Article 317 Misbehaviour Is Personal, Not Collective: Supreme Court Clarifies Removal Standard for Public Service Commission Members

Case: In Re: Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (2025 INSC 1047)

Court: Supreme Court of India (Advisory Jurisdiction under Article 317(1))

Date: 28 August 2025

Bench: J.K. Maheshwari, J.; Aravind Kumar, J.

Introduction

This advisory opinion under Article 317(1) of the Constitution arose from a Presidential Reference seeking the removal of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, a Member of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), on six charges of “misbehaviour.” The reference followed the leak of the question paper for the Assistant Engineer (Civil) Mains Examination conducted on 26–27 August 2022, which triggered a public outcry, a state-appointed High-Level Inquiry Committee, and a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe. Although three other members of APPSC resigned, Ms. Bage did not, and became the sole sitting member against whom the reference was pursued.

The Supreme Court conducted a full fact-finding inquiry as mandated by Article 317 and Order XLIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The Court framed four issues focusing on: (i) whether the respondent’s conduct constituted “misbehaviour” under Article 317; (ii) whether vagueness of charges could be examined; (iii) whether “non-application of mind” by prior authorities could be raised; and (iv) whether the six charges stood proved.

The decisive themes of the judgment are: the constitutional protection and independence of Public Service Commissions (PSCs), the nature and scope of “misbehaviour” under Article 317, the need for individual attribution (in personam) of acts or omissions to justify removal, and the inapplicability of “collective responsibility” to PSCs. The Court also commented on troubling state actions inconsistent with Article 319(d), which bars post-tenure government employment for PSC members.

Summary of the Judgment

All six charges against Ms. Bage were held not proved. The Court found no cogent material linking her to the paper leak, nor any specific duty that she failed to discharge which could amount to misbehaviour.
Misbehaviour under Article 317 is personal, not collective. Removal requires individualised proof of acts or omissions attributable to the particular member; PSCs are not governed by the doctrine of “collective responsibility.”
Vague, sweeping, or institution-wide allegations are insufficient. Charges must be specific and supported by evidence showing personal culpability.
High standards for PSC members reaffirmed—but evidence is crucial. While PSC members must maintain impeccable conduct, mere institutional lapses or policy decisions (even erroneous but bona fide) do not amount to misbehaviour.
Standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities. The Court reiterated that, in Article 317 references, the standard is not “beyond reasonable doubt,” yet allegations must be supported by reliable material.
Suspension to be revoked; consequential and monetary benefits restored. The Court recommended revocation of the respondent’s suspension and restoration of all attendant benefits.
State conduct flagged as arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory. The Court noted the incongruity of the State pressing collective allegations while later appointing resigned members to other posts, despite the bar under Article 319(d).

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Special Reference No. 1 of 1983, (1983) 4 SCC 258; Report (1990) 4 SCC 262:
- Established that the Supreme Court’s inquiry under Article 317 is fact-finding into the allegations themselves, not limited to reviewing the President’s prima facie assessment.
- Demonstrated that egregious conduct (physical assault by a PSC member) could constitute misbehaviour.
- Influence here: The Court applied the same fact-finding rigor, requiring direct attribution of misconduct to the member; nothing similar was found against Ms. Bage.
Sher Singh, In re, (1997) 3 SCC 216:
- Attempting to influence outcomes for relatives and nondisclosure of conflicts can constitute misbehaviour.
- Influence here: Illustrates individualized culpability thresholds; contrasted with the absence of any conflict, influence, or nondisclosure by the respondent.
Ram Ashray Yadav (Dr.), In re, (2000) 4 SCC 309:
- Mere institutional lapses, absent personal culpability, do not amount to misbehaviour.
- Influence here: A central anchor for rejecting vague or institution-wide allegations against a single PSC member.
Sayalee Sajeev Joshi (Smt), In re, (2007) 11 SCC 547:
- Failure to disclose that a daughter was a candidate amounted to misbehaviour; no proof of collusion otherwise.
- Influence here: Reinforces the focus on specific, attributable acts; none existed against Ms. Bage.
Reference No. 1 of 2003 (OPSC Chairman), (2009) 1 SCC 337:
- Misbehaviour is not defined; requires case-by-case assessment; not every negligence or error qualifies.
- Enumerated categories: wilful abuse, corruption, lack of integrity, offences of moral turpitude, persistent failure, etc.
- Influence here: Guided the Court’s calibration of “misbehaviour” versus “lapse.”
Reference No. 1 of 2006 (Chhattisgarh PSC), (2009) 8 SCC 41:
- Irregularities attributable to officers do not ipso facto implicate the Chairman; need specific evidence.
- Influence here: Parallels the APPSC case where the CBI pinned blame on the DCoE and printer’s agent, not on any member.
Mehar Singh Saini, In re, (2010) 13 SCC 586:
- “Misbehaviour” has wide connotation; includes conduct eroding public faith; standard of proof is preponderance.
- Non-cooperation with lawful investigations and endorsement of tainted selections can qualify.
- Influence here: The Court measured APPSC facts against Saini and found no analogous conduct by the respondent.
C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605:
- Clarified “misbehaviour” (Article 124 context): elastic term; not every error qualifies; requires mens rea for misconduct.
- Influence here: Informs the distinction between lapses and misbehaviour applicable to Article 317.
Common Cause v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 667; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501:
- Explained “collective responsibility” in a Cabinet/Westminster setting.
- Influence here: Used to demonstrate why collective responsibility is inapposite to PSCs and Article 317 removals.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Constitutional architecture and purpose

