Clarifying Deputation Tenure and Premature Repatriation under DoPT OM 17.06.2010 – Commentary on VUKKEM RAMBABU v. UNION OF INDIA

Clarifying Deputation Tenure and Premature Repatriation under DoPT OM 17.06.2010 – Commentary on VUKKEM RAMBABU v. UNION OF INDIA

I. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court’s judgment in VUKKEM RAMBABU v. UNION OF INDIA & Ors. (WPCT 94 of 2025, decided on 10 November 2025) revisits and clarifies the legal position governing deputation and premature repatriation of Central Government employees, with particular reference to the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT) Office Memorandum dated 17.06.2010 (referred to once as 17.06.2020 in the judgment, but clearly understood to be the 2010 OM).

The case arose from the petitioner’s posting on deputation as Principal Private Secretary (PPS) in the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Kolkata Bench, his subsequent premature repatriation to the parent department (the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal – ITAT), and his challenge to that repatriation as illegal, mala fide and contrary to the DoPT OM and Supreme Court precedent.

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, comprising Justice Madhuresh Prasad and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya, dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Kolkata Bench’s decision rejecting the challenge to repatriation.

The judgment is significant because it:

  • Reaffirms that a deputationist has no vested right to continue on the deputation post or to complete any “tenure” of deputation.
  • Clarifies the interpretation and application of para 9 of the DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010 on premature reversion.
  • Distinguishes tenure appointments (as discussed in Parshotam Lal Dhingra) from deputation positions.
  • Explains when a repatriation order is considered non-stigmatic and not requiring a full-fledged inquiry or disciplinary process.
  • Clarifies that Rule 255 of the General Financial Rules, 2005, dealing with transfers during leave, does not apply to repatriation.
  • Reiterates procedural requirements such as notice and approval of the competent authority under the DoPT OM.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background

  • The petitioner, Vukkem Rambabu, was serving as Senior Private Secretary in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Visakhapatnam.
  • He applied for the post of Principal Private Secretary (PPS) on deputation to the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Kolkata Bench, pursuant to a circular issued by the Principal Registrar, AFT, New Delhi.
  • After skill test and interview, an appointment letter dated 17.02.2022 was issued in his favour.
  • His parent department delayed relieving him; only pursuant to an order dated 19.01.2024 of the CAT, Jabalpur Bench (OA 493 of 2022), he was relieved and joined AFT Kolkata on 16.04.2024 – more than two years after the appointment order.
  • Within about six months of joining, he was issued a three months’ (90 days) notice of premature repatriation on 03.10.2024 by the Registrar, AFT Kolkata, acting on a communication from the AFT Principal Bench dated 24.09.2024.
  • He challenged the notice before CAT, Kolkata in OA No. 1513 of 2024, but withdrew it, with liberty to make a detailed representation. He made such representation on 04.11.2024.
  • While his representation was pending, an order dated 02.01.2025 was issued relieving him and repatriating him to his parent department.
  • He then filed OA 29 of 2025 with MA 70 of 2025 before CAT, Kolkata Bench, which was dismissed by order dated 25.03.2025.
  • The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution assailed the CAT’s order and the repatriation.

2. Petitioner’s Key Contentions

  1. Protection under DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010: He relied on para 9 of the DoPT OM on deputation, arguing that:
    • His deputation tenure could not be curtailed unless a specific “situation” for premature reversion arose.
    • Only unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance could justify such premature reversion, and these did not exist in his case.
  2. Reliance on Supreme Court precedents:
    • Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia, (2004) 2 SCC 65 – cited to contend that the repatriation order was hasty and mala fide.
    • Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 – cited to argue that where an appointment is for a specified period, the tenure cannot be cut short except through disciplinary proceedings and punishment.
  3. Violation of principles of natural justice: He contended that premature repatriation required prior hearing or at least observance of audi alteram partem (right to be heard), which was allegedly not afforded.
  4. Lack of approval from competent authority: He asserted that as his appointing authority was the Defence Minister, no repatriation notice could legally issue without prior approval of the Defence Minister.
  5. Mala fides and victimisation: He alleged that his dispute regarding TA advance and other issues with the Registrar-in-Charge, AFT Kolkata, led to victimisation and motivated repatriation.
  6. Illegality during leave: He argued that the relieving order was issued while he was on leave, in violation of Rule 255 of the General Financial Rules, 2005, which governs transfers during leave.

