Approvers’ Bail, Section 306(4) CrPC and Foreign Nationals’ Right to Speedy Trial: Commentary on Nurul Islam v. State of Rajasthan

Approvers’ Bail, Section 306(4) CrPC and Foreign Nationals’ Right to Speedy Trial:
Commentary on Nurul Islam v. State of Rajasthan

1. Introduction

The decision of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in Nurul Islam & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 5888/2025, decided on 24 November 2025 by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand (marked “Reportable”), addresses a recurring but under-discussed question in criminal procedure:

  • Can an approver (pardoned accused) be released on bail before his testimony is recorded, in light of Section 306(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)?
  • How does this strict statutory position interact with the fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly where the approver is a foreign national?

The case arises out of a serious offence involving an alleged racket in illegal kidney transplantation and human trafficking, in which two Bangladeshi nationals, having turned approvers, sought bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration and delayed trial. All co-accused were already on bail; only the approvers remained in custody.

The judgment does not grant bail but reaffirms and sharpens the doctrinal framework laid down by a Larger Bench in Noor Taki @ Mammu v. State of Rajasthan and constitutional jurisprudence on Article 21. It also delivers a stern reminder to trial courts about their duty to prevent undue delay, especially where approvers and foreign nationals are in custody.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and Allegations

  • Petitioners:
    1. Nurul Islam, s/o Abdul Jabbarar, resident of Bangladesh, in custody.
    2. Md. Ahsaanul Kobir, s/o Md. Fajlur Rahman, resident of Bangladesh, in custody.
  • Respondent: State of Rajasthan, through the Public Prosecutor.

The petitioners are foreign nationals from Bangladesh, originally lodged in District Jail Gurugram (Haryana), later transferred to Central Jail, Jaipur. They were arrested on 23.04.2024 in connection with:

FIR No. 319/2024, Police Station Jawahar Circle, Jaipur City (East), registered under:

  • Section 419 IPC – Cheating by personation,
  • Section 420 IPC – Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property,
  • Section 471 IPC – Using as genuine a forged document,
  • Section 120-B IPC – Criminal conspiracy.

The core allegation is that a criminal racket facilitated illegal kidney transplant surgeries for patients and donors who were not related, by procuring or forging documents, and bringing foreign nationals from Bangladesh to Jaipur for transplantation.

2.2 Status as Approvers

During the investigation, the petitioners:

  • accepted a tender of pardon and became approvers, and
  • on the basis of their statements, other co-accused were apprehended and arrested.

Subsequently, a charge-sheet was filed against both:

  • the petitioners (as approvers), and
  • other co-accused (as accused).

Crucially, all the principal and other co-accused, alleged to be the main persons in the kidney transplantation racket, were granted regular bail under Section 439 CrPC. The petitioners alone remained in custody because they had become approvers.

2.3 Delay in Commencement of Trial

Despite the filing of the charge-sheet:

  • The trial had not commenced.
  • Even charges had not been framed against any accused.
  • Over one and a half years had passed since the petitioners’ arrest (23.04.2024).
  • The next date before the trial court was 25.11.2025.
  • The delay was attributed to repeated applications by the principal accused, allegedly intending to delay the trial.

2.4 The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition

Before the High Court, the petitioners sought:

  • Release on bail pending trial, on the ground that:
    • they were approvers,
    • they had cooperated with the investigation,
    • all co-accused were already on bail, and
    • their prolonged incarceration violated their right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Article 21.

The State opposed the bail by invoking Section 306(4) CrPC and relying on the Larger Bench decision in Noor Taki @ Mammu v. State of Rajasthan.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Issues Framed

The central legal question identified was:

Whether benefit of bail can be granted to an approver unless and until his statements are recorded before the Trial Court?

