Re‑Characterising Evidence from Circumstantial to Direct and Sifting Partly Hostile Testimony: Commentary on Ram Singar Singh v. State, 2025 DHC 10558‑DB

1. Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Ram Singar Singh v. State (CRL.A. 173/2003, decided on 28 November 2025) presents a detailed example of how appellate courts may:

Re‑appreciate the entire evidence in a criminal appeal;
Re‑characterise a case treated as “circumstantial” at trial as one resting on direct evidence;
Sift truth from falsehood in the testimony of a partly unreliable or “turned” witness, without discarding that witness wholesale; and
Rely on presumptions of fact under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in tandem with direct and forensic evidence.

The case arises from the murder of Lance Naik Kanhaiya Lal, a member of a security detachment posted at the residence of one Lalit Makan (House No. L‑105–106, Kirti Nagar, Delhi). The appellant, Ram Singar Singh, another member of the same security team, was accused of shooting Kanhaiya Lal dead with his service rifle in the early hours of 28 June 1996, allegedly driven by revenge for being beaten by the deceased the previous day.

Convicted by the Trial Court under:

Section 302 IPC (murder), and
Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (use of prohibited arms in contravention of Section 7),

the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and three years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively, sentences to run concurrently. He challenged both conviction and sentence before the High Court.

A striking feature of the judgment is the Court’s extensive discussion of the psychology of revenge and anger (paras 1–2, 35–36), which it integrates into the legal framework of motive under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The decision also crystallises the principles governing:

The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence under Section 60 of the Evidence Act;
The non‑application of the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus in India; and
The permissive nature of factual presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The security detail and the altercation

In June 1996, a security team was posted round‑the‑clock at the residence of Lalit Makan at Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. The detachment comprised:

The appellant, Ram Singar Singh;
The deceased, Lance Naik Kanhaiya Lal;
HC Rajesh Singh Chauhan (PW‑17); and
Constable Devinder Pal Singh (PW‑3).

Each guard was issued one rifle and 50 cartridges. Of these, 5 cartridges were to be loaded in the magazine, and 45 were to be carried in a bandolier belt.

On 26 June 1996, an altercation occurred between the appellant and the deceased, ostensibly on the trivial issue of cleaning a bathroom. Crucially, evidence established that:

The deceased beat the appellant during this altercation;
The incident was reported to higher authorities via an application Ex. PW8/B sent to the Company Commander; and
The application and its seizure were proved by multiple witnesses, including Inspector Mohd. Umar (PW‑8) and Inspector Surjit Malik (Investigating Officer).

This prior incident of humiliation and physical assault became central to the Court’s conclusion that there was a strong motive of revenge under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

2.2 The night of the incident

On the night intervening 27–28 June 1996:

According to the duty roster and the testimony of PW‑3 and PW‑17:
- PW‑3 (Const. Devinder Pal Singh) was on duty 7:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m.;
- The deceased, Kanhaiya Lal, was on duty 10:00 p.m. – 1:00 a.m.;
- The appellant was on duty 1:00 a.m. – 4:00 a.m.
At about 3:30 a.m., both PW‑3 and PW‑17 were asleep in the room where the guards rested.

Around 3:30 a.m., a gunshot was heard. The narrative that the Court ultimately accepts is:

PW‑3 woke up on hearing the first gunshot, turned on the light, and saw the appellant holding his rifle near the cot where Kanhaiya Lal was lying;
Before PW‑3 could fully grasp the situation, the appellant fired a second shot at the sleeping Kanhaiya Lal;
PW‑3 immediately caught hold of the rifle barrel and raised an alarm;
PW‑17 (HC Rajesh Singh Chauhan) woke to the alarm and gunshot sound, saw the appellant with rifle in hand, and observed blood oozing from Kanhaiya Lal’s body;
The two witnesses together overpowered the appellant, disarmed him, and later tied his hands;
The appellant attempted to escape by climbing the main gate but was pulled down by the guards holding his legs and again restrained.

