Anticipatory Bail under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Non-Arrest for Sub-Seven-Year Offences, and Journalistic Activity: A Commentary on Rafiq Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh

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I. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) in Rafiq Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Misc. Crim. Case No. 46585 of 2025 (decided on 17 November 2025 by Hon’ble Justice Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar), is an early and instructive order under the newly enacted criminal procedure and substantive codes:

• Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) – replacing the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) – replacing the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The case sits at the intersection of:

• the evolving law of anticipatory bail under the BNSS,
• the continued applicability of Supreme Court guidelines limiting arrest for offences punishable with less than seven years’ imprisonment, and
• the tension between journalistic reporting (especially via social media/YouTube) and offences relating to reputation and manipulated electronic content under the BNS.

The applicant, a news reporter, feared arrest in an FIR alleging that he had recorded, manipulated and caused to be uploaded a video falsely depicting a police head constable as accepting a bribe, thereby harming the constable’s reputation. The High Court granted anticipatory bail, while at the same time imposing an unusual condition restraining the applicant from engaging in any activity which has potential to disrepute the police officials of the concerned police station, especially the complainant.

The order therefore raises two distinct clusters of legal issues:

1. Procedural / Criminal Justice Issues: How do the Supreme Court’s arrest-guidelines in Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar Antil continue to operate under the BNSS for sub-seven-year offences, and how do they interact with anticipatory bail jurisdiction?
2. Substantive / Rights Issues: How far can bail conditions restrict journalistic or expressive activity, particularly when the very subject of reporting is a complainant police official?

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II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Parties

• Applicant: Rafiq Khan – approximately 42 years old, a news reporter by profession, stated to have family responsibilities.
• Respondent: The State of Madhya Pradesh, represented by the Public Prosecutor.

2. The Incident and FIR

The core factual narrative, as gleaned from the order, is as follows:

1. Prior complaints by the applicant: The applicant had allegedly made earlier complaints to higher police authorities against the Station House Officer (SHO) of Police Station GRP, Ratlam, alleging illegal activities within that police station’s jurisdiction.
2. 12 June 2025 – the chalan incident:
   According to the complainant, Head Constable (HC) Mahendra Tiwari of Police Station GRP Ratlam:
   • He was on duty at the circulating area of Ratlam Railway Station.
   • He found an auto-rickshaw (Registration No. MP-43-ZA-1329) standing in a “No Parking Zone”, obstructing traffic.
   • The auto driver fled; the constable followed and intercepted the vehicle at Shivaji Hotel.
   • He intercepted Imran s/o Shabbir and issued a chalan under Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act, with a compounding fee of Rs. 500.
   • During this process, the applicant-reporter arrived and recorded a video of the interaction.
3. 28 June 2025 – video goes online:
   HC Tiwari was later informed by a friend that a YouTube channel named “Tej India” was broadcasting a video showing him receiving a bribe. He alleged:
   • The video that had gone viral was edited and manipulated.
   • The manipulation caused serious harm to his reputation and social standing.
4. FIR and offences invoked:
   Based on this complaint, Police Station Station Road, Ratlam registered:
   • Crime No. 779 of 2025
   • For offences under Sections 336(3) and 336(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (offences relating, in context, to reputational harm and manipulated audio-visual content).
   The maximum punishment for these offences is stated by the Court to be less than seven years’ imprisonment.

3. The Applicant’s Version

The defence projected by the applicant at the anticipatory bail stage is:

• He is a reporter discharging his professional duty.
• He received information that HC Mahendra Tiwari was allegedly taking action (chalan) beyond his jurisdiction and went to the spot to report it.
• He recorded the video but did not manipulate, edit or forge the video; he merely forwarded it to the relevant YouTube channel for reporting.
• There was no intention to cause wrongful loss or harm to the reputation of the police officer; the recording was part of investigative journalism.
• The FIR is alleged to be a counter-blast or retaliatory measure to his prior complaints against police officials.

