Apeejay School v. Dhriti Duggal (2025): Re-affirming Civil Court Jurisdiction in Private School Fee Recovery Disputes

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Apeejay School v. Dhriti Duggal & Ors. (2025 INSC 925) settles a decade-long wrangle over whether private, unaided schools in Haryana can approach ordinary civil courts to recover fee arrears—particularly those arising from disputed fee hikes—or whether such matters stand exclusively within the domain of the Fee and Fund Regulatory Committee (FFRC) constituted under the Haryana School Education Act, 1995 and the Haryana School Education Rules, 2003.

The contest originated when Apeejay School, having unilaterally revised its fees for the academic year 2009-10, sued certain students and their parents for the differential amounts. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the school’s claim (with minor modifications), but the Punjab & Haryana High Court later held that Section 22 of the Act and the alternate FFRC mechanism divested civil courts of jurisdiction. Both the school and the parents approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave petitions (SLPs).

The apex court, through a bench comprising B.R. Gavai, K. Vinod Chandran and N. V. Anjaria, granted leave, allowed the school’s appeals, restored the trial court decrees (with interest at 6%), and laid down a significant principle on the coexistence of civil remedies with specialised regulatory forums.

2. Summary of the Judgment

No express or implied ouster: Section 22 of the 1995 Act and Rules 158A–158B do not expressly bar civil suits for recovery of fees; nor is an implied bar made out under the principles in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968).
Limited remit of FFRC: The FFRC may entertain complaints only from students/parents alleging “capitation fee” or “excessive fee”. It provides no affirmative remedy to schools seeking to enforce payment.
Limitation defence rejected: Suits filed in 2014 were within limitation, the cause of action having revived upon final disposal of the State’s appeal against the High Court’s 2011 judgment striking down the 20 % cap notification.
Conditional decree upheld: Recovery decrees remain subject to any future FFRC order favouring students; however, refund will be limited to the extent of fee hike actually found excessive.
Interest rate moderated: Supreme Court maintained the appellate court’s reduction of interest from 12 % to 6 % p.a.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Earlier Authorities Cited

Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968 SCC OnLine SC 40)
Laid down seven guiding tests to determine when civil court jurisdiction is excluded. The Court here invoked Dhulabhai to stress that in absence of a clear statutory bar or an adequate alternative remedy for the plaintiff, jurisdiction survives.
Haryana Progressive Schools Conference v. State of Haryana (CWP 11223/2009, decided 27-4-2011)
Struck down State notification capping annual fee increases at 20 %. Noted that authorities could still intervene against profiteering, but the statutory basis for the cap was missing.
Anti-Corruption & Crime Investigation Cell v. State of Punjab (CWP 20545/2009, decided 9-4-2013)
A Division Bench created ad hoc committees for Punjab, Haryana, and Chandigarh to examine fee-hike disputes, a precursor to the formal FFRC mechanism incorporated in 2014.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Statutory Interpretation

Section 22, 1995 Act: Ousts civil jurisdiction only where the Government or its officers are empowered to adjudicate. Recovery of regular school fees is not such a matter.
Rules 158A & 158B (2014 amendment): Empower FFRC to adjudicate complaints about capitation or excessive fee raised by students or parents. They do not empower schools to sue within that forum.
Implication: Because the school had no statutory forum to pursue its claim, preserving the traditional civil remedy avoids a remediless situation, satisfying Dhulabhai test 5 (adequate remedy).

(b) Application to Facts

Parents paid only the pre-2009 scale, relying on the since-struck-down 20 % cap.
The school sued in 2014—after the State withdrew its intra-court appeal—thereby eliminating uncertainty and starting limitation afresh.
Civil courts decreed recovery but kept it contingent on FFRC findings, balancing private and regulatory interests.

(c) Error in High Court’s Approach

The High Court assumed that because the FFRC could investigate fee reasonableness, it automatically displaced civil courts. The Supreme Court corrected this by:

Emphasising lack of a statutory enforcement remedy for schools within the FFRC system.
Repeating the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium: where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Dual Pathways: Students/parents may still raise grievances before FFRC, but schools remain free to invoke civil jurisdiction for recovery.
Limitation Blueprint: Schools can rely on finality of preceding public-law litigation (e.g., quashing of cap notifications) to compute fresh cause of action.
Legislative Prompt: Legislatures may revisit regulatory frameworks to create symmetrical remedies (for both payers and receivers) if they wish to curtail civil litigation.
Pan-Indian Persuasive Value: Although rooted in Haryana statutes, the doctrinal discussion on ouster and specialised tribunals will influence education-related fee disputes in other States having similar committees (e.g., Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Ouster of Jurisdiction: A statutory provision that explicitly or implicitly prevents ordinary civil courts from hearing certain disputes—in favour of a specialised tribunal or authority.
Capitation Fee: Any amount, by whatever name, exceeding the notified tuition or other approved fees, charged as a condition for admission or continuation.
FFRC: A fee-regulating body tasked with preventing profiteering by schools. It acts upon complaints from stakeholders but cannot suo motu order fee recovery for schools.
Conditional Decree: A judgment that becomes enforceable subject to a future event—in this case, potential FFRC findings.
Limitation Period: The time window during which a suit must be filed; calculated here from final resolution of public-law challenges affecting the cause of action.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Apeejay School v. Dhriti Duggal reinforces a fundamental tenet of Indian civil jurisprudence: specialised statutory mechanisms will oust civil courts only when the legislature has unambiguously said so and when the alternate forum offers a complete, efficacious remedy to all affected parties. Where a regulatory committee (FFRC) is designed mainly for consumer protection, it cannot preclude a service provider from pursuing ordinary civil relief. By reading Section 22 and Rules 158A–158B harmoniously with Dhulabhai, the Court has ensured equilibrium—students retain a watchdog in the FFRC, and schools retain recourse to the judiciary for fee recovery.

Practitioners should note the decision’s meticulous approach to:

Statutory construction when multiple remedial avenues coexist;
Computing limitation in the wake of public-law decisions; and
Drafting conditional decrees that accommodate yet-to-be-invoked regulatory oversight.

In the broader landscape, the judgment safeguards access to justice while signalling that legislature-created forums must address the needs of both sides of a regulated relationship if they wish to operate as exclusive dispute-resolvers.