A. Krishnaswami Ayyar for appellants.—The plaintiffs and some of the defendants (namely, defendants 3 and 4) are Mangalavilas people who have been held to be the illegitimate sons of Sivaji, the late Raja of Tanjore, and they have been held to be entitled to their shares in the private properties of the late Raja in a recent litigation—Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar. The present suit is instituted by the illegitimate sons to establish their right to joint trusteeship of certain devastanams and their endowments along with the first and second defendants who were held to be the sons of an adopted son of the late Raja. Two questions arise, viz., (1) whether the illegitimacy is a bar to trusteeship, (2) what is the quantum of their interest in the trusteeship and how it is to be exercised. The lower Court held that illegitimate sons are postponed to legitimate sons and that it was by primogeniture that succession to trusteeship devolved and that the elder son of the adopted son was entitled to be sole trustee. The devastanams, etc., were taken over by the Government in 1855 on the Raja's death, but, restored in 1863 to the Senior Rani, as the then senior among the seven Ranis of the late Raja. In a previous litigation between the senior widow against the Secretary of State and others, it was held that the senior widow to whom the devastanams and endowments were restored took a widow's estate; see judgment of the High Court in Kalianasundaram Ayyar v. Umamba Bayi Saheba(2). So long as a Hindu family is joint, only the senior member is entitlad to manage. Both trusteeship and secular property of the Raja follow the same line of inheritance. Both the trusteeship and secular property of the Raja were granted in the same way to the widows in the name of the then senior widow.Kumaraswami Sastri, J.—For 200 years, the Raja alone was trustee and not the junior members of the family—how can the restitution in 1863 make the trusteeship partible, if it was originally impartible and devolved by primogeniture?In the Nuzvid case, Raja Vmlcata Ban v. Court of Wards property was held to be divisible after re-grant The ordinary rule of Hindu Law is, as to trusteeship, that there ought to be enjoyment by co-sharers by turns. See per Bhashtam Ayyangar, J., in Ramanathan, Chetty v. Murvgappa Chetty. This view is approved by the Privy Council on appeal in Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti(3); see also Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar(4), Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar(5) and Meenakshi Achi v. Somasundaram Pillai(6).Primogeniture and exclusion of females should be proved as a custom, the ordinary rule of Hindu Law being that trusteeship is partible property. The very first, trustee recognized by the Government by the re-grant in 1863 was a woman who was the senior widow of the family. When the family is joint, only the senior male member of the family is entitled to manage. See Thandavaroya Pillai v. Shunmugam Pillai(7).After the last widow's death, the management vested in all the co-heirs to the estate. There is coparcenery between co-widows. See the judgment in A.S 101 and 299 of 1919 of Wallis. C.J, and Sadasiva Ayyar, J.; and Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba(8). The case in Kaliana Sundaram Ayyar v. Umarhba Boyi Saheba is direct authority that the grant in 1863 was a grant to a joint family.The next question is as to the illegtimate son's right to the acquisitions made by the late Ranis. The Receiver was in management of the Raja's private properties on behalf of the widows. The position is the same as if a widow was in possession of the estate on behalf of all of them. The presumption is that the acquisitions take the character of the parent estate, and the line of succession is the same as in the case of the parent estate. See the observations of the Privy Council in Nabakishore Mandal v. Upendrakishore Mandal. The onus is on the party who alleges the acquisitions to be stridhanam of the widow to prove it. See also Mussumat Bhagbutti Daee v. Chowdry Bholanath Thakoor; Gonda Kooer v. Kooer Oody Singh; Isri Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain and Sheolochun Singh v. Sahib Singh.The case Saodamini Dasi v. The Administrator-General of Bengal is clearly distinguishable; the state there vested in an executor who was to pay some income to the widow until she adopted; hence no income of the husband's estate vested in the widow, or was used by the widow in making the acquisitions; in the present appeal, the Receiver held for the rightful owners and no property vested in the Receiver unlike the case of an executor. The observation in Akkanna v. Venkayya is opposed to the observations of the Privy Council in Nabakishore Mandal v. Upendrakishore Mandal. The question of presumption, left open by Privy Council in Rajah of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiyasami Tevar is finally decided in Nabakishore Mandal v. Upendrakishore a Mandal.The next point is, even assuming that the acquisitions were the stridhanam properties of the Ranis, the illegitimate sons are heirs, because they are the husband's heirs under the special text of Brihaspathi, The adopted son was adopted by Kamakshi Boyi Saheba only and not in association with the other Ranis. The other Ranis who subsequently inherited the property were only step-mothers of the adopted son. See Uttumalai case—Annapumi Nachiar v. Forbes. The latter could inherit only as a sapinda of their husband. All the sons, including the adopted son's son, take as husband's heirs. No son can be excluded. See Bai Kesserbai v. Hunsraj Morarji.In Nanja Pillai v. Sivabagyathachi a co-wife's daughter succeeded to the step-mother. If a woman has no issue, you must trace the inheritance as if the property was the husband's property. See also Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal.Kumaraswami Sastri, J.