Appointing High Court Is the “Court” under Section 29A: Calcutta High Court Affirms Residual Jurisdiction to Extend or Substitute Arbitrator

Introduction

In Best Eastern Business House Pvt Ltd v. Mina Pradhan, 2025 CHC-OS 190 (Calcutta High Court, Commercial Division, Original Side), Justice Shampa Sarkar addressed a recurring and practically consequential question in Indian arbitration law: which “Court” has jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 when the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, but the arbitral subject matter lies outside the High Court’s ordinary original civil jurisdiction?

The dispute stemmed from a partnership deed dated October 16, 2015. Upon invocation of the arbitration clause, the Calcutta High Court appointed a sole arbitrator in A.P. 481 of 2021. The pleadings were completed, the statutory 12-month clock under Section 29A(1) began, and after a six-month consensual extension recorded on December 7, 2024, the mandate expired on April 4, 2025. On April 9, 2025, the award-holder approached the Calcutta High Court under Section 29A(4) for a further extension.

The core jurisdictional issue was sharply joined:

The petitioner argued that because the Calcutta High Court appointed the arbitrator under Section 11, it is the “Court” for purposes of Section 29A and can extend the mandate—including exercise of the substitution power under Section 29A(6).
The respondent relied on the definition of “Court” in Section 2(1)(e), the Supreme Court’s decision in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C JV (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801), and the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s view in Dr. V.V. Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala, to contend that only the principal civil court of original jurisdiction (here, the Commercial Court at Siliguri) could entertain a Section 29A application.

Summary of the Judgment

The Calcutta High Court allowed the application and extended the arbitrator’s mandate by one year, finding no attributable delay by the tribunal or parties and noting that the proceedings had reached an advanced stage. Critically, the Court held that:

“Court” in Section 29A must be read contextually in light of Section 2(1)(e)’s opening words “unless the context otherwise requires,” harmonized with Sections 11 and 29A.
Where the High Court has appointed the arbitrator under Section 11, the appointing High Court is the proper “Court” to entertain a Section 29A application, including the power to extend the mandate and, if necessary, substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6).
A contrary view—compelling an application to be filed in the district’s principal civil court—would create a jurisdictional anomaly by enabling a subordinate court to substitute an arbitrator appointed by a High Court, disrupting judicial hierarchy and legislative design.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD was distinguished as context-specific: there, the High Court had not appointed the arbitrator and lacked ordinary original civil jurisdiction, and hence the principal civil court was the proper forum. The ratio does not displace the appointing High Court’s jurisdiction in Section 11 cases.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel, 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 5017
The Gujarat High Court reasoned that although Section 2(1)(e) normally points to the principal civil court, Section 29A(6)’s power to substitute arbitrators makes it “inconceivable” that a district court could substitute an arbitrator appointed by a High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11. It interpreted “Court” in Section 29A to mean the appointing court where the tribunal was constituted by the court. The Calcutta High Court adopted this rationale.
DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co., 2020 SCC Online Del 2501
The Delhi High Court underscored the conflict that would arise if a principal civil court could substitute a court-appointed arbitrator, concluding that “Court” in Section 29A should be the Section 11 appointing court. This supported the Calcutta High Court’s harmonized reading to avoid hierarchical conflict.
Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios v. MSEDCL, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1437
The Bombay High Court held that because Section 29A(6) empowers substitution, the forum must be aligned with Section 11’s appointing authority—especially in international commercial arbitration, where the Supreme Court is the exclusive appointing court. The Calcutta High Court cited Cabra to illustrate the structural necessity of aligning extension/substitution powers with the appointing authority.
Magnum Opus IT Consulting Pvt. Ltd. v. Artcad Systems, 2022 SCC Online Bom 2861
This decision acknowledged contextual interpretation: where a High Court appoints under Section 11, “Court” in Section 29A can mean that High Court; where it does not, the principal civil court may be appropriate. The Meghalaya High Court relied on this to hold that since the arbitrator was not court-appointed, the Commercial Court at Shillong had jurisdiction. Calcutta High Court used this distinction to reinforce that appointment-source matters.
Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak Prasad, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2174
The Calcutta High Court earlier held that “Court” in Section 29A partakes the character of the appointing authority under Section 11. The present judgment is consistent with and further entrenches this approach within the Calcutta High Court’s jurisprudence.
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C JV, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801
The Supreme Court upheld the Meghalaya High Court in a context where the High Court was not the appointing court and lacked ordinary original civil jurisdiction; thus, the principal civil court was the proper forum for Section 29A. The Calcutta High Court reads this as a contextual holding, not as a universal rule displacing appointing-court jurisdiction in Section 11 appointments.
Dr. V.V. Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala, (2024) 1 SCC (AP) 94
The Andhra Pradesh High Court favored a strictly textual reading of “Court” in Section 29A per Section 2(1)(e). The Calcutta High Court respectfully disagreed, finding that such a reading produces anomalies and is contrary to legislative intent when Section 11 appointment is involved.
Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1
Cited for the interpretive principle that textual and contextual interpretations must align and the statute must be construed as a coherent whole. This undergirds the Court’s harmonized reading of Sections 2(1)(e), 11, and 29A.
Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steel Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 313 and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat v. Union Medical Agency, (1981) 1 SCC 51
These authorities explain when statutory definitions may yield to context. The Court uses them to justify departing from the default Section 2(1)(e) meaning where “the context otherwise requires.”
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 and State of Haryana v. AGM Management Services Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 520
These cases caution against reading judgments as statutes and emphasize context-sensitive application of precedent. They justify distinguishing Chief Engineer (NH) PWD and resisting a one-size-fits-all reading.

2) Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three interlocking steps.

Step 1: The statutory matrix requires harmonious construction.
Section 2(1)(e) defines “Court” but expressly qualifies all definitions by “unless the context otherwise requires.” Section 29A(4) empowers the “Court” to extend an arbitrator’s mandate and Section 29A(6) empowers that “Court” to substitute arbitrators while ensuring continuity under Section 29A(7). Section 11 vests the appointment power in the High Court or Supreme Court, depending on the arbitration. Reading these together, the Court concludes that Section 29A’s design presupposes alignment between the forum extending/substituting and the forum with the appointment power, to avoid direct conflict and preserve judicial hierarchy.
Step 2: Power to substitute is concomitant to appointment; hierarchy must be preserved.
The ability to substitute the tribunal (Section 29A(6)) is not a mere procedural adjunct; it is an incident of the appointment power. Allowing a principal civil court to substitute a High Court–appointed arbitrator would enable a subordinate forum to undo or alter a superior court’s constitution of the tribunal. The Court finds this result legally impermissible and contrary to legislative intent.
Step 3: Context determines forum; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD is distinguishable.
Where the High Court has not appointed the arbitrator and does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction (as in the Meghalaya case), the principal civil court is the correct forum under Section 29A. But where the High Court has appointed the arbitrator under Section 11 (as in the present case), the “context otherwise requires” that the appointing High Court retain Section 29A jurisdiction, including substitution power, irrespective of the arbitral subject matter’s territorial location. This avoids a “jurisdictional anomaly,” respects hierarchy, and fits Section 29A’s structure.

The Court also addresses and limits the “functus officio” argument: once the tribunal is constituted under Section 11, the appointing court becomes functus officio as to merits control, but this does not extinguish the Act’s expressly conferred residual jurisdiction under Section 29A to extend time, reduce fees in cases of tribunal-caused delay, substitute the tribunal, or give consequential directions to manage continuation.