3.2 Court’s Decision

The High Court held:

  1. Under Section 306(4) CrPC and as interpreted by the Larger Bench in Noor Taki @ Mammu, an approver is required to be detained in custody and ordinarily cannot be released on bail before his statement is recorded during trial.
  2. Because in the present case the petitioners’ statements had not yet been recorded, and the matter was still at the stage of framing of charges, they could not be granted bail at this stage.
  3. Nonetheless, the Court strongly disapproved of the delay in the trial and emphasised that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 extends to foreign nationals as well. Prolonged detention without trial can violate Article 21.
  4. The Court issued directional relief instead of bail:
    • The trial court was directed to:
      • decide charge/discharge and frame charges (if any) within four weeks of receipt of the certified copy of the order; and
      • thereafter record the statements of the petitioners as approvers on priority, as Prosecution Witnesses (PW) 1 and 2.
  5. The bail petition was disposed of without granting bail, but liberty was reserved for the petitioners to move a fresh bail application after their statements were recorded, to be considered in accordance with law.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework

4.1.1 Section 306 CrPC – Tender of Pardon to Accomplice (Approver)

Section 306 CrPC empowers a Magistrate to tender pardon to a person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in an offence, on condition of full and true disclosure of all circumstances and the involvement of co-accused. Once a pardon is accepted, the person becomes an approver.

Sub-section (4) is central here. It provides, in substance, that:

  • Every person accepting a tender of pardon:
    • shall be examined as a witness in the court taking cognizance; and
    • shall be examined in the subsequent trial.
  • Such person “shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial”, unless he is already on bail.

Two key consequences follow:

  1. Once pardoned, the person ceases to be an “accused” and becomes a witness.
  2. There is an express legislative direction that he must be kept in custody until completion of the trial, unless already on bail.

4.1.2 Section 439 CrPC – Special Powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding Bail

Section 439 CrPC allows the High Court or Court of Session to grant bail to a “person accused of an offence”. The Larger Bench in Noor Taki, followed here, held:

  • Once an accused accepts pardon and becomes an approver, he is no longer a “person accused of an offence” for the purposes of Section 439.
  • Therefore, Section 439 does not apply to an approver; he has no statutory right to seek bail under this provision in his capacity as an approver.

4.1.3 Section 482 CrPC – Inherent Powers of the High Court

Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders:

  • to give effect to any order under the Code,
  • to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or
  • to secure the ends of justice.

The Larger Bench in Noor Taki held that, despite the restrictive language of Section 306(4), the High Court retains power under Section 482 to enlarge an approver on bail in exceptional and reasonable cases, particularly where prolonged detention would otherwise violate Article 21.

4.1.4 Article 21 of the Constitution – Right to Life and Personal Liberty

Article 21 guarantees:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

After Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, this “procedure” must be just, fair and reasonable, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. The jurisprudence on Article 21 has further clarified that:

  • Speedy trial is an integral and essential part of Article 21.
  • The right applies to all persons, not just Indian citizens — thus covering foreign nationals.

The High Court in this case relies heavily on this expanded understanding, through several Supreme Court precedents.

4.2 Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.2.1 Noor Taki @ Mammu v. State of Rajasthan (Larger Bench, Rajasthan High Court)

This is the pivotal precedent. The Larger Bench was specifically constituted to answer whether an approver could be released on bail, and if so, under what authority and in what circumstances.

Key determinations (as quoted and adopted in the present judgment, particularly paras 15–19 of Noor Taki):

  1. Section 439 CrPC does not apply to approvers:
    • After accepting a pardon, an approver no longer remains an accused unless he breaches the terms of the pardon and is subsequently tried.
    • His status is that of a witness; hence, he falls outside the wording “person accused of an offence” in Section 439.
  2. Debate about Section 306(4)(b) being mandatory or directory is of limited practical relevance:
    • Since there is no statutory provision granting bail to an approver (via Section 439), the question of construing 306(4)(b) as directory vs mandatory for granting bail is largely academic.
  3. Article 21 and Inherent Powers under Section 482 CrPC:
    • Detention must be reasonable, fair and just. Prolonged incarceration, even if under “due process”, can violate Article 21.
    • The High Court, in appropriate cases, may:
      • declare the continued detention of an approver illegal if it becomes unreasonable or oppressive, or
      • enlarge the approver on bail using its inherent powers under Section 482.
    • The Larger Bench gives illustrative situations:
      • Where the trial is inordinately long, with many witnesses still to be examined.
      • Where there is a re-trial due to procedural irregularities, while co-accused are on bail.
      • Where accused are abusing the process by absconding and delaying the trial, and the approver remains confined.
      • Particularly where the approver:
        • has already been examined,
        • has supported the prosecution,
        • has not violated the terms of pardon, and
        • there is no early end of the trial in sight.
    • The Bench expressly declined to read Section 306(4)(b) as an absolute bar which could override Section 482 CrPC.
  4. Application in Noor Taki itself:
    • The approver’s statement had been recorded and he had complied with pardon conditions.
    • Detention exceeded 22 months; co-accused were on bail; over 20 witnesses remained to be examined.
    • The Court confirmed interim bail and allowed him to remain on bail during the trial.

