Annulment of Bail in Dowry Death Cases: Mandatory Consideration of the Section 113B Presumption

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince & Anr., 2025 INSC 1367, is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on bail in cases of dowry death. A two-judge Bench (B.V. Nagarathna, J. and R. Mahadevan, J.) cancelled the bail granted by the Allahabad High Court to a husband accused under Sections 498A, 304B and 328 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The judgment does three important things:

Reaffirms that a complainant–father is an “aggrieved person” competent to seek cancellation of bail.
Applies and consolidates the distinction between annulment of a legally flawed bail order and cancellation of bail due to post‑bail misconduct.
Very clearly holds that in dowry death prosecutions, courts deciding bail must factor in the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, once the foundational facts of Section 304B IPC are prima facie made out.

Coupled with strong observations on the social evil of dowry, the judgment is likely to shape how trial courts and High Courts approach bail in dowry death cases, and when higher courts will interfere to annul bail already granted.

II. Background and Factual Matrix

II.1 Parties

Appellant: Yogendra Pal Singh – father of the deceased woman, Aastha @ Saarika, and complainant.
Respondent No. 1: Raghvendra Singh @ Prince – husband of the deceased, sole chargesheeted accused.
Respondent No. 2: State of Uttar Pradesh.

II.2 Facts Leading to the FIR

Aastha @ Saarika married Respondent No. 1 on 22.02.2023. According to the complainant:

He spent about ₹22 lakh in cash, articles worth ₹10 lakh and jewellery worth ₹15 lakh in the marriage.
After marriage, the deceased was allegedly subjected to continuous cruelty and harassment for dowry.
A specific additional demand was made for a Fortuner car, accompanied by threats, mental and physical torture.
During the chhathi ritual at her parental home, she reportedly disclosed the cruelty and the demand for the Fortuner.
Ten days before her death (on 02.06.2023) she was sent back to her matrimonial home only after the husband assured that no further harassment would occur.

On the night of 04/05.06.2023:

There was a quarrel between the deceased and her husband at a family function.
Around 1.30 a.m., the deceased called her elder sister Diksha, weeping and seeking help; she allegedly said that her husband and relatives had forcibly made her consume a “foul-smelling” substance, after which she felt unwell.
She was taken to Sadar Hospital, Fatehpur with froth coming out of her mouth, and died en route while being shifted to Kanpur on 05.06.2023.

A post-mortem on 05.06.2023 noted an abrasion on the left forearm but could not immediately determine the cause of death. The viscera report from the Forensic Science Laboratory later confirmed the presence of aluminium phosphide, a highly toxic poison, as the cause of death.

II.3 Investigation and Chargesheet

An initial General Diary entry (G.D. Entry No. 019) recorded the death under suspicious circumstances.
FIR No. 415/2023 was registered later on 15.06.2023 under Sections 498A, 304B, 120B, 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, naming the husband and several in‑laws.
The husband was arrested only on 22.09.2023, more than three months after the FIR; other named in‑laws were never arrested.
Chargesheet No. 557/2023 (30.10.2023) was filed only against the husband under Sections 498A, 304B and 328 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; the politically influential uncle, Tej Bahadur Singh alias Ram Bahadur, and his wife Vijay Shri, were dropped.
An Assistant Prosecution Officer later pointed out deficiencies in the investigation, leading to transfer of the case to CB‑CID; CB‑CID ultimately reaffirmed that only the husband was to be prosecuted.

II.4 Bail Proceedings

The Sessions Court rejected the husband’s bail application on 20.10.2023.
The Allahabad High Court, in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024, granted bail to Respondent No. 1 by order dated 09.10.2025.
The appellant–father filed the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court seeking cancellation of this bail.

III. Issues Before the Supreme Court

Maintainability: Whether the complainant–father, as an aggrieved person, has locus standi to seek cancellation/annulment of bail granted to the husband.
Scope of interference: Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court interfere with and annul a bail order passed by the High Court, particularly distinguishing between annulment and cancellation of bail.
Bail in dowry death: Whether, in a case of alleged dowry death under Section 304B IPC occurring within four months of marriage, the High Court’s grant of bail—without considering the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act and the gravity of the offence—was legally sustainable.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held:

