1. Introduction

This Supreme Court decision in Obalappa and Ors. v. Pawan Kumar Bhihani and Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14966 of 2025, dated 17 December 2025, engages with three interlocking issues in property and civil procedure:

• Whether an allotment by a development authority, founded on a land acquisition that is later quashed, can confer a protectable right to an allottee.
• What are the limits of a “rectification deed” that purports to alter the survey numbers (and thereby the very subject-matter) of the allotted property decades after the original agreement.
• What evidentiary and procedural standards govern the grant of a permanent injunction, especially regarding clear identification of the suit property.

The respondents (plaintiffs in the suit) claimed an injunction over “Site No. 66” allegedly allotted to their father by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), first as part of land acquired from the appellants’ family, and later, by way of a rectification deed, as land in different survey numbers altogether. The appellants (defendants) claimed title through their mother and grandfather to the original survey numbers from which the BDA had purportedly acquired land; that acquisition was later quashed by the High Court.

The trial court dismissed the suit for injunction; the High Court reversed that dismissal and decreed the suit in first appeal. The Supreme Court has now restored the trial court’s dismissal, laying down important clarifications on:

• the consequences of a quashed acquisition on subsequent allotments,
• the validity and scope of rectification deeds by development authorities, and
• the necessity of precise identification and proof in suits for permanent injunction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual Background and Procedural History

The essential facts as recorded in the judgment are:

• The appellants’ property is in Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 at Kempapura Agrahara Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk. The land was notified for acquisition by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) via a preliminary notification dated 30.07.1977 and a final notification dated 10.05.1978.
• Although the BDA purportedly acquired the land, physical possession was not taken. Nevertheless, the BDA entered into an agreement to allot “Site No. 66” to the respondents’ father (the original allottee) in 1993 and later executed a sale deed in 2003.
• The agreement (Annexure P‑2, dated 24.05.1993) contained conditions requiring construction of a residential building on the allotted site within two years, and stipulated that a sale deed would be executed only after construction (Clauses 2 and 15). No such building was constructed even by the time the later suit was filed in 2012.
• The appellants challenged the BDA’s acquisition of Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 by way of a writ petition. The High Court set aside the acquisition (Annexure P‑20), quashing the preliminary and final notifications. A subsequent appeal filed by the BDA was later withdrawn (Annexure P‑13).
• The respondents initially filed O.S. No. 26629 of 2011 in respect of Site No. 66 “comprised in Survey Nos. 349 and 352”, obtaining an ex parte temporary injunction. They did not pursue this suit further; the Supreme Court notes that they sought no leave to file a second suit on the same subject.
• Subsequently, on 03.08.2012, the BDA executed a rectification deed in favour of the respondents (children of the original allottee). This deed purported to correct an alleged “mistake” in the survey numbers by replacing Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 with Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11.
• On the strength of this rectification deed, the respondents filed the present suit (O.S. No. 6887 of 2012) seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the appellants from interfering with their alleged possession of Site No. 66 in Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11. They pleaded obstruction by the appellants as of 29.01.2012, when they allegedly attempted to construct on the site.

2.2 Trial Court’s Decision

The trial court dismissed the suit for permanent injunction, holding in substance that:

• The plaintiffs (respondents) had not established title to Site No. 66:
  • The BDA’s acquisition of Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 (from the appellants’ mother) had been set aside by the High Court. As the allotment to the respondents’ predecessor was based on that acquisition, it could not sustain a claim of title against the appellants.
  • The conditions of the 1993 allotment agreement (construction within two years; sale deed only after construction) were not complied with; no building existed even in 2012.
• The identity of the suit property was uncertain:
  • Acquisition records (Annexure P‑36) showed Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11 as belonging to third parties, each measuring 4 and 3 guntas.
  • Site No. 66 could not be clearly located either in Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 or in Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11.
  • The rectification deed did not specify the reasons or factual basis for changing the survey numbers after two decades.
• Key documents were not proved:
  • Exhibit P‑24, a letter allegedly from the BDA Land Acquisition Officer, bore no seal, and had an illegible signature; the author was not examined. The court refused to rely on it.
  • The building licence (Annexure P‑22) related to a property different from the schedule property in the suit.
• There was “clear ambiguity” in identifying the property; the plaintiffs ought to have sought appointment of a Commissioner (with a surveyor’s assistance) to identify the site. They had not done so.

Accordingly, the trial court found that the plaintiffs had neither proved title nor properly identified the suit property, and refused to grant an injunction.