4. Criminal Antecedents

The State referred to one criminal antecedent mentioned in the case diary. In reply:

• The applicant pointed out that in Crime No. 130/2016, he had been acquitted by judgment dated 20.08.2025 in RCT No. 3412/2016.
• The High Court accepted the position that, “in absence of criminal antecedent”, there was no live negative history against him; an acquitted matter could not be treated as a subsisting antecedent for the purpose of bail.

5. The Application Under BNSS

The applicant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking anticipatory bail (pre-arrest bail) in relation to Crime No. 779/2025. He contended:

• The offences are punishable with imprisonment less than seven years.
• In such cases, as per the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arnesh Kumar v. State Of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51, arrest should generally be avoided, and a notice of appearance ought to be issued instead.
• Despite this, the police were “trying to arrest and humiliate” him rather than follow the prescribed guidelines.
• He is willing to cooperate with the investigation and will not evade the process of law.

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III. Summary of the Judgment

1. Core Holding

The High Court allowed the application and granted anticipatory bail to Rafiq Khan, directing that:

• In the event of his arrest in Crime No. 779/2025, he shall be released on bail.
• He must furnish a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with a separate solvent surety of the like amount.
• The order is to remain effective till the end of the trial, subject to cancellation upon breach of conditions.

2. Key Reasons

The Court’s reasons can be summarised as:

1. Nature and severity of offence: The offences under Sections 336(3) and 336(4) BNS are punishable with less than seven years’ imprisonment, bringing the case within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar Antil on the limited necessity of arrest.
2. Applicability of Supreme Court guidelines: The Investigating Officer is “expected to follow” the guidelines laid down in those cases, which discourage routine arrest in such offences and encourage the use of notice of appearance instead.
3. Prima facie substance in defence narrative: The Court noted that the contentions raised by the applicant had prima facie substance, especially in light of his earlier complaints to higher police authorities against the concerned SHO, thereby lending some plausibility to the allegation of retaliatory motivation.
4. Applicant’s profile and risk assessment: Considering his age (around 42), profession (reporter), family responsibilities, and the absence of criminal antecedents, the Court found:
   • no likelihood of fleeing from justice;
   • no significant risk of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses;
   • custodial interrogation was not necessary for the investigation.
5. Balancing investigation and liberty: The Court concluded that granting anticipatory bail would not prejudice a free, fair and full investigation, whereas incarceration could cause undue hardship, social disrepute, and humiliation to the applicant.

3. Conditions of Bail

The anticipatory bail was subjected to several conditions, including that the applicant:

• shall be available for investigation as and when directed by the Investigating Officer;
• shall not commit or be involved in any offence of a similar nature;
• shall not make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade them from disclosing facts to the Court or police;
• shall not attempt to tamper with evidence, or allure, pressurise or threaten witnesses;
• during trial, shall ensure compliance with Section 309 CrPC / Section 346 BNSS regarding examination of witnesses in attendance (essentially, not to seek unnecessary adjournments and thereby obstruct the trial);
• shall not indulge in any activity which has the potential to disrepute the police officials of Police Station GRP Ratlam, especially the complainant head constable.

The Court directed that these conditions be:

• reproduced on the personal bond and surety bond; and
• explained in simple language if the accused or surety is unable to write, with a certification by the scribe.

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IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Arnesh Kumar v. State Of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273

In Arnesh Kumar, the Supreme Court was confronted with rampant misuse of arrest powers, particularly in offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The Court laid down binding guidelines aimed at:

• Curtailing routine, mechanical arrests by the police;
• Ensuring that arrest is made only when it is necessary and justified as per Section 41 CrPC (now the equivalent provision in BNSS);
• Requiring the police to issue a notice of appearance under Section 41A CrPC (again, to be read with its BNSS counterpart) before arresting a person in many categories of cases.

The Court in Arnesh Kumar emphasised a shift from a culture of “arrest first and then proceed” to “proceed and then, if necessary, arrest”, especially in cases not involving heinous or very serious offences.