The present judgment explicitly treats Noor Taki as correctly laying down that:

  • ordinarily, an approver should be detained until his statement is recorded, but
  • in exceptional cases, the High Court can grant relief under Section 482 CrPC if Article 21 considerations so require.

4.2.2 Article 21 and Speedy Trial Cases

The Larger Bench in Noor Taki (quoted in this judgment) drew extensively from Supreme Court jurisprudence, which is equally relevant in the present reasoning:

  • Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi:
    • Reaffirmed that “procedure established by law” under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just.
    • Expanded the notion of “life” and “personal liberty” to include more than mere animal existence.
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India:
    • Seminal judgment holding that laws depriving life or liberty must meet the tests of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.
    • Serves as the doctrinal foundation for expanding Article 21 to include fair procedure and speedy trial.
  • Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar:
    • The Supreme Court expressed anguish at long incarceration of undertrial prisoners without meaningful progress in their trials.
    • Emphasised judicial responsibility to ensure that trials do not stagnate while accused languish in jail.
  • Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (multiple decisions, particularly (1980) 1 SCC 108; AIR 1979 SC 1377):
    • Recognised speedy trial as a fundamental right implicit in Article 21.
    • Directed release of undertrial prisoners who had been detained longer than the maximum possible sentence for the alleged offence.
  • Sunil Batra (Ii) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488:
    • Held that even convicts are entitled to live with human dignity, protected by Article 21.
    • Used to support the proposition that all stages of criminal justice (including incarceration) must honour dignity and non-arbitrariness.
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union Of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1:
    • Recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right protected by Article 21.
    • Relied upon to underline that aspects of personal dignity and privacy apply to all persons, including accused and foreign nationals.

In the present judgment, Justice Dhand re-invokes this body of jurisprudence to emphasise that:

  • Prolonged pre-trial detention, especially without even framing of charges, can offend the “fair, just and reasonable” standard of Article 21.
  • The protection of Article 21 extends to foreign nationals as much as to Indian citizens.

4.3 Court’s Legal Reasoning in Nurul Islam

4.3.1 Status of the Petitioners as Approvers

The Court notes that:

  • The petitioners became approvers during investigation.
  • The co-accused were traced and arrested based on the petitioners’ statements.
  • All accused, including the petitioners, have been charge-sheeted, but the trial has not commenced.

This leads to the central question: should approvers be granted bail before their statements are recorded at trial?

4.3.2 Application of Section 306(4) CrPC and Noor Taki

Relying on the statutory text and the Larger Bench, the Court states (paras 7–10, summarised):

  • Section 306(4) CrPC is “clear and specific”, mandating that:
    • an approver shall be examined as a witness, and
    • shall not be released on bail but detained in custody until termination of trial (unless already on bail).
  • The Larger Bench in Noor Taki has already “set at rest” the issue:
    • An approver is not an “accused” for purposes of Section 439; thus, regular bail under Section 439 is not available.
    • As a rule, the approver should remain in custody until his statement is recorded.

Although the Larger Bench also recognised that in “exceptional and reasonable cases” the High Court may resort to Section 482 CrPC to enlarge an approver on bail (especially where detention becomes unreasonably long), Justice Dhand focuses on the baseline rule:

“The answer of the reference by the Larger Bench is clear and specific that the approver should be detained in custody until his statement is recorded.” (para 9)

On the specific facts here, since the petitioners’ statements had not yet been recorded, the Court treats itself as constrained from granting bail at this stage within the normal framework of Section 306(4) CrPC.

