
4. Public policy and abuse of process: The Court recognized the trend of framing consensual relationships as rape or similar offenses when they end acrimoniously. It underscored that criminal law should not be misused to settle personal scores or vent dissatisfaction arising from a relationship that turned sour.

C. Impact

This ruling holds considerable weight for future criminal jurisprudence in India, especially regarding:

• Clarity on Consent: Courts and litigants are reminded that adult relationships with clear mutual understanding are unlikely to lead to criminal liability under Section 376 IPC unless there is a genuine falsehood at inception.
• Guidance on False Promise Cases: The Supreme Court has honed the evidentiary requirement to prove “misconception of fact” under Section 375 IPC. Mere failure to fulfill a promise—especially when the other party knows or should have known its precariousness—does not suffice to establish rape.
• Discouraging Abuse of Criminal Law: By discharging the Appellant, the Court prioritizes the prevention of abuse of legal provisions. This case signals to lower courts and complainants that allegations must be subjected to scrutiny where the factual matrix strongly suggests a consensual relationship.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Consent” under IPC: For sexual activity to be consensual, both parties must voluntarily agree to participate. Where a person is persuaded by genuine misinformation (e.g., a false identity or deception), consent is invalid. However, if both parties understand the situation, that consent is typically deemed valid.

“Misconception of Fact” and Rape: Under Section 376 IPC, rape charges can be brought if one party obtains sexual consent by a material misrepresentation. Yet, a “promise of marriage” is not necessarily treated as a factual representation unless it is proven to be intentionally false from the very beginning and is the sole reason the consent was given.

Discharge Stage (Section 227 of CrPC): This legal provision allows an accused person to be discharged if, after considering the record of the case and the documents submitted, the judge sees no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The judiciary aims to prevent unwarranted prosecutions or harassment.

False Promise vs. Failed Promise: Courts distinguish between a situation where someone never intended to fulfill a marriage promise (false from the start) and a scenario where a relationship breaks down naturally over time (which may entail an eventual failure to marry, but cannot be presumed a crime).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal underscores the importance of distinguishing consensual adult relationships from criminal acts borne out of deception. By focusing on the Complainant’s knowledge and voluntary participation, the Court has clarified that a continuing consensual relationship—even where one party is already married—does not by itself amount to rape on a false promise of marriage.

Ultimately, the ruling prevents the misuse of criminal provisions and reiterates that the bar for establishing offenses such as rape, cheating, or criminal intimidation is high, requiring specific factual proof of deception or coercion from the onset. This decision will guide future litigation, ensuring that the judiciary protects genuine victims while preventing unfounded criminal accusations from proceeding to trial.