Abuse of Media Platforms, Cognizable Offences and Limited Power to Quash FIRs under Section 528 BNSS: Commentary on Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan

Abuse of Media Platforms, Cognizable Offences and Limited Power to Quash FIRs under Section 528 BNSS: Commentary on Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan

1. Introduction

The decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 5786/2025 (decided on 26 November 2025 by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand), is significant on two main planes:

  • Substantively, it deals with allegations of misuse of a media platform (a television news channel) for purposes of extortion and coercion, placing that conduct squarely within the realm of cognizable criminal offences.
  • Procedurally, it clarifies that the well-settled jurisprudence on the High Court’s inherent power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC continues to apply, mutatis mutandis, to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The judgment is also notable for its elaborate preface on the role and responsibility of the media in a constitutional democracy. It balances the centrality of a free press under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution with the impermissibility of “yellow journalism” and blackmail under the garb of press freedom.

At its core, the case concerns a petition to quash an FIR alleging that a senior media professional, heading the Rajasthan channel of Zee Media, used the threat of adverse news coverage to extort money from various vendors and third parties, thereby also damaging the goodwill and reputation of the media house itself.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and Positions

  • Petitioner / Accused: Ashish Dave, Channel Head–Zee Rajasthan / Zee 24 Ghanta, employed with Zee Media since 21.03.2023, stationed at Jaipur.
  • Respondent No. 1: State of Rajasthan (through Public Prosecutor).
  • Respondent No. 2 / Complainant: Sanju Raju, representing Zee Media (the company/employer).

2.2 Allegations in the FIR

FIR No. 257/2025 was registered at Police Station Ashok Nagar, Jaipur City (South) under Sections 308(2), 318(4) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). While the judgment does not reproduce the bare text of these provisions, the parties proceed on the basis that the offences broadly correspond to:

  • Criminal breach of trust (BNS §316 – as mentioned by counsel),
  • Cheating (BNS §318), and
  • Extortion / related coercive offences (BNS §351).

The complaint by Zee Media alleges, in essence:

  1. The petitioner, as Channel Head, held a senior position with authority over editorial and operational decisions.
  2. Internal findings and “multiple complaints” received by the company indicated:
    • Unauthorised financial dealings,
    • Abuse of authority,
    • Use of the company’s name and brand to engage with external businesses in “unethical and coercive” ways.
  3. The petitioner allegedly:
    • Misrepresented his authority and demanded monetary favours from vendors and other entities,
    • Issued threats that, if demands were not met, “negative or damaging news content” would be broadcast on Zee Media channels,
    • Used the channels to broadcast negative, threatening or defamatory content to pressure parties into compliance.
  4. These acts are said to be:
    • Unauthorised by the company,
    • Personal in nature, undertaken for his own benefit,
    • A “gross criminal misuse” of the company’s platform and resources,
    • Causing “substantial and irreparable harm” to the company’s reputation, credibility and goodwill.

The company encloses “multiple third-party complaints” and supporting material as Annexure A, and requests registration of an FIR under relevant provisions of the BNS and other applicable laws.

2.3 Progress of Investigation

During investigation, the police recorded statements of several witnesses under Section 180 BNSS (the BNSS provision corresponding broadly to recording of witness statements during investigation). Many such witnesses reportedly stated that:

  • The petitioner (and allegedly co-accused) made illegal demands for money.
  • They paid money due to threats of negative or damaging broadcasts about them.

The court consciously refrains from evaluating these witness statements, noting that doing so would prejudice either the prosecution or the defence.

2.4 The Petition under Section 528 BNSS

The petitioner invokes Section 528 BNSS (the successor to Section 482 CrPC) seeking to quash the FIR, arguing that:

  • Even if the FIR’s contents are accepted as true, no cognizable offence is made out.
  • Goodwill or reputation of the company does not constitute “property” under Section 2(21) BNS, hence criminal breach of trust/extortion based on goodwill is legally untenable.
  • No individual “victim” of extortion has lodged a complaint; only the employer (Zee Media) complains.
  • Defamation is a non-cognizable offence and should be pursued, if at all, by complaint before a Magistrate, not by FIR.
  • The FIR is a product of an underlying employee–employer dispute and is inherently mala fide.
  • The case falls squarely within the quashing parameters laid down in State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