3. Respondents’ Key Contentions

  • The respondents highlighted his conduct at AFT Kolkata as a “situation” warranting premature repatriation:
    • On the very next day of joining, he sought TA advance after having already completed the journey, contrary to norms (advance is taken before travel).
    • He persistently sent communications and complaints directly to higher authorities (including the Chairperson, AFT and Principal Bench), bypassing the established official hierarchy.
    • He continued this pattern despite warnings/advisories from the Principal Bench, violating DoPT instructions and AFT guidelines dated 04.10.2022.
  • They asserted that his behaviour clearly reflected unsuitability and unsatisfactory conduct, justifying premature repatriation under the DoPT OM.
  • They pointed out that:
    • A 90 days’ notice of repatriation (dated 03.10.2024) was issued, complying with para 9 of the DoPT OM;
    • The repatriation order dated 02.01.2025 was issued after expiry of the notice period;
    • Prior approval of the Defence Minister (competent authority) was obtained on 31.12.2024.
  • They relied strongly on Supreme Court decisions: both of which hold that a deputationist has no right to continue on deputation or to be absorbed, and may be repatriated at any time.

4. Decision of the High Court

The Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the CAT’s order. Key conclusions:

  • Unsuitability and unsatisfactory conduct established: The Court accepted the respondents’ case that the petitioner’s persistent disregard of hierarchy and repeated complaints to higher authorities despite warnings rendered him unsuitable and his conduct unsatisfactory.
  • Compliance with DoPT OM (17.06.2010): The Court held that:
    • Para 9 of the OM was complied with by giving three months’ advance notice to both the lending department and the petitioner.
    • A legitimate “situation” for premature repatriation existed on facts.
  • Approval of competent authority present: The Defence Minister’s approval dated 31.12.2024 was obtained before issuance of repatriation order; the petitioner’s contrary plea was held to be factually incorrect.
  • No right to continue on deputation: Relying on Kunal Nanda and Ratilal B. Soni, the Court reiterated that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on deputation or to seek absorption.
  • Distinguishing petitioner’s precedents: Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil and Parshotam Lal Dhingra were held inapplicable. In particular, the Court underscored that the present case is not a tenure appointment case, but one of deputation governed by the DoPT OM.
  • Non-stigmatic repatriation: The repatriation notice and order were characterised as repatriation simpliciter, containing no stigma or adverse finding on the petitioner’s record. Hence, they did not attract disciplinary safeguards or full-fledged natural justice requirements.
  • GFR Rule 255 inapplicable: The Court held that Rule 255 of the General Financial Rules, 2005 applies to transfers, not to repatriation of deputationists. Therefore, issuance of the relieving order while the petitioner was on leave did not violate that rule.
  • No mala fides proved: Allegations against the Registrar-in-Charge were rejected because:
    • He was not impleaded personally, making such allegations impermissible;
    • The petitioner’s own affidavit stated that no complaint had been made against him; this was supported by RTI information;
    • Hence, there was no factual or legal basis for alleging mala fides or stigma.
  • Article 226 review limited: On the above findings, the Court held there was no ground to interfere with the CAT’s decision in exercise of the High Court’s discretionary writ jurisdiction.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36

This landmark Constitution Bench decision concerned the conditions under which termination of a government servant’s employment amounts to “dismissal”, “removal” or “reduction in rank” attracting the protections of Article 311 of the Constitution. One critical principle from Dhingra is that:

Even if a post is temporary, where an appointment is made for a specified period, the appointee acquires a right to hold the post for that entire period, which cannot be curtailed except by way of punishment (i.e., dismissal, removal, etc.).

The petitioner sought to apply this reasoning to his deputation “tenure”, arguing that his appointment as PPS on deputation for a defined period could not be prematurely cut short except through disciplinary proceedings.