Article 317 is designed to insulate PSC members from political winds by prescribing a rigorous, judicially-superintended removal process. It qualifies the doctrine of pleasure.
“Misbehaviour” is undefined and must be construed contextually, with due regard to the office, standards expected, and the alleged act/omission.
Article 317(4) supplies a specific instance—interest in government contracts—but does not limit the broader ambit.

2) “Misbehaviour” versus “misconduct”

Drawing on legal dictionaries and precedent, the Court reiterated:
- Misbehaviour: improper/unlawful conduct; wider, normative ambit; includes conduct eroding public faith.
- Misconduct: implies wilfulness/mens rea; graver transgressions breaching definite rules.
Every misconduct may be misbehaviour, but not every misbehaviour is misconduct; the Article 317 inquiry targets “misbehaviour.”

3) Removal is in personam; no “collective responsibility” under Article 317

Article 317 removal and suspension target a specific Chairman or Member; charges must be particularised and attributable to the individual.
Importing Cabinet-style collective responsibility into PSC functioning is constitutionally unsound; PSCs are independent constitutional bodies, not political executives.
The Attorney General’s plea to read institutional/collective misbehaviour into Article 317 was respectfully declined.

4) Standard of proof and scope of inquiry

The Court reaffirmed:
- Scope: A full fact-finding inquiry into the allegations themselves—not a limited review of the President’s prima facie satisfaction (1983 Special Reference).
- Standard: Preponderance of probabilities (per Mehar Singh Saini), applied with the gravity of consequences in mind.
Vague, sweeping charges without cogent material fail the constitutional threshold.

5) Application to the six charges

Charge I (Paper leak; failure to ensure confidentiality):
- No material showed the respondent’s involvement in paper setting, moderation, printing, or leakage.
- Work allocation order (18.08.2021) placed AE (Civil) recruitment under another member; respondent handled legal/judicial matters. 2017 Guidelines kept members out of confidential paper-setting/printing functions.
- CBI charge-sheets attributed leakage to the DCoE and a printer’s representative; respondent not named.
- Held: Not proved.
Charge II (Historic leakages since 2017; failure to change guidelines):
- Respondent joined in August 2021; no specific duty to unilaterally revise guidelines was shown.
- Held: Vague; not proved.
Charges III & V (Failure to take remedial action/guideline revision; non-finalisation of “2022 Guidelines”):
- Draft 2022 Guidelines existed but were kept in abeyance by collective Commission decision pending a government High-Level Committee process triggered by student union demands.
- APPSC’s additional affidavit admitted no member was solely assigned guideline revision; no order delineating such exclusive duty existed.
- Held: Vague; individual culpability not shown; not proved.
Charge IV (Collective responsibility; respondent’s special liability as “legal” member):
- No constitutional or institutional basis to impose collective responsibility on PSC members under Article 317.
- “Legal matters” portfolio did not translate into an exclusive duty to revise examination guidelines or to police confidentiality across operational domains.
- Held: Not proved.
Charge VI (Abeyance of punishments for unfair means; failure to advise against):
- The impugned decision was a quasi-judicial/administrative determination amid absence of settled guidelines and pending comparative data from other PSCs/UPSC; bona fide policy error, if any, is not “misbehaviour.”
- Held: Not proved.