The deceased succumbed to his injuries at the spot.

2.3 Investigation and trial

Upon receiving information, the police arrived at the scene. Key investigative steps included:

Recording of PW‑3’s statement and registration of the FIR based on endorsement Ex. PW19/A;
Seizure of:
- Two spent cartridges found near the cot;
- Broken bullet pieces;
- The appellant’s rifle (Ex. P‑1) and his bandolier belt (Ex. P‑3) containing 45 live cartridges;
- The duty register;
- The bloodstained clothes and blood sample of the deceased.
Deposition of seized items in the malkhana (police storage) and subsequent dispatch to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) in sealed condition;
Conduct of post‑mortem by Dr. L.T. Ramani (PW‑13);
Preparation of a rough site plan (Ex. PW19/B) and a scaled site plan (Ex. PW2/A) showing:
- The position of the cot;
- The location of the appellant when apprehended (approx. 1 metre from the cot);
- The main gate (13–15 metres from the scene of crime).

After trial, the appellant was convicted for:

Murder under Section 302 IPC; and
Use of arms in contravention of Section 7 punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

He was sentenced to:

Life imprisonment and a fine of ₹10,000 (with one year’s simple imprisonment in default) for Section 302 IPC; and
Three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 (with one month’s simple imprisonment in default) for Section 27 of the Arms Act.

The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The present criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence.

3. Issues Before the Delhi High Court

The Court (Subramonium Prasad J. and Vimal Kumar Yadav J.) identified, implicitly and explicitly, several core issues:

Nature of Evidence:
- Is the prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, as argued by the defence and assumed by the Trial Court, or does it rest on direct (ocular) evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence Act?
Credibility of Key Witnesses:
- Given inconsistencies and a later “somersault” by PW‑3 in cross‑examination, can PW‑3 and PW‑17 be treated as reliable witnesses?
- Does the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus apply, such that an untruth on one aspect renders the entire testimony inadmissible or untrustworthy?
Link between Rifle and Crime:
- In the absence of fingerprint evidence on the rifle, has the prosecution conclusively linked the appellant’s rifle to the fatal shots?
Motive and Revenge:
- Does the prior altercation and beating of the appellant by the deceased furnish a legally relevant motive under Section 8 of the Evidence Act?
Use of Presumptions:
- Can the Court draw presumptions of fact under Section 114 of the Evidence Act from the established facts (presence with weapon, close range firing, motive, attempted escape, etc.)?
Mens Rea for Murder:
- Do the injury characteristics and manner of assault satisfy the requirements of the first clause of Section 300 IPC, so that the offence is murder under Section 302 IPC rather than a lesser form of culpable homicide?
Applicability of Section 27 of the Arms Act:
- Does the appellant’s use of the rifle fall within the mischief of Section 7, attracting punishment under Section 27?

4. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal, confirming both conviction and sentence.

Key conclusions include:

