Blood Alcohol Threshold for “Intoxication” under Section 304-AA IPC: Commentary on Dilbag Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh

1. Introduction

The judgment in Dilbag Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 HHC 37656, delivered by the Himachal Pradesh High Court on 10 November 2025, is significant for two principal reasons:

It lays down a clear interpretative benchmark for what constitutes being “in a state of intoxication” under Section 304-AA of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), by reading that provision in harmony with Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act).
It reaffirms and applies the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”) in the context of criminal negligence in motor accident cases, and clarifies the use of an accused’s statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The case arises from a tragic road accident where a truck laden with apple boxes fell 200–250 feet into a gorge near Hasan Valley in Himachal Pradesh. One person, Krishan @ Kundru, died on the spot in a crushed condition on the road, and the appellant, Dilbag Singh, sustained injuries. The prosecution’s case was that Dilbag Singh, who was driving the truck, did so in a rash and negligent manner while in a state of intoxication, leading to the accident and consequent death.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 279 and 304-AA IPC, sentencing him to six months’ simple imprisonment under Section 279 and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment plus fine under Section 304-AA, with both sentences running concurrently. On appeal, the High Court re-examined:

Whether the prosecution had established that the appellant was in a “state of intoxication” within the meaning of Section 304-AA IPC;
Whether rashness or negligence was proved when no direct eyewitness to the actual accident was available; and
Whether the conviction under Section 304-AA could be sustained or should be modified to another offence (notably, Section 304-A IPC).

The decision, approved for reporting, thus establishes a precedent of practical importance in the law of road traffic offences and criminal negligence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Charges and Trial Court’s Decision

The accused was charged under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304-AA IPC. At the end of trial, the Sessions Court:

Convicted him under Section 279 IPC (rash driving) and Section 304-AA IPC (causing death or injury by driving a vehicle in a state of intoxication);
Sentenced him to:
- 6 months’ simple imprisonment under Section 279 IPC;
- 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment and ₹10,000 fine (with 6 months’ default imprisonment) under Section 304-AA IPC.

The defence, inter alia, contended that the deceased (the conductor) had gotten down to place a stone behind the rear wheel of the stationary truck, the vehicle suddenly moved, crushed him, and fell into the gorge, and that the accused was not intoxicated.

2.2 High Court’s Core Findings

Justice Rakesh Kainthla, for the High Court, held:

On “intoxication” under Section 304-AA IPC:
- Forensic analysis showed 21.68 mg% of ethyl alcohol in the accused’s blood and 12.65 mg% in urine.
- Relying on Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology and Section 185 MV Act, the Court held that:
  - “Intoxication” in medico-legal terms corresponds to much higher blood alcohol levels (150–300 mg%).
  - Even statutorily, under Section 185 MV Act, the prohibited threshold is 30 mg per 100 ml of blood.
- Because the accused’s blood alcohol level did not cross 30 mg%, he had neither violated Section 185 MV Act nor could he be treated as being in a “state of intoxication” for Section 304-AA IPC.
- Consequently, the conviction under Section 304-AA IPC was found unsustainable.
On negligence and causation:
- It was admitted and proved that:
  - The accused was driving the truck at the relevant time (proved via PW15, the owner, and the accused’s Section 313 CrPC admission);
  - The truck left the road and fell 200–250 feet into a gorge while carrying apple boxes;
  - The deceased died of injuries consistent with a road traffic accident.
- Applying res ipsa loquitur (Syed Akbar, Thakur Singh, Keshavamurthy) in the criminal context, the Court held that:
  - Such an accident is of a kind which “speaks for itself” as the probable result of negligence, absent any extraordinary explanation.
  - The burden shifted to the accused to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part.
  - The defence version (that the deceased went behind the rear tyre to place a stone and was crushed) was inherently implausible given:
    - The direction of travel (Charabra to Dhalli) and gradient;
    - The mechanical inspection which ruled out collision or mechanical defect;
    - The fact that forward movement could not have crushed someone standing behind the rear tyre in the manner alleged.
- The Court therefore concluded that the accident occurred due to the negligent driving of the accused.
Modification of Conviction:
- Section 304-AA IPC is treated as an aggravated form of Section 304-A IPC (causing death by negligence), distinguished by the additional element of intoxication.
- The accused, having been charged and defended himself against the more serious offence (304-AA), could validly be convicted of the lesser included offence of Section 304-A IPC when the aggravating element failed but basic negligence causing death was proved.
Sentence:
- The conviction under Section 304-AA IPC was set aside.
- The accused was instead convicted under Section 304-A IPC and sentenced to:
  - 18 months’ imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000, with 4 months’ simple imprisonment in default of payment.
- The conviction and sentence under Section 279 IPC (6 months’ simple imprisonment) remained, with directions that substantive sentences run concurrently (as per the trial court).
- The accused was given the benefit of Section 428 CrPC (set-off of pre-conviction detention).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.1.1 Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology

