Candidacy Begins on Nomination: Karnataka High Court Reaffirms that Only Post‑Nomination Acts Can Constitute “Corrupt Practices” under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act

Introduction

In Election Petition No. 3 of 2024, the Karnataka High Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.I. Arun) dismissed at the threshold a challenge to the election of Smt. Prabha Mallikarjun from the Davanagere Lok Sabha constituency. The petitioner, Mr. Suban Khan, had alleged bribery in violation of Section 123(1)(A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA). The core legal question was narrow yet decisive: when does a person become a “candidate” for the purposes of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the RPA?

The Court reaffirmed a well-settled principle from Supreme Court precedents—candidacy commences only upon filing of nomination under Section 79(b). Therefore, acts alleged to be corrupt practices that occur before nomination cannot be used to void an election under Section 100 read with Section 123. Applying this to the pleadings, the Court held that all alleged acts occurred before the respondent filed her nomination and, even if assumed true, did not disclose a cause of action. Consequently, the petition was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

Background and Parties

- Petitioner: Mr. Suban Khan, voter/election petitioner challenging the returned candidate’s election.
- Respondent: Smt. Prabha Mallikarjun, returned candidate from the Indian National Congress (INC) for the Davanagere Parliamentary Constituency.

The petition initially challenged two categories of acts:

• Issuance of the “Congress Guarantee Card” allegedly amounting to bribery.
• Distribution of cash and goods to voters, specifically alleged on 06.04.2024.

During arguments, the petitioner expressly abandoned the “Congress Guarantee Card” ground in view of an earlier Karnataka High Court ruling in E.P. No. 7 of 2024 rejecting that line of challenge. The petitioner confined the challenge to specific instances pleaded in paragraphs 12 and 12A of the petition—each pegged to the date 06.04.2024. The respondent sought rejection of the petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, contending that the alleged acts preceded the respondent’s nomination on 12.04.2024 and cannot, in law, constitute corrupt practices attributable to a “candidate.”

Key Issue

What is the legally relevant date on which a person becomes a “candidate” for the purposes of Section 123 of the RPA, and can acts alleged before that date sustain an election petition seeking to void an election?

Summary of the Judgment

- The Court held that a person becomes a “candidate” only upon filing nomination, as defined in Section 79(b) of the RPA.
- Relying on Supreme Court precedents, it ruled that acts alleged as corrupt practices that occur prior to nomination are legally irrelevant for Section 123.
- Since all alleged instances of bribery (cash distribution and pressure cookers) were pleaded as having occurred on 06.04.2024—before the respondent filed her nomination on 12.04.2024—the petition, even if its factual assertions are taken as true, fails to disclose a cause of action.
- The petition was therefore rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. Pending applications were disposed of.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Subhash Desai v. Sharad J. Rao and Others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 446

  The Supreme Court explicitly held that allegations pertaining to the period prior to the filing of nomination papers cannot amount to corrupt practices for the purposes of an election petition. The High Court quoted paragraph 18 of this decision, which anchors the “cut-off” at the date of filing nomination, drawing also on the statutory definition in Section 79(b) and referencing Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain.

• Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975)

  Among its many holdings, the case clarified that the election law uses the expression “candidate” with reference to several offences and liabilities, and a temporal anchor is needed—otherwise a person could be indefinitely treated as a candidate. The High Court used this to reinforce that legal responsibility under election offences/practices attaches only after candidacy arises by nomination.

• Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba, (1994) 2 SCC 392

  The Supreme Court reiterated that allegations anterior to the nomination date cannot constitute corrupt practices. The Karnataka High Court cited this to reaffirm the principle and to align the timeline test for evaluating pleadings in election petitions.

• Karnataka High Court, E.P. No. 7 of 2024 (regarding “Congress Guarantee Card”)

  Although not analyzed afresh in this order (because the petitioner did not press this ground), the Court acknowledged that an earlier judgment of the same High Court had already rejected the proposition that issuance of the “Congress Guarantee Card” per se constitutes a corrupt practice. That prior ruling indirectly shaped the petitioner’s litigation strategy and narrowed the live issue here to the alleged bribery on 06.04.2024.

2) Statutory Provisions and Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a clear statutory sequence:

• Section 123(1)(A), RPA (Bribery):

  Defines bribery as any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent, or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, to induce an elector to vote or refrain from voting. The provision expressly ties liability to the status of being a “candidate” (and to the “election agent,” who exists only post‑nomination).

• Section 79(b), RPA (Definition of “candidate”):

  “Candidate” means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election. The High Court emphasized this definition to demarcate the onset of legal responsibility for corrupt practices.

• Application to Facts:

  - Respondent’s nomination was filed on 12.04.2024 and accepted thereafter; she was earlier named by the party on 23.03.2024.
  - All allegations of bribery (cash and pressure cookers) were pleaded as acts of 06.04.2024.
  - Therefore, as a matter of law, these acts—occurring before 12.04.2024—cannot be corrupt practices “by a candidate or his agent” or “by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent,” because there was no “candidate” or “election agent” in existence on 06.04.2024 for the purposes of Section 123.