Case based on direct evidence: Contrary to the Trial Court’s characterisation, the High Court held that the prosecution case rested on direct, ocular evidence because PW‑3 had witnessed the appellant firing a second shot at the deceased, and PW‑17 had immediately seen the appellant with rifle in hand near the bleeding victim (paras 8–10, 15, 18).
Credibility of PW‑3 and PW‑17: Despite PW‑3’s later attempt in cross‑examination to distance the appellant from the room, the Court held that:
- His earlier testimony and the corroboration from PW‑17 were credible;
- The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India;
- The Court is entitled to sift truth from falsehood in a witness’s evidence (paras 16–18).
Motive established: The beating of the appellant by the deceased the previous day, recorded in Ex. PW8/B and unchallenged by the defence, established a strong motive of revenge, relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act (paras 2, 10–12, 35–36).
Medical and forensic corroboration:
- Post‑mortem (Ex. PW13/A) revealed two firearm entry wounds (right sub‑mandibular region and right lower chest), with blackening and heat effect indicating close‑range firing, and injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (paras 24–25, 38);
- CFSL report (Ex. PX) confirmed that the spent cartridges and bullet fragments were fired from rifle Ex. P‑1, issued to and seized from the appellant (para 27).
Presumption of fact under Section 114 Evidence Act: From the proved circumstances – motive, duty roster, presence with rifle, close‑range shots, immediate apprehension, attempted escape, extra‑judicial confession (threat to shoot PW‑3 also) – the Court drew the inference that it was the appellant and no one else who fired the fatal shots (paras 33–36).
Intention to cause death: Given:
- Use of a deadly weapon (rifle);
- Close‑range firing; and
- Targeting of vital parts (face/neck region and chest),
the act fell squarely under the first clause of Section 300 IPC and therefore amounted to murder (paras 37–38).
Section 27 Arms Act: The appellant’s use of the rifle in violation of the restriction under Section 7 attracted punishment under Section 27 (para 39).
Fingerprint argument rejected: The absence of fingerprint lifting on the rifle was held to be non‑fatal, as fingerprint evidence would have been merely corroborative in the face of strong direct and forensic evidence (para 31).

Accordingly, the High Court upheld the conviction and maintained the sentences, dismissing the appeal (paras 40–41).

5. Detailed Legal Analysis

5.1 Direct vs circumstantial evidence and Section 60 Evidence Act

A key move by the High Court is its reframing of the evidentiary nature of the case. The defence and even the Trial Court had treated it as a circumstantial evidence case, invoking case law like Sharad Birdhichand Sarda on the need for a fully established, complete chain of circumstances.

The High Court, however, begins its legal analysis by referring to Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which mandates that:

Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct.

The Court explains (para 9):

“Direct evidence” means original evidence, i.e., testimony of a witness who perceived the fact with his own senses (saw or heard it), as opposed to hearsay;
“Circumstantial evidence” consists of facts or circumstances which, when proved, permit an inference to be drawn regarding the principal fact in issue (here, the killer’s identity).

The Court reiterates standard doctrine:

The Court must first see whether the basic or primary facts are proved;
Then examine whether those facts are sufficient to draw an inference of guilt;
The circumstances must not only be consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with innocence.

However, crucially, the Court then holds (paras 8, 10, 15, 18) that this is not, in fact, a “pure” circumstantial case because:

PW‑3 testified in examination‑in‑chief that he actually observed the appellant firing a second shot at the sleeping deceased;
PW‑17 testified that he saw the appellant with rifle in hand immediately after the gunshot, near the bleeding body of the deceased;
Both witnesses physically overpowered and disarmed the appellant at or near the scene.

These are not merely “circumstances” from which guilt is inferred; they constitute direct, ocular evidence of:

The act of firing (second shot);
The presence of the appellant with the murder weapon next to the victim immediately after the shooting.

This re‑characterisation is important doctrinally: it limits the applicability of the strict tests in pure circumstantial evidence cases (such as those in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda) and justifies a somewhat different approach to appellate review.

5.2 Motive and the use of psychological literature (Section 8 Evidence Act)

At the very outset (paras 1–2) and again in paras 35–36, the Court extensively discusses psychological insights concerning:

The nature of revenge as an emotionally driven response;
The “reward circuitry” in the brain and release of dopamine and endogenous opioids when a person acts with vengeance (citing work of Dr. David Chester);
The “magnitude gap” – the perception that retaliation feels more satisfying than doing nothing.

The Court connects this discourse to Section 8 of the Evidence Act, which renders facts relating to:

Motive, and
Conduct of any party, including previous or subsequent conduct,

relevant when such facts influence or are influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact.