The High Court, however, decisively distinguished Dhingra:

  • Dhingra dealt with tenure appointments in substantive service, not with deputation governed by a specific deputation policy (DoPT OM).
  • The Court held that the petitioner’s case was “not a case of tenure appointment” but one purely of deputation, to which the DoPT OM expressly applies.
  • Therefore, the rule in Dhingra about curtailment of a fixed-term substantive appointment did not translate into a vested right for a deputationist to complete his deputation term.

This distinction is important: a tenure post and a deputation posting carry very different legal incidents.

2. Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 65

This judgment deals with mala fides and arbitrary exercise of administrative power. The petitioner relied on paragraph 25 of this decision to argue that the speed and nature of his repatriation indicated mala fide intent.

The Calcutta High Court found this reliance misplaced:

  • The facts in Bahadursinh concerned an allegedly hasty, motivated, and procedurally defective adverse action.
  • In the present case:
    • A structured process was followed: a 90-day notice was issued under para 9 of the DoPT OM;
    • The competent authority’s approval was obtained;
    • The order was non-stigmatic and followed prolonged conduct-related issues.
  • Hence, no presumption of mala fides arose; the “post haste” test in Bahadursinh was inapplicable.

3. Kunal Nanda v. Union Of India & Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 362

This is a leading authority on the nature of rights of a deputationist. The Supreme Court in Kunal Nanda held:

“The basic principle underlying deputation itself is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position therein at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation.”

The Calcutta High Court reproduces and relies upon this core principle to:

  • Reject the petitioner’s claim that he had a vested right to continue in AFT Kolkata until the notional completion of his deputation “tenure”.
  • Emphasise that at any time, and at the instance of either the borrowing or lending department, a deputationist may be sent back to his parent cadre.

This reinforces a consistent judicial understanding that deputation is, by design, temporary and defeasible at the employer’s option, subject to overarching administrative fairness and policy.

4. Ratilal B. Soni & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1990 Supp SCC 243

In Ratilal B. Soni, the Supreme Court reiterated that employees on deputation do not acquire a right to be absorbed in the borrowing organisation and may be repatriated at any time. The case is often cited to buttress the “no right to absorption” and “no permanent expectation” doctrine in deputation law.

The High Court cites Ratilal alongside Kunal Nanda to reinforce that the petitioner’s claim to continue on deputation, or to treat his deputation as a protected tenure, is untenable.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Nature of Deputation and Rights of a Deputationist

The Court treats the issue as squarely governed by settled principles of deputation law:

  • A deputationist continues to hold a substantive lien in his parent department.
  • The deputation post is held only on a temporary, permissive basis, subject to the exigencies of the borrowing organisation.
  • He does not acquire:
    • a right to continue till the end of the sanctioned deputation term, or
    • a right to be absorbed in the borrowing organisation.

On this foundation, the Court concludes that the petitioner’s “substantial claim for continuing on the deputation post” is inconsistent with law as laid down by the Supreme Court.

2. Interpretation of Para 9 of DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010

Para 9 of the OM (quoted in the judgment) states:

“Normally, when an employee is appointed on deputation/foreign service, his services are placed at the disposal of the parent Ministry/Department at the end of the tenure. However, as and when a situation arises for premature reversion to the parent cadre of the deputationist, his services could be so returned after giving an advance notice of at least three months to the lending Ministry/ Department and the employee concerned.”

Key aspects of the Court’s reading:

  • The OM:
    • recognises a general rule: repatriation normally occurs at the end of deputation tenure; but
    • specifically permits premature repatriation “as and when a situation arises”, subject to a minimum 3-month notice.
  • The phrase “a situation arises” is deliberately broad. It is not confined only to:
    • unsuitability, or
    • unsatisfactory performance;
    although these are clearly typical examples.
  • The Court does not treat para 9 as creating a closed list of permissible grounds for premature repatriation. Instead, it focuses on:
    • The existence of a bona fide administrative situation justifying repatriation;
    • Compliance with the procedural requirement of three months’ notice.