4.3.3 Strong Censure of Trial Court Delay

Despite refusing bail, the Court takes a firm view on the conduct of the trial court (paras 11–12):

  • Over 1.5 years of custody have elapsed without even framing of charges.
  • The trial court has been “deferring the matter from one day to another unnecessarily, by entertaining unwanted requests made by any of the parties”.
  • The Court “does not appreciate such act” and reminds the trial court:
    • that some accused (such as these petitioners) are in custody for a prolonged period,
    • that delay in framing charges is unjustifiable, and
    • that the court must remain mindful of the custody status of undertrial prisoners and approvers.

This is a clear message: judicial case management is not a formality when personal liberty is at stake.

4.3.4 Article 21 and Foreign Nationals

An important part of the reasoning is the explicit recognition that:

  • The petitioners are foreign nationals (Bangladeshi).
  • They are nonetheless fully protected by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

The Court makes several key constitutional assertions (paras 13–16):

  • Article 21 applies to “persons”, not merely “citizens”: thus its protection “extends to all persons and this right is not confined to Indian citizens alone and it is available to the foreign nationals as well”.
  • Right to life and dignity under Article 21 is available to “all human beings, including foreigners”.
  • Fair and speedy trial is an integral part of Article 21 and is an “essential component” of criminal procedure for all persons, including foreign nationals.

Citing Sunil Batra (II) and K.S. Puttaswamy, the Court reinforces that:

  • Even convicts are entitled to live with dignity.
  • Privacy and dignity cannot be arbitrarily invaded, even in the case of an accused or foreign national.

This constitutional analysis underpins the Court’s conclusion in para 17:

“Prolonged detention without trial can be a violation of Article 21 of Constitution of India.”

4.3.5 Relief Granted: Directions Instead of Bail

Balancing Section 306(4) CrPC and Article 21 concerns, the Court chooses an intermediate course:

  1. Directional Relief to Speed up Trial (paras 18–19):
    • The trial court is directed to:
      • decide charge/discharge and frame charges within four weeks from receipt of the certified copy of the High Court’s order.
      • Upon framing charges, the trial court must record the statements of the petitioners as PW-1 and PW-2 on a priority basis.
  2. No Bail at Present:
    • The criminal misc. petition is disposed of without granting bail.
  3. Liberty to Seek Bail Later (para 21):
    • The petitioners are given liberty to file an appropriate bail application after their statements are recorded before the trial court.
    • Any such bail application is to be decided “in accordance with law,” clearly suggesting that Noor Taki and Article 21 will then become squarely relevant in assessing whether continued detention is justified.

4.4 Assessment and Critical Commentary

4.4.1 Reaffirmation of the Basic Rule: No “Ordinary” Bail for Approvers Before Testimony

The judgment cogently reaffirms the core proposition of Noor Taki:

  • An approver’s status is that of a witness, not an accused.
  • Section 439 CrPC is thus not a viable route for his bail.
  • Section 306(4) expresses a clear legislative intention that an approver should remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial, unless already on bail.

By emphasising that the Larger Bench’s “answer” is “clear and specific” that the approver should be detained in custody until his statement is recorded, the Court:

  • Reinforces stability and predictability in the law on approvers’ bail in Rajasthan.
  • Signals to subordinate courts and practitioners that attempts to bypass Section 306(4) through ordinary bail applications are unlikely to succeed.

4.4.2 Tension with Article 21 and the Use of Section 482 CrPC

At the same time, the judgment implicitly recognises a tension:

  • On one hand, Section 306(4) requires that the approver be detained until termination of the trial (or at least until his testimony is recorded).
  • On the other hand, Article 21 requires that detention by due process be “reasonable, fair and just,” and that trials be conducted with reasonable expedition.

The Larger Bench in Noor Taki resolved this tension by invoking Section 482 CrPC:

  • In exceptional cases, especially where prolonged detention becomes unreasonable or oppressive, the High Court may release an approver on bail.
  • However, in Noor Taki itself, this was done after the approver’s statement had already been recorded and the conditions of pardon were fulfilled.