Legally, the Court uses the psychological framework to strengthen its conclusion that:

The prior beating of the appellant by the deceased on 26.06.1996, recorded in Ex. PW8/B and not challenged by the defence, established a clear and cogent motive of revenge (paras 10–12);
The appellant’s sense of humiliation and insult, “keeping the wound green”, likely fermented into lethal retaliation by the very next night (paras 10–11, 35–36);
Such motive, while not a substitute for proof of guilt, is a powerful reinforcing factor when viewed alongside strong direct and forensic evidence.

Significantly, the Court recognises the defence’s correct proposition that “proof of motive alone will not enable the prosecution to discharge its onus” (para 3). However, it holds that here motive is not the sole link; it is part of a coherent narrative confirmed by:

Duty roster and weapon allotment;
Ocular testimony of PW‑3 and PW‑17;
Forensic and medical reports; and
The appellant’s subsequent conduct (attempted escape, threats to PW‑3).

The invocation of contemporary psychological literature is not, strictly speaking, the creation of a new legal rule, but it reflects an emerging juridical style where courts rely on behavioural science to explain and contextualise motive and human conduct under Section 8.

5.3 Treatment of partly unreliable testimony and rejection of falsus in uno

A critical evidentiary challenge was posed by PW‑3’s testimony:

In examination‑in‑chief (28.10.1998), PW‑3 unequivocally deposed that:
- He was asleep in the room;
- He woke on hearing a gunshot;
- He saw the appellant with rifle inside the room and then saw him fire a second shot at the deceased;
- He caught hold of the rifle barrel and raised an alarm.
In cross‑examination held much later (26.04.2001), PW‑3 altered his story, claiming that:
- The appellant was allegedly at the sentry post 15 yards away from the room;
- The appellant was caught while allegedly performing sentry duty there.

The defence sought to capitalise on this contradiction, arguing that:

The prosecution case became doubtful;
The absence of consistent, trustworthy ocular evidence pushed the case squarely into the domain of circumstantial evidence;
PW‑3 and PW‑17, having not “supported” the case fully, rendered the prosecution version unreliable.

The Court responds by invoking well‑established Indian doctrine that the principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (“false in one thing, false in all”) does not apply in India (para 16). Citing several Supreme Court judgments:

Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277;
Mohan Singh v. State of M.P., (1999) 2 SCC 428;
Triloki Nath v. State of U.P., (2005) 13 SCC 323;
State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, (2010) 12 SCC 324,

the Court reiterates the settled principle:

Courts must sift the evidence, separating truth from falsehood;
Merely because a witness lies or exaggerates on one aspect does not mandate discarding the entire testimony;
The Court should evaluate which parts of the testimony are corroborated and consistent with probabilities and other evidence.

Applying this approach, the Court finds (paras 16–18):

The later version of PW‑3 in cross‑examination, placing the appellant at the sentry post, is inconsistent with:
- The natural course of events;
- The initial testimony given much closer in time to the incident;
- The corroborative testimony from PW‑17;
- The site plans showing the place of sentry duty at the gate and the place of crime in the room.
PW‑3 did not explain why the appellant was overpowered, disarmed, tied up, and handed over to police if he had merely been peacefully performing sentry duty at a distance;
The later “somersault” appears to be an attempt to help the appellant, possibly due to lapse of time, pressure, or sympathy;
The core of PW‑3’s evidence – hearing the gunshot, switching on the light, seeing the appellant with rifle near the cot, catching the rifle barrel, and helping overpower the appellant – remains consistent and is strongly corroborated by PW‑17 and other evidence.

Therefore, the Court:

Rejects the inconsistent portion of PW‑3’s cross‑examination that places the appellant at a distance; but
Accepts his earlier and otherwise consistent version, reinforced by PW‑17 and forensic evidence.

This is a robust application of the Indian approach to partly hostile or compromised witnesses: courts are not to throw the baby out with the bathwater but to extract “nuggets of truth” where corroborated (para 16).