The State and the complainant oppose the petition, contending that:

  • The FIR clearly discloses cognizable offences.
  • Multiple third-party victims’ complaints and statements corroborate the allegations of extortion.
  • The High Court, at this stage, cannot engage in a “mini-trial” or appreciate evidence.
  • The alleged conduct amounts to “yellow journalism” and blackmail, and must be fully investigated.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand dismisses the petition and refuses to quash FIR No. 257/2025. The key holdings are:

  1. FIR discloses cognizable offences: On a prima facie reading, the allegations—misuse of a media platform to threaten and extort money and broadcast negative content—clearly disclose cognizable offences under the BNS.
  2. Scope of Section 528 BNSS is narrow: The High Court’s inherent power (under Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) may be used to quash proceedings only in exceptional cases. At the FIR stage, the Court must not:
    • Weigh evidence,
    • Conduct a mini-trial, or
    • Enter into questions of genuineness, reliability or sufficiency of evidence.
  3. Bhajan Lal categories not attracted: This is not a case where, taking the allegations at face value, no offence is made out, or where the allegations are inherently absurd or manifestly attended with mala fides such that investigation itself should be interdicted.
  4. Investigation should proceed: Whether the allegations are ultimately true, whether the petitioner is actually involved, and whether specific statutory ingredients (e.g. of cheating, criminal breach of trust or extortion) are satisfied, are matters for the Investigating Officer and, later, the trial court.
  5. Media’s special responsibility: While affirming the central role of a free and independent press, the Court underscores that media professionals must not misuse their position to extort, threaten or harass; such acts are criminal, not protected by press freedom.
  6. Procedural safeguard under Section 35 BNSS: If, upon investigation, the Investigating Officer finds that a cognizable offence is made out against the petitioner, he shall issue a notice under Section 35 BNSS (akin to pre-arrest notice) to the petitioner.

Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous petition and connected applications are disposed of; the FIR stands; and investigation is allowed to proceed unhindered.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Nature of the Allegations: Abuse of Media Platform as Extortion

The judgment is framed against a detailed preface on the constitutional role of the media. The Court traces how:

  • Media is a “fourth pillar of democracy”.
  • It informs public opinion, scrutinises governmental and institutional power, exposes corruption and systemic failures, and enables meaningful exercise of democratic rights.
  • With this power comes great responsibility: the media must adhere to truth, accuracy, impartiality and avoid misuse of its platform.

Against this backdrop, the allegations against the petitioner are particularly serious:

  • He is not a field-level reporter but Channel Head, exercising control over editorial decisions.
  • He allegedly used that editorial power as a lever of coercion:
    • Threatening to air damaging or negative news unless money was paid,
    • Actually airing or circulating such news in furtherance of that threat,
    • Doing so without authorisation from the employer, for personal gain.

The High Court explicitly accepts that such allegations, if proven, move the conduct outside the domain of journalistic choice and into the realm of criminality (principally extortion and related offences). This is important because:

  • Media defendants sometimes invoke Article 19(1)(a) to resist criminal process.
  • The Court here effectively draws a line: threat-based monetisation of editorial content is not journalism; it is extortion.

4.2 The Threshold Question: Does the FIR Disclose a Cognizable Offence?

The central legal question before the Court is not whether the petitioner is guilty, but whether:

Assuming the FIR allegations are true as stated, do they disclose the commission of cognizable offences under the BNS, warranting investigation?

Justice Dhand’s answer is unambiguous: Yes. He emphasises that:

  • The FIR alleges a clear pattern:
    • Illegal demands for money,
    • Accompanied by threats of adverse broadcasts,
    • And misuse of the company’s platform.
  • Subsequent witness statements (under Section 180 BNSS) prima facie corroborate these allegations.

Once the court concludes that cognizable offences are disclosed, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court tightly circumscribes the High Court’s ability to interfere at this stage.

4.3 Precedents Cited by the Petitioner and Their Limited Persuasive Force

The petitioner’s counsel invoked a large battery of Supreme Court and High Court authorities, including:

Though the judgment does not analyse each of these cases individually, it effectively treats them as embodying the Bhajan Lal–Neeharika line of jurisprudence: that criminal proceedings may be quashed where:

  • No offence is disclosed even if all allegations are accepted as true, or
  • The FIR is patently frivolous, absurd or malicious, or
  • Continuation of proceedings would be an abuse of process.

