Attempt to Rape Not a “Heinous Offence” for Juveniles under JJ Act, 2015:
Commentary on K S/o P v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 RJ‑JP 42985

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in K S/o P v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 1217/2025 & 1371/2025, decided on 27 October 2025 by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand ([2025:RJ-JP:42985]).

The case is significant for its clear reaffirmation of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v. State (Nct Of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 405, namely:

• Only those offences which prescribe a minimum sentence of seven years or more qualify as “heinous offences” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act, 2015”).
• Offences whose maximum sentence exceeds seven years but which either have no minimum or a minimum below seven years do not fall within the “heinous” category; they are to be treated as “serious offences”.

Applied to the facts, the High Court held that attempt to commit rape under Sections 376/511 IPC, along with the other charged provisions (including POCSO and IT Act offences), does not qualify as a “heinous offence” under the JJ Act, 2015, because none of them carries a statutory minimum of seven years’ imprisonment. Consequently, the juveniles cannot be tried as adults before a Children’s Court.

II. Background and Procedural History

1. Parties

• Petitioners: Two boys, both juveniles at the time of the alleged offences:
  • A @ S, aged about 16 years, resident of Teliwada, Pisangan, Ajmer (Rajasthan), detained in an Observation Home, Ajmer.
  • K S/o P, aged 18 years 8 months at the time of the revision, but a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident, resident of Jatawas, Pisangan, Ajmer.
• Respondents:
  • State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor.
  • Complainant: Rameshwar Lal Sahu, father of the victim, resident of Teliwada, Pisangan, Ajmer.

2. Alleged Offences

Criminal cases were registered against the petitioners for offences under:

• Indian Penal Code (IPC):
  • Section 376/511 – Attempt to commit rape
  • Section 354-A – Sexual harassment
  • Section 354-D – Stalking
  • Section 384 – Extortion
  • Section 306 – Abetment of suicide
  • Section 120-B – Criminal conspiracy
• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO):
  • Section 7 read with Section 8 – Sexual assault and its punishment
  • Section 11 read with Section 12 – Sexual harassment and its punishment
• Information Technology Act, 2000:
  • Section 67-A – Publishing or transmitting sexually explicit material in electronic form

The detailed factual matrix (nature of the interactions, precise conduct, etc.) is not recounted in the judgment. For present purposes, it is enough to note that the allegations concern sexual offences and related conduct (including extortion and abetment of suicide) involving a minor girl.

3. Proceedings before the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB)

After investigation, the police filed a chargesheet before the Juvenile Justice Board, Ajmer, because both accused were juveniles at the time of the incident.

The Board, by its judgment dated 26.03.2025, took the view that:

• The alleged offences do not fall within the definition of “heinous offences” under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act, 2015.
• Accordingly, the Board would conduct the inquiry itself and would not transfer the case to the Children’s Court for trial as adult accused.

4. Appeal to the Special POCSO Court

Aggrieved by the Board’s decision, the complainant preferred an appeal under Section 101 of the JJ Act, 2015, before the:

Special Judge, POCSO Act & Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, Court No. 2, Ajmer (“Appellate Court”).

By judgment dated 16.06.2025, the Appellate Court:

• Allowed the appeal.
• Quashed the JJB order dated 26.03.2025.
• Directed that the case be remitted to the Children’s Court for a fresh trial of the petitioners as accused (i.e., as adults).

The Appellate Court appears to have accepted the prosecution’s stance that, because Section 376 IPC (rape) carries a minimum sentence of seven years, an attempt to commit rape (Section 376/511 IPC) should be treated as a “heinous offence”, allowing the juveniles to be tried as adults.

5. Revisions before the High Court

The juveniles challenged the Appellate Court’s decision by filing two criminal revision petitions before the Rajasthan High Court. Since both revisions involved common questions of law and arose out of the same appellate order dated 16.06.2025, the High Court heard and decided them together by a common judgment.

III. Issues Before the High Court

The High Court framed the central legal issue in paragraph 7:

“Whether the alleged offence, for which the petitioners are facing the inquiry, can be treated as 'heinous offence' within the purview of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015?”