5.4 Extra‑judicial confession and subsequent conduct

The Court notes an important aspect of PW‑3’s testimony (paras 18–19, 29):

When PW‑3 refused to release the appellant from his grip on the rifle, the appellant threatened that he would:
“open a fire on him also”
if not released.

The Court interprets this as:

An implicit admission by the appellant that he had in fact fired the shot(s) at Kanhaiya Lal;
A form of extra‑judicial confession, made spontaneously in the immediate aftermath of the crime (para 29).

Though not a classical “I did it” confession, the threat to repeat the same act against PW‑3 in the same context, while holding the same rifle, is treated as an inculpatory statement supporting the prosecution version that he had just used the rifle on the deceased.

Indian courts traditionally approach extra‑judicial confessions with caution, requiring corroboration. Here, the Court explicitly notes that this extra‑judicial confession “fills in the gap” left by the other evidence (para 29) – meaning it strengthens an already strong case rather than operating as its foundation.

Additionally, the appellant’s attempt to escape by climbing the wall of the main gate (paras 19, 28) is treated as:

Subsequent conduct relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act; and
Further reinforcement of a consciousness of guilt.

5.5 Presumptions under Section 114 Evidence Act

The Court devotes substantial reflection to the nature of presumptions (paras 33–34). It distinguishes:

Logical inferences that any reasonable mind would draw from established facts; and
Legal presumptions recognised and sometimes codified in the Evidence Act.

It notes that:

Presumptions of fact are permissive, not mandatory – the Court “may presume”, not “shall presume”;
Section 114, in particular, allows the Court to use its common sense and experience to judge the effect of particular facts;
Such presumptions do not violate Article 21 of the Constitution and are not ultra vires.

Applying Section 114, the Court highlights the established facts (para 36):

The appellant had been beaten and humiliated by the deceased the previous day;
At about 3:30 a.m., PW‑3 and PW‑17 awoke to gunshot sound;
They saw the appellant inside the room, holding his rifle near the cot of the deceased;
The deceased was bleeding profusely from close‑range gunshot injuries and died almost immediately;
The appellant was overpowered and disarmed at a distance of about one metre from the cot, and then later intercepted while trying to climb the main gate (13–15 metres away);
The ballistic report confirmed that the spent cartridges and bullet fragments came from the appellant’s rifle;
The appellant’s bandolier had 45 live cartridges and his rifle had 3 live cartridges remaining, which is consistent with two shots having been fired from his rifle (of an original 5);
The appellant threatened to shoot PW‑3 as well if not released, implying prior use of the rifle.

From this constellation of facts, the Court draws the presumption that:

“it was the Appellant and none else who fired gunshots on the victim” (para 36).

This is a textbook use of Section 114:

The inference is natural and logical given the facts;
The defence provided no alternative explanation consistent with innocence;
No other person with a weapon was shown to be present at the firing point at that exact moment.

5.6 Medical and forensic corroboration

5.6.1 Post‑mortem findings and intention

Dr. L.T. Ramani’s autopsy (Ex. PW13/A) revealed:

An oval punctured entry wound at the right sub‑mandibular region/angle of mandible; and
Another entry wound at the right front lower part of the chest/costal margin;
Corresponding exit wounds associated with these entries;
Blackening and heat effects around both entry wounds, indicating close‑range firing;
Injuries that were anti‑mortem (inflicted during life) and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (paras 24–25, 38).

The Court relies on these factors (para 38) to satisfy the requirements of the first clause of Section 300 IPC:

The act causing death was done with intention to cause death, inferred from:
- Use of a lethal firearm (rifle);
- Targeting vital parts – face/neck region and chest;
- Close‑range firing, negating accidental discharge or distant stray firing;
- Not merely one but two shots, reinforcing purposeful action.

5.6.2 Ballistic evidence and chain of custody

CFSL report Ex. PX concluded:

Rifle Ex. P‑1 is a firearm under the Arms Act and was in working order;
The seized cartridges and bullet fragments (Ex. P‑2 collectively) were fired from rifle Ex. P‑1 (para 27).