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Clear forum rule in Section 11 appointments: In the Calcutta High Court’s jurisdiction, where the arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11, applications under Section 29A—including for extension, fee reduction for tribunal-caused delay, or substitution—should be brought before the appointing High Court, even if the arbitral dispute’s subject matter lies beyond its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Preservation of judicial hierarchy: The judgment guards against subordinate courts reconstituting or substituting tribunals constituted by superior courts, maintaining coherence between Sections 11 and 29A.
Harmonized reading gains traction: The decision aligns Calcutta with Gujarat, Delhi, and Bombay High Courts on contextual interpretation of “Court” in Section 29A, and marks a conscious departure from the Andhra Pradesh view in Dr. V.V. Subbarao.
Contextualization of Supreme Court precedent: Chief Engineer (NH) PWD is affirmed as context-specific, not as a blanket rule displacing appointing-court jurisdiction. Parties must analyze whether the arbitrator was court-appointed; that fact will often be determinative of the proper Section 29A forum.
Practical predictability for arbitration timelines and midstream relief: Counsel can plan filings and strategies knowing that the appointing forum will likely handle time extensions and any substitution requests, thereby reducing forum shopping and procedural bifurcation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Court” (Section 2(1)(e)) and “unless the context otherwise requires”: The Act defines “Court” generally as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction (and certain High Courts). But the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” allows a different meaning in a particular section if needed to make the Act work coherently. Here, because Section 29A also gives the power to substitute the arbitrator, “Court” is read as the appointing High Court where the arbitrator was appointed under Section 11.
Section 29A timeline: The arbitral award must be made within 12 months from completion of pleadings (post-2019 amendment). Parties may by consent extend by a further 6 months. After that, the arbitrator’s mandate terminates unless extended by the Court (which may act before or after expiry). While extending, the Court may reduce fees for tribunal-caused delays and even substitute the arbitrator(s).
“Mandate” of an arbitrator: The legal authority of an arbitrator to continue hearing and decide the dispute. It terminates when the statutory time expires unless extended by the Court.
Substitution under Section 29A(6): When extending time, the Court can replace one or all arbitrators. The reconstituted tribunal is deemed to be in continuation (Section 29A(7)), and the proceedings continue from the stage they had reached, based on the existing record.
Functus officio (limited): After appointing an arbitrator under Section 11, the High Court doesn’t supervise the merits of the arbitration. But the Act specifically gives the Court limited, subsequent powers under Section 29A to extend or adjust the tribunal’s mandate and conditions—so the High Court is not functus officio for these purposes.
Ordinary original civil jurisdiction: Some High Courts (like Calcutta) exercise original civil jurisdiction for certain territories and causes. The respondent argued lack of territorial nexus. The Court held that for Section 29A in a Section 11-appointment case, the appointing High Court’s contextual jurisdiction prevails, notwithstanding where the cause of action lies.

Key Practical Takeaways

When a High Court appoints the arbitrator under Section 11, Section 29A applications for extension, fee reduction, or substitution should be filed before that High Court.
If the arbitrator was appointed by agreement of the parties (or otherwise not by the High Court), the principal civil court of original jurisdiction (often the designated Commercial Court) is ordinarily the proper forum for Section 29A applications.
Section 29A(4) allows the Court to extend time even after expiry; however, counsel should docket the 12-month-from-pleadings completion date and the 6-month consensual extension cap to avoid lapses.
Where delay is attributable to the tribunal, fee reduction up to 5% per month of delay is possible, but only after giving the tribunal an opportunity of being heard.
Substitution is an exceptional but available remedy at the extension stage; the reconstituted tribunal continues from the existing record, limiting prejudice and duplication.

Conclusion

Best Eastern Business House Pvt Ltd v. Mina Pradhan establishes a clear and workable rule in the Calcutta High Court: in domestic arbitrations where the High Court has appointed the arbitrator under Section 11, that High Court is the “Court” under Section 29A competent to extend the mandate and, where warranted, substitute the arbitrator. This contextual interpretation, anchored in the statute’s architecture and the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires,” preserves coherence between Sections 11 and 29A, avoids jurisdictional anomalies, and respects judicial hierarchy.

By distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decision in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD as contextual and aligning with the Gujarat, Delhi, Bombay, and prior Calcutta views, the judgment clarifies forum selection for Section 29A applications and enhances procedural certainty in Indian arbitration. It is a significant contribution to the jurisprudence on the temporal management of arbitral proceedings and the scope of judicial intervention post-appointment—ensuring that the forum empowered to build the tribunal can also, where necessary, extend or reshape it to achieve the Act’s objective of efficient and timely arbitration.