In more concrete terms, the Court had to determine:

1. Whether the set of offences charged – particularly attempt to commit rape under Sections 376/511 IPC – meet the statutory definition of “heinous offences” under Section 2(33) JJ Act, 2015.
2. If not “heinous”, whether the Special POCSO Court was justified in directing the case to be tried by the Children’s Court as if the accused were adults.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed both revision petitions and held:

1. None of the offences with which the juveniles are charged carries a statutory minimum punishment of seven years or more.
2. Consequently, none of these offences qualifies as a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act, 2015.
3. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shilpa Mittal v. State (Nct Of Delhi), offences with maximum punishment exceeding seven years but without a minimum of seven years must be treated as “serious offences”, not “heinous”.
4. Therefore, Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015 (preliminary assessment for heinous offences by children aged 16–18 years and possible transfer to Children’s Court) is not attracted in this case.
5. The Special POCSO Court’s judgment dated 16.06.2025, which had remitted the case to the Children’s Court for trial as adult accused, is legally unsustainable and is quashed and set aside.
6. The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board, Ajmer, to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the JJ Act, 2015, treating the petitioners as children in conflict with law, and not as adult accused.

Thus, the High Court restores the primacy of the juvenile justice mechanism, ensuring that the petitioners remain within the JJB framework and are not subjected to adult criminal trial.

V. Statutory Framework and the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Classification of Offences under the JJ Act, 2015

The starting point of the Court’s analysis is the tripartite classification of offences under the JJ Act, 2015:

1. Petty offences – Section 2(45)
   • Offences for which the maximum punishment under IPC or any other law is up to three years imprisonment.
2. Serious offences – Section 2(54)
   • Offences for which the maximum punishment is more than three years but not more than seven years imprisonment.
3. Heinous offences – Section 2(33)
   • Offences for which the minimum punishment is seven years or more imprisonment under IPC or any other law.

The distinction between “maximum” and “minimum” punishment is crucial:

• Petty and serious offences are classed by reference to the maximum possible sentence.
• Heinous offences, in contrast, are defined only by reference to a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years or more.

This structure produces a “gap” or fourth category:

• Offences where the maximum punishment exceeds seven years, but:
• either there is no minimum sentence prescribed, or
• the minimum sentence is less than seven years.

These “fourth category” offences are not expressly classified as petty, serious, or heinous by the bare text of the statute—an issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal and central to this judgment.

B. Role of the Classification: Sections 14, 15, 18 and 19 JJ Act, 2015

The Court then turns to the functional role of this classification in the broader scheme of the JJ Act:

• Section 14 – Inquiry by the Board
  • The Board must conduct an inquiry in respect of a child alleged to be in conflict with law.
  • Time limits for completion of inquiry differ and can be extended in certain cases depending on whether the offence is “petty”, “serious” or “heinous”.
  • Section 14(3) specifically links preliminary assessment under Section 15 to heinous offences.
• Section 15 – Preliminary Assessment in Heinous Offences by Children Aged 16–18
  • Applies only if:
    • The offence is a “heinous offence”, and
    • The child is 16 years or above at the time of commission.
  • The Board must assess:
    • Mental and physical capacity to commit the offence.
    • Ability to understand its consequences.
    • Circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed.
  • Based on this assessment, the Board may either:
    • Retain the case and proceed as a juvenile case, or
    • Order transfer of the case to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult (triggering Section 18(3)).
• Section 18(3) – Transfer for Trial as Adult
  • If after preliminary assessment in a heinous offence case, the Board opines that the child should be tried as an adult, it may transfer the case to the Children’s Court.
• Section 19 – Role of the Children’s Court
  • The Children’s Court must independently decide whether the child should indeed be tried as an adult or dealt with under juvenile procedure.

The scheme clearly shows that treating a child as an adult is an exception, reserved only for:

• Children aged 16–18, and
• Only when charged with a “heinous offence” as narrowly defined by Section 2(33).

C. Examination of the Specific Offences Charged

The Court, in paragraphs 30–33, painstakingly recites the punishment provisions for each of the charged offences and underscores that:

• Section 354-A IPC (sexual harassment): Maximum 3 years (no minimum).
• Section 354-D IPC (stalking): Maximum 3 years (first conviction) and 5 years (subsequent) – no minimum prescribed.
• Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide): Imprisonment up to 10 years – no minimum.
• Section 384 IPC (extortion): Imprisonment up to 3 years – no minimum.
• Section 120-B IPC (criminal conspiracy): Punishment tied to the underlying offence; in this case, relevantly linked to other offences which themselves do not carry minimum seven-year terms.
• Sections 7 & 8 POCSO (sexual assault): Minimum 3 years, extendable to 5 years.
• Sections 11 & 12 POCSO (sexual harassment): Imprisonment up to 3 years – no minimum.
• Section 67-A IT Act: Imprisonment up to 5 years (first conviction) and 7 years (subsequent) – again, no minimum term.