The prosecution also established:

Proper seizure and sealing of cartridges, bullet pieces, rifle and bandolier with seal “SKM”;
Depositing in malkhana in intact condition;
Transmission to CFSL without tampering.

The Court notes that these aspects were not seriously disputed by the defence (paras 23, 26–27). Hence, the ballistic report robustly links the specific weapon issued to and seized from the appellant to the fatal shots.

5.6.3 Fingerprints – corroborative but not essential

One of the defence’s central criticisms was that the investigating agency did not:

Lift fingerprints from the rifle; or
Submit them for comparison, thereby allegedly creating a reasonable doubt.

The Court rejects this line of argument (para 31), holding that:

Fingerprint evidence would have been merely a corroborative piece of evidence;
Where there is strong direct ocular evidence, corroborated by medical and ballistic evidence, the absence of fingerprints cannot “take away the weight” of the prosecution case;
The law does not demand that the prosecution present every conceivable piece of scientific evidence, especially when critical facts are otherwise robustly established.

This aligns with settled jurisprudence that non‑production of a particular piece of evidence is not fatal if the remaining evidence, taken as a whole, proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

5.7 Applicability of Section 302 IPC and Section 27 Arms Act

5.7.1 Section 302 IPC and the first clause of Section 300

The Court methodically applies the first clause of Section 300 IPC, which states that culpable homicide is murder if:

“the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death.”

Recognising that intention is seldom proved by direct evidence, the Court notes (para 37) that it must be inferred from:

Nature of the weapon used;
Part of the body targeted;
Force applied;
Number of blows/shots.

Here:

The weapon was a rifle – a deadly firearm;
Two shots were fired at vital parts (face/neck region and chest) from close range (paras 24–25, 38);
The injuries were medically certified to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (para 24).

These factors lead the Court to conclude that the appellant intended to cause the death of Kanhaiya Lal. There was no suggestion of a sudden fight, provocation at the time of shooting, or any accidental discharge. The earlier altercation had occurred a day before, and by the time of the shooting, the appellant was on his assigned duty.

Consequently, the Court holds that the offence is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC (para 40).

5.7.2 Section 27 of the Arms Act

The Court briefly but clearly affirms conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act (para 39).

Section 7 of the Arms Act imposes restrictions on possession and use of prohibited arms or ammunition except under authority of the Central Government. Section 27 prescribes punishment for using arms in contravention of Section 7.

The Court notes:

The appellant used rifle Ex. P‑1 “in commission of the crime in violation of the provisions of Section 7”;
He therefore rendered himself liable to punishment under Section 27.

While the judgment does not dwell deeply on whether this was a strictly “prohibited” weapon under the statutory definition or on the precise nature of Section 7 authorisation, the conviction is premised on:

The appellant’s unauthorised use of his official rifle for a non‑duty criminal purpose;
Established judicial practice that use of service arms for private violence attracts Section 27 when it contravenes statutory restrictions.

5.8 Defence precedents and why they were rejected

The defence relied on several Supreme Court precedents:

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622;
State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, (2010) 12 SCC 324;
Braham Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288;
Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 341.

These decisions broadly concern:

Stringent standards for conviction on circumstantial evidence (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, Baldev Singh);
Handling of contradictions and inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and the effect on reliability (Krishna Master, Braham Swaroop);
Cases where recovery or linkage of weapon was doubtful.

The High Court’s response (paras 32, 31) is essentially twofold:

Inapplicability of “circumstantial evidence” line:
- Since this case is not purely circumstantial but anchored in direct ocular evidence, the “five golden principles” of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda on circumstantial evidence do not strictly govern;
- The presence of eye‑witnesses who actually saw the firing (PW‑3) and immediate post‑firing scene (PW‑17) distinguishes this case.
Absence of material contradictions or suspicious recovery:
- The Court finds no material contradictions that go to the root of the prosecution case – discrepancies are either minor or related only to the later part of PW‑3’s testimony, which is rejected as tailored;
- Recovery of the rifle from the appellant’s possession at the scene, seizure of cartridges, chain of custody, and ballistic linking are all found to be unimpeachable;
- Thus, the defence’s reliance on cases where recovery was doubtful or inconsistencies were fatal does not assist the appellant.