The Court extensively quoted from Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 11th Edition (2012), particularly the medico-legal classification of blood alcohol levels:

Sober – below 10 mg%;
Drinking – 20–70 mg%;
Under the influence of alcohol – 80–100 mg%;
Drunk or intoxicated – 150–300 mg%;
Coma and death – above 400 mg%.

This medical text was used to anchor the legal term “intoxication” in scientific evidence. The Court reasoned that, when the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is 21.68 mg%, the person falls in the “drinking” stage, but far below the “intoxicated” range (150–300 mg%). This scientific categorisation strongly informed the court’s conclusion that the accused could not be described as being in a “state of intoxication” within the meaning of Section 304-AA IPC.

3.1.2 IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearl Beverages Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 704

In this decision, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 185 MV Act, which criminalises driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 30 mg per 100 ml of blood, as detected by a breath analyser (and later, any other test including laboratory test).

The Supreme Court stressed that:

Being a criminal offence, all ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt;
The specific level of alcohol (exceeding 30 mg/100 ml) must be proved by proper testing.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court borrowed this standard and applied it by analogy to Section 304-AA IPC, reasoning that:

If the legislature has expressly tolerated up to 30 mg% BAC for driving (without criminal liability under Section 185 MV Act), it would be illogical and contrary to principles of statutory interpretation to penalise a person for a more serious offence (Section 304-AA IPC) at a BAC below this tolerated limit.

This is a classic application of the canon that the legislature must be presumed to act coherently and not contradict itself. The Court concluded that a BAC below 30 mg% cannot be treated as “intoxication” for Section 304-AA IPC when the same level does not even trigger criminal liability under Section 185 MV Act.

3.1.3 Use of Section 313 CrPC Statements – Supreme Court Line of Authorities

The judgment summarises and applies a consistent line of Supreme Court decisions on the evidentiary value of statements made by an accused under Section 313 CrPC:

State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700
Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236
Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257
Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747

The principles extracted from these authorities, and relied on by the High Court, are:

Statements under Section 313 CrPC are not “evidence” in the strict sense (no oath, no cross-examination), but under Section 313(4) they may be taken into consideration by the court.
If the accused confesses to the offence, the court may convict on that basis (after caution and satisfaction of voluntariness).
Where there is no full confession, the statement may still:
- Be used to support and lend credence to the prosecution evidence; and
- Be relied upon in part, particularly its inculpatory portions, if:
  - The exculpatory parts are found to be false or inherently improbable; and
  - The inculpatory parts align with independent prosecution evidence.

In Dilbag Singh, the Court used this jurisprudence to:

Rely on the accused’s admission that he was driving the truck;
Rely on his admission that the truck did fall into the gorge;
At the same time, reject his exculpatory narrative (that the deceased had gone behind the truck to place a stone and was crushed) as implausible and inconsistent with the physical and mechanical evidence.

Thus, Section 313 CrPC was used not as a standalone basis for conviction, but to corroborate the prosecution case and to discredit the defence version.

3.1.4 Res Ipsa Loquitur in Criminal Negligence – Syed Akbar, Keshavamurthy, Thakur Singh

The Court relies on:

Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30
Keshavamurthy v. State, 2002 Cri LJ 103
Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208

In Syed Akbar, the Supreme Court explained that while the burden of proving the offence always lies on the prosecution, in cases where the nature of the accident itself strongly indicates negligence, the court may draw an inference of negligence under Section 114 Evidence Act (illustrating the application of res ipsa loquitur) subject to the usual safeguards of circumstantial evidence:

The objective circumstances of the accident must be clearly established;
They must point unerringly to the guilt of the accused;
The chain of circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

In Keshavamurthy, applying res ipsa, a car that left a wide, unobstructed road at night and hit a roadside tree was deemed prima facie to show driver’s negligence; the driver was expected to explain how the accident happened without negligence.