The appeal was maintainable. A complainant or other aggrieved person may challenge a bail order; it is not only the State that can invoke Section 439(2) CrPC.
The present case falls within the category of annulment of bail based on legal infirmity in the High Court’s order, rather than cancellation for post‑bail misconduct.
The High Court’s order was perverse and unsustainable because:
- It failed to consider the gravity and nature of the offence—a dowry death within four months of marriage.
- It ignored prima facie incriminating material, including consistent statements of the deceased’s relatives and what the Court treated as dying declarations about forced administration of poison.
- It did not apply the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, which arises once the ingredients of Section 304B IPC are prima facie satisfied.
The Court emphasised that in dowry death cases, courts must be alive to the societal ramifications; leniency in bail without adequate reasons undermines public confidence in the justice system.
Accordingly, the bail granted to Respondent No. 1 was cancelled/annulled, and he was directed to surrender forthwith.
The Bench clarified that its findings are confined to the question of bail; the criminal trial is to proceed on its own merits, uninfluenced by these observations.

V. Detailed Analysis

V.1 Maintainability and Locus Standi of the Complainant

The Court first addressed whether the complainant–father could maintain an appeal against the order granting bail.

Relying on:

R. Rathinam v. State by DSP, (2000) 2 SCC 391; and
Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 2087 of 2008, decided on 19.12.2008,

the Court reaffirmed that:

The power under Section 439(2) CrPC to cancel bail may be invoked not only by the State but also by any aggrieved person.
A complainant can challenge a bail order on its merits, not only on the ground that bail has been misused after being granted.

In the present case, the father was clearly an aggrieved person: his daughter died in unnatural circumstances within four months of marriage; he was the complainant in the FIR alleging dowry death. The Court therefore held that the appeal was clearly maintainable.

V.2 Legal Framework on Bail Annulment and Cancellation

V.2.1 Statutory Provisions

Section 439(2) CrPC: Empowers the High Court or Court of Session to direct that any person released on bail be arrested and committed to custody “if it considers it necessary so to do.”
Section 437(5) CrPC: Enables a Magistrate to cancel bail granted under Section 437.

These provisions clearly indicate that the grant of bail is not final or irrevocable; liberty can be rescinded where judicially warranted.

V.2.2 The Darshan Framework: Annulment vs Cancellation

A central plank of the Court’s reasoning is its reliance on its recent decision in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 INSC 979, which comprehensively re‑examined the law on bail annulment and cancellation. Extracts of Darshan are quoted at length in the judgment.

The Court endorses the two‑category framework developed in Darshan:

Annulment of Bail Orders (Category A)
This applies where:
- The bail order is legally infirm from the outset – for example, because the court ignored material evidence, considered irrelevant factors, or misapplied settled legal principles.
- Annulment is justified even without any supervening misconduct by the accused after release.
Cancellation of Bail (Category B)
This applies when:
- Post‑release conduct justifies revocation, such as interference with witnesses, tampering with evidence, absconding, or committing further offences.

Substantial supporting precedents are invoked:

State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411 – distinction between rejection and cancellation of bail.
Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 – bail can be set aside if granted in disregard of material facts.
Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 – a perverse or unjustified bail order can be quashed even without post‑bail misconduct.
Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, 2008 (6) SCALE 415 – reliance on irrelevant material makes a bail order vulnerable.
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 – mechanical grant of bail, ignoring gravity and antecedents, is impermissible.
Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, (2011) 6 SCC 189 – serious allegations and position of accused can justify cancellation; distinction between the same court cancelling bail and an appellate court annulling the order.
Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 – annulment of bail where criminal antecedents and relevant factors were ignored; parity is not enough.
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 – emphasises totality of circumstances.
State of Kerala v. Mahesh, AIR 2021 SC 2071 – even under Article 136, Supreme Court can interfere with bail orders lacking application of mind or based on irrelevant considerations.
Pinki v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 482 – bail in child trafficking annulled; collective societal interest can outweigh individual liberty.

In the present case, the Supreme Court expressly classifies the matter as one of annulment of a perverse bail order— not of cancellation arising from misuse of liberty post‑release. The focus is on the High Court’s failure to take account of critical material and statutory presumptions.

V.2.3 Bail Factors Reiterated

Drawing from Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Court reiterates the classic bail considerations:

Nature of accusations and severity of potential punishment.
Nature and strength of evidence supporting the accusations.
Reasonable apprehension of witness intimidation or threat to the complainant.
Prima facie satisfaction about the genuineness of the prosecution case.