• Order VII Rule 11(a), CPC (Rejection for no cause of action):

  Under election law (Section 87, RPA applies CPC “as nearly as may be”), a petition can be rejected at the threshold if, assuming the pleaded facts to be true, no cause of action arises. Here, even if bribery on 06.04.2024 occurred exactly as alleged, it would not constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123 because the respondent was not yet a “candidate.” Hence, the petition was rightly rejected for failure to disclose a cause of action.

3) Why Party Nomination Is Not Enough

A key practical clarification is that being “declared” or “officially announced” as a party nominee does not transform a person into a “candidate” under the RPA. The controlling statutory definition in Section 79(b) pegs candidacy to the filing of a nomination paper (read with Section 34 RPA regarding deposit). The High Court meticulously adhered to this textual anchor, consistent with Supreme Court authority.

4) Pleadings and Amendment

The petitioner had initially pleaded paragraph 12 alleging cash distribution on 06.04.2024. Subsequently, paragraph 12A was added by amendment to include alleged distribution of pressure cookers by the respondent’s husband and father-in-law. Crucially, counsel for the petitioner clarified at the time of amendment that these acts too occurred on 06.04.2024, not later. This alignment of all allegations to a pre‑nomination date foreclosed any curative possibility within the petition and cemented the Court’s conclusion on the absence of cause of action.

5) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

This order’s practical effects are significant for election litigation and campaign conduct:

• Strict Timeline Discipline in Pleadings:

  Election petitions alleging corrupt practices must scrupulously tie each act to dates after the filing of nomination. Allegations pegged to pre‑nomination periods—even if serious—cannot sustain a corrupt practices claim under Section 123.

• Evidence Collection Strategy:

  Investigations and affidavits should be built around events occurring after nomination. Where patterns begin earlier, petitioners should plead and prove the post‑nomination continuation, with particulars of date, time, place, persons involved, and the candidate’s or election agent’s consent.

• Model Code of Conduct (MCC) vs. RPA:

  Pre‑nomination irregularities may violate the MCC or other laws, but they are not, without more, election “corrupt practices” for voiding an election. Aggrieved parties should consider contemporaneous complaints to the Election Commission or law enforcement, rather than an election petition premised solely on pre‑nomination acts.

• Party Policy Promises:

  The Court noted that the “Congress Guarantee Card” issue had already been rejected in another case (E.P. No. 7 of 2024). While this order did not re‑adjudicate that point, the trend suggests courts treat broad party policy promises and manifesto‑type assurances as political speech rather than quid pro quo bribery, absent specific, individualized inducements tied to a candidate’s post‑nomination conduct.

• Threshold Filings and Litigation Economy:

  The use of Order VII Rule 11(a) in election disputes conserves judicial time by filtering out petitions that cannot succeed even if facts are assumed true. Counsel must therefore conduct a rigorous legal audit—especially on dates—before filing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Corrupt practice” (Section 123, RPA):

  Statutorily defined wrongful acts (like bribery) that, if proved, can invalidate an election. For bribery, the act must be by the “candidate” or by someone with the candidate’s or election agent’s consent, and the objective must be to induce voting behavior.

• “Candidate” (Section 79(b), RPA):

  A person becomes a candidate only upon filing (or claiming to have filed) a nomination. Party declaration or ticket announcement is not enough.

• “Election agent”:

  An agent appointed under the RPA to represent the candidate in election matters. This role exists only after nomination; hence, consent of an “election agent” cannot exist before nomination.

• “Cause of action” and Order VII Rule 11(a), CPC:

  To survive, a petition must allege facts which, if taken as true, entitle the petitioner to relief. If the pleaded facts, even when assumed true, cannot result in relief (because the law renders them irrelevant), the Court can reject the petition at the outset.

• “Model Code of Conduct” (MCC):

  A set of guidelines enforced by the Election Commission to ensure fair campaigning. Violations can attract administrative or other legal action, but not every MCC breach equates to a statutory “corrupt practice” for voiding an election.

Practical Guidance for Future Election Petitions

• Anchor every alleged corrupt practice to dates on or after the nomination filing date.
• Plead material facts with precision (who, what, when, where, how), and ensure they satisfy Section 83 RPA requirements (though not at issue here, courts enforce this strictly).
• Establish the candidate’s or election agent’s consent for acts by third parties; merely being a party functionary is not enough.
• Differentiate between party-wide policy announcements and individualized inducements; courts typically treat the former as political speech, not bribery.
• Use contemporaneous remedies (ECI complaints, criminal complaints) for pre‑nomination misconduct rather than relying solely on a post‑result election petition.

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court’s order in MR. SUBAN KHAN v. SMT. PRABHA MALLIKARJUN is a crisp reaffirmation of a foundational election law principle: for the purpose of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the RPA, candidacy begins upon filing the nomination. Acts alleged before that date cannot be used to invalidate an election under Section 100. By applying Supreme Court precedents—Subhash Desai, Indira Nehru Gandhi, and Mohan Rawale—the Court rejected the petition at the threshold for want of cause of action, since all allegations were anchored to 06.04.2024, preceding the respondent’s nomination on 12.04.2024.

The decision sharpens the temporal boundary for election disputes, underscores the premium on meticulous pleadings, and delineates the institutional paths for redress: while pre‑nomination misconduct may invite other forms of accountability, it does not, without more, translate into a corrupt practice for the purposes of setting aside an election. This principled clarity will guide litigants, campaigns, and courts in structuring and assessing future election petitions.