2.3 High Court’s Decision in First Appeal

On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court and decreed the suit for permanent injunction. Its crucial basis, as summarised by the Supreme Court, was:

• A survey allegedly carried out by the BDA at the request of the respondents’ advocate (addressed to the police) indicated that Site No. 66 existed in Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11 as per the rectification deed.
• Relying on this survey, the High Court accepted the respondents’ claim and restrained the appellants from interfering with their possession.

2.4 Supreme Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court (per K. Vinod Chandran J., with Ahsanuddin Amanullah J. concurring) allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the suit. In essence, the Court held:

• The respondents had not proved title to Site No. 66:
  • The original allotment was rooted in an acquisition of Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 which had been quashed; the BDA could not confer a better title than it possessed.
  • The conditions of allotment (construction within two years and precondition for sale deed) remained unfulfilled.
• The rectification deed, executed roughly two decades after the original agreement and after the acquisition had been set aside, changing the survey numbers from 349/1 and 350/12 to 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11:
  • did not state any cogent basis or grounds for such a change,
  • did not inspire confidence and could not be treated as a valid rectification, and
  • could not operate to confer rights in lands standing in the names of third parties, who were not parties to the suit.
• The identity and location of Site No. 66 on the ground remained unproved:
  • Even on a plain reading of the pleadings, there was ambiguity in the description of the schedule property; Site No. 66 was alleged at different times to be in Survey Nos. 349 & 352; 349/1 & 350/12; and later 350/9, 350/10 & 350/11.
  • The plaintiffs did not secure a court-appointed Commissioner with a surveyor to identify the suit land.
  • The High Court erred in relying on the BDA’s alleged survey report, which was unproved, unsigned with clarity, and prepared behind the appellants’ back.
• Mere production of a document (such as a survey letter or acquisition officer’s letter) does not equate to proof; the author must be examined or the document properly proved.
• In these circumstances, no injunction can be granted when:
  • title is not established, and
  • the suit property is not clearly identified by survey and boundaries.

3. Legal Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Underlying Principles

The text of the judgment, as provided, does not expressly cite earlier case-law by name. However, the Court’s reasoning is clearly grounded in several well‑established principles of Indian property law, specific relief, and evidence, including:

• Nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he does not have): A development authority cannot confer valid title in land if its own acquisition of that land has been set aside. Once the acquisition is nullified, the authority’s derivative allotments lose their legal foundation.
• Nature and limits of rectification: Rectification of a deed is meant to correct a mistake in expressing an already‑agreed intention, not to rewrite the bargain or substitute one property for another altogether, particularly to the prejudice of third parties.
• Requirements for granting a permanent injunction: A plaintiff must show at least lawful possession and a clearly identified suit property. Where title is seriously in dispute and property identity is unclear, a bare suit for injunction is on weak footing.
• Evidentiary rules on documents: Mere marking/production of a document (like a survey letter) does not make its contents automatically admissible or reliable. The document must be proved, typically through the testimony of its author or appropriate certification, especially where it is used to decide substantive rights.
• Procedural integrity and consistency in pleadings: Changing the description of the same suit property over time and filing successive suits without leave raises doubts about the bona fides of the claim, even if the Court stops short of formally declaring a bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC.

The Supreme Court’s decision applies these principles to the specific facts of this case, particularly emphasising the interplay between a quashed acquisition and subsequent rectification-based allotments.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Effect of Quashed Acquisition on BDA Allotment

A linchpin of the Court’s reasoning is that the BDA’s allotment to the respondents’ predecessor was founded on an acquisition that had been annulled:

• The acquisition notifications (1977 and 1978) relating to Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 were quashed by the High Court (Annexure P‑20), and the BDA’s subsequent appeal was withdrawn (Annexure P‑13).
• The Court notes that the “original allotment was made of the property acquired from the mother of the appellants … which acquisition proceedings were challenged successfully.” (para 13)
• Once the acquisition is “set at naught”, the BDA has no lawful title to that land. An allotment resting on that acquisition is therefore legally precarious and cannot be enforced against the original owners.

By emphasising that “the respondents cannot claim any right over the property acquired by the BDA … which acquisition was later set at naught” (para 13), the Court applies the nemo dat principle: the BDA cannot pass a title that it never validly obtained.