In Nurul Islam, Justice Dhand does not exercise Section 482 to release the petitioners, even though:

  • They have been in custody for over 1.5 years.
  • All co-accused are on bail.
  • The trial has not even commenced, and charges have not been framed.

Instead, the Court uses its supervisory jurisdiction to:

  • censure the trial court, and
  • direct early framing of charges and urgent recording of the approvers’ testimony.

This approach:

  • Maintains fidelity to the statutory mandate of Section 306(4), and
  • Protects Article 21 values indirectly by accelerating the process that will enable a future bail application on a stronger footing (after statements are recorded).

It is a cautious, incremental solution that avoids directly overriding the legislative scheme while still addressing the constitutional concern of delay.

4.4.3 Articulation of Foreign Nationals’ Rights

A particularly significant aspect of this judgment is its explicit articulation that:

  • Foreign nationals, including undertrial prisoners and approvers, enjoy the full protection of Article 21.
  • This includes the right to:
    • life and personal liberty,
    • dignity, and
    • speedy and fair trial.

While this follows settled constitutional doctrine (Article 21 applies to “persons”), its express reiteration in a “reportable” criminal procedure decision involving foreign nationals and serious organised crime is non-trivial. It:

  • Rejects any suggestion that foreign nationals can be treated as having lesser procedural or substantive protection.
  • Ensures that future courts in Rajasthan, when dealing with foreign undertrials or approvers, cannot treat nationality as a basis to dilute Article 21 guarantees.

4.4.4 Accountability of Trial Courts

The Court’s remarks on the trial court’s handling of the case are also important:

  • There is explicit disapproval of the trial court for entertaining “unwanted requests” by parties that delay framing of charges.
  • The High Court emphasises that:
    • Trials should not be adjourned mechanically.
    • Courts must always keep in view the custody status and duration of incarceration of accused/approvers.

This reflects a broader shift in Indian criminal jurisprudence:

  • From a passive, docket-driven model where delay was often tolerated,
  • To a more active case-management model, especially where liberty interests are at stake.

4.5 Likely Impact on Future Cases

4.5.1 Approvers’ Bail in Rajasthan

For approvers in Rajasthan, this judgment, read with Noor Taki, yields the following practical rules:

  1. No ordinary bail under Section 439 CrPC is available once a person has validly become an approver.
  2. The default position is that the approver remains in custody until:
    • his statement is recorded in court, and ordinarily
    • until the termination of the trial, unless exceptional circumstances exist.
  3. High Court’s rescue valve via Section 482 CrPC remains available in:
    • cases of egregious delay, abuse of process, re-trials, or clearly excessive incarceration, particularly after the approver has testified and complied with the terms of pardon.
  4. Sequence of relief is likely to evolve as:
    1. Ensure early recording of approver’s evidence.
    2. Then assess, in a subsequent bail application, whether continued detention is compatible with Article 21, applying Noor Taki–type reasoning.

4.5.2 Foreign Nationals in Criminal Proceedings

By clearly stating that:

  • Article 21 protection extends to foreign nationals, and
  • Fair and speedy trial is part of that protection,

the judgment strengthens the position of:

  • Foreign undertrial prisoners,
  • Foreign convicts seeking humane treatment, and
  • Foreign approvers caught in prolonged proceedings.

Courts will likely rely on this judgment as persuasive authority when foreign nationals complain of:

  • undue delays in trial,
  • prolonged detention, or
  • treatment inconsistent with dignity or privacy.

4.5.3 Trial Court Practice and Case Management

Trial courts in Rajasthan can expect closer scrutiny when:

  • they repeatedly adjourn framing of charges without substantial reason,
  • they permit principal accused to file dilatory applications indefinitely, or
  • they fail to prioritise recording of evidence of approvers and undertrial prisoners in long-custody cases.

This judgment provides a basis for:

  • High Court supervisory directions to expedite trials, and
  • Potentially, later findings that detention has become unconstitutional under Article 21.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Who is an “Approver”?