The only potentially problematic charge is Section 376/511 IPC (attempt to commit rape), because:

• Section 376 IPC (completed rape) does, in certain clauses, prescribe a minimum sentence of seven years or more (and in some categories, ten or twenty years).
• However, the juveniles are not charged with completed rape under Section 376 simpliciter; they are charged only with its attempt, punishable under Section 511 IPC.

Section 511 IPC provides that for an attempt to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment:

“… shall … be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life, or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence…”

The Court reasons (para 38) that in an attempt to commit rape, the statutorily prescribed punishment does not include a minimum of seven years; at best, only a fraction (“half”) of the minimum sentence of the completed offence may be invoked, which in any event falls below seven years. Therefore, attempt to rape under Sections 376/511 IPC is not a “heinous offence” as defined in Section 2(33).

D. Application of Shilpa Mittal v. State (Nct Of Delhi)

The crux of the High Court’s reasoning lies in its reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shilpa Mittal v. State (Nct Of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 405.

In Shilpa Mittal, the Supreme Court confronted the precise interpretive question:

Whether an offence with a maximum sentence of more than seven years but:

• no prescribed minimum, or
• a minimum of less than seven years

can be treated as a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) JJ Act, 2015?

The Supreme Court held:

1. Literal meaning governs: The definition of “heinous offence” expressly refers to offences “for which the minimum punishment is imprisonment for seven years or more.” The Court refused to delete or treat “minimum” as surplusage.
2. Fourth Category Exists: There indeed exists a “fourth category” of offences – those whose maximum punishment exceeds seven years but which lack a minimum of seven years. These offences:
   • Do not fall under “petty”.
   • Do not fit under “serious” (because their maximum exceeds seven years).
   • Do not meet the statutory definition of “heinous” (as they lack a minimum of seven years).
3. Court cannot legislate: Although the legislative drafting is imperfect, the Court cannot read down the word “minimum” or expand the category of “heinous offences” on its own notion of policy.
4. Interim solution under Article 142: Exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed that, until Parliament addresses this gap, all “fourth category” offences shall be treated as “serious offences” for the purposes of the JJ Act.

The Rajasthan High Court, at paragraphs 36–38, expressly relies on these conclusions and notes:

• An offence that does not prescribe a minimum sentence of seven years cannot be treated as a “heinous offence”.
• Offences in the “fourth category” (maximum > 7 years, minimum < 7 or none) are to be treated as “serious offences”, not “heinous offences”.

Since none of the offences alleged against the juveniles carry a statutory minimum of seven years:

• They cannot be classified as “heinous offences” under Section 2(33).
• The case falls squarely within the domain of “serious offences”.
• Therefore:
  • Section 15 JJ Act (preliminary assessment for heinous offences) does not apply.
  • The juveniles cannot be transferred for trial as adults before the Children’s Court.

E. Beneficial Interpretation and Child-Centric Approach

The Court emphasizes, drawing from the structure and object of the JJ Act (paras 24–27, 23, 26):

• The JJ Act, 2015 is a beneficial social welfare legislation intended to:
  • Protect children in conflict with law from the harshness of the regular criminal justice system.
  • Prioritize rehabilitation, social reintegration, and child-friendly processes.
• The exception allowing 16–18-year-old children to be tried as adults must be narrowly construed and invoked only where the statute clearly so permits (i.e., strictly in relation to heinous offences).
• The term “heinous offence” cannot be stretched or interpreted in a way that is less beneficial to the child, particularly for offences falling between “serious” and “heinous”.

Accordingly, the High Court refuses to treat the alleged offences as “heinous” merely because they are morally grave or because the maximum punishment exceeds seven years. What controls is the presence (or absence) of a statutory minimum sentence of seven years.

F. Distinction from Authorities Cited by the Prosecution

The Public Prosecutor and complainant relied on:

• Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu & Anr., (2023) 12 SCC 401.
• XXX v. State of U.P. & Anr., Allahabad High Court, Criminal Revision No. 3690/2025, decided 10.10.2025.

The High Court summarily distinguishes these cases (para 38) on the ground that:

• They do not directly address the specific definitional question raised here, namely, the precise scope of “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) in the context of the fourth category of offences.
• The authoritative pronouncement on this point is Shilpa Mittal, and there is “no valid reason to take a different view.”

