Bail under BNSS 2023 for Alleged Facilitators in Cyber‑Fraud: Role, Recovery and Parity as Key Determinants

Bail under BNSS 2023 for Alleged Facilitators in Cyber‑Fraud: Role, Recovery and Parity as Key Determinants
Commentary on Shaik Noushad Ahammed v. State of Punjab, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 21 November 2025

1. Introduction

The decision in Shaik Noushad Ahammed v. State of Punjab by the Punjab & Haryana High Court is an early and instructive application of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) to bail proceedings in serious cyber‑fraud cases. The petitioner, a Relationship Manager of a bank, was implicated as a facilitator in a sophisticated “digital arrest” scam in which the victim was allegedly coerced via video calls by imposters posing as police and CBI officers to transfer over Rs. 1.03 crore to fraudulent accounts.

The Court, exercising powers under Section 483 BNSS (corresponding in substance to the former Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), granted regular bail to the bank official, despite the gravity of the cyber‑crime, by emphasising:

  • his clean antecedents,
  • absence of any recovery or demonstrated personal gain,
  • arguable doubts regarding his specific role and duty in KYC verification,
  • parity with co‑accused who had already been granted bail, and
  • the lack of necessity for further custodial interrogation.

While the order is fact‑centric and relatively brief, it lays down a useful practical benchmark for assessing bail applications of bank employees and intermediaries implicated as alleged facilitators in cyber‑fraud cases under the new criminal law codes (BNS and BNSS).

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The “digital arrest” and transfer of funds

The complainant, Charanjit Kaur, alleged that on 11 April 2025 she began receiving WhatsApp calls and video calls from unknown numbers. One caller, identifying himself as “Vijay Khanna” from Police Station Colaba, Maharashtra, told her:

  • that multiple fake bank accounts in Canara Bank had been opened using her Aadhaar and mobile number;
  • that fraud had been committed using her bank accounts, and an FIR had been registered in Colaba; and
  • that she was liable to be arrested.

She was told that if she could not appear personally, she could be placed under “digital arrest” and be produced online before a Judge. During the video call:

  • the caller wore a police uniform,
  • the background resembled a police station with “Police Station Colaba, Maharashtra” visible, and
  • whenever “Vijay Khanna” left the screen, another person in police uniform replaced him.

She was allegedly kept under this so‑called “digital arrest” from 11.04.2025 to 14.04.2025, being instructed not to disconnect the call under threat of “physical arrest”. Thereafter:

  1. On 14.04.2025, she was asked to provide details of her bank accounts for “verification”.
  2. On 15.04.2025, she was told that a CBI officer would question her; she then received WhatsApp messages asking her to send account details and to transfer funds to certain accounts. Acting under this coercion, she:
    • transferred Rs. 57 lakh via RTGS to RBL account no. 309026654559, and
    • transferred Rs. 29 lakh to account no. 25410110148907, both accounts provided by “Vijay Khanna”.
  3. On 16.04.2025, she again received messages asking her to inform them whenever her husband and son left home.
  4. On 17.04.2025, she was instructed to transfer an additional Rs. 17 lakh, which she did.
  5. On 18.04.2025, she was asked—through WhatsApp voice call—to go to local Police Station Phase‑1, Mohali, with her bank slips, account details and Aadhaar card to obtain an “NOC”. Once at the police station, she realised she had been duped and lodged a complaint with the State Cyber Crime Cell, Mohali.

On her complaint, FIR No. 30 dated 11.06.2025 was registered at Police Station Cyber Crime, SAS Nagar, Mohali, for offences under:

  • Sections 308(2), 318(4), 127(7), 61(2), 238, 316(5), 337, 338, 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and
  • Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Though the specific statutory cross‑mapping of these BNS provisions is not discussed in the judgment, contextually they relate to serious economic/cheating‑type offences and misuse of electronic means.

2.2 The role attributed to the petitioner

The petitioner, Shaik Noushad Ahammed, was a Relationship Manager with a bank. His alleged role, as per the prosecution, was that:

  • He helped co‑accused Azeez Mohammad in opening a fake account in the name of “Mohammad Pasha”, a fictitious person.
  • A substantial portion of the cheated amount—Rs. 57 lakh—was deposited in this account and later withdrawn.
  • He allegedly opened the account without proper verification of documents (KYC).

Crucially, the petitioner’s involvement was first brought on record through the disclosure statement of co‑accused Azeez Mohammad Mustafa, who reportedly stated that:

“The account in question had been opened with the aid of the petitioner.”