Applying this to the facts:

  • The petitioner’s conduct (TA advance demand post-journey, repeated bypassing of hierarchy, ignoring warnings) constituted a “situation” justifying premature repatriation.
  • A 90-day notice was served on 03.10.2024, and the repatriation order was issued only on 02.01.2025 – after the notice period expired.
  • Hence, the DoPT OM was fully complied with.

3. Assessment of Unsuitability and Unsatisfactory Conduct

The Court carefully records the petitioner’s conduct at AFT Kolkata:

  • Raising TA advance claims despite already having undertaken the journey, contrary to the norm of seeking advance prior to travel.
  • Repeatedly making complaints and representations directly:
    • to the Chairperson, AFT;
    • to the Principal Bench;
    • to other higher authorities,
    even after receiving warning/advisory communications.
  • Persistently ignoring the official chain of command and DoPT instructions, as well as AFT guidelines dated 04.10.2022.

On these facts, the Court holds that:

“It is apparent from the petitioner’s conduct at AFT that one cannot find fault with the opinion of the authorities that he was ‘unsuitable’ and that his conduct was ‘unsatisfactory’.”

Thus, even if one assumed (as the petitioner did) that only “unsuitability” or “unsatisfactory performance” could justify premature repatriation, the Court finds that these conditions were actually met in his case.

4. Non-Stigmatic Repatriation and Natural Justice

A critical distinction in service law is between:

  • Non-stigmatic, simpliciter orders (e.g., routine transfers, repatriation, or terminations at the end of contract), which typically do not trigger a full disciplinary procedure; and
  • Stigmatic orders (which attach blame, dishonesty, or other serious findings), which effectively amount to punishment and invoke the need for:
    • formal charges,
    • inquiry,
    • opportunity to defend (natural justice),
    • and often Article 311 protections.

The Court emphasises that:

  • The 90-day notice (03.10.2024) and the relieving/repatriation order (02.01.2025) are repatriation simpliciter.
  • They do not contain:
    • any finding of misconduct,
    • any expression casting aspersions on integrity or character, or
    • any adverse remarks that could be treated as a stigma.
  • Accordingly, they are administrative orders of repatriation, grounded in suitability considerations, and do not attract the stricter natural justice requirements applicable to punitive orders.

While the petitioner invoked “principles of natural justice”, the Court implicitly holds that:

  • The requirement under para 9 of the DoPT OM of three months’ advance notice satisfies the procedural fairness requirement applicable to premature repatriation.
  • No separate, detailed pre-decisional hearing or departmental inquiry is mandated where:
    • the order is non-stigmatic; and
    • the deputationist is simply reverted to his parent cadre, where he continues his substantive employment.

5. Rejection of Mala Fides Allegation

Allegations of mala fides in administrative law are taken seriously, but they must meet strict standards:

  • The person alleged to be acting with mala fides (improper motive, personal vendetta) must ordinarily be:
    • specifically named and
    • impleaded as a party respondent in personal capacity,
    so that he can respond to the allegation.
  • The allegations must be pleaded with particularity, not in vague or general terms.

In this case:

  • The petitioner alleged that the Registrar-in-Charge had obstructed his TA advance and engineered his repatriation.
  • However:
    • The Registrar-in-Charge was not impleaded personally either before CAT or the High Court.
    • The petitioner’s own affidavit in reply stated that no complaint had been made against him, and this position was supported by an RTI reply.

The Court accordingly holds:

  • There is “no scope” to entertain such personal allegations against the Registrar-in-Charge “behind his back”.
  • Factually, the petitioner’s own statements and RTI information contradict his allegations.
  • Hence, the plea of mala fides and “stigmatic” repatriation is both factually and legally unsustainable.

6. Competent Authority and Approval Requirement

The petitioner contended that:

  • His appointing authority was the Defence Minister.
  • Therefore, any order curtailing his deputation (through premature repatriation) had to be preceded by the Defence Minister’s approval.

The respondents produced material showing that:

  • The notice of repatriation (03.10.2024) itself reflected that approval of the competent authority was contemplated; and
  • Approval of the Defence Minister was actually obtained on 31.12.2024, before the relieving/repatriation order dated 02.01.2025.

