Citizenship by Birth Overriding Adverse Police Reports: Madras High Court on Passports for Children of Sri Lankan Refugees

Citizenship by Birth Overriding Adverse Police Reports: Madras High Court on Passports for Children of Sri Lankan Refugees

1. Introduction

The judgment in Gokuleswaran v. The Regional Passport Officer & Others, W.P.(MD) No.23811 of 2025, decided by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on 14 October 2025 by Justice P.T. Asha, addresses a recurrent and sensitive legal issue: whether a person born in India to Sri Lankan Tamil refugee parents before 01.07.1987 is an Indian citizen by birth and, if so, whether passport authorities and police can deny or delay the grant of a passport by branding him a “Sri Lankan suspect”.

The ruling is significant because it:

  • Reaffirms the scope of Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 on citizenship by birth for persons born in India before 01.07.1987; and
  • Clarifies that adverse police reports based solely on the foreign nationality of parents or refugee status cannot override statutory citizenship when the person satisfies the requirements of Section 3(1)(a).

In practical terms, the judgment has important consequences for children of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees born in India before 01.07.1987 and for the manner in which passport authorities and police conduct and act upon verification in such cases.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Petitioner and His Background

The petitioner, Gokuleswaran, was born on 09.02.1986 at the Government Hospital, Tiruchirappalli, Tamil Nadu. His parents had migrated from Sri Lanka in 1983 as refugees and were accommodated in the Sri Lankan Tamils Rehabilitation Camp at Kottapattu, Tiruchirappalli. He has always been resident in India.

Claiming that he is an Indian citizen by birth under Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the petitioner applied for an Indian passport on 22.02.2024 (Application File No. TR2066290806924).

2.2 Objections Raised by the Passport Authority and Police

  • On 27.02.2024, the first respondent (Regional Passport Officer, Tiruchirappalli) issued an objection letter.
  • On 01.03.2024, the first respondent informed the petitioner that an adverse police report had been received from the second respondent (Commissioner of Police, Tiruchirappalli) labelling him:
    “Suspect in Sri Lankan.”
  • The petitioner appeared before the first respondent, produced his original records (including birth certificate, educational records, Aadhaar) and copies of judicial orders recognising citizenship by birth, and explained that he is an Indian citizen by birth.
  • Despite this, on 11.09.2024, the first respondent sent a reminder letter seeking further response.
  • The petitioner submitted a detailed representation on 09.10.2024, reiterating his entitlement to citizenship by birth.
  • Once again, he was summoned on 19.03.2025 by the first respondent to offer an explanation, with continued reference to the same adverse police report.

As the passport was not issued despite multiple rounds of explanation and verification, the petitioner approached the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the Regional Passport Officer to process and issue his passport.

2.3 Stand of the Respondents

(a) Regional Passport Officer (R1)

In the counter affidavit, the first respondent stated:

  • The petitioner had enclosed his Transfer Certificate, +2 Mark Sheet, Birth Certificate and Aadhaar Card with his application.
  • An adverse police verification report was received from the Commissioner of Police with the remark “Suspect in Sri Lankan”.
  • The petitioner had allegedly not produced “sufficient documents” to establish his Indian citizenship.
  • On verification, the Tiruchirappalli City Municipal Corporation confirmed that the petitioner’s birth certificate was true and genuine.
  • Despite this confirmation, the second respondent reiterated its adverse report, stating that the petitioner's parents are of Sri Lankan nationality, and hence he was not eligible for an Indian passport.

(b) Police Authorities (R2 & R3)

  • The second respondent is the Commissioner of Police, Tiruchirappalli, who forwarded the adverse verification report.
  • The third respondent, the Inspector of Police, K.K. Nagar Police Station, filed a counter asserting:
    • The petitioner is of Sri Lankan nationality;
    • He is residing as a refugee in the Sri Lankan Tamil Rehabilitation Camp at Kottapattu under the jurisdiction of R3;
    • A criminal case is pending against him.