Another co‑accused, Wasim, whose phone number appeared as the registered number in the account opening form, was also part of the alleged conspiracy.

2.3 Procedural posture: petition for regular bail

The petitioner moved the High Court by way of a first petition under Section 483 BNSS, 2023, seeking regular bail. Section 483 of BNSS is the successor‑provision to former Section 439 CrPC, conferring special powers on the High Court and Court of Session to grant bail in serious offences.

By the time of the hearing:

  • co‑accused Azeez Mohammad Mustafa, on whose disclosure the petitioner was named, had already been granted bail;
  • co‑accused Wasim, whose mobile number was linked to the disputed account, had also been granted bail;
  • no recovery (money or documents) had been made from the petitioner;
  • the State admitted the fact of bail to co‑accused and did not dispute the period of custody.

3. Legal Framework

3.1 Section 483 BNSS, 2023 – Special powers of High Court regarding bail

Section 483 BNSS is the new procedural provision that substantially replaces Section 439 CrPC. While the exact statutory wording is not reproduced in the order, the structure and purpose are to:

  • empower the High Court and Court of Session to grant bail in cases of persons accused of offences,
  • impose conditions as deemed just and proper, and
  • govern the grant of regular (post‑arrest) bail in non‑bailable offences.

In essence, substantive bail jurisprudence developed under Section 439 CrPC continues to guide interpretation under Section 483 BNSS, absent contrary legislative intent. This continuity is important:

  • factors such as nature of accusation, severity of punishment, prima facie involvement, possibility of tampering with evidence, and need for custodial interrogation remain central; and
  • bail remains a matter of judicial discretion, to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.

3.2 Offences under BNS, 2023

The FIR invoked several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). Although the judgment does not analyse each section individually, contextually:

  • the provisions appear to capture offences of cheating, fraud, forgery/false documents, criminal conspiracy or facilitation, and related misconduct, re‑codified under BNS in lieu of their IPC counterparts; and
  • the gravity of economic loss (over Rs. 1.03 crore) and the use of impersonation and technology to induce transfers accentuate the seriousness of the alleged offences.

3.3 Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000

Section 66 IT Act broadly deals with computer‑related offences, such as dishonest or fraudulent acts using a computer, computer system or computer network. In a scam of this nature—relying on WhatsApp calls, digital impersonation and online transfers—this provision is naturally attracted.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Issues before the Court

Though the order is concise, the core issues can be distilled as:

  1. Whether, on the material available at the bail stage, the petitioner’s alleged role as a Relationship Manager in opening a fraudulent account justified his continued custodial detention.
  2. Whether the factors of:
    • clean antecedents,
    • absence of recovery or evidence of personal gain,
    • arguable doubts as to his responsibility for KYC verification,
    • parity with co‑accused already on bail, and
    • lack of need for further custodial interrogation
    weighed in favour of granting regular bail under Section 483 BNSS.

4.2 The Court’s holding

Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj allowed the petition and ordered that the petitioner be released on regular bail on furnishing appropriate bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court or duty magistrate.

The Court’s decision hinged upon:

  • the petitioner’s clean criminal antecedents;
  • no recovery being effected from him;
  • arguable issues regarding his precise role and responsibility as a Relationship Manager in KYC verification;
  • parity with co‑accused (Azeez and Wasim) who had already been granted regular bail; and
  • the conclusion that further custodial detention was not warranted for purposes of investigation.

The Court also imposed a standard non‑tampering condition: the petitioner shall not extend threats or influence any prosecution witnesses directly or indirectly.

Finally, the Court cautioned that its observations should not be treated as an expression on the merits of the case and that the trial court should decide the matter independently based on the evidence.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents and doctrinal context

5.1.1 No specific precedents cited, but continuity of bail jurisprudence

The judgment does not expressly cite any prior case law. Nonetheless, it is clearly operating within the well‑settled general principles of bail that have evolved under the pre‑existing CrPC framework, now carried into BNSS. Key doctrinal anchors from Supreme Court jurisprudence (not cited but relevant for context) include:

  • The oft‑quoted principle that “bail is the rule, jail is the exception”, which has been reiterated in numerous decisions and highlights that pre‑trial incarceration should not be punitive but only preventive or investigative where necessary.
  • The approach in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51, where the Supreme Court laid stress on:
    • discouraging unnecessary arrests,
    • expediting grant of bail where custodial interrogation is not required, and
    • recognising the deleterious impact of prolonged pre‑trial detention.
  • Other bail cases emphasising clean antecedents, absence of criminal history, and parity with co‑accused as relevant factors in favour of bail.