Application in Rafiq Khan

In the present judgment, the High Court directly invokes Arnesh Kumar to stress that:

• The offences under BNS Sections 336(3) and 336(4) are punishable with less than seven years of imprisonment.
• In such a category of offences, arrest is not the default response; the Investigating Officer must first consider whether arrest is truly necessary.
• The police are “expected to follow” the Supreme Court’s guidelines, which implies:
  • Assessment of the necessity of arrest in terms of preventing further offences, ensuring proper investigation, etc.;
  • Use of notice of appearance rather than immediate arrest when appropriate.

Thus, Arnesh Kumar plays a central role in the Court’s conclusion that the applicant’s custodial arrest is not required, strongly supporting the grant of anticipatory bail.

2. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (2022) 10 SCC 51

In Satender Kumar Antil, the Supreme Court comprehensively revisited the law of arrest and bail in the context of both general offences and special statutes. It categorised offences based on their maximum sentence and:

• Reinforced the principle that bail, not jail, is the general rule;
• Mandated that for offences punishable up to seven years, the police and courts should lean towards non-arrest and bail unless clear necessity is shown;
• Stressed that courts must scrutinise the justification for arrest, particularly when the accused has cooperated in investigation.

Application in Rafiq Khan

The High Court refers to Satender Kumar Antil alongside Arnesh Kumar, using them in tandem to:

• Confirm that the sub-seven-year offence category triggers a presumption against unnecessary custodial arrest.
• Underscore that the investigation can proceed effectively without arrest, particularly when an accused expresses willingness to cooperate.
• Support the conclusion that incarceration is not necessary for investigation in the present case.

Collectively, these precedents provide the doctrinal backbone for the order: the High Court is signalling that the arrest-control jurisprudence of the Supreme Court continues to bind investigating agencies and courts under the BNSS/BNS regime just as it did under CrPC/IPC.

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V. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

1. Anticipatory Bail under BNSS and Continuity with CrPC Jurisprudence

The application is presented as one under Section 482 BNSS for anticipatory bail. Under the earlier CrPC regime, anticipatory bail was principally governed by Section 438 CrPC, while Section 482 CrPC dealt with the inherent powers of the High Court. The BNSS has restructured and renumbered several provisions. Without engaging in textual comparison, the key functional point is that:

• The High Court continues to exercise an anticipatory bail jurisdiction analogous to that under Section 438 CrPC.
• The guiding principles – protection of personal liberty, risk assessment, and need for custodial interrogation – remain substantially the same.

Although the judgment does not explicitly cite earlier leading cases on anticipatory bail under CrPC such as Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab or Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), its structure and reasoning echo those principles:

• Anticipatory bail as a safeguard of liberty: The Court treats anticipatory bail as a tool to protect against unjustified arrest, humiliation and social disrepute, not merely as a procedural privilege.
• Assessment of necessity of arrest: The Court explicitly finds that custodial incarceration is not needed for the purposes of investigation in the present case.
• Duration of protection: By directing that the order shall remain effective till the end of trial (subject to cancellation), the Court adopts a stance consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Sushila Aggarwal that anticipatory bail need not be of limited duration.

2. Risk Assessment: Flight, Tampering, and Reoffending

In line with general bail jurisprudence, the Court examines the classical considerations:

• Likelihood of absconding: The applicant’s age (42), stable profession (news reporter), and family responsibilities suggest that he is anchored in the local community and unlikely to flee.
• Criminal antecedents: The Court gives significant weight to the fact that apart from one case in which he stands acquitted, there is no prior criminal record. It treats him as having no criminal antecedents for bail purposes.
• Risk of tampering or influencing witnesses: There is no particularised allegation that he has threatened or influenced witnesses, and the Court considers such risk minimal in the circumstances.
• Likelihood of repeating a similar offence: Again, the Court does not see a real risk of recidivism given his profile and the nature of the allegations.

On this basis, the Court concludes that the applicant does not pose a serious risk to the integrity of investigation or trial if he remains at liberty.

3. Relevance of the Alleged Retaliatory Motive

A distinctive feature of this case is the applicant’s assertion that the FIR is a retaliatory response to his earlier complaints against police officials. The Court notes:

“The contentions raised by the applicants have prima facie substance, looking to the previous complaint lodged by the applicant with higher police officials.”