— In the case of collateral succession, illegitimate sons have no right?The inheritance to stridhanam is under a special text of Brihaspathi. In Subramania Ayyar v. Rathnavelu Chetty it has been held that a putative father succeeds to his illegitimate son. An illegitimate son is a sapinda of the putative father. If the property is stridhanam of the Ranis, the plaintiffs and other illegitimate sons inherit jointly with the adopted son's sons.A.V Viswanatha Sastri for first respondent.—There were three sets of properties confiscated by the Government in 1855. There has been a distinction in the mode in which they were regranted or otherwise disposed of. The three kinds of properties are (i) raj, (ii) private properties, (iii) devastanams, chatrams and other charitable endowments. See The Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Saheba With regard to the re-grant of devastanams and their endowments, the terms of the re-grant are in sharp contrast to those of the re-grant of the private properties under Exhibit A-46 (in 1862, August 21). In the grant of devastanams, there are no words showing a widow's estate as granted, or mention of daughter or next heirs of Raja, or words importing the participation of the other co-widows in the trusteeship. The grant to Kamakshi Boyi Saheba is a grant in fee simple as absolute trustee. The Rajas were sole trustees all along. The Senior Rani was sole trustee from 1863 to 1892, and so also were the succeeding Ranis. In Baboo Beer Pertab Sahee v. Maharajah Bajendra Partab Sahee it was held that a re-grant to a junior member after confiscation for rebellion, though a new grant, continues the old impartible nature of the tenure. By the grant in 1863, the old rule of primogeniture as to trusteeship was not taken away. The case Mutu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar distinguishes the case in Raja Venkata Row v. Court of Wards. See also Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer. Under the Hindu Law, the eldest heir of a trustee succeeds to him. See Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti, Trimbak v. Lakshman, Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar, Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj v. Sri Gopal Lalji Makaraj and Mayne's Hindu Law, paragraph 430. The decision in Meenakshi Achi v. Somasandaram Pillai is distinguishable, as that was a grant in favour of two members of the family.As to the claim for the acquisitions made by the Ranis, there are three points to be remembered in this connexion, (1) the Receiver was in possession of the corpus from 1866, and none of the widows was in possession; (2) each Rani had a pension of Rs. 9,600 per annum, and Kamakshi Boyi Saheba had Rs. 1,000 more; and (3) this is a Government grant. The widows had under the grant only a life estate, and there can be no accretion in the case of life estates. It is a question of intention I of the widow whether there was accretion to the corpus or not. The onus is on the person who alleges that there was accretion to prove it; the decision in Akkanna v. Venkayya is approved by the Privy Council in Rajah of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiyasami Tevar and in Rani Jagadamba Kumari v. Wazir Narain Singh.Illegitimate sons cannot succeed to collaterals See Karuppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan, Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan. Illegitimate daughter does not inherit to her mother's stridhanam, Meenakshi v. Muniandi Panikkan, Subramania Ayyar v. Rathnavelu Chetty(9), Dharma Lakshman v. Sakharam Ramjirao(10), Zipru v. Bomtya(11). Bai Kesserbai v. Hunsraj Morarji(12) approves of Gojabai v. Shrimant Shahajirao Maloji Raji Bhosle(13). Illegitimate sons of a man cannot claim as sapindas of his widow.C.S Venkata Achariyar for the second, respondent (adopted son's second son).—Illegitimate sons are outside the pale of Hindu Law except where texts expressly give rights to them. In Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik (Saptur Zamindari case), a senior son by a wife of an inferior caste was held to have no right as against a younger son of a wife of a superior caste. A fortiori an illegitimate son (who is son of no wife) should be postponed to a legitimate son. The grant of 1863 gives an absolute right to Kamakshi Boyi Saheba. It is her stridhanam. The construction put on the grant in Kalianasundaram Ayyar v. Umamba Bayi Saheba is erroneous. It is not res judicata in this suit. The second defendant is entitled to be a joint trustee with the first defendant.A. Krishnaswami Ayyar for appellants in reply.— Management by turns is division of trusteeship. Unless special usage is alleged and proved, ordinary rule of partibility applies.The root of the title of Kamakshi Boyi Saheba is the grant of 1863. When the grantee put forward a certain title in a certain character and the grant is made to her as such, the grant should be so construed. See Vengamrna v. Chelamayya.There being no proof of special usuage as regards this institution after 1863, the ordinary rule of partibility of trusteeship should be followed. In the case of stridhanam, in default of issue of the woman, the cases lay down that succession is traced as if the property belonged to the husband. In Bai Kesserbai v. Hunsraj Morarji the Privy Council held that one co-widow succeeds to another co-widow. In Tukaram v. Narayana Ramchandra it was held that propinquity is identical for woman's sapindas and for her husband's sapindas. In Nanja Pillai v. Sivabagyathachi it was held the stridhanam heir is (her husband's) nearest sapinda. In Subramania Ayyar v. Rathnavelu Chetty, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., says that an illegitimate son is a sapinda of his father. See also Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal and Jogendro Bhupati Hurrochundra Mahapatra v. Nityanand Man Sing.