In other words, whatever procedural or factual observations those other cases may contain, they cannot override the binding ratio of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal on the definitional question.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying the Status of Attempt to Rape under JJ Act, 2015

A key practical takeaway from this judgment is that, in the context of juvenile justice:

• Completed rape under Section 376 IPC (where the statute prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years or more) is a “heinous offence” for JJ Act purposes.
• Attempt to commit rape under Sections 376/511 IPC:
  • Does not carry a prescribed minimum sentence of seven years.
  • Therefore, is not a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33).
  • Must be treated as a “serious offence”.

This has concrete consequences:

• A child between 16–18 years charged only with attempt to rape cannot be subjected to a Section 15 preliminary assessment for trial as an adult.
• Such a child must ordinarily be dealt with entirely within the JJB framework, using juvenile procedures, rehabilitation-focused measures, and child-friendly processes.

B. Uniform Application of the “Fourth Category as Serious” Doctrine

The judgment is an important reaffirmation, at the High Court level, of the doctrine crafted in Shilpa Mittal:

• All offences whose maximum punishment exceeds seven years but which have no minimum or a minimum below seven years fall into the “fourth category”.
• Until Parliament amends the JJ Act, these must be treated as “serious offences”, not “heinous offences”.

This ensures consistency and predictability across juvenile courts and JJBs in Rajasthan:

• Boards and Special Courts cannot treat fourth-category offences as “heinous” merely because the conduct feels heinous in ordinary language or because the maximum punishment is high.
• They must strictly adhere to the statutory criterion of a minimum sentence of seven years or more for an offence to be “heinous”.

C. Limiting the Scope for Adult Trials of Juveniles

By holding that Section 15 is not triggered in the present case, the Court underscores that:

• The possibility of trying juveniles as adults is tightly controlled and cannot be lightly invoked.
• Courts must guard against the trend of mechanically seeking to transfer serious juvenile cases to the Children’s Court simply because the allegations involve morally grave conduct.
• Only those cases that squarely fall within the statutory definition of “heinous offences” can move into the Section 15 / Section 18(3) pathway.

In practice, this will:

• Reduce the number of juveniles being exposed to adult criminal procedure and sentencing.
• Reinforce a child-centric approach emphasizing reformation and reintegration.

D. Implications for POCSO Offences

The decision also indirectly clarifies the status of many POCSO offences in the JJ Act framework:

• For example, sexual assault under Sections 7/8 POCSO (minimum 3 years, extendable to 5) and sexual harassment under Sections 11/12 POCSO (up to 3 years) are:
  • Undeniably grave from a child protection perspective.
  • But, owing to their statutory sentencing structure, they are not “heinous offences” under Section 2(33).
  • They are to be treated as serious offences in the JJ Act classification.

Thus, a 16–18-year-old child accused only of these POCSO offences cannot be tried as an adult under the present statutory scheme.

E. Continuing Legislative Gap and Need for Reform

The Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal had explicitly urged the legislature to address the “fourth category” lacuna by amending the JJ Act. The Rajasthan High Court’s reliance on this judgment in 2025 indicates that, as of the date of this decision, no such amendment had been enacted.

Thus, the Court’s application of the Shilpa Mittal doctrine serves as a reminder that:

• Serious offences (including some that would ordinarily be regarded as “heinous” in everyday language) remain outside the “heinous” category for JJ Act purposes unless the statutory minimum is seven years.
• The onus is on Parliament to:
  • Clarify the classification, and/or
  • Recalibrate sentencing provisions or JJ Act definitions if it wishes to bring certain categories of offences (like attempt to rape, culpable homicide, etc.) within the “heinous” fold for juveniles.

VII. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

1. “Petty”, “Serious” and “Heinous” Offences – In Simple Terms

Under the JJ Act, 2015:

• Petty offences:
  • Maximum punishment: up to three years.
  • Less serious crimes (e.g., simple hurt, minor theft in many instances).
• Serious offences:
  • Maximum punishment: more than three years and up to seven years.
  • More serious crimes (e.g., some forms of hurt, certain property offences, some POCSO offences).
• Heinous offences:
  • These are the gravest, but the test is technical:
    • They must have a minimum sentence of seven years or more.
    • Example: many forms of rape under Section 376 IPC, certain terror offences, etc.

Important: An offence can be very serious in moral terms but still not be “heinous” under the JJ Act unless it has that minimum seven-year sentence built into the statute.

