Clarifying the Reach of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC: Transferees from Third‑Party Owners Can Maintain Objections in Execution

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar (since deceased) through LRs & Ors., 2025 INSC 1044, addresses a recurring and practically important problem in execution proceedings: when, and against whom, the bar contained in Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) applies.

The case arises from a layered property dispute in Goa involving:

an original owner (Mrs. Misquita),
a subsequent purchaser of the property (M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.),
a tenant (respondent no. 1 – Madan Waman Chodankar),
the tenant’s business partners (the “Maliks”), and
a later purchaser of the property (the appellant, Tahir V. Isani).

The immediate controversy is procedural but has substantial substantive consequences. A decree of ejectment in a partnership dispute (between the tenant and his partners) was being executed. The appellant, who had purchased the property from an independent owner (and obtained a surrender from the partners), resisted execution under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC claiming independent ownership and possession. The decree-holder’s legal representatives invoked Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, arguing that the appellant was a transferee pendente lite and therefore barred from maintaining such objections.

The High Court of Bombay at Goa accepted that argument and terminated the enquiry under Order XXI Rules 97–101. The Supreme Court has now reversed that view, drawing a crucial distinction between:

a transferee from the judgment-debtor (who is hit by Rule 102), and
a transferee from an independent owner not party to the suit (who is not).

The judgment clarifies the scope of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC and its interaction with the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”), while also emphasizing the need to balance finality of litigation with protection of bona fide third‑party property rights in execution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.) allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and restored the executing court’s decision to continue the enquiry under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC. In essence, the Court held that:

Order XXI Rule 102 CPC applies only where the obstructing party derives title from the judgment-debtor.
A person resisting or obstructing execution is barred from invoking Rules 97–101 only if:
- there is a decree for possession of immovable property;
- there is resistance/obstruction to its execution;
- the resisting party is a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property; and
- such transfer took place after institution of the suit in which the decree was passed.
The appellant did not trace his title from the judgment-debtor (the Maliks).
He purchased the property by registered sale deed from M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., who in turn had purchased it from the original owner. Neither Rizvi nor the original owner was a party to the partnership suit (Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B) in which the decree was passed. Therefore, the appellant was not a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of Rule 102.
Consequently, the bar under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC did not apply.
The appellant, as a third-party owner, was entitled to maintain an application under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC and to have his objections adjudicated under Rules 98 and 100.
The decree-holder’s belated attempt—after almost a decade of enquiry—to close the proceedings by invoking Rule 102 was rejected.
The Supreme Court characterized the application (Ext. D‑100) as belated and mala fide, especially since all material facts (including the surrender deed) were already on record as early as 2009.
The executing court must now complete the enquiry under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations in the Supreme Court’s order.

In short, the Court re‑affirms the protective purpose of Order XXI Rule 102 for decree-holders but firmly limits it to transferees of judgment-debtors, thereby preserving the right of independent third‑party owners to question execution proceedings that may affect their proprietary or possessory rights.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Background (in Brief)

To contextualize the legal issues, it is useful to recast the sequence of transactions and litigations:

