Article 21 Overrides Indefinite Pre-trial Detention Under PMLA: Bail Where Trial Is Not Likely to Commence and Delay Is Attributable to ED

1. Introduction

Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement (2026 INSC 12, decided on 06-01-2026) concerns the grant of regular bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The appellant, a former promoter and non-executive Chairman associated with the “Amtek Group”, challenged the Delhi High Court’s refusal of bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) read with Section 45 PMLA.

The alleged “predicate offences” were FIRs lodged by IDBI Bank and Bank of Maharashtra alleging cheating, conspiracy, breach of trust, forgery (IPC) and corruption offences (PC Act), with alleged fraud amounts of INR 385.35 crores and INR 289 crores. Based on these FIRs, the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) registered two ECIRs alleging laundering of proceeds of crime. The appellant was arrested on 09-07-2024; prosecution complaints were filed on 06-09-2024 and a supplementary complaint on 02-08-2025. Cognizance had not yet been taken.

Core issues before the Supreme Court were: (i) whether prolonged pre-trial custody (about 16 months and 20 days) with no imminent trial offended Article 21; (ii) how to apply bail principles in PMLA cases (including the effect of Section 45’s constraints) when the maximum sentence is seven years; (iii) whether allegations of witness-influence and dissipation of attached properties justified continued detention; and (iv) who was responsible for delay in progress of the case.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court’s order dated 19-08-2025, and directed that the appellant be released on bail on terms to be fixed by the trial court. Additional conditions included providing a contact telephone/mobile number, surrendering the passport, and not leaving India without trial court permission.

The Court held that continued incarceration, where (i) the maximum sentence is seven years, (ii) investigation qua the appellant was stated to have concluded, (iii) evidence is largely documentary and already with the prosecution, (iv) cognizance was not taken and proceedings were still at document scrutiny stage, and (v) trial was not likely to commence soon given 210 witnesses, violates the appellant’s Article 21 right to speedy trial.

It rejected the ED’s claims of witness-influence as “wholly incredulous” on the facts, and found the principal delay in trial progress was attributable to the ED’s own challenge (which caused an eight-month deferment of proceedings) rather than to the accused.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Article 21, speedy trial, and constitutional limits on pre-trial detention

Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 9 SCC 813: The Court quoted/relied on the proposition that if the State/prosecuting agency/court lacks the “wherewithal” to protect the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial, it should not oppose bail solely because the crime is serious; Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of crime. This case supplied the normative constitutional anchor for overriding carceral “seriousness” arguments.
Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660: Used to reinforce that lengthy incarceration (there, around 17 months) without trial commencement deprives an undertrial of speedy trial rights, making bail appropriate notwithstanding statutory stringency. In the present case, the Court treated ~16 months 20 days similarly significant.
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713: Cited by the appellant to support the wider constitutional principle that statutory restrictions cannot justify indefinite pre-trial detention when trial is not likely to conclude within reasonable time. Though originally in a different statutory context, its constitutional logic informs the Court’s Article 21 approach in special-statute bail.

B. PMLA-specific bail approach where maximum sentence is seven years

V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC2626: Treated as a direct PMLA guidepost: where the maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration pending trial may warrant bail by constitutional courts if trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time; statutory restrictions cannot result in indefinite pretrial detention. The present judgment substantially applies this framing to Section 45 PMLA scenarios without allowing Section 45 to become a mechanism for indefinite custody.
Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1291: A three-Judge Bench was cited for two decisive propositions: (i) prolonged incarceration cannot convert pretrial detention into punishment; and (ii) where evidence is documentary and already seized, the risk of tampering is materially reduced—supporting bail.

C. Economic offences: no blanket “class-based” denial of bail

Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51: Used to underline that economic offences are diverse and cannot be mechanically grouped to deny bail. The Court repeats the caution against blanket categories and insists on a fact-specific assessment (gravity, sentence, circumstances, investigation status, trial prospects).
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791: Cited both in submissions and reasoning: (i) gravity is assessed case-wise and sentence is relevant; (ii) economic offences cannot automatically be treated as a separate class to refuse bail. The judgment adopts this to resist the ED’s “gravity-only” posture.

D. Long incarceration benchmarks and comparative bail grants

The Court supported its conclusion by referencing that in multiple cases bail was granted with custody periods ranging from months to around seventeen months, including: Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2269, Sanjay Agarwal (s) v. Directorate Of Enforcement (s)., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1748 (cited twice in the judgment), Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2276, Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl) No.3148 of 2025 (Order dated 15.04.2025), Neeraj Singal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3598, Abdul Razak Peediyakkal v. UOI, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2326, and again Manish Sisodia (supra). This “comparative proportionality” approach signals that the Court is building an empirically consistent Article 21 threshold in PMLA custody cases.

E. “Seriousness” and refusal of bail; re-apply approach

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 and B. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70: Cited by the ED to argue that long incarceration cannot be the only ground for bail, especially with allegations of tampering/influencing witnesses. The Court did not reject the principle in the abstract, but distinguished it on facts—finding the tampering/influence claims unpersuasive and trial delay largely prosecutorial.
Bimal Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl.) No. 7942/2021: Invoked by ED to suggest the “re-apply after some time” approach. The Court, however, granted bail immediately, implying that where Article 21 breach is evident, deferral is not an adequate remedy.