2.4 Submissions of Counsel

  • For the Petitioner (Mr. I. Romeo Roy Alfred):
    • Relied on Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 to contend that the petitioner, being born in India on 09.02.1986, is a citizen by birth.
    • Invoked the decision in Nalini v. Regional Passport Officer, 2022 (6) CTC 245, where the Madras High Court held that a person born in India prior to 01.07.1987 is a citizen by birth.
  • For the Regional Passport Officer (R1) (Mr. K. Govindarajan, Deputy Solicitor General of India):
    • Submitted that the petitioner's parents are Sri Lankan nationals and have not acquired Indian citizenship.
    • Fairly conceded that, since the petitioner was born prior to 01.07.1987, he would be an Indian citizen by birth.
  • For the State Police (R2 & R3) (Mr. S. Prakash, Government Advocate (Criminal Side)):
    • Supported the adverse police report and described the petitioner as a Sri Lankan national and refugee with a pending criminal case.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Justice P.T. Asha allowed the writ petition and held that:

  1. The petitioner was born on 09.02.1986 in Tiruchirappalli. His birth certificate is genuine and is corroborated by his educational records.
  2. Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, any person born in India on or after 25/26.01.1950 and before 01.07.1987 is a citizen of India by birth, irrespective of the nationality of the parents.
  3. Since the petitioner’s birth is prior to 01.07.1987, he is an Indian citizen by birth, even though his parents are Sri Lankan refugees.
  4. Once citizenship by birth is established and the genuineness of documents is verified, an adverse police report based solely on the parents’ Sri Lankan nationality cannot override this statutory right.
  5. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to be issued a passport. The writ petition was allowed and the first respondent was directed to process and issue the passport within eight weeks of receipt of the order.

The Court did not treat the police description of the petitioner as a “Sri Lankan refugee” or the reference to a pending criminal case as a legal bar to recognizing his citizenship or issuing the passport in this proceeding.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework: Citizenship by Birth and Passports

4.1.1 Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955

Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (as it stands after subsequent amendments) provides, in substance, that:

Every person born in India on or after 26 January 1950 but before 1 July 1987 shall be a citizen of India by birth.

The judgment paraphrases this as persons born “on or after 25.01.1950 but before 01.07.1987”, but the critical cut-off for the purpose of this case is clearly 01.07.1987. The key features of Section 3(1)(a) are:

  • Citizenship accrues automatically by birth if the temporal and territorial conditions are met.
  • There is no requirement that either parent must be an Indian citizen during this period.
  • Nationality or immigration status of the parents does not affect the child’s citizenship under this clause (for births before 01.07.1987).

Later amendments (especially post-1987 and 2004) have imposed stricter requisitos for children born in India, but they do not retrospectively affect births prior to 01.07.1987.

4.1.2 Passports and Citizenship

Under the Passports Act, 1967 and related rules:

  • A passport is normally issued only to an Indian citizen.
  • Authorities may verify identity, residence, and criminal background through police verification.
  • However, passport authorities are not empowered to invent new criteria for citizenship contrary to the Citizenship Act.

Thus, when a person’s citizenship is statutorily conferred by Section 3(1)(a), the role of the passport authority is essentially to:

  • Verify the authenticity of documents (e.g., birth certificate); and
  • Act upon that verification unless any genuine legal disqualification clearly applies.

4.2 Precedent Relied On: Nalini v. Regional Passport Officer (2022)

The Court explicitly relies on the decision in Nalini v. Regional Passport Officer, 2022 (6) CTC 245. In Nalini, the Madras High Court held that:

A person born in India prior to 01.07.1987 is a citizen of India by birth, as per Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.

Although the present judgment does not reproduce extensive passages from Nalini, its reliance serves several purposes:

  1. It reaffirms the settled interpretation that pre-01.07.1987 births in India are sufficient for citizenship by birth, without parental citizenship requirements.
  2. It shows that the issue is not res integra (not a novel or undecided question); the Madras High Court has already pronounced on this legal point.
  3. It underscores that passport authorities must conform to this interpretation in their decision-making and cannot treat children of refugees or foreign nationals born before 01.07.1987 as “suspects” in nationality merely because of parental origin.

Thus, Nalini provides the doctrinal anchor for this judgment: when the statutory conditions of Section 3(1)(a) are demonstrably satisfied, citizenship is automatic and non-discretionary.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 Establishing the Fact of Birth in India

The Court first focuses on the factual foundation:

  • The petitioner was born on 09.02.1986 at the Government Hospital, Tiruchirappalli.
  • The birth certificate was verified by the Tiruchirappalli City Municipal Corporation and found to be genuine.
  • The same date of birth is reflected in his SSLC and HSC mark sheets, adding consistency and corroboration.

This meticulous verification process is crucial because Section 3(1)(a) operates on the fact of birth in India during a defined period Once the genuineness of the birth certificate is confirmed by the competent authority, there is no factual ambiguity left to be resolved.

4.3.2 Application of Section 3(1)(a) Citizenship Act

Having established the factual premise, the Court applies the law in straightforward terms:

Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, any person born in India on or after 25.01.1950 but before 01.07.1987 is a citizen of India by birth, irrespective of the nationality of the parents. Therefore, since the petitioner was born on 09.02.1986, i.e., prior to the cut-off date, he is an Indian citizen by birth.