In Thakur Singh, the bus fell from a bridge into a canal—a classic situation where res ipsa loquitur was held applicable, and the burden shifted onto the driver to displace the inference of negligence, which he failed to do.

Drawing from these authorities, the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that where a truck, driven by the accused, leaves the road and plunges 200–250 feet into a gorge, in absence of any evidence of mechanical failure or external impact, a strong prima facie inference of negligent driving arises, calling for an explanation from the driver.

3.2 Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

3.2.1 Determining Who Was Driving

The Court first confirmed that the accused was indeed the driver of the truck:

PW15, the owner of the truck (Yudhvir), stated that:
- Dilbag Singh was employed as the driver;
- Krishan @ Kundru was the cleaner/conductor;
This statement was not challenged in cross-examination, and thus was accepted as correct.
The accused himself, in his Section 313 CrPC statement, admitted that he was driving the vehicle.

Consistent with Supreme Court guidance, the Court treated this admission as reliable corroboration of PW15 and took it into account to conclusively hold that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident.

3.2.2 Nature of the Accident and Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The next crucial factual element was the manner of the accident:

PW12 (Investigating Officer) found the truck 200–250 feet below the road in a gorge.
The deceased was found on the kachha portion of the road near the accident site, “in a crushed condition”.
The mechanical inspection report (PW4):
- Found no mechanical defect that could have caused the accident;
- Recorded only damage consistent with a fall (front show, wind glass, cabin door, body, tank roof).
No evidence suggested that any other vehicle collided with the truck.

Given these facts, and relying on Syed Akbar, Keshavamurthy and Thakur Singh, the Court reasoned:

A properly functioning truck on a road does not ordinarily leave the road and fall hundreds of feet into a gorge in the absence of negligence by the driver.
Thus, the accident “speaks for itself” as an indicator of negligence, permitting an inference under res ipsa loquitur that the accused drove negligently.
The burden shifted to the accused to give a plausible account of the accident that would negate negligence.

3.2.3 Evaluation of the Accused’s Explanation

The accused claimed that:

The deceased got out of the vehicle to place a stone behind the rear tyre so that the vehicle did not move;
The accused then heard some noise and the vehicle moved, crushing the deceased and falling into the gorge.

The Court rejected this version for several reasons:

Inconsistency with direction and dynamics of movement:
- The truck was travelling from Charabra to Dhalli and was facing the Dhalli side near Hasan Valley.
- If someone placed a stone behind the rear tyre, any unintentional movement would naturally be forward, not backward.
- Forward movement of the truck could not reasonably crush a person standing behind the rear tyre in the manner described.
Contradiction with mechanical evidence:
- The defence, in cross-examination, floated a suggestion that another vehicle hit the truck, causing it to roll down after crushing the deceased.
- However, the mechanical inspection report (PW4) showed no damage indicative of collision with another vehicle.
- No such suggestion was put to the mechanical expert (PW4), undermining this alternative theory.
Lack of coherent alternative explanation:
- Beyond the accused’s bare statement, there was no evidence supporting his version about the stone and the vehicle’s movement.
- The version failed to account for the truck leaving the road and plunging 200–250 feet into the gorge.

As a result, the Court held that the accused had failed to rebut the inference of negligence arising from the circumstances of the accident, and that the only reasonable conclusion was that the accident was caused by his rash and negligent driving.

3.2.4 “Intoxication” and the Interplay of Section 304-AA IPC with Section 185 MV Act

Section 304-AA IPC (as quoted by the Court) punishes:

“Whoever, while in a state of intoxication, drives or attempts to drive any vehicle and causes the death of any person not amounting to culpable homicide, or causes any bodily injury likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine…”

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in steps:

Medico-legal meaning of “intoxication”:
- Based on Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence, a person is “drunk or intoxicated” when BAC is between 150–300 mg%.
- At 21.68 mg%, the accused was merely in the “drinking” category, not intoxicated.
Statutory threshold under Section 185 MV Act:
- Section 185 MV Act criminalises driving only when alcohol in the blood is in excess of 30 mg/100 ml.
- In IFFCO-Tokio, the Supreme Court stressed that this threshold must be strictly proved in criminal proceedings.
Presumption against legislative contradiction:
- The Court reasoned that the legislature cannot be presumed to:
  - Permit driving with alcohol below 30 mg% (no offence under Section 185 MV Act), yet
  - At the same time treat such a person as “intoxicated” for the far more serious offence under Section 304-AA IPC.
- To avoid this incoherence, the Court held that a person with less than 30 mg% alcohol cannot be considered to be in a “state of intoxication” for Section 304-AA IPC.