The Court accepts this and concludes:

  • The plea that repatriation was without approval of the competent authority is factually incorrect.
  • The requirement that premature repatriation be authorised at appropriate level of authority was fully met.

7. Inapplicability of Rule 255, General Financial Rules 2005

The petitioner argued that issuing a relieving order while he was on leave violated Rule 255 of the GFR, 2005, which regulates transfers during leave.

The Court’s reasoning:

  • Rule 255 governs transfers of government servants from one post/office to another.
  • The present case is not a transfer between posts within the same establishment or cadre; it is a repatriation of a deputationist from the borrowing organisation (AFT) back to his parent organisation (ITAT).
  • Repatriation of deputationists is governed by the DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010, not by the GFR’s transfer rules.

Thus, Rule 255 is held inapplicable, removing yet another plank of the petitioner’s challenge.

8. Limited Scope of Judicial Review under Article 226

Finally, the Court reminds that its jurisdiction under Article 226 is:

  • Discretionary and supervisory, not appellate.
  • Primarily concerned with:
    • illegality,
    • irrationality,
    • procedural impropriety, or
    • violation of fundamental/legal rights;
    not with re-appreciating factual assessments (e.g., whether the borrower found an officer “suitable”).

Given that:

  • The CAT had carefully examined the facts and held repatriation valid;
  • The DoPT OM was complied with;
  • The Defence Minister’s approval existed;
  • No stigma or mala fides were established;
  • The Supreme Court’s settled law on deputation clearly supported repatriation;

the High Court found no ground to interfere and therefore dismissed the writ petition without costs.

C. Impact and Future Implications

1. Reaffirmation of No Vested Right to Continue on Deputation

The judgment strongly reinforces that a deputationist cannot insist on continuing on a deputation post:

  • Deputation is at the pleasure and convenience of the borrowing and lending departments.
  • A deputationist’s primary legal right is to continue in service in his parent department, not to hold a specific deputation assignment.
  • This principle may discourage future litigation premised on a supposed “tenure right” in a deputation assignment.

2. Clarification on DoPT OM 17.06.2010 – Para 9

The Court’s application of para 9 clarifies:

  • “A situation arises” is not a narrow or formulaic test; unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct, or broader administrative requirements may qualify.
  • The core procedural safeguard is the three months’ advance notice to both the lending department and the employee.
  • So long as notice is given and reasons are not mala fide or arbitrary, premature repatriation is permissible.

In practice, this gives administrative authorities reasonable flexibility while assuring deputationists of notice and transparency.

3. Distinguishing Deputation from Tenure Appointments

By expressly stating that Parshotam Lal Dhingra (a tenure case) does not apply to deputation, the judgment:

  • Prevents conflation of tenure protections with deputation arrangements;
  • Will likely be cited to counter future arguments that a deputation “for x years” carries a legally enforceable right to serve out that period.

4. Discipline, Hierarchy, and Organisational Efficiency

The Court’s emphasis on:

  • strict adherence to official hierarchy, and
  • compliance with internal instructions and guidelines,

signals judicial support for:

  • maintaining administrative discipline in quasi-judicial institutions like AFT;
  • repatriation as a legitimate tool where a deputationist’s behaviour disrupts institutional functioning, even if no formal misconduct charges are framed.

5. Guidance on Pleading Mala Fides

The judgment underscores two critical points for future service litigation:

  • Those alleged to have acted with mala fides must be impleaded personally.
  • Self-contradictory pleadings (e.g., claiming to have made complaints, then swearing to the contrary in affidavit) will severely undermine a case.

This will likely encourage more careful and responsible pleading standards.

6. Demarcating Transfer and Repatriation

By holding that Rule 255 of GFR 2005 does not apply to repatriation, the Court:

  • clarifies that rules designed for intra-cadre transfers do not automatically extend to inter-organisational repatriation of deputationists;
  • confirms that repatriation is governed chiefly by DoPT’s deputation policy instruments, not general financial/transfer rules.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is Deputation?