Key aspects of this reasoning:

  • The Court emphasizes that the nationality of the parents is irrelevant for births during this period.
  • The petitioner's parents being Sri Lankan refugees does not in any way dilute his citizenship by birth.
  • The language of Section 3(1)(a) is treated as clear and mandatory; there is no room for discretion once its prerequisites are met.

4.3.3 Rejection of the Adverse Police Report

The crux of the administrative controversy was the adverse police report describing the petitioner as a:

“Suspect in Sri Lankan.”

The Court directly addresses the legal value of such a report in the face of statutory citizenship:

Once citizenship by birth is established and the genuineness of the documents is verified, the adverse police report referring to his parents’ nationality cannot override the statutory right conferred by Section 3(1)(a).

This is a critical articulation of principle:

  • Police verification is an administrative tool to assist the passport authority; it cannot create a parallel regime of nationality determination in conflict with the Citizenship Act.
  • An adverse remark based solely on the foreign nationality or refugee status of parents is legally irrelevant to a person’s citizenship by birth under Section 3(1)(a).
  • Administrative authorities (passport office and police) are bound by the statute and cannot “override” it through internal notings or reports.

4.3.4 Direction to Issue Passport

Having found that the petitioner is an Indian citizen by birth, the Court holds that he is entitled to a passport. It therefore:

  • Allows the writ petition; and
  • Directs the Regional Passport Officer to process and issue the passport within eight weeks of receiving the order.

The grant of a Writ of Mandamus indicates that the Court viewed the duty of the passport authority in this situation as a legal obligation, not a matter of administrative grace or policy discretion.

Although the third respondent had mentioned a pending criminal case, the judgment does not explore that question in detail. The central dispute argued before the Court and adjudicated was the citizenship status of the petitioner and the legality of denying a passport on the ground that he was a “Sri Lankan suspect”. The decision makes it clear that, at least on the citizenship front, there is no legal impediment.

4.4 Administrative Law Dimensions: Limits on Police and Passport Authority

The judgment also has a strong administrative law undercurrent. It implicitly lays down the following propositions:

  1. Statutory Supremacy: Where the legislature has clearly defined citizenship by birth, executive agencies cannot re-interpret or dilute those conditions through circulars, internal guidelines, or police notings.
  2. Scope of Police Verification: Police verification in passport matters is meant to verify:
    • Identity and address;
    • Past conduct and criminal antecedents;
    • Genuineness of stated particulars.
    It is not meant to substitute the statutory test for citizenship.
  3. No Parallel Adjudication of Citizenship: Police authorities cannot unilaterally brand a statutorily recognized Indian citizen as a foreign national or “suspect” and thereby deny him legal rights.
  4. Mandamus as a Check on Administrative Overreach: The Court uses the remedy of mandamus to compel compliance with statutory duties and to check arbitrary administrative behaviour based on misconceptions about refugee offspring.

4.5 Treatment of Children of Refugees Under Indian Citizenship Law

Although not elaborated in theoretical terms, the judgment carries important substantive implications for refugee jurisprudence and citizenship:

  • India has hosted large numbers of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees who fled civil conflict in Sri Lanka, many of whom have lived in camps in Tamil Nadu for decades.
  • Their children born in India before 01.07.1987 fall squarely within Section 3(1)(a) and are citizens by birth — irrespective of the refugee or foreign national status of the parents.
  • The judgment confirms that being born in a refugee camp in India is still being born “in India” for the purposes of Section 3(1)(a).
  • Administrative practices that treat such children as “Sri Lankan” merely because they live in refugee camps are legally unsustainable in the face of Section 3(1)(a).

This contributes to a more coherent and rights-based approach: children of refugees, if statutorily entitled to citizenship, are not to be perpetually held in a legal limbo or denied documentation.

4.6 Impact and Future Implications

4.6.1 For Passport Authorities

The judgment sends a clear message to Regional Passport Offices in Tamil Nadu and, by persuasive value, across India:

  • Where an applicant produces a genuine birth certificate showing birth in India before 01.07.1987, passport authorities must presume Indian citizenship by birth unless there is cogent evidence to the contrary (e.g., forged documents).
  • Authorities cannot deny or indefinitely delay issuance on the basis that the parents are foreign nationals or refugees.
  • They must resist blanket reliance on adverse police reports expressing nationality “suspicions” not grounded in law.