The Court also refers to State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, which similarly lists relevant factors, including likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, and the accused’s position and influence.

V.3 Application to the Present Case: Why the High Court’s Order Was Perverse

V.3.1 Ignoring the Gravity of Dowry Death

The Supreme Court found that the High Court granted bail by invoking general propositions such as “bail is the rule, jail is the exception” and Article 21 without:

Engaging with the gravity of the offence: an unnatural death of a young bride within four months of marriage.
Considering that Section 304B IPC prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years, extendable to life imprisonment, and targets a grave and pervasive social evil.

Rather than balancing liberty with societal interest in the specific context of dowry death, the High Court appears to have mechanically applied broad liberty‑centric principles.

V.3.2 Overlooking Statutory Presumption Under Section 113B Evidence Act

The Supreme Court’s most significant doctrinal move is its insistence that:

“The dying declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy the foundational requirements of Section 304B IPC. Consequently, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against Respondent No. 1.”

In other words, once:

The death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances,
within seven years of marriage, and
there is material that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death,

a statutory presumption of dowry death arises, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut it. The High Court failed to account for this presumption at all, treating the case as if it were a routine homicide or abetment matter. This omission was held to be a serious error of law.

V.3.3 Treatment of Evidence at the Bail Stage

The Court carefully notes that:

The cause of death—whether ingestion was forced or voluntary—and the precise role of each accused are matters for trial.
However, at the bail stage, there is substantial prima facie material:
- Post‑mortem noting an abrasion on the forearm (approx. 8 cm above the wrist), suggesting possible restraint.
- FSL report confirming aluminium phosphide poisoning.
- Statements under Section 161 CrPC of:
  - Abhay Singh (brother‑in‑law of the elder sister) – repeated complaints by the deceased about harassment and demand for a vehicle.
  - Father – specific narration that shortly before death, the deceased said her husband and in‑laws had forcibly made her consume a “smelly substance.”
  - Mother and younger sister – consistent accounts of ongoing dowry‑related cruelty.
  - Elder sister – account of late night distressed phone calls and the deceased’s narration at the hospital that her husband and relatives had forced the substance upon her.

The Court treats these disclosures—particularly those made to the father and sister when death was imminent— as dying declarations of “high evidentiary value” at least for bail purposes. The High Court did not meaningfully engage with this material, nor did it explain why it was insufficient to justify continued custody pending trial.

V.3.4 Lapses in Investigation and Potential Influence

The Court also takes note of:

The delayed arrest of the husband (over 100 days after the FIR).
The non‑arrest and subsequent exoneration of politically influential relatives initially named in the FIR.
The Assistant Prosecution Officer’s written complaint about investigative deficiencies, prompting transfer to CB‑CID.

These circumstances, while not determinative of guilt, were considered relevant for bail: they suggested a real risk of unfairness and potential influence over the process, which the High Court did not evaluate, despite the applicable standard requiring assessment of the likelihood of tampering with evidence and intimidating witnesses.

V.4 The Presumption of Dowry Death: Sections 304B IPC and 113B Evidence Act

V.4.1 Elements of Dowry Death Under Section 304B IPC

The Court revisits the statutory scheme, drawing heavily on earlier leading decisions:

Kans Raj v. State Of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207;
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477; and
Baijnath v. State of M.P., (2017) 1 SCC 101.

From these, it reiterates that for Section 304B IPC to apply, the prosecution must show:

The death of a woman is caused by burns, bodily injury, or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances;
Such death occurs within seven years of marriage;
The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;
Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry; and
Such cruelty or harassment occurred “soon before her death.”

V.4.2 The Meaning of “Soon Before Her Death”

The Court adopts the interpretation from Kans Raj and Rajinder Singh:

“Soon before” is a relative term, not necessarily “immediately before.”
The key is a proximate and live link between cruelty/harassment and the death.
Persistent or continuous harassment over a period may suffice, provided it is not too remote or stale.

In this case, the deceased had allegedly reported:

Continuous dowry‑related harassment since marriage, and
Specific incidents leading up to the date of death, including a quarrel on the very day preceding her collapse.

These facts, coupled with the very short interval between marriage (February) and death (June), easily satisfied the proximity requirement at the prima facie level.

V.4.3 Operation of Section 113B: Presumption of Law

Section 113B of the Evidence Act provides that when the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person caused the dowry death.