Thus, even though the forensic report showed some alcohol in the accused’s system, this was not legally sufficient to attract the aggravated offence under Section 304-AA IPC. The conviction under that section was therefore set aside.

3.2.5 Conversion from Section 304-AA IPC to Section 304-A IPC

Having found that:

The accused was driving the vehicle;
His negligence caused the accident leading to the death of the deceased;
But he was not in a state of intoxication within the meaning of Section 304-AA IPC,

the Court held that:

Section 304-AA IPC is an aggravated form of Section 304-A IPC, the aggravating element being the state of intoxication.
Where the aggravated element is not proved, but the base offence of causing death by negligence is, the accused can be convicted under Section 304-A IPC instead.
Since the accused had full notice of the allegation of rash and negligent driving causing death (as part of the 304-AA charge) and had defended on that basis, there was no prejudice in altering the conviction to the lesser offence of Section 304-A IPC. This fits within the broader principle (reflected in Section 222 CrPC) that a person charged with a higher offence may be convicted of a lesser included offence.

3.2.6 Sentencing Considerations

Section 304-A IPC prescribes a maximum punishment of two years’ imprisonment, or fine, or both. The Court, noting that:

A “young life” had been lost as a result of the negligence;
The accident was serious, with a truck plunging into a deep gorge;

sentenced the appellant to:

18 months’ imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC;
₹10,000 fine, with a 4-month simple imprisonment default clause.

The sentence for Section 279 IPC (6 months’ simple imprisonment) was left undisturbed, and both substantive sentences were to run concurrently, with set-off for pre-trial custody under Section 428 CrPC.

4. Impact and Significance

4.1 Clarification of the Legal Standard for “Intoxication” under Section 304-AA IPC

The most important doctrinal contribution of this judgment is the harmonisation of Section 304-AA IPC with Section 185 MV Act by:

Embedding within Section 304-AA the 30 mg/100 ml BAC threshold as a minimum requirement to treat a driver as “in a state of intoxication” for criminal liability; and
Reinforcing that scientific evidence (medical jurisprudence and forensic analysis) is critical in determining whether intoxication exists in law.

Consequences:

Prosecution Strategy:
- In future, for Section 304-AA prosecutions, the State will need:
  - Reliable forensic or breath analyser evidence showing BAC > 30 mg%;
  - To anticipate and counter defence arguments invoking this threshold.
Defence Strategy:
- Defence counsel can now strongly argue that:
  - Without proof of a BAC above 30 mg%, Section 304-AA IPC is not attracted;
  - At best, the prosecution may seek a conviction under Section 304-A IPC (if negligence is otherwise proved).
Judicial Consistency:
- Subordinate courts in Himachal Pradesh are now bound to follow this interpretation;
- The decision may also be persuasive in other High Courts until a contrary view or an authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement emerges.

4.2 Reinforcement of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Criminal Negligence Cases

The judgment reinforces that res ipsa loquitur is not confined to civil negligence suits but is applicable, with appropriate caution, in criminal trials, particularly:

Where the manner of the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, it would not occur without negligence (e.g., vehicles flying off roads, plunging into canals or gorges);
Where mechanical defect and external causes (e.g., collision, obstruction) are ruled out.

This shifts a practical evidential burden on accused drivers in such scenarios to provide a credible explanation. While the legal burden still lies on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, res ipsa allows permissive inferences that, if unrebutted or weakly rebutted, can support convictions under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC.

4.3 Guidance on Use of Section 313 CrPC Statements

By synthesising multiple Supreme Court authorities, the judgment provides a clear operational guide for trial courts:

Section 313 CrPC is a tool for fair trial, giving the accused an opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances.
The court may:
- Use the accused’s admissions to corroborate prosecution evidence (e.g., admission of driving, admission of accident);
- Reject exculpatory parts if they are implausible or contradicted by reliable evidence (e.g., the stone-behind-tyre narrative).