Original ownership and tenancy:
- Mrs. Maria Eduardo Apolina Gonsalves Misquita owned a 477 sq. m. plot with a two-storey building in Panaji.
- On 22 February 1977, she leased a portion of the ground floor to respondent no. 1, Madan Waman Chodankar, on rent.
Partnership and sub‑tenancy arrangement:
- On 13 March 1977, respondent no. 1 entered into a partnership with the Maliks to run a hardware business on part of the leased premises.
- Under the partnership deed, the tenancy was to continue in the name of respondent no. 1 (he remained the tenant of record).
First sale of property to Rizvi and arrangements for redevelopment:
- On 16 January 1988, Mrs. Misquita sold the entire property to M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.
- On 16 April 1988, an agreement was entered into between Rizvi and the Maliks for surrender of possession to enable demolition and reconstruction, with a promise of re‑accommodation; respondent no. 1 signed as a confirming party.
Litigation over demolition and eviction:
- Respondent no. 1 (tenant) filed Regular Civil Suit No. 112/88/C against Rizvi to restrain demolition. He succeeded in 1999; the appeal was dismissed in 2001.
- Rizvi filed Rent Case No. 17/1989 before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of respondent no. 1 for alleged sub‑letting to the Maliks.
Partnership suit between tenant and Maliks:
- In 1996, respondent no. 1 filed Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B against the Maliks for dissolution of partnership, recovery of profits and ejectment.
- The Maliks’ written statement stated that all parties had surrendered their rights in favour of Rizvi on 11 April 1988.
Second sale of property and surrender to appellant:
- On 24 April 2007, Rizvi sold the property to the appellant, Tahir V. Isani, by registered sale deed.
- On 5 October 2007, the Maliks executed a surrender deed in favour of the appellant after receiving Rs 10 lakhs.
Ex parte decree in partnership suit and execution:
- On 24 April 2008, Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B was decreed ex parte in favour of respondent no. 1 (the Maliks stopped contesting).
- Respondent no. 1 initiated Execution Application No. 22 of 2008(B).
- In February 2009, the appellant objected under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC, asserting his ownership and possession.
Enquiry in execution and belated application under Rule 102:
- The executing court framed issues in 2013 and commenced evidence (including the appellant’s statement).
- In 2019, after nearly ten years of enquiry, the legal heirs of respondent no. 1 moved Application Ext. D‑100 seeking discontinuance of the enquiry, relying on Order XXI Rule 102 CPC and the doctrine of lis pendens.
- The executing court rejected this application on 17 September 2021.
High Court’s intervention:
- In Writ Petition No. 86 of 2022, the High Court set aside the executing court’s order, holding that the appellant was a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor and that his application under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 was barred by Rule 102.
Supreme Court appeal:
- The Supreme Court granted leave, ordered status quo in 2022, and has now allowed the appeal, restoring the executing court’s enquiry.

3.2 Statutory Framework: Order XXI Rules 97–102 CPC and Section 52 TPA

The decision closely examines the post‑1976 scheme of Order XXI CPC, which substantially restructured the mechanism for dealing with resistance or obstruction in execution:

Rule 97: Allows the decree-holder or auction purchaser to complain of resistance/obstruction to delivery of possession.
Rule 98: Provides for orders after adjudication on an application under Rule 97; if resistance is without just cause by the judgment-debtor or a transferee pendente lite (and others specified), the court must put the decree-holder in possession.
Rule 99: Allows any person (other than the judgment-debtor) who is dispossessed in execution to complain.
Rule 100: Orders on such complaints (Rule 99).
Rule 101: Provides that all questions (including right, title or interest) arising between parties to an application under Rule 97 or 99 shall be adjudicated by the executing court itself, and not by a separate suit.
Rule 102: A carve‑out. It declares that Rules 98 and 100 do not apply to resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, i.e., a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after institution of the suit in which the decree was passed.

Rule 102 incorporates, in execution, the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 TPA, which restricts transfers of property during pendency of litigation concerning rights in that property and ensures that decrees bind transferees from the parties.

The Supreme Court’s task, therefore, was not to deny the policy underlying Rule 102 (protection of decree-holders and finality of litigation), but to ensure that it is applied within its textual and conceptual limits.

3.3 Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

3.3.1 Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 14

Usha Sinha is the principal precedent relied upon by the Court to explain the object and operation of Order XXI Rule 102. In that case, the Supreme Court:

Quoted Rule 102 in extenso,
Held that it is founded on justice, equity and good conscience,
Recognised Rule 102 as an expression of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 TPA, and
Warned that without such a rule, decree-holders could be endlessly frustrated by successive transfers pendente lite.

The Court in Usha Sinha emphasized:

A transferee from a judgment-debtor is presumed aware of the litigation and cannot claim equity; he buys at his own risk.
Protecting such transferees unduly would make execution impossible: every attempt to enforce a decree could be stalled by fresh transfers.
Rule 102 bars such transferees from invoking the remedial machinery of Rules 98 and 100.

However, Usha Sinha also clarified the condition for invoking Rule 102:

“For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the decree-holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment-debtor.”

In Tahir V. Isani, the Supreme Court fully endorses the Usha Sinha rationale, but crucially distinguishes the present case on facts. Here, the appellant:

did not derive his title from the judgment-debtor (the Maliks), and
purchased from an independent owner (Rizvi) who was not a party to the suit which culminated in the decree under execution.

Thus, while Usha Sinha sets a strong bar against transferees from judgment-debtors, the present case decides who counts as such a transferee and when that bar applies.

3.3.2 Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew (2023) 20 SCC 76

The Court cites Jini Dhanrajgir to highlight the chronic problem that decree-holders’ real difficulties begin in execution, echoing a famous Privy Council observation in Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Sing (1872). The Court in Jini Dhanrajgir lamented that:

“The difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they have obtained a decree.”