While the Court rightly clarifies that the ultimate “veracity of the prosecution and complicity of the applicant” must be decided at trial, it is prepared to factor in the possibility of mala fide prosecution at the bail stage. This approach is consistent with established principles that:

• Where allegations of mala fides, vendetta or counter-blast are plausible, courts may lean more favourably towards granting anticipatory bail.
• At the same time, the Court does not prejudge guilt or innocence; it simply recognises that using arrest power in a potentially retaliatory case would be problematic.

4. Interplay Between Reputational Offences and Journalistic Freedom

Although the Court does not engage in a detailed freedom of speech analysis, the factual matrix clearly pits:

• Reputation and dignity of a public servant (a police head constable) against
• Journalistic investigation and the right to report on alleged misconduct using digital platforms (YouTube).

The FIR alleges manipulation of a video to falsely depict the constable as accepting a bribe, which, if true, would fall squarely within the realm of criminal wrongdoing—not protected speech. At the same time, the applicant insists he merely recorded and forwarded an unedited video in furtherance of legitimate reporting.

The High Court’s response is cautious:

• It does not make any factual finding on whether the video was manipulated; it leaves this question to the trial.
• However, it recognises that the applicant’s version is not frivolous and that arrest is unnecessary at this stage.

In practical terms, the order emphasises that in cases where journalists are accused of reputational offences arising out of their reporting:

• The criminal process must not be used as a tool of harassment or retaliation through unnecessary arrest.
• Investigations can proceed without curtailing liberty, particularly for sub-seven-year offences.

5. Bail Conditions and the Free Speech Concern

The most noteworthy (and potentially contentious) bail condition is:

“The applicant shall not indulge in any activity which has potential to disrepute the police officials of the police station GRP Ratlam, specially, the complainant.”

This condition goes beyond conventional bail stipulations (attend investigation, do not tamper with evidence, etc.) and appears to impose a substantive restraint on the applicant’s future speech and professional activity, specifically:

• It targets any activity that has the “potential to disrepute” police officials, not limited to illegal activity.
• It focuses in particular on the complainant, i.e., the very police officer whose conduct may be a legitimate subject of reporting and scrutiny.

From a constitutional perspective, such a condition raises difficult questions under:

• Article 19(1)(a) – the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, including the right to criticise or expose public officials;
• Article 19(2) – reasonable restrictions in the interests of, among other things, defamation, public order and integrity of the State.

On one hand, courts do have a wide discretion to impose conditions that ensure:

• The fairness of the trial (no witness intimidation, no prejudicial publicity);
• The safety of complainant and witnesses;
• The accused does not engage in conduct amounting to further offences of a similar nature.

On the other hand, a blanket prohibition on any activity that could potentially cause “disrepute” to an official can:

• Be overbroad, covering even truthful, good-faith reporting or criticism;
• Operate as a form of prior restraint on speech, placing the journalist under the threat of bail cancellation for continuing his professional work;
• Create a chilling effect on investigative journalism regarding police misconduct, particularly involving the complainant and his police station.

The Court does not elaborate on how this condition should be interpreted or limited. One reasonable reading, consistent with constitutional norms, would be:

• To construe the condition as prohibiting unlawful or malicious acts—such as further manipulation of videos or demonstrably false allegations intended to malign;
• But not as a total ban on legitimate, good-faith reporting or criticism supported by evidence.

Nonetheless, the open-textured phrase “potential to disrepute” leaves room for future legal contest, either at the stage of bail cancellation or in constitutional challenge if the condition is used to stifle legitimate expression.

6. Transitional References: CrPC and BNSS

The bail condition relating to trial conduct refers to Section 309 CrPC / Section 346 BNSS, indicating:

• A transitional phase in which courts and practitioners are still referencing both the old and new procedural codes;
• An intention to ensure that witnesses present in court are examined without unnecessary adjournments, furthering the goal of speedy trial.

By making compliance with these provisions a bail condition, the Court reinforces the responsibility of the accused to:

• Not seek unjustified adjournments;
• Facilitate the expeditious examination of witnesses who are in attendance.