Justice Dhand holds that the present case does not satisfy these thresholds. Consequently, the petitioner's reliance on these authorities is found to be misplaced and the cited judgments are held inapplicable to the facts.

4.4 Precedents Relied Upon by the Court

The High Court anchors its reasoning in a line of binding Supreme Court precedents on the scope of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now mirrored in Section 528 BNSS). The key cases are:

4.4.1 Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 9 SCC 35

In Kaptan Singh, the Supreme Court held that:

  • Where a charge-sheet has been filed after investigation, the High Court has even less leeway to quash proceedings.
  • Even then, it must not act as an appellate court or conduct a mini-trial.

Justice Dhand cites this to underline that:

  • Even post-charge-sheet, appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the quashing stage.
  • A fortiori, at the FIR stage, the High Court must be even more circumspect.

4.4.2 Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104

Dineshbhai emphatically held that while examining the legality of an FIR:

  • The High Court cannot act as an investigative agency or appellate court.
  • It must only see if the factual contents of the FIR disclose a prima facie cognizable offence.
  • It must not appreciate evidence or draw contested inferences at this stage.

Justice Dhand reproduces and endorses this approach, applying it to the petition under Section 528 BNSS.

4.4.3 Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State Of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191

This case reiterates key propositions regarding Section 482 CrPC:

  • The inherent power is an exception, not the rule.
  • It must be exercised sparingly, with great caution, only to:
    • Prevent abuse of process of any court, or
    • Secure the ends of justice.
  • The mere existence of allegations of abuse of process is not a carte blanche to quash: such allegations themselves must be borne out by the record.

4.4.4 Daxaben v. State Of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 117

Daxaben reaffirms that:

  • Even in non-compoundable offences, inherent powers can be used to quash proceedings, but only in exceptional cases, often where:
    • The dispute is overwhelmingly civil or personal in nature, and
    • Victim and offender have genuinely resolved their differences.
  • Grave offences (such as abetment to suicide in that case) cannot be lightly quashed on compromise.

By analogy, Justice Dhand indicates that allegations of systematic extortion through misuse of a news channel are serious public wrongs and cannot be dismissed as a mere private employer–employee dispute or a purely civil disagreement.

4.4.5 State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, (2022) 16 SCC 703

Pratima Mohanty reiterates that:

  • Quashing of criminal proceedings is to be an exception, not the norm.
  • The High Court should not enter into merits, evaluate evidence or conduct a mini-trial at the stage of discharge or quashing.
  • After a charge-sheet is filed, interference under Section 482 CrPC should be even rarer.

4.4.6 Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399

This decision censured a High Court that effectively conducted a “mini-trial” at the quashing stage. The Supreme Court stressed that:

  • At the discharge/quashing stage, the court is not required to see whether charges are proved,
  • Proof is a matter for trial; the only question is whether there is material to proceed.

Justice Dhand uses this to caution against delving into the petitioner’s defence or scrutinising the credibility of witness statements at this preliminary stage.

4.4.7 Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 407

Neeharika is arguably the leading modern authority on the limits of the High Court’s power to quash FIRs or stay investigations. It lays down, inter alia, that:

  • Court should not thwart investigation into cognizable offences except in rare cases where no offence is made out on the face of the FIR.
  • FIR is not an encyclopedia; all details need not be pleaded at that stage.
  • The court cannot inquire into the reliability or genuineness of allegations at the FIR stage.
  • Quashing is to be an exception, not the rule.

Justice Dhand expressly quotes and applies these principles, emphasising that:

  • The court’s task is limited to seeing whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.
  • Once that is answered in the affirmative, the police must be permitted to complete investigation.

4.4.8 State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779 and earlier cases

The Court also relies on:

  • Habib Abdullah Jeelani (emphasising cautious use of inherent powers),
  • Kurukshetra University v. State Of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451 (inherent powers cannot be used arbitrarily; FIR cannot be quashed before investigation commences, save in rarest of rare cases), and
  • V. Ravi Kumar v. State, (2019) 14 SCC 568 (High Court cannot enter the factual arena at the quashing stage).