2. The “Fourth Category” – High Maximum, Low or No Minimum

The “fourth category”, as described in Shilpa Mittal, consists of offences where:

• The maximum punishment is more than seven years, but
• There is no statutory minimum or the minimum is less than seven years.

Examples include (depending on current statutory law):

• Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC in some forms).
• Murder (Section 302 IPC) – which prescribes death or life imprisonment but no minimum fixed term.
• Abetment of suicide (Section 306 IPC) – maximum ten years, no minimum.

Such offences are not “heinous” under the JJ Act, as per the present legal position. They are to be treated as “serious offences” until Parliament revises the law.

3. Juvenile Justice Board vs. Children’s Court

• Juvenile Justice Board (JJB):
  • A specialized body dealing exclusively with children in conflict with law (persons below 18 at the time of the offence).
  • Focuses on inquiry (not a conventional criminal trial), rehabilitation, and social reintegration.
  • Uses child-friendly procedures and dispositional orders (e.g., community service, counseling, placement in special homes, etc.) rather than purely punitive imprisonment.
• Children’s Court:
  • Typically a Sessions Court or Special Court designated to deal with offences against children (including POCSO cases).
  • In the context of the JJ Act, it receives cases transferred by the JJB under Section 18(3) after a preliminary assessment in heinous cases involving 16–18-year-olds.
  • It may then decide whether to:
    • Try the child as an adult under regular criminal procedure, or
    • Retain juvenile procedures in line with Section 19.

The high procedural and substantive stakes involved in transferring a child to the Children’s Court for trial as an adult explain the strict, narrow construction of “heinous offences”.

4. “Minimum” vs. “Maximum” Punishment

• Maximum punishment:
  • The upper ceiling of imprisonment a court can impose (e.g., “up to ten years”).
  • Courts may impose any sentence up to this limit.
• Minimum punishment:
  • The lowest sentence a court must impose (e.g., “not less than seven years”).
  • Courts cannot go below this minimum, barring specific statutory exceptions.

Under Section 2(33) JJ Act:

• Only offences with a mandatory minimum of seven years or more qualify as “heinous”.
• High maximums alone do not suffice.

5. Attempt Offences under Section 511 IPC

Section 511 IPC deals with attempts to commit offences where:

• The full offence is punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.

In such cases:

• The person attempting the offence can be punished with imprisonment up to one-half of the maximum punishment for the full offence.
minimum sentence of the completed offence for the attempt.

Thus, while completed rape under Section 376 IPC may be a “heinous offence” (due to its minimum seven-year-plus sentence), an attempt to rape under Sections 376/511:

• Is punished under Section 511 with a possibly lower maximum, and
• Does not have a minimum of seven years in its own right.

Consequently, under the JJ Act, 2015, such attempts are not “heinous offences” and cannot trigger the Section 15 pathway.

VIII. Conclusion

The Rajasthan High Court’s decision in K S/o P v. State of Rajasthan is a careful and principled application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shilpa Mittal to a concrete and sensitive context – juveniles accused of sexual offences and related conduct including attempt to rape and abetment of suicide.

The key takeaways are:

1. Strict Statutory Definition of “Heinous Offence”:
   • Only offences with a minimum sentence of seven years or more are “heinous” under Section 2(33) JJ Act.
   • High maximum sentences alone are insufficient.
2. Attempt to Rape Not Heinous under JJ Act:
   • Attempt to commit rape under Sections 376/511 IPC does not have a statutory minimum of seven years.
   • It is therefore not a “heinous offence” for juvenile justice purposes and falls within the “serious offence” category.
3. Protection of Juveniles from Adult Criminal Process:
   • Children aged 16–18 can be tried as adults only in clearly defined “heinous offence” cases.
   • Absent a qualifying “heinous offence”, juveniles must remain within the JJB system, benefitting from child-centric, rehabilitative mechanisms.
4. Binding Nature of Shilpa Mittal:
   • The High Court explicitly follows the Supreme Court’s clarification on the “fourth category” of offences and its direction that such offences be treated as “serious” until legislative amendment.

In a broader sense, the judgment reinforces the fundamental policy of the JJ Act, 2015: children, even when accused of grave wrongs, are to be viewed primarily as subjects of care and reform, not mere objects of punishment, and any departure from that philosophy must rest on clear, narrow statutory authorization, not on an expansive or emotive reading of the law.