Clarification of Delay in Witness Statements and Remission Policy in Homicide Cases

I. Introduction

In Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. The State of Maharashtra (2025 INSC 387), the Supreme Court of India addressed two significant aspects in a homicide case: (1) the permissibility of delayed recordings of eyewitness statements and the evidentiary value that can still be attached to them, and (2) the correct legal framework and policy to be followed for considering the premature release (remission) of life convicts. The Judgment came in the context of the appellant, accused of murder, seeking an acquittal or, in the alternative, a lesser conviction and a more favorable remission policy.

The appellant (Accused No.1) was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murdering one Sukhdeo Mahadeorao Dhurve. The Trial Court’s conviction and sentence of life imprisonment were upheld by the High Court, leading the appellant to approach the Supreme Court. The case thus presented complex issues ranging from alleged communal rivalry, delayed statements of witnesses, the interplay of minor inconsistencies in prosecution evidence, and the proper threshold for granting remission under the applicable state policy.

II. Summary of the Judgment

After carefully analyzing the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Court rejected the contention that delayed witness statements, allegedly caused by communal disturbances (riots) right after the incident, should invalidate or severely undermine the prosecution case. It found the prosecution’s explanation of the delay reasonable in the context of the broader factual scenario.

The Court also dismissed the alternate argument that the appellant’s actions should be evaluated under Section 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). The repeated use of a knife, already in the possession of the appellant prior to the altercation, demonstrated sufficient intention to commit murder, thereby justifying conviction for murder.

On the remission aspect, the Court highlighted the principle that a life convict’s eligibility for premature release (remission) must be considered in accordance with the most beneficial state policy—either in force at the date of conviction or in use at the time of consideration for remission, whichever offers a more liberal or favorable approach. The Court noted that the appellant had served over 14 years of actual incarceration, making him potentially eligible for fresh consideration under the relevant policy. Therefore, the Court granted liberty to the appellant to file a fresh representation for remission under the appropriate policy.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

A number of earlier Supreme Court decisions were drawn upon to clarify two central issues in this case:

• Delayed Witness Statements: The Court referred to decisions in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 SCC 247, Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 457, State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh (2011) 4 SCC 786, Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 253, and other related cases, reaffirming that minor inconsistencies in witnesses’ accounts or a short delay in recording their statements will not by itself render the prosecution case unreliable, provided the delay has been adequately explained.
• Remission and Premature Release: The Court discussed State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216, Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1, BILKIS YAKUB RASOOL v. UNION OF INDIA (2024) 5 SCC 481, and Mafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2982). These cases outline the legal framework for determining the appropriate policy for remission and emphasize that the convict has to be considered under the policy yielding the most beneficial outcome, subject to fulfilling eligibility requirements.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Conviction of the Appellant: The appellant challenged the veracity of eyewitness testimony, alleging that witnesses might be biased due to purported communal tension. However, the Court reiterated that minor contradictions in witness accounts are acceptable so long as there is a core consistency in their testimony about the incident of murder. It further held that communal tension and a subsequent riot adequately explained the delay of two to three days in recording eyewitness statements, and such a delay did not compromise the integrity of the evidence.

2. No Exception to Murder: The defense attempted to argue that the appellant had no premeditated intent, pointing to a spontaneous quarrel. However, the Court noted that the appellant was carrying a knife and inflicted multiple stabs, which indicated the necessary intention to kill. Neither the spontaneity nor the alleged lack of motive could downgrade the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

3. Remission Policy: On the question of remission, the Court invoked established precedents confirming that a life convict’s eligibility for premature release rests on the policy at the time of conviction or any more liberal policy in effect on the date the application for release is considered. It recognized that the appellant had served a substantial portion of the sentence (14+ years of actual incarceration) and directed the State to consider his fresh plea for remission promptly, applying the correct legal position.

C. Impact of the Judgment

The Judgment clarifies two significant dimensions of criminal jurisprudence:

1. Limitations of Delayed Statements: It strengthens the stance that delayed statements, if convincingly justified (e.g., due to riots or law-and-order difficulties), should not automatically be deemed manipulative or unreliable. This stance will guide future courts in dealing with prosecutorial evidence recorded after some delays due to extraordinary circumstances.
2. Remission for Life Convicts: The Court’s direction to the State on applying the most beneficial policy for remission highlights how a convict’s rehabilitation prospects cannot be overlooked, especially when a considerable portion of the sentence has been served. This ensures a fair and uniform standard across jurisdictions for prisoners seeking early release.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 302 (IPC) – This section prescribes the punishment for murder. It mandates a sentence of death or life imprisonment (with a possible fine).
• Common Intention (Section 34, IPC) – When a criminal act is committed by multiple people in furtherance of a shared intention, each participant is equally liable for the act.
• Delay in Recording Statements (Section 161, CrPC) – Witness statements must generally be recorded promptly. However, where extraordinary circumstances (like communal violence) impede speedy collection of evidence, a short delay, if sufficiently explained, does not invalidate the evidence.
• Remission Policy (Premature Release) – A life convict can seek release before completing the entire sentence based on state policies. Courts have mandated that the policy in force at the time of conviction, or if a more lenient policy exists at the time of consideration, governs the remission application.

V. Conclusion

The Judgment in Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. The State of Maharashtra reaffirms that consistent testimony, even if recorded after a justifiable delay, can still prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a murder case. The Court rejected the plea to downscale the offense from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, emphasizing the demonstrable premeditation in using a knife. Significantly, the Court once again underscored the principle that state policy for remission must be applied in the most beneficial manner to the convict, striking a balance between public safety and fair treatment for those who have served a large portion of their sentences.

In essence, the Judgment clarifies that legitimate delays in investigative procedure—when supported by credible explanations—do not automatically vitiate a prosecution case, and that life convicts, once they have served substantial time in incarceration, retain the right to be fairly and promptly considered for remission under the most suitable policy in force.