Although the Court does not expressly mention these authorities, its approach—especially the emphasis on the limited utility of further custody, clean record, and parity—is consistent with this established bail doctrine.

5.1.2 Transition from CrPC to BNSS: substantive continuity

The reference to Section 483 BNSS instead of Section 439 CrPC signals the beginning of regular judicial engagement with the new procedural code. However, the Court does not treat BNSS as substantively altering bail standards. Rather, bail analysis proceeds as before:

  • Nature and gravity of the accusation: The scam is serious, involves a large sum, and is technologically sophisticated; yet seriousness alone is not decisive against bail.
  • Role of the accused: The petitioner is allegedly a facilitator, not the mastermind or direct beneficiary.
  • Need for custodial interrogation: Once investigation has substantially progressed and no further recovery is expected from the accused, continued custody loses justification.
  • Likelihood of absconding or tampering: Addressed through standard conditions and the petitioner’s background (no prior criminal record).

Thus, the case reflects a continuity of principles rather than a doctrinal shift under BNSS.

5.2 The Court’s legal reasoning

5.2.1 Clean antecedents and absence of recovery

A core plank of the Court’s reasoning is that no incriminating material or proceeds of crime were recovered from the petitioner, and there was no evidence of any financial benefit accruing to him from the alleged transaction. Additionally:

  • the petitioner had no prior criminal record (“clean antecedents”);
  • there was no indication of his involvement in any other similar scam or offence.

These factors strongly support the inference that:

  • he is not a habitual offender, and
  • his propensity to re‑offend or misuse liberty is comparatively low.

In bail jurisprudence, clean antecedents and lack of recovery are often treated as indicators that the accused’s role may be marginal or at least disputable—sufficient to temper the rigour of pre‑trial custody, particularly where rigorous cross‑examination and detailed scrutiny can occur at trial.

5.2.2 Arguable role and responsibility of a Relationship Manager

The petitioner’s defence was that, as a Relationship Manager:

  • his function was largely to facilitate account opening upon submission of documents by prospective customers;
  • KYC verification and backend checks were the responsibility of separate units, not his personal mandate;
  • there was no allegation that he himself forged documents or knowingly facilitated fraud.

The State’s reply, via the affidavit of the Superintendent of Police (Cyber Crime), claimed that the petitioner:

  • assisted co‑accused Azeez in opening a fake account in the name of a fictitious person; and
  • did so without proper verification of documents.

However, critically, when questioned:

  • the State was “not in a position to refer to any standard adopted procedure” to demonstrate that document verification (KYC) was indeed the personal responsibility of a Relationship Manager.

This gap in the prosecution’s stand led the Court to note the presence of “arguable issues with respect to the role and responsibility of the petitioner”. In other words:

  • whether a Relationship Manager can in law be treated as the primary person responsible for KYC verification, and thus as a principal offender in the opening of a fraudulent account, is not free from doubt;
  • such a contested issue is better thrashed out at trial, rather than used as a basis for continued pre‑trial incarceration.

This reasoning is important: it recognises that role‑specific liability in institutional settings (like banks) must be grounded in clear evidence of assigned responsibilities and actual knowledge, not inferred merely from designation.

5.2.3 Nomination based solely on co‑accused’s disclosure

The petitioner’s name surfaced in the FIR through the disclosure statement of co‑accused Azeez Mohammad Mustafa. At the bail stage, courts are cautious in treating such disclosures, especially when they are:

  • the sole basis for implicating the accused; and
  • not corroborated by independent evidence (such as recovery, documentary linkage, or direct financial benefit).

While the judgment does not explicitly elaborate on the evidentiary value of such disclosures, the Court’s emphasis on absence of recovery and lack of demonstrated benefit implies scepticism in treating mere disclosure as sufficient to deny bail, especially when:

  • other co‑accused (including the very person who made the disclosure) are already on bail.

5.2.4 Parity with co‑accused

The Court lays substantial stress on the fact that:

  • Azeez Mohammad Mustafa—on whose disclosure the petitioner was nominated—had already been granted regular bail; and
  • Wasim, whose phone number was registered with the disputed account, was also on bail.

The principle of parity in bail matters requires that:

  • where similarly placed co‑accused have been granted bail on similar allegations, denial of bail to another accused without distinguishing reasons could be seen as arbitrary and discriminatory;
  • conversely, bail can be granted to maintain consistency and fairness in judicial approach.