This background is used in Tahir V. Isani to underline:

Execution law must be decree-holder friendly and should not be abused by judgment-debtors to delay or defeat decrees.
Yet, courts are bound to apply the law as it stands, even if the result feels inconvenient or burdensome to decree-holders.

The message is clear: Rule 102 is a shield for decree-holders—but only within its legitimate sphere. It cannot be expanded to extinguish the rights of genuine third‑party owners who are not transferees of the judgment-debtor.

3.3.3 Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566]

This English decision is the classic authority on the doctrine of lis pendens. It is quoted (via Usha Sinha) to justify why those who buy property during pending litigation concerning that property must take it subject to the court’s eventual decision.

The key idea drawn from Bellamy is that:

the necessities of mankind demand that litigation must come to an end, and
if transferees pendente lite could claim immunity, litigation would be endless, with each new transfer generating a new round of resistance to execution.

In Tahir V. Isani, this principle is acknowledged, but the Court carefully confines its reach to transferees from parties to the litigation, as Section 52 TPA itself stipulates.

3.3.4 Privy Council and Oudh decisions (Raj Durbhunga and Kuer Jang Bahadur)

The Court references:

Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Sing (Privy Council, 1872), and
Kuer Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India Ltd. (Oudh Judicial Commissioner’s Court, 1925),

to reinforce the longstanding concern that execution procedures should not be misused by judgment-debtors to defraud decree-holders. Again, these are invoked to justify a disciplined approach to execution, not to deprive bona fide third parties of their rights.

3.3.5 Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain (1981) 2 SCC 675

Although the Supreme Court does not discuss this decision at length, it notes that the executing court relied on it to hold that the doctrine of lis pendens did not bar the enquiry in the present case.

Dev Raj Dogra is part of the broader jurisprudence that:

recognizes the right of third parties claiming independent title or interest to be heard in execution, and
cautions against extending lis pendens beyond its proper reach so as to extinguish legitimate, independent rights.

By ultimately approving the executing court’s approach (and setting aside the High Court’s contrary view), the Supreme Court in Tahir V. Isani implicitly affirms the limited, context‑specific application of lis pendens in execution matters.

3.4 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.4.1 Purpose and limits of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC

The Court begins by acknowledging that the “whole scheme” of Rule 102 is to promote finality of litigation—captured in the Latin maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation). The rule is intended to prevent:

scrupulous judgment-debtors from frustrating execution by alienating property during litigation; and
their transferees from obstructing the decree-holder’s right to possession.

However, the Court emphasizes that Rule 102 is not a blanket provision. It can apply only if its statutory preconditions are met. These preconditions are systematically identified in paragraph 11 of the judgment.

3.4.2 The four ingredients for applying Rule 102

The Court crystallizes the applicability of Order XXI Rule 102 into four distinct requirements:

Existence of a decree for possession of immovable property.
There must be a decree that directs delivery of possession of some immovable property.
Resistance or obstruction in execution of that decree.
Someone is resisting or obstructing the execution of that possession decree.
Resistance by a transferee from the judgment-debtor.
The person causing resistance must be a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property.
Transfer pendente lite.
The transfer must have occurred after the institution of the suit in which that decree was ultimately passed.

If—and only if—all four conditions are satisfied, Rule 102 comes into play and bars the transferee pendente lite from invoking the protective machinery of Rules 98 and 100 (and by implication the substantive enquiry under Rules 97 and 101).

3.4.3 A crucial negative proposition: who Rule 102 does not cover

The Court then articulates a key negative proposition (paragraph 13):

Rule 102 applies only to a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the immovable property which was the subject-matter of the suit pendente lite.
If the resisting person does not trace his title from the judgment-debtor—that is, he received the property from someone other than the judgment-debtor—then the bar of Rule 102 does not apply.
Such a person is entitled to invoke Rules 97 to 101, even if his transfer took place during the pendency of the suit in which the decree was passed.

This is the new clarificatory holding of the judgment:

A transferee pendente lite from an independent, non‑party owner is not treated as a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor for purposes of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC and is therefore not barred from maintaining objections in execution under Rules 97–101.

The Court thus introduces the concept of “tracing title from the judgment-debtor” as the touchstone for determining whether Rule 102 can be used to shut out an objector in execution.