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VI. Impact and Future Implications

1. Continuity of Arrest-Control Jurisprudence under BNSS/BNS

Perhaps the most significant systemic message of this order is that:

• The Arnesh Kumar – Satender Kumar Antil line of cases remains fully applicable despite the shift from CrPC/IPC to BNSS/BNS.
• Categorisation based on the maximum sentence (less than seven years) continues to serve as a key determinant for when arrest should be avoided or minimised.
• Investigating officers in Madhya Pradesh—and by persuasive extension, in other States—are reminded that the mere registration of an FIR does not justify automatic arrest in such offences.

This continuity ensures that the transition to the new codes does not dilute the Supreme Court’s pro-liberty jurisprudence on arrest.

2. Strengthening the Norm of “Bail, Not Jail” for Sub-Seven-Year Offences

By granting anticipatory bail where:

• the offence is below seven years,
• the accused has no significant criminal history, and
• arrest is not demonstrably necessary,

the Court reinforces the overarching principle that:

Deprivation of liberty through arrest must be an exception, not the rule, particularly for non-heinous offences.

This is likely to influence:

• Future anticipatory bail orders in Madhya Pradesh involving sub-seven-year offences under the BNS;
• Police practice, by reminding officers that resorting to arrest without adhering to the Supreme Court-mandated framework may invite judicial censure and liberal use of anticipatory bail.

3. Implications for Journalists and Digital Media Actors

For journalists, stringers, YouTubers and digital media actors, this case signals both protection and caution:

• Protection: Courts are willing to recognise the potential for FIRs to be retaliatory against critical reporting, and to ensure that such FIRs do not translate into immediate incarceration without strong justification.
• Caution: At the same time, journalists are reminded that:
  • If they engage in manipulation or fabrication of content to depict false facts (such as an officer taking a bribe when he is not), they can face serious criminal liability.
  • Court-imposed conditions—like the one in this case restricting activities that may bring disrepute to a complainant—may affect their ability to continue certain forms of reporting.

The broader impact is to encourage:

• Ethical, evidence-based reporting by journalists; and
• Judicial vigilance against the misuse of criminal process to suppress legitimate investigative journalism.

4. Possible Future Litigation on Bail Conditions and Free Speech

Condition (6), prohibiting any activity that may cause “disrepute” to police officials, is likely to have a ripple effect:

• It may be cited by the State in future cases as a template for imposing speech-related bail conditions in journalist cases.
• Conversely, it may invite challenges on the ground that such conditions:
  • Are vague and overbroad;
  • Impose disproportionate restrictions on legitimate expression;
  • Blur the line between regulating conduct for trial fairness and substantively suppressing criticism of public officials.

Appellate or constitutional courts may in future:

• Clarify the permissible scope of speech-restricting bail conditions;
• Insist that such conditions be narrowly tailored to specific unlawful conduct (e.g., manipulation of evidence, doxxing, threats), rather than open-ended references to “disrepute”.

5. Procedural Fairness: Explaining Conditions in Simple Language

The directive that bail conditions be reproduced on the bond and explained to the accused/surety, with certification by the scribe if necessary, furthers:

• Procedural fairness, ensuring that the accused and surety are not merely signing documents blindly;
• Meaningful consent and understanding of obligations, thus reducing inadvertent breaches; and
• Accountability of court staff and scribe in explaining the conditions accurately.

This is a salutary step, aligning with the spirit of the BNSS to make the criminal process more accessible and comprehensible to non-lawyers.

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VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts Used in the Judgment

1. Anticipatory Bail

Anticipatory bail is an order by a court that, if a person is arrested for a specified offence, they shall be immediately released on bail. It:

• Is sought before arrest, when a person apprehends that an FIR has been lodged or may be lodged.
• Protects against the misuse of arrest power for harassment or humiliation.
• Does not quash the case; it only affects whether and how the person is taken into custody.

2. FIR and Case Diary

An FIR (First Information Report) is the initial complaint recorded by the police about a cognizable offence. The case diary is a confidential record maintained by the Investigating Officer, noting:

• Steps taken in investigation;
• Statements of witnesses;
• Evidence collected so far.

Courts often rely on the case diary at the bail stage to understand the status and strength of the prosecution’s case.

