Ankit Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 INSC 501):
The Supreme Court’s “Non‑Heinous Offence” Test for Cancelling Anticipatory Bail of Habitual Offenders

Introduction

In Ankit Mishra v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India was called upon to decide whether anticipatory bail granted to a habitual offender—respondent no. 2, Abdul Razzak—should be cancelled. The appellant (de facto complainant) contended that the High Court of Madhya Pradesh erred in extending the benefit of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) to an accused with 45 past FIRs. The key issues were:

• Whether an extensive criminal history, per se, bars an accused from anticipatory bail in a pending investigation for non‑heinous offences.
• What parameters govern cancellation of anticipatory bail once it has already been granted by a lower court?
• To what extent should the gravity of the current charges—each punishable with imprisonment not exceeding seven years—shape the analysis?

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s order, but in doing so it articulated a refined doctrinal test—hereafter referred to as the “Non‑Heinous Offence Test”—for reviewing anticipatory bail of habitual offenders.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court held that the High Court’s grant of anticipatory bail did not suffer from any fundamental legal error.
• It underscored that all alleged offences in the present FIR (Sections 195A, 294, 506 IPC) are triable by a Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) and attract a maximum punishment below seven years.
• While acknowledging the respondent’s “habitual offender” tag, the Court distinguished between heinous and non‑heinous offences and found the latter dispositive.
• It reiterated that cancellation of bail demands “very cogent and overwhelming circumstances,” borrowing heavily from Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. (2022) 8 SCC 559 and earlier precedents.
• The appeal was dismissed; however, stringent conditions were imposed: on release in other cases, the respondent must report monthly to the police station and abstain from fresh criminal activity, failing which cancellation can be sought.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2022) 8 SCC 559 – The Court extracted paras 31‑36, which catalogue circumstances warranting cancellation of bail, including misuse of liberty, tampering, or orders resting on irrelevant considerations.
2. Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349 – Laid the foundational six‑fold test for bail cancellation (interference with justice, absconding, etc.).
3. Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 508 – Drew a doctrinal line between (i) bail cancellation due to subsequent misconduct and (ii) correction of an unjustified grant. The present Court invoked this to emphasise that it was dealing with the latter category.
4. Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118 – Reaffirmed that non‑application of mind or ignoring material factors can justify setting aside bail, guiding the present scrutiny.
5. Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta (2011) 6 SCC 189 – Clarified that bail may be cancelled even if not misused, where allegations are very serious.

The Court synthesised these authorities, but crucially inserted an additional filter: the gravity of the current offence must be non‑heinous for an habitual offender to retain anticipatory bail.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory framework considered: Section 438 Cr.P.C. (anticipatory bail) and Section 195A IPC (threatening witness). The Court noted that the offences are cognisable and bailable by discretion, with sentencing brackets not exceeding seven years.
2. Habitual offender ≠ automatic bar: – The bench accepted that “ordinarily” habitual offenders should not obtain bail “in a routine manner.” – However, it distinguished between habitual offending in general and the nature of the instant offence. When the present charges are “non‑heinous,” liberty can be preserved, subject to safeguards.
3. Application of Deepak Yadav framework to facts: – No evidence of tampering, intimidation, or flight risk post‑bail was shown. – The High Court had examined the respondent’s record and still exercised discretion—hence there was no patent perversity.
4. Proportionality principle: – The Court implicitly applied a proportionality lens: cancelling liberty in a matter punishable with ≤7 years, when the accused is already incarcerated in other matters, would be excessive absent supervening circumstances.
5. Protective conditions: – Recognising public‑safety concerns, the bench imposed monthly reporting and a zero‑tolerance clause for fresh offences—linking continued liberty to ongoing conduct.

C. Impact of the Judgment

• New Precedent: Establishes the “Non‑Heinous Offence Test” for habitual offenders: When the present offence is triable by a Magistrate and carries a maximum sentence below seven years, anticipatory bail need not be cancelled solely because of an extensive criminal history.
• Guidance to High Courts: Reinforces that judicial discretion must weigh (i) gravity of current charge, (ii) criminal antecedents, and (iii) possible misuse of liberty; but an adverse past is not ipso facto disqualifying.
• Practical effect: – Police & prosecutors must marshal concrete post‑bail misconduct or show that the current offence is heinous, else higher courts may decline to cancel bail. – Defence counsel can cite this case to resist cancellation when current allegations are minor but the accused’s past is chequered.
• Intersection with bail reforms: The ruling complements the Supreme Court’s broader push (e.g., Satender Kumar Antil) toward reducing unnecessary incarceration for under‑trials facing non‑heinous charges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anticipatory Bail (Section 438 Cr.P.C.): A pre‑arrest bail order protecting an individual from being taken into custody on accusation of a non‑bailable offence.
• Cancellation of Bail: A judicial act overturning an earlier grant of bail, resulting in the accused being taken into custody. It may occur because of (i) subsequent misconduct or (ii) discovery that the original order was legally flawed.
• Heinous vs. Non‑Heinous Offence: Though not statutorily defined, courts generally treat offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or ≥7 years as “heinous.” The present judgment operationalises this threshold explicitly for bail‑cancellation analysis.
• Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC): The magistracy tier empowered to try criminal offences punishable up to seven years’ imprisonment.
• Habitual Offender: An accused with repeated criminal cases; however, the term is descriptive, not determinative, for bail purposes. Each new offence must still be assessed on its own gravity.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ankit Mishra crystallises an important doctrinal checkpoint: the gravity of the present offence trumps the accused’s criminal history when evaluating cancellation of anticipatory bail, provided the offence is non‑heinous and the original order is not perverse. By reaffirming the sanctity of personal liberty, while simultaneously empowering lower courts to attach rigorous conditions, the judgment strikes a calibrated balance between individual rights and societal safety. Going forward, practitioners and courts alike must engage in a two‑tiered analysis—(i) examine whether the current allegations surpass the heinous‑offence threshold; (ii) if not, require demonstrable post‑bail misconduct or patent legal error before revoking the concession of anticipatory bail. In a criminal‑justice system grappling with overcrowded jails and protracted trials, this precedent furthers the Court’s incremental effort to ensure that incarceration is reserved for those accused of genuinely grave offences or demonstrably misusing their liberty.