3.4.4 Application to the facts: chain of title and independent ownership

Applying this to the present case, the Court emphasizes:

The judgment-debtors in the ex parte decree were the Maliks (the partners of respondent no. 1 in the hardware business), not M/s Rizvi.
The appellant purchased the property from M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., which had earlier purchased from the original owner, Mrs. Misquita.
Neither Rizvi nor Mrs. Misquita was a party to Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B.

Thus, the Court holds (paragraph 15):

The appellant “does not trace his title from the judgment-debtor” (the Maliks).
He is a bona fide purchaser from an independent owner, and not a transferee of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of Rule 102.

Even though:

the appellant also obtained a surrender deed from the Maliks in October 2007, and
this surrender occurred during the pendency of the partnership suit,

the Court treats the appellant’s root of title as the sale deed from Rizvi, not the surrender from the Maliks. The surrender affected possession and tenancy-related aspects, but did not form the foundation of the appellant’s ownership. Therefore, for purposes of Rule 102, he is not a transferee of the judgment-debtor.

3.4.5 Nature of the underlying suit: not a title suit

The Court further notes (paragraph 6) that Special Civil Suit No. 97/1996/B was:

a suit for dissolution of partnership, recovery of profits and ejectment,
and did not adjudicate ownership over the property.

The title to the property lay with the owners (first Misquita, then Rizvi, then the appellant) and was never in issue in the partnership suit. This weakens any attempt to apply Section 52 TPA (which is triggered when “any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question” between parties to a suit) to transfers by parties who were not even impleaded in that suit.

Thus, the combination of:

the nature of the suit (inter se between tenant and partners), and
the chain of title (from owner to Rizvi to appellant),

removes the appellant from the scope of both Rule 102’s “transferee of judgment-debtor” and Section 52 TPA’s “transfer by a party to the suit”.

3.4.6 Belated invocation of Rule 102 and procedural fairness

The Court also gives procedural reasons for rejecting the respondent’s attempt to close the enquiry:

Delay and mala fides:
The appellant’s application under Rules 97 and 101 was filed in February 2009, fully disclosing:
- the 2007 sale deed in his favour, and
- the 2007 surrender deed executed by the Maliks.
Yet, the decree-holder’s legal heirs waited until 2019—a decade later, after issues had been framed (2013) and evidence had been recorded—to file Ext. D‑100 under Rule 102. The Court labels this delay as belated and mala fide.
Acquiescence in the enquiry:
The decree-holder had participated in the enquiry under Rules 97 and 101 for several years without objection. Attempting to terminate it at an advanced stage on a technical plea was found unjustifiable.
Right of third-party owners to protect against collusive decrees:
The Court endorses the executing court’s view that an independent owner like the appellant has a legitimate right to object to execution, particularly where there is a possibility of a collusive decree being used to dispossess him.

These procedural factors fortify the substantive holding and send a strong signal that Rule 102 cannot be deployed as a late-stage ambush to nullify carefully structured enquiries under Rules 97–101.

3.5 Impact and Significance

3.5.1 For third‑party purchasers and property transactions

The judgment provides important reassurance for bona fide purchasers:

A person who buys property from a non‑party owner (even during pendency of some other suit between tenants, partners, or other claimants) will not automatically be treated as a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor.
Such a purchaser retains the right to approach the executing court under Order XXI Rules 97–101 and to demand a full adjudication of his right, title and interest.

In practice, this:

encourages more careful due diligence as to who is a party to what litigation, and
reassures buyers that they are not completely helpless if they discover that some form of litigation is ongoing between others in relation to parts of the property (e.g., tenant–sub-tenant disputes, partnership disputes).

3.5.2 For decree-holders and execution strategy

Decree-holders still benefit from strong protection against transferees from their judgment-debtors:

Those who derive title from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit remain fully bound by Rule 102 and cannot derail execution by invoking Rules 97–101.

However, decree-holders must now be careful:

to distinguish between transferees from judgment-debtors and independent third‑party owners, and
to raise Rule 102 objections at the earliest possible stage, rather than after prolonged proceedings.

The judgment discourages the tactic of:

allowing a full enquiry under Rules 97–101 to proceed for years, and then
trying to abort it belatedly by citing Rule 102.

3.5.3 For executing courts

The decision reinforces the post‑1976 understanding that:

Executing courts have wide jurisdiction under Rule 101 to decide questions of right, title and interest in property arising out of resistance/obstruction.
Such questions must be decided within execution, not relegated to separate suits.
Before applying Rule 102, courts must formally test the four ingredients listed by the Supreme Court—especially whether the obstructing party truly “traces his title from the judgment-debtor”.