F. Contextual proceedings that shaped investigation posture

Jaskaran Singh Chawla vs. Union of India and Ors.: The Court noted that an interim order directed CBI and SFIO to conduct exhaustive investigation and to cooperate with ED. This contextualizes the breadth of the investigative ecosystem and explains the large evidentiary universe, but does not justify indefinite detention in the Court’s analysis.
Additional cases cited in submissions include Udhaw Singh v. Directorate Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 357, Prem Prakash v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No.691 of 2023 - Order dated 04.10.2024, Dineshchand Surana v. Asst. Director, ED, SLP (Crl.) No.15274 of 2024 - Order dated 06.08.2025, and Kapil Wadhawan v. CBI, SLP (Crl.) No.16953 of 2025 - Judgment/Order dated 11.12.2025, reinforcing the appellant’s broad Article 21 and parity-based bail narrative.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Gravity is relevant—but not absolute. The Court reiterates that “gravity” must be assessed factually, including by considering the prescribed sentence. It stresses that economic offences cannot be treated as a homogeneous class for blanket denial of bail.
Article 21 operates as a constitutional check on special-statute detention. Where trial does not commence or progress reasonably, continued custody becomes punitive, converting pretrial detention into punishment—impermissible under Article 21. This check is explicitly stated to apply “irrespective of the nature of the offence.”
PMLA’s seven-year maximum sentence matters. Borrowing from V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, the Court treats prolonged custody as especially unjustifiable where the ceiling sentence is seven years and the process risks consuming a substantial portion of the potential sentence before conviction.
Case-stage realities: no cognizance; voluminous record; many witnesses; no near-term trial. The Court puts decisive weight on: (i) cognizance not taken; (ii) proceeding still at scrutiny of documents; (iii) 210 witnesses; and (iv) no indication that day-to-day hearing would begin soon.
Investigation concluded; evidence documentary and in State custody. With the ED’s recorded submission that investigation qua the appellant concluded, and with documentary evidence already seized, the Court finds reduced necessity of custody and reduced risk of evidentiary tampering.
Alleged witness-influence found factually implausible. The Court rejects the claim that the appellant instructed Ms. Anuradha Kapur not to join investigation, emphasizing the timeline: the appellant has been in custody since 09-07-2024, while she was arrayed as a witness only on 02-08-2025—making the allegation “wholly incredulous” as framed.
Delay attribution: prosecutorial challenge caused an eight-month deferment. The Court makes a pointed finding that delay is attributable “only to the respondent” because ED’s challenge to the notice order led to eight months of stayed/ deferred proceedings until withdrawal. This reasoning strengthens the Article 21 case: the State cannot both impede progress and rely on delay to justify detention.
Dissipation/alienation allegations not linked to the appellant on the record. The Court notes the property transactions relate to M/s Marichika Properties and finds no evidence the appellant was a signatory or materially linked at that stage. Hence, dissipation is “untenable at this stage.”

3.3 Impact

Strengthening the “Article 21 override” in PMLA bail: The judgment consolidates a line of authority that even under stringent bail regimes, constitutional courts will intervene where custody becomes effectively indefinite due to delayed commencement/progress of trial.
Prosecutorial-delay accountability: By expressly attributing delay to ED’s own litigation choice (and using that attribution to support bail), the judgment discourages prosecuting agencies from procedural strategies that stall trial while opposing bail.
Fact-sensitive approach to “witness influence” and “dissipation” claims: The decision signals that generalized allegations will not suffice; agencies must show coherent timelines, formal witness status, and a demonstrable nexus between accused and alleged acts (e.g., signatures, control, instructions).
Operational guidance for trial courts: While granting bail, the Court leaves conditions to be fixed by the trial court and adds modern compliance tools (contact number; passport surrender; travel restriction). This balances liberty with enforceability and may be replicated in similar PMLA bail orders.
Economic offence bail jurisprudence becomes more granular: Reaffirming that economic offences are not a monolithic category, the judgment pushes courts to analyze (i) sentence range, (ii) case stage, (iii) nature of evidence, and (iv) realistic trial timelines rather than relying on rhetoric of “largest fraud” or abstract gravity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Predicate offence: The underlying scheduled offence (e.g., cheating/corruption) that generates the “proceeds of crime.” PMLA proceedings depend on such scheduled offences.
ECIR: Enforcement Case Information Report—ED’s internal case registration for money laundering inquiry/investigation, typically based on a predicate offence/FIR.
Proceeds of crime: Property derived or obtained from criminal activity related to a scheduled offence; laundering allegations center on handling and disguising such property.
Cognizance: The stage when the court formally takes notice of the offence/complaint and begins judicial proceedings against the accused; before cognizance, the case may remain at filing/scrutiny/registration-related stages.
Section 45 PMLA “twin conditions”: A restrictive bail framework generally requiring (i) opportunity to the prosecutor to oppose bail and (ii) court’s satisfaction that the accused is not guilty and not likely to commit an offence while on bail. This judgment demonstrates that even where Section 45 is invoked, Article 21 concerns about indefinite detention and non-commencing trial can justify bail by constitutional courts.
Pre-trial detention vs. punishment: Custody before conviction is meant to ensure investigation/trial integrity (appearance, non-tampering). When it becomes prolonged without trial progress, it effectively punishes without conviction—constitutionally impermissible under Article 21.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision establishes a clear, enforceable principle: in PMLA prosecutions (maximum seven-year sentence), prolonged undertrial custody without likely commencement of trial—especially where evidence is documentary, investigation is concluded, and delay is attributable to the prosecution—violates Article 21 and warrants bail.

The judgment’s significance lies in its insistence that the criminal process cannot itself become the punishment, and that “gravity” rhetoric cannot eclipse the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and speedy trial—particularly when systemic and prosecutorial delays are demonstrable on the record.