In effect, the Court distinguishes these precedents on facts and on the nature of the evidence in the present case.

5.9 Precedents positively relied on by the Court

The Court cites several Supreme Court decisions to fortify its approach to evaluating inconsistent witnesses:

Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277:
- One of the earliest and most cited pronouncements that Indian courts are not bound by falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus;
- Court’s duty is to separate true from false, not to discard entire testimony automatically.
Mohan Singh v. State of M.P., (1999) 2 SCC 428:
- Reiterates that testimony of a witness cannot be discarded merely because parts of it are false or exaggerated; the court must assess which parts inspire confidence.
Triloki Nath v. State of U.P., (2005) 13 SCC 323:
- Again affirms that the court must evaluate evidence in a realistic manner and is entitled to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony.
State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, (2010) 12 SCC 324:
- Though cited by the defence, the Court uses it to reinforce the principle that minor contradictions or embellishments do not necessarily destroy prosecution evidence if the core is consistent and credible.

By explicitly invoking these authorities (para 16), the High Court grounds its approach in well‑settled Supreme Court jurisprudence and sends a clear message: partial untruth or later tailoring by a witness does not immunise an accused if the reliable core of the witness’s testimony is supported by independent evidence.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Direct vs circumstantial evidence

Direct evidence:
- Testimony of a witness who directly perceived a fact (saw, heard, etc.);
- Example here: PW‑3 seeing the appellant fire the second shot; PW‑17 seeing the appellant with rifle in hand immediately after gunshot.
Circumstantial evidence:
- Facts which do not directly prove guilt but from which guilt can be inferred (e.g., motive, presence near scene, possession of weapon, conduct after incident);
- Here: prior beating (motive), duty roster, attempted escape, etc.

6.2 Motive (Section 8 Evidence Act)

Motive is the underlying reason for doing an act. Section 8 makes facts showing motive relevant because they help explain why an accused may have committed the crime. However:

Motive alone cannot prove guilt; it is a supporting factor;
In this case, motive (revenge for beating) strongly supplements direct and forensic evidence.

6.3 Extra‑judicial confession

An extra‑judicial confession is a confession made by an accused to a person other than a magistrate or police officer. Courts treat such confessions cautiously, requiring corroboration.

In this judgment, the appellant’s threat to PW‑3 – effectively, “I will shoot you too” – is read as an implied admission that he has already used the rifle on the deceased, especially in the immediate context of the shooting.

6.4 Presumptions of fact (Section 114 Evidence Act)

Section 114 permits a court to:

“May presume” certain facts from others which are proved; this is discretionary;
Use its experience and common sense in drawing inferences.

Example here:

Proved facts: appellant found with rifle near deceased, close‑range shots, motive, attempted escape, ballistic matching, threat to shoot PW‑3.
Inference: appellant was the shooter.

6.5 Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus

A Latin maxim meaning “false in one thing, false in everything”. Some systems treat a proven lie on one point as fatal to a witness’s entire testimony. Indian law rejects automatic application of this maxim.

Instead, courts:

Evaluate which portions of the testimony are consistent with other evidence and probabilities;
May rely on a witness in part while discarding the rest.

6.6 “Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”

This medical phrase is central to determining whether an injury amounts to murder. It means:

The injury, if left untreated, will normally cause death in the usual run of events;
It supports an inference that the assailant intended to cause death or at least to cause such injury as is likely to cause death.

In this case, close‑range firearm injuries to the face/neck and chest fall squarely within this category.