This encourages a more structured and principled approach to objections under Order XXI, rather than a reflexive tendency to treat every pendente lite transferee as barred.

3.5.4 For the doctrine of lis pendens

Doctrinally, the judgment highlights the limits of lis pendens:

Section 52 TPA and Rule 102 apply only where a party to the suit transfers the property in dispute.
They do not extend to transfers by persons who are not parties to the suit, nor to property that is not directly and specifically in issue in that suit.

This is a significant reaffirmation that lis pendens is not a universal freeze on all dealings in or around a disputed property. Rather, it operates within the specific contours of the litigation and parties before the court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Execution, decree-holder and judgment-debtor

Decree: The final formal expression of an adjudication by a civil court, resolving the rights of the parties.
Decree-holder: The person in whose favour the decree is passed.
Judgment-debtor: The person against whom the decree is passed and who must comply with it.
Execution: The process by which a court’s decree is actually carried out or enforced (e.g., taking possession of property, attaching assets, etc.).

4.2 Lis pendens and Section 52 TPA

Lis pendens literally means “pending litigation”.
Section 52 TPA provides that when a suit involving a right to immovable property is pending, the property cannot be transferred by any party to that suit so as to adversely affect the rights of any other party under any decree that may be passed.
Anyone who buys from a party to such a suit during its pendency is treated as if they stand in the shoes of that party and are bound by the eventual decree.

4.3 Transferee pendente lite under Order XXI Rule 102

A transferee pendente lite is someone who purchases or otherwise acquires rights in the property from a party to a suit while that suit is still pending.
Rule 102 specifically targets a person “to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit.”
Such a person cannot take advantage of Rules 98 and 100 to block execution or claim restoration of possession.

In this case, the key point is that:

A person is a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor only if he derives his title from the judgment-debtor.
If his title is derived from someone else altogether (e.g., an independent owner who is not a litigating party), he is not such a transferee for Rule 102, even if his purchase date falls during the pendency of some litigation.

4.4 Order XXI Rules 97–101: “Mini-trial” in execution

When someone resists or obstructs execution (Rule 97) or complains of dispossession (Rule 99), the executing court is required to hold an enquiry under Rules 98, 100 and 101.
Rule 101 mandates that all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, arising between the parties to such applications, shall be decided by the executing court itself—no separate suit is allowed.
This enquiry is often described as a “mini-trial”, with evidence, witnesses and arguments, conducted within the execution proceedings.

4.5 Collusive decree

A collusive decree is a decree obtained not after a genuine contest, but by agreement or understanding between parties with the objective of affecting the rights of third parties who are not before the court.
Third-party owners are entitled to challenge the effect of such decrees in execution if they are being used to dispossess or adversely affect them.
One of the central purposes of allowing objections under Rules 97–101 is precisely to provide a forum for such challenges.

5. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar refines and clarifies the law at the vital intersection of execution proceedings, lis pendens, and third‑party rights. The key takeaways are:

Rule 102 is a targeted bar, not a general one.
It applies only to transferees who derive their title from the judgment-debtor after the institution of the suit that culminates in the decree under execution.
Transferees from independent, non‑party owners are not caught.
Even if the transfer to them occurs during ongoing litigation between other parties, such transferees may still invoke Order XXI Rules 97–101 to protect their rights.
Section 52 TPA and Rule 102 must be applied with precision.
Lis pendens attaches only where:
- a suit directly concerns rights in immovable property, and
- the transfer is by a party to that suit.
It does not automatically defeat every transfer related in some way to the property.
Execution courts remain powerful forums for resolving title disputes arising out of resistance or obstruction.
Under Rule 101, such courts must fully adjudicate questions of right, title and interest, without relegating parties to separate suits, unless barred in a clearly applicable case by Rule 102.
Procedural fairness limits the late use of technical bars.
An attempt to invoke Rule 102 after years of enquiry and participation is liable to be treated as belated and mala fide, particularly where all relevant facts were known from the outset.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment reinforces a balanced approach:

Decree-holders are shielded from obstruction by transferees of their judgment-debtors, preserving the finality of decrees.
Third‑party bona fide purchasers from independent owners are not sacrificed on the altar of finality; they remain entitled to a fair hearing in execution.

The decision thus harmonizes the public interest in finality of litigation with the individual interest in protection of property rights, and offers clear guidance for future cases on the proper reach of Order XXI Rule 102 CPC.