Key points, drawn from Baijnath and adopted here:

The presumption is a presumption of law, not merely of fact – once foundational facts are proved, the court is bound to draw it.
Foundational facts include:
- Unnatural death within seven years of marriage; and
- Cruelty/harassment “soon before death” for or in connection with dowry demand.
Only after these elements are shown does the burden shift to the accused to rebut the presumption.

The Supreme Court finds that in this case, at least prima facie:

The death was unnatural (poisoning) and occurred within four months of marriage.
There was consistent material alleging cruelty and harassment tied to dowry (demand for a Fortuner vehicle).
The alleged incidents of forced administration of poison were narrated immediately before the death.

Therefore, the presumption under Section 113B was clearly triggered and should have been a central consideration in the High Court’s bail decision. The High Court’s failure to even advert to it was a core reason for annulment of the bail.

V.5 Bail and the Societal Context of Dowry Death

Beyond doctrinal analysis, the Court makes powerful normative observations:

Dowry has reduced the sacred institution of marriage to a “commercial transaction.”
The evil of dowry is often disguised as gifts but in reality feeds material greed and social display.
Dowry deaths represent an “abhorrent manifestation” where women are killed to satisfy such greed.
Such offences are not private wrongs; they are crimes against society at large, violating constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity (Articles 14 and 21).

The Court cautions that “judicial passivity or misplaced leniency” in the face of such atrocities would embolden perpetrators and erode public trust in justice. This is in line with Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 172, where the Court noted that granting bail in dowry death cases despite strong incriminating material shakes public confidence and undermines the protective purpose of Sections 304B and 498A IPC.

Similarly, in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 443, the Court had warned that while misuse of Section 498A must be checked, the growing menace of dowry‑related crimes demands careful judicial balancing to ensure that the law continues to protect genuine victims. The present decision leans firmly in favour of a robust, victim‑sensitive approach in dowry death bail cases.

V.6 Treatment of the Defence Arguments

The accused’s counsel advanced several arguments:

Delay of ten days in lodging the FIR.
Absence of initial dowry allegations in the G.D. entry.
Lack of call records corroborating the alleged distress call.
Allegation of deceased’s prior love affair and supposed unwillingness to marry the accused.
Exoneration of the uncle and aunt in further investigation.
Fifteen months’ incarceration already undergone.

While not exhaustively discussed, the Supreme Court’s reasoning implicitly indicates:

Delay in FIR can be explained by shock and grief, especially in cases of sudden death; it does not negate the seriousness of allegations at the bail stage.
Inconsistencies between initial G.D. entry and subsequent FIR are matters for trial; for bail, the Court looks at the totality of statements and circumstances.
Non‑production of call records does not by itself demolish otherwise consistent witness accounts, particularly when there is no indication of fabrication at this stage.
Suggestions of a love affair or unwillingness to marry are classic defences targeting the character or mental state of the deceased; they are trial issues, not decisive against bail cancellation when there is strong prima facie evidence of dowry harassment and unnatural death.
Exoneration of other relatives actually underscores the point that the husband, as the direct matrimonial partner, remains centrally implicated; it does not dilute the case against him.
Period of incarceration, while relevant, is outweighed here by the seriousness of the charge, the statutory presumption, and the nature of evidence.

The Supreme Court therefore concludes that the High Court’s order fails the test of judicious exercise of discretion and must be set aside.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

VI.1 Dowry Death (Section 304B IPC)

A “dowry death” under Section 304B IPC occurs when:

A married woman dies by burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances;
The death occurs within seven years of her marriage; and
She was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for or in connection with any demand for dowry, and this cruelty was inflicted soon before her death.

If these conditions are satisfied, the husband or relatives “shall be deemed to have caused her death” – this is a strong deeming provision reflecting legislative condemnation of dowry‑related deaths.

VI.2 Section 498A IPC – Cruelty by Husband or Relatives

Section 498A penalises:

Any wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury to her body or mental health; or
Harassment with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property or valuable security (i.e., dowry).

Cruelty for dowry under Section 498A often provides the factual foundation for invoking the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B.

VI.3 Presumption Under Section 113B of the Evidence Act

Section 113B says that if:

A woman dies in circumstances attracting Section 304B IPC; and
It is shown that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with dowry;

then the court must presume that the accused caused the dowry death. This is a presumption of law: once basic facts are proved, the court has no discretion but to presume the accused’s responsibility, unless he rebuts it.