An approver is:

  • A person who was originally an accused or suspected to be involved in an offence,
  • who is offered a pardon by the court under Section 306 (or 307) CrPC,
  • on the condition that he makes a full and true disclosure of:
    • the circumstances of the offence, and
    • the roles of his co-accused.

Once he accepts the pardon:

  • He ceases to be prosecuted as an accused in that case (unless he breaks the terms of the pardon).
  • He becomes a prosecution witness, testifying against the remaining accused.
  • If he later conceals facts or lies in court, he can be prosecuted under Section 307 CrPC for breach of pardon.

5.2 Why Must an Approver Be Kept in Custody? (Section 306(4) CrPC)

The law requires that:

  • An approver “shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial”, unless he was already on bail.

The rationale is:

  • To ensure the approver’s availability to testify.
  • To reduce the risk that he disappears or turns hostile.
  • To prevent difficulties in re-arresting him if he breaches the terms of his pardon (especially relevant for foreign nationals).

Thus, unlike ordinary accused, approvers have a more restrictive legal position on bail.

5.3 Why Can’t an Approver Use Section 439 CrPC for Bail?

Section 439 CrPC applies to a “person accused of an offence.” The Larger Bench in Noor Taki clarified that:

  • Once a person has been granted pardon and accepted it, he is no longer an accused in that case.
  • He is now a witness; hence he falls outside Section 439’s wording.

Therefore, approvers cannot claim bail as of right under Section 439 CrPC like ordinary undertrials.

5.4 What Is “Speedy Trial” Under Article 21?

“Speedy trial” means that:

  • Criminal proceedings should be conducted within a reasonable time.
  • An accused (or approver) should not be:
    • left in jail for years without framing of charges, or
    • made to wait indefinitely for trial to begin or finish.

The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon and subsequent cases has held:

  • Speedy trial is part of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
  • Excessive delay can itself be a ground for:
    • release on bail, or
    • even quashing of proceedings in extreme cases.

5.5 Why Does Article 21 Apply to Foreign Nationals?

Article 21 uses the word “person”, not “citizen”. Therefore:

  • It protects everyone within the territory of India, including:
    • Indian citizens,
    • foreign nationals,
    • stateless persons, and
    • even illegal migrants.

Consequently:

  • Foreigners enjoy the same right to:
    • fair and reasonable procedure,
    • speedy trial,
    • dignity, and
    • humane treatment in custody.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Significance

The decision in Nurul Islam v. State of Rajasthan is a significant reaffirmation and clarification of the law relating to approvers’ bail and the interface between Section 306(4) CrPC and Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly in the context of foreign nationals.

Key takeaways:

  1. Approvers’ bail is exceptional, not routine:
    • By default, an approver must remain in custody until his evidence is recorded and normally till the trial ends, consistent with Section 306(4) CrPC.
    • Section 439 CrPC is not available to approvers because they are no longer “accused.”
  2. High Court retains exceptional power under Section 482 CrPC:
    • In extraordinary circumstances — especially when detention becomes unreasonably long and oppressive — the High Court can, to secure the ends of justice and uphold Article 21, enlarge an approver on bail.
    • Noor Taki provides the guiding framework for when this may be done.
  3. Speedy trial and dignity are non-negotiable, even for foreign nationals:
    • Article 21 protects all “persons,” including foreign nationals such as the petitioners.
    • Prolonged detention without even framing of charges offends the constitutional promise of fair and speedy trial.
  4. Trial courts are under a duty to prevent delay:
    • Repeated adjournments and entertaining dilatory tactics from accused are unacceptable when undertrial/approver liberty is at stake.
    • The High Court can and will issue directions to frame charges and record crucial evidence (like approvers’ statements) on priority.
  5. Structured path for future bail:
    • Though bail was not granted in this case, the Court laid down a clear procedural path:
      • Expedite charge framing and record the approvers’ testimony promptly.
      • Thereafter, consider a fresh bail application in light of the completed testimony and Article 21 considerations.

In the broader legal context, this judgment consolidates the legal position in Rajasthan on approvers’ custody, underscores the universality of Article 21 protections, and advances a more accountable, rights-conscious approach to criminal trial management, especially where foreign nationals and complex organised crimes are involved.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Rajasthan High Court

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