Deputation means that:

  • An employee of one department/organisation (lending/parent department) is sent to work in another department/organisation (borrowing department).
  • The employee’s lien (permanent substantive post) remains in the parent department.
  • The deputation post is temporary, based on mutual administrative convenience.

The officer is called a deputationist.

2. What is Repatriation?

Repatriation means:

  • Sending the deputationist back to his parent department to serve on his substantive post.
  • It normally happens at the end of the deputation period, but can also happen prematurely if justified by administrative reasons and permitted by policy.

3. Tenure Post vs. Deputation Post

  • Tenure post: A post filled for a fixed, definite period by direct appointment or promotion. The appointee generally:
    • has a right to hold the post for the full term; and
    • cannot be removed before the term except through due process (disciplinary action, etc.).
  • Deputation post: A posting on “loan” from the parent department:
    • no absolute right to continue till the sanctioned end date;
    • subject to repatriation based on administrative convenience, as long as policy (e.g., DoPT OM) is followed.

4. Non-Stigmatic vs. Stigmatic Orders

  • Non-stigmatic order:
    • Neutral in language;
    • Does not record misconduct, dishonesty, or blame;
    • Examples: routine transfer, repatriation simpliciter, non-renewal of contract at end of term.
    • Generally does not require a full departmental inquiry.
  • Stigmatic order:
    • Contains adverse findings suggesting wrongdoing/moral blame;
    • Examples: orders referring to incompetence, misconduct, corruption;
    • Usually treated as punitive, requiring a proper inquiry and observance of principles of natural justice and Article 311 safeguards.

5. Principles of Natural Justice (in this Context)

In service law, natural justice typically means:

  • Notice of the proposed adverse action;
  • Opportunity to be heard or to make a representation;
  • Decision by an unbiased authority.

For premature repatriation of a deputationist:

  • The DoPT OM requires a three months’ advance notice to the deputationist and parent department.
  • If the repatriation is non-stigmatic, this notice is usually treated as adequate procedural fairness; a full disciplinary inquiry is not required.

6. Mala Fide in Administrative Law

Mala fide means:

  • an action taken with bad faith, improper motive, or personal vengeance, rather than for legitimate public reasons.

To prove mala fides:

  • The allegations must be:
    • specific and detailed, not vague;
    • directed at named individuals who are impleaded as parties;
    • supported by credible facts or documents.

Courts are slow to accept allegations of mala fide; they require a high standard of proof.

V. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in VUKKEM RAMBABU v. UNION OF INDIA & Ors. provides a clear and structured reaffirmation of the legal position relating to:

  • the temporary and defeasible nature of deputation;
  • the scope of premature repatriation under the DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010;
  • the absence of any vested right in a deputationist to continue on the deputation post or to complete a notional tenure;
  • the difference between tenure appointments and deputation posts and the inapplicability of Parshotam Lal Dhingra to the latter;
  • the circumstances in which repatriation is treated as non-stigmatic and does not attract full-fledged disciplinary safeguards;
  • the limited role of GFR’s transfer rules in deputation cases; and
  • the high threshold for proving mala fides and the necessity of proper pleading and impleadment.

By upholding the CAT’s decision and relying on Supreme Court precedents like Kunal Nanda and Ratilal B. Soni, the judgment strengthens doctrinal clarity in service jurisprudence on deputation. For administrators, it confirms that:

  • Premature repatriation is permissible where supported by bona fide administrative reasons,
  • provided the procedural safeguards of the DoPT OM (especially notice and competent approval) are followed.

For employees, the judgment is a reminder that:

  • Deputation is not a right but a privilege subject to institutional needs;
  • Reversion to the parent department, even before the end of an expected deputation period, is generally lawful if done fairly and non-stigmatically.

In the broader legal context, this decision will likely serve as an important reference point for future disputes concerning premature repatriation of deputationists, particularly within the framework of the DoPT OM dated 17.06.2010.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Calcutta High Court

Judge(s)

The Hon'ble Justice Madhuresh PrasadThe Hon'ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

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