3.2.2 Non-Compliance with Allotment Conditions

The Court also highlights the respondents’ non-compliance with the terms of the original allotment:

• The 1993 agreement (Annexure P‑2) stipulated that:
  • A residential house must be constructed within two years of allotment (Clause 2).
  • Execution of a sale deed would be contingent on such construction (Clause 15).
• Despite this, no residential building had been constructed by 2012, nearly two decades later; the plaint itself admits only pillars and foundation having been laid when interference was allegedly attempted.
• The Court treats this as another factor undermining the respondents’ claim, noting that “no building was constructed by the father of the respondents or the respondents themselves, even when the suit … was filed” and concluding that “The title of the respondents/ plaintiffs, hence, was rightly found, to have been not established, by the trial court.” (paras 9, 9–10)

While the Court does not expressly frame this as a forfeiture, it clearly treats non-fulfilment of these essential conditions as significant in assessing whether the respondents can assert a strong, equitable or legal claim to the site.

3.2.3 Invalidity and Limits of the Rectification Deed

A central issue is the BDA’s rectification deed dated 03.08.2012, which changed the survey numbers associated with Site No. 66 from 349/1 and 350/12 to 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11.

The Supreme Court takes a sceptical stance on this rectification:

• The rectification came two decades after the original agreement (1993) and almost a decade after the sale deed (2003), and after the High Court had already set aside the acquisition of the original survey numbers.
• The Court notes that the rectification deed:
  • “does not speak of the specific grounds on which the alleged errors were rectified” (para 10), and
  • involved a change of survey numbers “after two decades, especially without any valid reasons being shown, that too after the acquisition proceedings … were set at naught” (para 13).
• The Court concludes that such a rectification “does not inspire confidence nor can it be treated as a valid rectification.” (para 13)
• Moreover, the survey numbers substituted by the rectification (350/9, 350/10, 350/11) belonged to third parties, who were not impleaded in the suit. This reinforces the conclusion that the rectification cannot operate to transfer or affect those lands.

In substance, the Court is drawing an important line: rectification cannot be used as a device to transplant an allottee’s rights from one set of survey numbers to another entirely different set, particularly post‑facto to cure an acquisition that has already been invalidated.

3.2.4 Ambiguity in Property Identity and Need for Survey/Commissioner

Another decisive aspect is the uncertainty regarding the identity and location of Site No. 66:

• At different points, Site No. 66 is:
  • linked to Survey Nos. 349 and 352 (in O.S. No. 26629 of 2011),
  • linked to Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 (based on the original BDA allotment), and
  • later asserted as being in Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11 (by virtue of the rectification deed and the present suit).
• The acquisition notification (Annexure P‑36) shows that Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11 (with extents of 4 and 3 guntas each) stand in the names of third parties, not the appellants or respondents.
• The trial court found that Site No. 66 could not be located either in 349/1 & 350/12 or in 350/9–11 on the evidence adduced.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court stresses:

“There was clear ambiguity in the identification of the schedule property and the location of Site No.66, even on a mere perusal of the pleadings. It was incumbent upon the plaintiffs… to have identified the property by seeking deputation of a Commissioner who could have identified the same with the assistance of a Surveyor.” (para 12)

This underscores a procedural duty in property disputes: where identification of land is contested or unclear, the plaintiff should seek a local inspection through a court-appointed Commissioner and surveyor. Failure to do so, especially when compounded by shifting survey descriptions, undermines the credibility and enforceability of the claim for injunction.

3.2.5 Evidentiary Value of BDA’s Alleged Survey and Letters

The High Court relied heavily on a survey allegedly conducted by the BDA at the request of the respondents’ advocate (to the police). The Supreme Court finds multiple defects in this approach:

• The letter/report relied on:
  • lacked an official seal of the BDA,
  • did not have a legible or clearly attributable signature, and
  • did not clearly describe boundaries or measurements “by metes and bounds”.
• Most critically, the survey (if conducted at all) was done behind the back of the appellants. The Court observes that such a document “could not have been relied upon by the High Court” (para 12).
• The mere production of this letter as Exhibit P‑24 did not amount to proof:

  “The document, though produced by the plaintiff who deposed before Court, production is not proof and the author of the said document, the Surveyor/Land Acquisition Officer was not examined before Court.” (para 12)

This reaffirms a core evidentiary principle: public records or survey reports significantly affecting private rights must be proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. They cannot be treated as conclusively establishing facts without proper proof and opportunity for cross‑examination.