Collectively, these precedents form the doctrinal backbone of the High Court’s decision to let the investigation proceed.

4.5 Continuity of Section 482 CrPC Jurisprudence under Section 528 BNSS

A structurally important aspect of this decision is its implicit recognition of the continuity of inherent powers under the new procedural code:

  • Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482 conferred inherent powers on High Courts to make such orders as may be necessary to:
    • Give effect to any order under the Code,
    • Prevent abuse of process of court, or
    • Otherwise secure the ends of justice.
  • The BNSS 2023 introduces Section 528, which is framed to serve an analogous purpose.
  • In this judgment, the High Court treats Section 528 BNSS as the functional successor to Section 482 CrPC, importing the entire body of Supreme Court jurisprudence under Section 482 into the construction and application of Section 528.

This is doctrinally significant. It reassures that:

  • The shift from CrPC to BNSS does not reset or dilute the long-settled jurisprudence on quashing criminal proceedings.
  • Courts and litigants can safely rely on Bhajan Lal, Neeharika, Kaptan Singh etc. when dealing with petitions under Section 528 BNSS.

4.6 Treatment of Specific Legal Issues Raised by the Petitioner

4.6.1 Whether the Company’s “Goodwill” is “Property” for BNS Offences

The petitioner argued:

  • Goodwill and reputation are intangible and do not qualify as “property” under Section 2(21) BNS.
  • Therefore, offences such as criminal breach of trust (BNS §316) cannot be made out.

The High Court deliberately refrains from adjudicating this interpretive question at the FIR stage. Its rationale is:

  • Resolving whether goodwill is “property” entails a substantive legal and factual enquiry.
  • Such questions, intertwined with appreciation of evidence (e.g. whether any “property” was entrusted, whether there was dishonest misappropriation), are for trial, not quashing.

Thus, the Court does not create new substantive law on the definition of “property” under BNS; it simply holds that:

This is not the stage to test the niceties of statutory interpretation; it is sufficient that the allegations plausibly touch upon recognised offences (cheating, breach of trust, extortion, etc).

4.6.2 Defamation as a Non-Cognizable Offence

The petitioner emphasised that:

  • The FIR repeatedly refers to “defamation” and reputational harm to the company.
  • Defamation, under criminal law, is a non-cognizable offence that generally must be pursued by a private complaint before a Magistrate.
  • Thus, lodging an FIR on such a basis is legally flawed.

The Court’s approach is nuanced:

  • It does not treat the FIR as one merely for defamation.
  • Rather, it focuses on the core gravamen of the complaint:
    • Monetary demands under threat of negative broadcasts,
    • Misuse of the company’s platform and brand for personal financial gain,
    • Coercion of third parties.
  • These elements transcend mere defamation and squarely fall within cognizable offences such as cheating, criminal breach of trust and extortion.

Thus, even though defamation is mentioned, the Court looks at the substance over form and upholds the FIR on the basis of the more serious, cognizable facets of the alleged conduct.

4.6.3 Absence of Individual Victim-Complainants

An important line of argument was:

  • No individual “victim” who allegedly paid money has themselves lodged an FIR.
  • The FIR is only by the company/employer, which is not the direct victim of extortion.

While the Court does not discuss this issue in elaborate doctrinal terms, its approach is implicit in its conclusions:

  • Under the statutory scheme, for cognizable offences, any person with knowledge of the offence can furnish information to the police.
  • The source of the information is immaterial so long as the information discloses a cognizable offence.
  • Zee Media is itself portrayed as a victim:
    • Its goodwill and reputation are said to have been damaged,
    • Its brand and editorial resources were allegedly misused for personal extortion schemes.

Thus, the absence of individual victim-FIRs does not vitiate the registration of the FIR or the continuation of the investigation.

4.6.4 Alleged Mala Fides and Employer–Employee Dispute

The petitioner asserted that:

  • The real backdrop was an employment dispute; his services were terminated by the company.
  • The FIR was allegedly a retaliatory measure to “throw him out” and malign him.
  • The cessation letter made no mention of criminal misconduct, suggesting that the later FIR was concocted.