3. “Prima Facie Substance”

When the Court says the applicant’s contentions have “prima facie substance”, it means:

• At first glance, without a full trial, the defence story appears plausible and not obviously false.
• This does not amount to an acquittal or a conclusive finding; it only affects the interim assessment for granting bail.

4. Tampering with Evidence and Influencing Witnesses

Tampering with evidence refers to any act that:

• Alters, destroys, hides, or fabricates evidence;
• Makes it more difficult for the truth to be discovered during trial.

Influencing witnesses involves:

• Threatening, bribing or otherwise pressuring witnesses;
• Persuading them to change or withhold their true statements.

Bail conditions often prohibit such conduct to safeguard the fairness of investigation and trial.

5. Sections 336(3) and 336(4) of BNS (Contextual Understanding)

The order does not reproduce the text of Sections 336(3) and 336(4) of the BNS. However, from the allegations, we can infer that these provisions relate to:

• Offences connected to publishing or disseminating content that harms the reputation of another; and
• Aggravated forms involving electronic or digital media, manipulation or falsification of recordings.

In the present case, the gravamen of the FIR is that the applicant allegedly manipulated a video and caused it to be broadcast on YouTube, wrongly portraying a legitimate chalan and fine collection as bribe-taking.

6. Section 309 CrPC / 346 BNSS – Examination of Witnesses in Attendance

Section 309 CrPC (and its BNSS counterpart, Section 346) relates to the Court’s duty to:

• Proceed with trial expeditiously and without unwarranted adjournments;
• Ensure that witnesses who are present in court are examined then and there, rather than being unnecessarily asked to return on another date.

Making compliance with these provisions a bail condition underscores the responsibility of the accused to cooperate in ensuring a speedy trial.

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VIII. Conclusion: Significance of the Judgment in the Broader Legal Context

The judgment in Rafiq Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh is notable for several interlinked reasons.

1. Reaffirmation of Non-Arrest for Sub-Seven-Year Offences:
   The High Court clearly reiterates that, even under the new BNSS/BNS regime, the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar Antil continue to govern the exercise of arrest powers in offences punishable with less than seven years’ imprisonment. This reinforces the emerging norm that:

   Arrest should not be a reflexive response to an FIR but a carefully justified step, especially for non-heinous offences.

2. Robust Protection of Liberty through Anticipatory Bail:
   The Court emphasises that anticipatory bail is a crucial instrument to prevent unnecessary incarceration, humiliation, and social disrepute, while still allowing investigation to proceed unhindered. By extending protection until the conclusion of trial (subject to cancellation), the Court aligns with the pro-liberty thrust of modern anticipatory bail jurisprudence.
3. Judicial Sensitivity to Possible Retaliatory Prosecutions Against Journalists:
   The Court recognises the plausibility of the applicant’s claim that the FIR may be a counter-blast to his earlier complaints against police officials. This reflects an awareness that criminal law can be misused to deter or punish investigative journalism. The grant of anticipatory bail in such a context helps preserve the space for critical reporting, at least to the extent of preventing immediate arrest.
4. Emerging Debate on Speech-Restricting Bail Conditions:
   Condition (6), prohibiting activities with the potential to “disrepute” the police officials, introduces an important and controversial dimension: the use of bail conditions to regulate speech, especially regarding public officials. While the intention may be to prevent further unlawful defamation or manipulation, the broad wording raises concerns of overbreadth, vagueness, and chilling effect on legitimate expression. This aspect of the judgment is likely to be debated in subsequent litigation and scholarship.
5. Procedural Fairness and Accessibility of Conditions:
   By directing that bail conditions be reproduced and explained to the accused and surety, the Court furthers the principle that justice must be not only done but be understood by those subject to it. This small but important measure aligns with the BNSS’s intent to make the criminal justice process more transparent and citizen-friendly.

In sum, the decision is a significant early marker in the application of the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. It preserves the constitutional commitment to personal liberty and restraint in the use of arrest, while simultaneously highlighting the complex interface between criminal law, reputation, and freedom of the press in an era of digital and social media-driven reporting.