VI.4 Annulment vs Cancellation of Bail

Annulment of bail:
- Done by a higher court.
- Based on defects in the original bail order (e.g., ignoring material evidence or legal provisions).
- Does not require any bad behaviour by the accused after bail.
Cancellation of bail:
- May be done by the same court or a higher court.
- Triggered by post‑bail misconduct (e.g., threatening witnesses, absconding, repeating offences).

The present judgment is an example of annulment: the High Court’s order was set aside because it was legally flawed, not because the accused misused his liberty after release.

VI.5 Dying Declaration

A “dying declaration” is a statement made by a person about the cause or circumstances of their impending death. Under Indian law, such statements are admissible in evidence (Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act). Courts attach high weight to dying declarations because a person on the verge of death is presumed unlikely to lie.

In this case, the deceased’s statements to her father and sister, made when she was in critical condition and shortly before death, alleging forced administration of poison by her husband and in‑laws, are treated as dying declarations for bail purposes.

VII. Likely Impact and Future Significance

VII.1 Stricter Bail Scrutiny in Dowry Death Cases

The judgment sends a clear signal that:

In dowry death prosecutions, general slogans like “bail is the rule” are insufficient; courts must rigorously examine statutory presumptions and gravity of the offence.
Once foundational facts of Section 304B IPC are prima facie established, the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B must be actively considered at the bail stage.

Trial courts and High Courts are likely to respond by:

Writing more detailed, reasoned bail orders in dowry death cases.
Explicitly addressing whether and how Section 113B is attracted.
Being cautious in granting bail where there are consistent accounts of dowry harassment and unnatural death within seven years of marriage.

VII.2 Empowerment of Complainants in Bail Challenges

By reaffirming that complainants can challenge bail orders on merits, the judgment:

Strengthens victim participation in criminal proceedings.
Encourages vigilant oversight of bail in serious offences, especially crimes against women.
May lead to more appeals/ applications by complainants or their families when they perceive that courts have unduly ignored material evidence in granting bail.

VII.3 Clarification of the Annulment–Cancellation Distinction

The Court’s adoption of the Darshan framework consolidates a clear doctrinal structure for future cases:

High Courts and trial courts will be aware that perverse bail orders can be set aside by superior courts even in the absence of post‑bail misconduct.
Appellate courts will more confidently categorise bail challenges as annulment cases (testing the legality of the order) rather than narrowly focusing on post‑bail conduct.

VII.4 Reinforcement of the Protective Purpose of Sections 304B and 498A IPC

The judgment strongly reaffirms that:

Sections 304B and 498A IPC, read with Section 113B of the Evidence Act, are meant to combat a grave social evil, not to be neutralised at the threshold through lax bail practices.
Misplaced leniency in dowry death bail matters can undermine legislative intent and embolden those who treat marriage as a site of extortion and violence.

This emphasis is likely to be invoked in future cases where courts are asked to balance concerns about the misuse of anti‑dowry laws against the reality of pervasive dowry‑related violence.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Title principle: Courts deciding bail in dowry death prosecutions must apply the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act once the foundational facts of Section 304B IPC are prima facie made out. Failure to do so can render a bail order perverse and liable to annulment.
Complainant’s locus: An aggrieved complainant, including a parent of the deceased, has standing to challenge a bail order on merits; bail may be annulled even without post‑bail misconduct.
Annulment vs cancellation: The judgment cements the distinction between annulment of a legally flawed bail order and cancellation for post‑release misbehaviour, aligning with State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan.
Evidence at bail stage: Consistent witness statements, dying declarations, medical evidence suggesting poisoning, and investigative lapses are all relevant in judging whether continued custody is justified.
Societal dimension: Dowry deaths are characterised as offences against the collective conscience of society; judicial leniency in such cases can erode faith in the justice system and weaken deterrence.
Limited to bail: The Court is careful to confine its conclusions to the question of bail, directing that the trial proceed independently on its own merits.

In sum, Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince advances bail jurisprudence by integrating the special statutory framework of dowry death into the bail decision itself, rather than treating such cases as ordinary offences. It underscores that where a married woman dies unnaturally within a short span of marriage amidst allegations of dowry‑related cruelty, the law demands a presumption of culpability at least at the threshold, and courts must respond with heightened scrutiny before restoring the liberty of the prime accused.