The Court notes:

  • No specific allegation of mala fides has been pleaded against named individuals in the FIR or in the reply to the police’s notice under Section 91 CrPC/BNSS equivalent (which the company responded to).
  • Even if an employment dispute co-exists, that does not automatically negate the criminal dimensions of the alleged conduct.
  • Whether the FIR is actuated by vendetta or ulterior motives is itself a question of fact requiring evidence, not amenable to summary determination at the Section 528 stage.

The Court holds that it cannot, at this premature stage, declare the FIR mala fide or quash it on such a ground, particularly when the allegations themselves prima facie disclose serious cognizable offences.

4.7 Observations on Freedom and Responsibility of the Press

The judgment’s preface, though largely obiter, is likely to be invoked in future jurisprudence concerning media ethics and crime. Key strands include:

  • Media is recognised as the “voice of the people” and a critical check on power.
  • The Court acknowledges:
    • The transformative impact of media on public policy and governance,
    • Its role in empowering citizens, for instance through the Right to Information Act.
  • However, the Court emphasises that:
    • Media professionals must avoid causing “undue harm” by threat or extortion.
    • They must refrain from content that amounts to harassment or defamation.
    • Their primary duty is to report “true and correct information” with truth, accuracy and impartiality.
    • They must not “threaten anyone to extort anything by causing fear or pressure of incorrect reporting”.

Though the Court does not yet convict or even charge the petitioner (that is a matter for trial), its normative stance is clear:

Misuse of a media platform for extortion or blackmail is antithetical to the very idea of press freedom and will be treated as a serious criminal matter.

This framing may influence both prosecutorial practice and judicial attitudes in future cases involving alleged “sting operations”, paid news, and coercive coverage.

4.8 Procedural Safeguards: Section 35 BNSS

In concluding, the Court notes:

  • If, after investigation, the Investigating Officer concludes that a cognizable offence is made out, he shall issue a notice under Section 35 BNSS to the petitioner.

Section 35 BNSS broadly corresponds to provisions like Section 41A CrPC, requiring the police to issue a notice of appearance to the accused in appropriate cases instead of immediately arresting them. The Court’s direction:

  • Affirms the commitment to procedural fairness and personal liberty even while refusing to quash the FIR.
  • Signals that the investigative process must comply with the new BNSS safeguards on arrest and summons.

Thus, while the High Court allows full investigation into serious allegations, it simultaneously reminds the police of their obligation to follow the more rights-sensitive arrest procedures under the BNSS.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 FIR and Cognizable Offence

  • FIR (First Information Report): The earliest report of a cognizable offence made to the police, which sets the criminal law in motion.
  • Cognizable offence: An offence for which the police may register an FIR and arrest without prior permission of the Magistrate (e.g. serious offences like cheating, extortion, assault, etc.).
  • Non-cognizable offence: The police cannot register an FIR or investigate without orders from a Magistrate (e.g. criminal defamation, in many contexts).

5.2 Section 528 BNSS (Inherent Powers of the High Court)

  • The BNSS equivalent of Section 482 CrPC.
  • Allows the High Court to:
    • Give effect to any order under BNSS,
    • Prevent abuse of the process of any court, or
    • Secure the ends of justice.
  • Used to:
    • Quash FIRs or criminal proceedings in rare cases,
    • Correct glaring procedural abuses.
  • Not a general appellate power; it is extraordinary and residual.

5.3 The Bhajan Lal Categories

In State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Supreme Court listed illustrative categories where criminal proceedings may be quashed, for example:

  • Where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose any offence.
  • Where the allegations are so absurd or inherently improbable that no prudent person could conclude there is sufficient ground to proceed.
  • Where the proceeding is manifestly mala fide and maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive.

Courts consistently stress that:

  • These categories are illustrative, not exhaustive.
  • They must be applied cautiously, not used to justify wholesale interference with investigations.

5.4 Difference Between Defamation and Extortion

  • Defamation:
    • Publication of statements that harm a person’s reputation.
    • In criminal law, typically non-cognizable and requires a private complaint.
    • Protected defences include truth, public good, fair comment, etc.
  • Extortion:
    • Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury (including reputational or financial harm) to dishonestly induce delivery of property or valuable security.
    • Generally a serious cognizable offence.
    • Threats may include threats to reputation, liberty or person; here, the alleged threat is adverse media coverage.