6) Vagueness and “non-application of mind” concerns

The Court underscored that the Inquiry Committee’s terms did not even specifically target members’ individual conduct; its report (especially Chapter 7) did not indict any member personally.
Letters by the Chief Minister and Governor pressed for wholesale reconstitution of the Commission—implicitly treating the issue as institution-wide—despite the absence of personal findings against the respondent. The Court found this approach arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory.
While the President’s power to refer is not contingent on prior fact-finding, the Court may and did examine the substantive basis of the charges; none stood established.

7) Article 319(d) inconsistency flagged

Despite statewide imputations of collective taint, resigned members were later appointed to other public posts—contrary to the constitutional prohibition in Article 319(d).
The Court flagged this contradiction as further indication that no personal culpability of members, including the respondent, had been established at any stage.

C. Impact and Prospective Significance

Precedential clarification: Individualised standard under Article 317
- Removals of PSC members must be grounded in in personam allegations proved on a preponderance of probabilities; institutional failings or generalized dissatisfaction will not suffice.
- “Collective responsibility” has no application to PSCs under Article 317.
Higher protection, but not immunity
- The judgment fortifies PSC independence against politicized references, yet preserves the capacity to remove members where specific misconduct (e.g., influence-peddling, conflicts, non-cooperation with lawful probes) is demonstrably proved.
Process discipline for governments
- States must craft Presidential References with precision: specific charges, delineated duties, clear causal link between conduct and alleged misbehaviour, and supporting material.
- Reliance on inquiry reports that do not indict individual members will be insufficient.
PSC governance and SOPs
- Although the respondent was exonerated, the judgment underscores that PSCs should reinforce SOPs, confidentiality protocols, and internal allocation of responsibilities with clear contemporaneous documentation.
Article 319(d) compliance spotlight
- States ought to revisit post-tenure appointments of former PSC members for constitutional compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 317 (Removal of PSC Members): A PSC Chairman/Member can be removed by the President only on the ground of “misbehaviour,” after a Supreme Court inquiry. Suspension can be ordered pending the Court’s report. Separate automatic grounds (insolvency, paid employment, infirmity) exist under Article 317(3).
“Misbehaviour” (Article 317): Not defined; broadly covers improper or unlawful conduct undermining the office’s integrity and public faith. Contextual and fact-specific; not every error or policy disagreement suffices.
“Misconduct” vs “Misbehaviour”: Misconduct often connotes wilfulness/mens rea and breach of definite rules; misbehaviour is broader, focusing on conduct incompatible with the constitutional office’s standards.
In personam Removal: Charges and proof must attach to the individual member—PSCs are not removable as a collective entity; “collective responsibility” is alien to Article 317.
Standard of Proof: “Preponderance of probabilities” (more likely than not), not “beyond reasonable doubt,” but applied with due gravity given the office and consequences.
Order XLIII, Supreme Court Rules, 2013: Prescribes the procedure for Supreme Court inquiries under Article 317—akin to trial-like fact-finding with witnesses and documents.
Article 319(d): Bars PSC members, after ceasing to hold office, from taking any employment under the Union or a State government.

Conclusion

This decision is a cornerstone in PSC jurisprudence. It solidifies that “misbehaviour” under Article 317 is a personal, evidence-based standard—not a tool for collective censure or institutional reset. The Supreme Court reaffirmed PSC members’ heightened ethical expectations and the constitutional imperative of their independence, while simultaneously insisting on disciplined legal standards: specific charges, individualized duties, and cogent proof.

By rejecting vague or speculative attributions—particularly where the operational breach was traced to non-member functionaries—the Court prevented a slippage from constitutional protection to political expediency. The explicit rejection of “collective responsibility” in the PSC context preserves the structural neutrality of Commissions and insulates their members from being scapegoated for systemic failures. The cautionary note on Article 319(d) further signals that constitutional guardrails around PSC tenure and post-tenure employment must be strictly observed.

Key takeaways:

PSC member removal demands individualized misbehaviour proved on preponderance of probabilities.
Vague, general, or collective allegations cannot ground removal under Article 317.
Bona fide quasi-judicial or policy decisions, even if later reversed, do not per se amount to misbehaviour.
States must ensure that inquiry terms of reference, evidence collection, and references to the President are meticulously crafted and person-specific.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment recalibrates the balance between accountability and independence of PSCs—fortifying public trust not through collective punishment but through principled, procedurally exacting adjudication of individual responsibility.