6.7 Section 27 Arms Act

Section 27 punishes anyone who:

Uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of Section 7 (which restricts use of certain arms without authorisation);
Especially when such use results in death or injury.

Use of a service rifle issued for protective duty, to commit murder in a private revenge incident, is treated as unauthorised within this framework.

7. Impact and Significance of the Decision

7.1 Clarifying the boundary between direct and circumstantial cases

This decision underscores that:

Even where there are circumstantial elements (motive, presumption, etc.), the presence of credible eye‑witness testimony can transform a case into one primarily based on direct evidence;
Attempts by defence to re‑cast such cases as purely circumstantial, in order to invoke stricter standards from cases like Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, may not succeed.

Appellate courts are thereby reminded that they can and should re‑characterise the nature of the evidence based on the record, rather than mechanically adopting the trial court’s classification.

7.2 Handling of partly hostile or compromised witnesses

The case is a clear reaffirmation of the principle that:

Later contradictions or attempts to water down testimony do not automatically destroy earlier, cogent, and corroborated portions of evidence;
Court’s role is evaluative and analytical, not mechanical rejection;
This has real impact in criminal trials where witnesses, over long durations, may come under pressure, develop sympathy, or otherwise alter portions of their testimony.

The approach followed here, built on Ugar Ahir and related case law, will continue to guide trial courts and appellate courts in dealing with “turning” witnesses, especially in serious offences.

7.3 Scientific evidence vs. ocular testimony

By holding that the absence of fingerprint evidence is not fatal where:

Ocular evidence is strong and credible; and
Ballistic and medical evidence are consistent with the prosecution narrative,

the Court emphasises that the criminal justice system does not mandate an “ideal” scientific investigation, but a fair and sufficient one. This guards against the tendency to treat every omission in forensic collection as creating a reasonable doubt, especially when critical evidence is otherwise overwhelming.

7.4 Motive and psychology in judicial reasoning

The Court’s invocation of psychological research on revenge and anger is notable for:

Bringing behavioural science into the legal interpretation of motive under Section 8;
Demonstrating a trend of courts contextualising human behaviour in a more nuanced way;
Possibly influencing how other courts articulate motive in future judgments, particularly in revenge‑driven crimes.

7.5 Responsibility of armed personnel and use of service weapons

By upholding conviction for both murder and Section 27 Arms Act, the Court sends a clear normative signal:

Members of security forces or guard details who use service weapons for personal vendettas will face the severest penal consequences;
Service arms are entrusted for public protection, not private vengeance, and misuse is a serious legal as well as disciplinary breach.

This has resonance for internal discipline in armed forces and police agencies, reinforcing the accountability of personnel entrusted with lethal weapons.

8. Conclusion

Ram Singar Singh v. State is significant not because it announces an entirely novel rule of law, but because it strongly consolidates and illustrates several important principles:

Courts may re‑characterise a case as one of direct evidence even if it was earlier argued as circumstantial, when reliable eye‑witness testimony exists;
The Indian approach to evidence rejects automatic application of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus and requires careful sifting of truth from falsehood in partially unreliable testimony;
Presumptions of fact under Section 114, grounded in common sense and experience, legitimately complement direct and forensic evidence to identify the assailant;
Motive – particularly revenge fuelled by humiliation – though not a substitute for proof, plays an important corroborative role when supported by objective evidence;
Scientific omissions (such as failure to lift fingerprints) do not render a prosecution case infirm where other evidence is cogent, consistent and complete;
Use of a service weapon in a personal revenge killing properly attracts both Section 302 IPC and Section 27 Arms Act.

The judgment stands as a careful and structured application of established evidence law principles to a factually clear yet evidentially contested homicide, reinforcing key doctrines that will continue to shape the appreciation of evidence in criminal trials and appeals.

Re‑Characterising Evidence from Circumstantial to Direct and Sifting Partly Hostile Testimony: Commentary on Ram Singar Singh v. State, 2025 DHC 10558-DB