Here, there is no suggestion that:

  • the petitioner’s role was more significant than Azeez or Wasim, or
  • that his custodial presence was specially required for investigation.

In the absence of such distinguishing factors, parity strongly favoured bail.

5.2.5 No necessity for further custodial detention

The Court records that further custodial detention is “not warranted for investigation of the present case”. This conclusion flows from:

  • the investigation already conducted,
  • lack of recovery from the petitioner, and
  • the fact that other key accused are already out on bail.

In bail jurisprudence, the continuing necessity of custody is a crucial factor: if interrogation can be effectively carried out while the accused is on bail, and if no further recoveries are expected, then continuing to keep the accused in judicial custody tends to veer towards punishment rather than legitimate investigative restraint.

5.2.6 Safeguards and non‑tampering condition

To mitigate risks associated with releasing the accused, the Court:

  • mandates that the petitioner shall not threaten or influence prosecution witnesses, directly or indirectly, and
  • leaves the imposition of bail conditions (including bonds and sureties) to the discretion of the trial court/duty magistrate.

This is a standard but important safeguard, ensuring that:

  • liberty is balanced with protection of the integrity of the trial; and
  • any misuse of bail can be addressed by cancellation if necessary.

5.3 Treatment of cybercrime and the “digital arrest” modus operandi

Although the modus operandi of the scam—“digital arrest” via video calls by persons impersonating police and CBI officers—is described in detail in the FIR narrative, the Court’s ratio is tightly focused on the petitioner’s individual role and the bail criteria. The judgment does not:

  • pronounce on specific legal characterisation of “digital arrest”; or
  • lay down any distinct doctrinal test for such cyber‑fraud schemes.

Nonetheless, the factual recital:

  • recognises the evolving and sophisticated nature of cybercrime, particularly social‑engineering frauds;
  • implicitly underscores the need for robust investigative and regulatory responses rather than focusing solely on low‑level functionaries; and
  • highlights the vulnerability of individuals to psychological coercion exercised through digital platforms.

The judgment therefore situates the bail question within the wider reality of cyber‑economic offences under the new BNS/BNS–BNSS regime, without allowing the gravity of the scam itself to overshadow the need for a role‑specific, evidence‑based bail analysis.

5.4 Impact and future implications

5.4.1 For bail jurisprudence under BNSS, 2023

Though a single‑judge order and fact‑specific, this decision is significant as an early application of Section 483 BNSS. It signals that:

  • Substantive principles of bail remain essentially unchanged in the transition from CrPC to BNSS; established case law on bail under Section 439 CrPC will continue to be relevant.
  • Courts will continue to weigh:
    • clean antecedents,
    • role of the accused,
    • parity with co‑accused,
    • necessity of custody, and
    • absence/presence of recovery or benefit
    as principal factors in bail decisions.

This continuity gives practitioners and litigants predictability in the application of bail standards under the new procedural code.

5.4.2 For liability of bank employees in cyber‑fraud cases

A more specific and practically important implication concerns bank officials—particularly Relationship Managers and field staff—implicated in account‑opening frauds. The judgment indicates that:

  • Liability of such employees cannot be presumed merely from their designation or from the fact that a fraudulent account passed through their desk.
  • Investigating agencies must demonstrate:
    • the actual scope of their duties under written Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or internal bank manuals;
    • that they personally bore responsibility for KYC verification or risk assessment; and
    • some independent linkage such as:
      • personal gain or unusual benefit,
      • documented knowledge of fictitious identity, or
      • deliberate bypass of mandatory checks.

In the absence of such concrete evidence, courts may be inclined to treat the involvement of such functionaries as an arguable question for trial rather than as a basis for protracted pre‑trial custody.

5.4.3 For investigative standards in cyber‑economic offences

The Court’s observation that the State could not point to any standard procedure mandating KYC verification by Relationship Managers subtly underscores the need for:

  • better documentation and understanding of institutional roles in banks and financial entities;
  • careful attribution of criminal liability based on actual duties rather than assumed responsibilities;
  • more rigorous gathering of evidence showing knowledge, intent and benefit on the part of facilitators.

Future investigations in similar cases will likely pay closer attention to:

  • obtaining and producing bank SOPs, KYC manuals and internal policies;
  • documenting who signed off at each stage of account creation;
  • tracing trails of commission, benefits or kickbacks, if any.

