V. Ramaswami Ayyar for K. Bajah Ayyar The question whether an application for delivery of possession of property purchased in court-auction related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in execution of which the property was sold came up for consideration before this Court in Krishna v. Subramania(2). But in that case the purchaser in court-auction was the decree-holder himself. It has been held in a number of cases in this Court that article 138 of the Indian Limitation Act was not applicable to proceedings for delivery of property by a decree-holder court-auction purchaser; see Rustomji on the Limitation Act, Fifth Edition, Volume II, page 1238. This was apparently based on the view that such proceedings came within section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code; see Kannan v. Avvulla Haji(3). Article 138 is however applicable to a stranger court-auction purchaser and a suit for recovery of property by such a purchaser is maintainable; see Krishna Satapasti v. Sarasvatula Sambasiva Row(1) which follows the decision in Kishori Mohun Roy Choudhry v. Chunder Nath Pal(2). The decision in Krishna Satapasti v. Sarasvatula Sambasiva Row(1) is cited with approval in Nadamuni Narayana Iyengar v. Veerabhadra Pillai(3). The stranger auction purchaser in such a case is not affected by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such a stranger purchaser is not a representative either of the decree-holder or of the judgment-debtor; see Nadamuni Narayana Iyengar v. Veerabhadra Pillai(3). He is the representative, if at all, of the judgment-debtor only and not of the decree-holder. The decisions in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan(4) and, Krishna v. Subramania(5) take the view that he is the representative of the judgment-debtor. The dispute in the present case is therefore one arising between the representatives of the same party. Section 47 consequently does not apply. The word “parties” in that section means parties whose interests are in conflict though they may not be arrayed on opposite sides in the suit; see Mulla, Civil Procedure Code, Tenth Edition, page 172. The decisions in Krishna Bhupati Devu Garu v. Venkataswamy(6), Anavarsada Khan Pani Sahib v. Misiri Khan Pani Sahib(7), Yegnasami Ayyar v. Chidambaranatha Mudaliar(8), Yagnasami Iyer v. Chidambaranatha Mudaliar(9), Budaraju Hanumantha Rao v. Allamneni Krishnamma(10), Raman Chettiar v. Chockkalinga Chetliar(11) and Ramakrishna Ayyar v. Mari Goundan(12) hold that a dispute between a party to a suit and his representative or one between the representatives of the same party is not governed by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decisions in Mangayya v. Sriramulu(13) and Vedaviasa Aiyar v. The Madura Hindu Labha Nidhi, Ltd.(14), when examined on the facts, are not opposed to the above view but support it. The same view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Maganlal v. Doshi Mulji(1), by the Allahabad High Court in Kedar Nath v. Arun Chandra Sinha(2) and by the Patna High Court in Munshi Rai v. Rup Narain(3). The decisions to the contrary in Subbutliayammal v. Chidambaram Asari(4) and Narasimha Ayyar v. Venkatachalapathi Ayyar(5), it is submitted, are not correct. The latter decision does not have regard to the fact that sub-section 3 of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, is controlled by sub-section 1 of the section. Sub-section 3 must be read as ancillary to sub-section 1 and not as an entirely independent provision; see Venubai v. Damodar Sbndur(6). The facts of the case in Prosurino Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal(7) were such that section 244 of the old Civil Procedure Code was made directly applicable to it. In Maganlal v. Doshi Mulji(1) Jenkins, C.J construed the above decision of the Privy Council in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal(7) and held that it did not dispense with the requirement of section 244 of the old Code which corresponds to section 47 of the new Code that the question must arise between the parties to the suit or their representatives. Ramesam, J. interpreted the Privy Council decision in the same maimer in Periyaya Ambalam v. Arulappan(8). The interpretation given by the learned Judges in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan(9) of the decision of the Privy Council in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal(7) is too wide and is not justified. The decision in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal(7) was applied and followed by the Privy Council in Ganapathy Mudaliar v. Krishnamachariar(10); but there is nothing in these decisions to justify an extended application of section 47. Before the section can apply, two conditions must be satisfied, viz., not only must the question involved relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, but it must arise between parties to the suit or their representatives, i.e, between parties or representatives whose interests are in conflict with each other; see Ramaswami Chettiar v. Meyyappan Servai(11). The terms of the section do not justify the overlooking of the latter condition. The decisions of the Division Bench in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan(1) given after the Full Bench judgment in the same case reported as Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan(2) and the decision in Jainulabdin Sahib v. Krishna Chettiar(3) have enlarged the scope of section 47 to an extent not justified by its terms.T.K Srinivasa Tatachari for second respondent.—Section 47 must be liberally construed. Having regard to the decision of the Privy Council in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal(4) the section applies to all cases where the questions involved relate to execution and the decisions regarding them affect the rights of the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors concerned. In that case the Privy Council do not deal with the question whether section 244 of the old Code was applicable to a dispute between a party and his own representative. But a liberal interpretation is put on that decision by the learned Judges in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan(2) and it is submitted that interpretation is correct. The latter decision goes to a great extent in favour of the respondent and may be upheld. As was observed in that case the auction purchaser may be regarded as the representative of the decree-holder for certain purposes. In addition to the cases already cited the decision in Sorimuthu Pillai v. Muthukrishna Pillai(5) also supports the respondent.Other respondents were not represented.