4.6.2 For Police Agencies

For the police, the ruling implies:

  • Police verification reports must be fact-based and legally informed, not merely reflective of longstanding administrative assumptions that all camp residents are “Sri Lankan”.
  • Descriptions like “Suspect in Sri Lankan” without more cannot determine nationality where the statutory test of citizenship by birth is satisfied.
  • They must differentiate between the status of first-generation refugees and that of children who may be Indian citizens by birth.

4.6.3 For Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Communities

This judgment is particularly important for:

  • Persons born in India in the early and mid-1980s to Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.
  • Individuals who have been denied passports or other documents on the assumption that they are Sri Lankan nationals.

Such individuals can rely on this ruling (alongside Nalini) to:

  • Assert their citizenship by birth under Section 3(1)(a); and
  • Challenge administrative refusals that ignore the statute and focus only on parental nationality.

4.6.4 For Wider Citizenship Jurisprudence

While the decision does not reshape the statute, it strengthens doctrinal clarity by:

  • Reasserting that citizenship by birth is a matter of law, not executive discretion.
  • Discouraging the creation of a shadow regime of extra-statutory nationality assessments for children of refugees or migrants.
  • Aligning practice with the intent of the Citizenship Act, 1955, especially for earlier cohorts of births.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Writ of Mandamus under Article 226

A Writ of Mandamus is an order issued by a High Court (or the Supreme Court) directing a public authority to perform a public or statutory duty that it has failed or refused to perform.

In this case:

  • The Regional Passport Officer has a statutory duty to issue passports to eligible Indian citizens.
  • Once the Court found that the petitioner is an Indian citizen by birth, there was no lawful basis for refusing his passport.
  • The Court therefore issued mandamus to compel the authority to process and issue the passport within a fixed period.

5.2 Citizenship by Birth under Section 3 of the Citizenship Act

Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 deals with citizenship by birth. The regime can be broadly understood in three phases:

  1. 26.01.1950 – 30.06.1987:
    Any person born in India during this period is a citizen by birth, irrespective of the nationality of the parents (Section 3(1)(a)).
  2. 01.07.1987 – 02.12.2004:
    At least one parent must be an Indian citizen at the time of the person’s birth.
  3. On or after 03.12.2004:
    At least one parent must be an Indian citizen and the other must not be an illegal migrant.

The petitioner in this case falls in the first phase, where the law is the most generous: no parental nationality conditions are imposed.

5.3 Police Verification and Passport Issuance

In India, passport applications typically trigger a police verification process, which aims to:

  • Confirm the applicant’s identity and residential address;
  • Check for criminal records or pending cases;
  • Detect misrepresentation or fraud in the application.

However:

  • Police reports are advisory inputs; they cannot modify statutory concepts of citizenship.
  • Labelling someone a “foreigner” or “suspect” without legal backing cannot defeat citizenship conferred by Parliament.

5.4 Refugee Status vs. Citizenship

A key conceptual confusion often seen in practice is between:

  • Refugee status (applies to persons who fled another country and have not been granted citizenship in the host country); and
  • Citizenship by birth (conferred by domestic law based on place and time of birth, irrespective of parents’ refugee status in certain periods).

The Court clarifies, in effect, that:

  • Parents may remain refugees or foreign nationals, but their children born in India in the relevant statutory window can be full Indian citizens by birth.
  • Such children cannot be perpetually treated as “refugees” solely because of their parents’ status.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Gokuleswaran v. The Regional Passport Officer & Others is an important reaffirmation of a fundamental principle of Indian citizenship law: for births in India prior to 01.07.1987, citizenship by birth under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 is automatic and unconditional as to parental nationality.

By:

  • Recognising the petitioner, born in 1986 to Sri Lankan Tamil refugee parents, as an Indian citizen by birth;
  • Holding that an adverse police report based solely on parents’ Sri Lankan nationality cannot override that status; and
  • Issuing a mandamus directing the passport authority to issue him a passport within eight weeks,

the Madras High Court has:

  • Corrected a recurring administrative tendency to conflate refugee parentage with non-citizenship of children;
  • Provided clear guidance to passport authorities and police on the limits of their role in nationality-related matters;
  • Afforded concrete relief to similarly placed children of refugees who are legally Indian citizens but practically undocumented.

In the broader legal context, the judgment consolidates and operationalises the interpretation laid down in Nalini v. Regional Passport Officer, promoting a citizenship regime that is governed by statutory text rather than administrative suspicion. It thus stands as a vital precedent for future cases involving children of refugees and foreign nationals born in India before 01.07.1987 who seek recognition of their rightful status as Indian citizens and the documentation that naturally flows from it.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Madras High Court

Judge(s)

HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE P.T.ASHA

Advocates

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