This approach maintains fairness while preventing Section 313 from becoming a device to inject unsubstantiated alternate theories into the record.

4.4 Sentencing Policy: Distinguishing Negligent from Intoxicated Homicide

The Court’s decision implicitly draws a line between:

Serious but “ordinary” negligent driving (Section 304-A IPC: up to 2 years), and
Aggravated negligent driving with intoxication (Section 304-AA IPC: up to life/imprisonment up to 7 years), where the accused acts in a state of culpable disregard for human life by driving while in a legally recognised state of intoxication.

By insisting on a proper threshold for intoxication and by substantially reducing the sentence when that element was not proved, the Court signals:

A willingness to impose severe penalties when the aggravated element exists;
But a corresponding requirement of rigorous proof of that element before such penalties are imposed.

5. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

5.1 Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) – mg%

mg% means milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood. So:

30 mg% = 30 milligrams of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

In Indian law:

Section 185 MV Act makes it an offence to drive if BAC is greater than 30 mg%.
In this case, the accused had 21.68 mg%, which is below that threshold.

5.2 Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase meaning “the thing speaks for itself.” In this context:

Some accidents are so unusual (e.g., a vehicle plunging off a road into a deep gorge) that they strongly suggest negligence by the person controlling the vehicle.
In such cases, once the basic facts are proved, the court can draw an inference of negligence and expect the driver to provide a credible, non-negligent explanation.
If he fails to do so, the inference of negligence may stand and support a conviction.

5.3 Section 304-A vs Section 304-AA IPC

Section 304-A IPC: Causing death by rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide; punishment up to 2 years or fine or both.
Section 304-AA IPC: Causing death or injury by driving any vehicle while in a state of intoxication; punishment can extend to 7 years or even life imprisonment, plus fine.

Thus:

Section 304-AA is essentially Section 304-A plus the additional aggravating factor of driving in a state of intoxication.

5.4 Lesser Included Offence

A lesser included offence is a crime whose essential elements are entirely encompassed within a more serious (“greater”) offence. Here:

To prove Section 304-AA, the prosecution must prove:
1. Rash and negligent driving causing death (the core of Section 304-A); and
2. That the driver was in a state of intoxication.

If the second element fails but the first is proved, the accused can be convicted of the lesser offence of Section 304-A, even if he was originally charged under Section 304-AA.

5.5 Section 313 CrPC – Accused’s Statement

Section 313 CrPC allows the court to question the accused after the prosecution evidence is over, to:

Explain any incriminating circumstances against him;
Give him a chance to put forward his version of events.

Key points:

The answers are not under oath and not “evidence” in the strict sense;
However, the court may:
- Rely on admissions that support the prosecution;
- Reject implausible exculpatory answers if inconsistent with other evidence.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The decision in Dilbag Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh is a carefully reasoned judgment that:

Clarifies the law on intoxicated driving causing death:
- “Intoxication” under Section 304-AA IPC is not triggered by any trace of alcohol, but requires at least crossing the 30 mg% BAC threshold recognised by Section 185 MV Act and supported by medico-legal standards.
- A conviction under Section 304-AA IPC without proof of this threshold is legally untenable.
Reaffirms the role of res ipsa loquitur in criminal negligence:
- Where a vehicle leaves the road and plunges into a gorge without mechanical defect or external impact, the accident itself is a strong indicator of driver negligence.
- The driver must then offer a credible explanation to avoid the inference of negligence; failure to do so will justify conviction under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC.
Provides robust guidance on using Section 313 CrPC statements:
- Admissions by the accused may be used to corroborate the prosecution;
- Exculpatory narratives that are internally inconsistent or contradict objective evidence may be rejected.
Illustrates principled sentencing differentiation:
- Negligent driving causing death warrants serious punishment (18 months under Section 304-A IPC in this case);
- But far graver punishments under Section 304-AA IPC must be reserved for cases where intoxication is conclusively established above the statutory threshold.

In sum, this judgment balances road safety concerns with fairness in criminal law by insisting that serious aggravated offences like Section 304-AA IPC be invoked only when their specific legal ingredients—particularly intoxication—are proved by reliable scientific evidence. At the same time, it ensures that drivers whose negligence causes death do not escape liability altogether, by permitting conviction under the lesser but still significant offence of Section 304-A IPC.