In this case, the High Court sees the alleged conduct as primarily extortionate, even though it has a defamation dimension.

5.5 Investigation vs. Trial vs. Quashing

  • Investigation: Conducted by police (or other agencies) after FIR registration—collecting evidence, recording statements, seizing documents.
  • Trial: Conducted by the court after charge-sheet is filed—evidence is led, witnesses are cross-examined, guilt is determined.
  • Quashing (Section 528 BNSS / 482 CrPC): High Court’s extraordinary power to terminate proceedings at a preliminary stage where continuing them would be an abuse of law or no offence is made out.

The judgment carefully respects these boundaries by:

  • Refusing to evaluate evidence or decide guilt at the quashing stage.
  • Leaving questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact (like “is goodwill property?”, “were threats actually made?”) to investigation and trial.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 For Media and Press Freedom Jurisprudence

  • The decision sends a clear message that press freedom is not a shield for extortion:
    • Threats of adverse coverage to extract money are not protected journalistic activity.
    • Media houses and editors may face criminal investigation where such patterns are alleged.
  • The Court’s extensive preface on media responsibility is likely to be cited as:
    • A High Court articulation of the ethical duties of media professionals,
    • A counterweight to arguments that all media conduct is presumptively shielded by Article 19(1)(a).

6.2 For Application of BNSS and BNS

  • The judgment is one of the early examples of a High Court:
    • Using BNS offences (308, 318, 351 etc.), and
    • Applying Section 528 BNSS in place of Section 482 CrPC.
  • It reinforces that:
    • Old Section 482 case law continues to govern Section 528 BNSS petitions.
    • The interpretive continuity between CrPC and BNSS is strong in the sphere of inherent powers.
  • The reference to Section 35 BNSS also illustrates:
    • How courts expect the police to implement new safeguards,
    • Balancing effective investigation with protection against unnecessary arrests.

6.3 For Future Quashing Petitions

  • The judgment consolidates the principle that:
    • Where an FIR alleges a pattern of serious, cognizable conduct (such as extortion via institutional platforms),
    • The High Court is highly unlikely to quash the FIR at the threshold.
  • Arguments based on:
    • Absence of explicit mention of misconduct in prior employment documents,
    • The presence of a parallel civil/employment dispute, or
    • The complainant not being the direct victim,
    are unlikely to succeed where there are multiple witness statements and corroborative allegations.

6.4 For Employer–Employee and Corporate Misconduct Contexts

  • Employers (especially media houses and large corporations) may view this judgment as:
    • Judicial validation of their ability to initiate criminal process against employees for abuse of corporate platforms or brands for personal gain,
    • Even where individual third-party victims do not themselves file complaints.
  • Courts may increasingly focus on:
    • Whether the allegations demonstrate systemic misuse of institutional authority,
    • As opposed to isolated employment disputes.

7. Conclusion

The Rajasthan High Court’s decision in Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan affirms and entrenches crucial principles at the intersection of media, criminal law and procedural powers:

  • Allegations that a media executive used his editorial platform to coerce and extort money from third parties clearly disclose cognizable offences warranting full investigation.
  • Section 528 BNSS is to be interpreted in line with Section 482 CrPC jurisprudence: the inherent power to quash is narrow, exceptional and to be exercised sparingly.
  • At the FIR stage, the High Court must not:
    • Evaluate evidence,
    • Conduct a mini-trial, or
    • Pronounce on the ultimate truth of allegations.
  • The mere presence of an employment dispute or an employer-initiated FIR does not, by itself, justify quashing, especially where multiple victim statements support the allegations.
  • Freedom of the press, while fundamental to democracy, cannot be stretched to immunise conduct that amounts to extortion, blackmail or criminal misuse of a media platform.

By refusing to interfere with the investigation while simultaneously underscoring the ethical and constitutional role of the media, the judgment draws a careful but firm line: the press is free, but not free to extort. And just as crucially, it confirms that the transition to the BNSS has not altered the core doctrinal limits on the High Court’s inherent power to quash criminal proceedings.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Rajasthan High Court

Judge(s)

Anoop Kumar Dhand

Advocates

Comments