5.4.4 For victims and policy responses to “digital arrest” scams

Although not directly addressed in the reasoning, the factual matrix will be of interest to policymakers and regulators concerned with “digital arrest” scams:

  • It highlights a pattern of psychological coercion through impersonation of law‑enforcement and CBI, a method increasingly seen in cyber‑fraud complaints.
  • It may spur discussions on:
    • public awareness campaigns about such scams;
    • clearer bank protocols for freezing suspicious transactions swiftly;
    • inter‑state and central coordination in cybercrime investigations.

While the case is about bail, it indirectly emphasises that broad systemic measures—rather than over‑criminalising low‑level employees—are essential for effective deterrence and victim protection.

6. Complex Concepts and Terminology Simplified

6.1 Regular bail vs. anticipatory bail

  • Regular bail (as in this case) is sought after arrest and during the pendency of investigation or trial. The accused is in custody and asks the court to be released on conditions.
  • Anticipatory bail (under the earlier Section 438 CrPC and its BNSS analogue) is sought before arrest, based on apprehension of arrest.

The petitioner here had already been arrested, and hence approached the High Court under Section 483 BNSS for regular bail.

6.2 FIR (First Information Report)

An FIR is the formal document recorded by the police when they receive information about the commission of a cognisable offence. It sets the criminal law in motion and is the foundation for investigation.

6.3 “Digital arrest” in cyber‑fraud

Although not a term of art in criminal statutes, “digital arrest” is used here to describe a fraudulent tactic where:

  • scammers impersonate police or investigating agencies over video/voice calls;
  • they claim to “arrest” the victim virtually, forcing them to remain on call and follow directions;
  • under this psychological coercion, victims are induced to transfer funds or share sensitive information.

Legally, such conduct is covered under offences relating to:

  • cheating,
  • impersonation,
  • criminal intimidation, and
  • computer‑related offences under the IT Act,

as now re‑codified under BNS and its allied statutes.

6.4 KYC (Know Your Customer) and bank liability

KYC is a regulatory framework requiring banks to:

  • verify the identity and address of customers;
  • assess risk before onboarding them; and
  • monitor transactions for suspicious activity.

Within a bank, different roles may be assigned: some functionaries collect documents and interact with customers (like Relationship Managers), while others perform backend verification and compliance checks. Criminal liability in a fraud case requires clarity on:

  • who was responsible for what in this chain; and
  • whether the person accused had knowledge and intent to facilitate fraud.

6.5 Parity in bail

Parity means treating similarly placed co‑accused in a similar fashion, unless there are distinguishing factors. If one accused with a particular role in a case has been granted bail, another accused with an equal or lesser role is ordinarily also entitled to bail, barring special circumstances such as:

  • greater involvement or leadership in the offence;
  • risk of absconding; or
  • record of influencing witnesses.

6.6 “Clean antecedents”

When courts refer to an accused as having “clean antecedents”, they mean:

  • no prior criminal cases or convictions; and
  • no apparent history of engaging in illegal activity.

This is relevant because bail decisions often involve an assessment of:

  • likelihood of re‑offending, and
  • the risk of the accused misusing liberty.

7. Conclusion

The decision in Shaik Noushad Ahammed v. State of Punjab is a measured reminder that, even in serious and technologically advanced cyber‑fraud cases, courts must adhere to individualised, evidence‑based assessments when deciding bail under the new BNSS framework.

By granting bail to a bank Relationship Manager accused of facilitating a fraudulent account, the Court:

  • affirmed the continuing relevance of clean antecedents, absence of recovery, and lack of direct benefit as key bail considerations;
  • underscored the importance of clarifying institutional roles (such as KYC responsibility) before attributing criminal liability to employees;
  • applied the principle of parity consistently where similarly placed co‑accused had already been granted bail; and
  • held that further custodial detention is unwarranted where investigation does not require the accused’s continued incarceration.

In the broader legal context, the judgment:

  • demonstrates continuity of established bail jurisprudence under Section 483 BNSS, despite the formal shift from CrPC;
  • provides valuable guidance for future cases involving alleged facilitators in financial institutions in cyber‑fraud scenarios; and
  • highlights, indirectly, the growing challenge of “digital arrest” and impersonation‑based cyber‑scams, calling for systemic, policy and regulatory responses beyond the criminal process alone.

Ultimately, the judgment reaffirms that bail decisions must strike a careful balance between protecting the integrity of investigations and safeguarding the individual’s right to liberty, particularly where the accused’s role, duties and culpability remain seriously contested and better suited for resolution at trial.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Punjab & Haryana High Court

Judge(s)

MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ

Advocates

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