3.2.6 Earlier Suit and Procedural Concerns

The Supreme Court also notes that:

• The respondents had previously filed O.S. No. 26629 of 2011 regarding Site No. 66 in Survey Nos. 349 and 352 and obtained an ex parte injunction.
• The current suit (O.S. No. 6887 of 2012) was filed later, with a different description of the survey numbers (350/9–11) after the rectification deed.
• No leave of the court was sought to file this subsequent suit in respect of the same property, albeit under altered survey descriptions.

While the Court does not explicitly invoke Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or formally hold the second suit barred, it remarks that this is a “pertinent” fact and implicitly treats it as a factor undermining the respondents’ conduct and the stability of their claim (para 7).

3.3 Impact and Implications

3.3.1 For Development Authorities (like BDA)

The judgment sends a clear signal to development authorities:

• Allotments predicated on acquisitions that are later quashed are legally vulnerable. Authorities must ensure that all pending litigation over acquisition is resolved or at least disclosed before allotting land.
• Rectification deeds cannot be misused to shift an allottee’s entitlement from land that has gone out of the authority’s control (due to quashed acquisition or other reasons) to entirely different parcels of land, especially when those belong to third parties.
• Delayed rectifications (after decades) and post‑litigation “corrections” will be viewed with suspicion unless backed by clear and convincing factual justification.

3.3.2 For Allottees and Purchasers from Development Authorities

For allottees of plots from entities such as BDA, this decision highlights:

• It is crucial to verify:
  • the status of the underlying acquisition, and
  • whether appeals against quashing orders exist or have been withdrawn.
• An allottee’s position may be precarious if the acquisition is successfully challenged by original landowners. This case suggests that, at least between the original landowners and such allottees, the original owners will have the upper hand when the acquisition is quashed.
• Reliance on post‑hoc rectification deeds to “shift” an allotment to different survey numbers is risky; courts will scrutinise such rectifications and may refuse to treat them as conferring valid title.

3.3.3 For Civil Litigation Practice in Injunction Suits

The judgment also has important procedural implications for property litigants and practitioners:

• Property must be clearly identified: Plaintiffs must ensure that the schedule to the plaint contains:
  • accurate survey numbers,
  • extent, and
  • boundaries (metes and bounds).
  Where there is scope for doubt, a Commissioner’s survey should be sought.
• Bare injunction vs. declaratory relief: Where title is seriously contested and acquisition/allotment issues exist, a suit merely for injunction may be inadequate. Plaintiffs should be prepared to seek declaratory relief over title, along with injunction, and ought to anticipate a higher evidentiary burden.
• Proof of documents: Parties relying on official surveys, acquisition records, or letters from authorities must prove them in accordance with the Evidence Act:
  • ensure proper certification or
  • examine the authors of such documents.
• Avoiding multiplicity and inconsistent suits: Filing serial suits over the same property with shifting survey descriptions, without leave or proper explanation, is likely to be treated as mala fide or at least as weakening the plaintiff’s credibility.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Land Acquisition and Its Quashing

Land acquisition is the process by which the State or statutory authorities compulsorily acquire private land for public purposes (like layouts, roads, etc.), typically through statutory notifications.

When a court quashes an acquisition, it sets aside the legal process by which the land was taken. The effect is that:

• the acquiring authority’s claim to the land is nullified, and
• title reverts to, or is deemed to have always remained with, the original landowners (subject to particular statutory nuances).

In this case, the BDA’s acquisition of the appellants’ land in Survey Nos. 349/1 and 350/12 was set aside. Therefore, the BDA could not legally pass title in this land to the respondents’ father, even though on paper it had previously entered into an agreement and executed a sale deed.

4.2 Rectification Deed

A rectification deed is a legal instrument executed to correct an error in an earlier deed—typically an error in names, survey numbers, descriptions, or boundaries—where the earlier deed does not accurately reflect the actual agreement between the parties.

However:

• Rectification is meant to correct a mistake in expression, not to change the substance of the bargain or to substitute a completely different property.
• Rectification cannot, in law, be used to:
  • rewrite an agreement after the fact,
  • cure the consequences of a quashed acquisition, or
  • unilaterally affect the rights of third parties who are not party to the deed.

In this case, the rectification deed purported to remove Site No. 66 from land whose acquisition was quashed (349/1 and 350/12) and magically place it in completely different survey numbers (350/9, 350/10 and 350/11) belonging to unrelated third parties. The Supreme Court rightly found that this “rectification” was neither properly explained nor legally acceptable.

4.3 Permanent Injunction

A permanent injunction is a final order of the court restraining a defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s rights in respect of a property or from committing some act. In property disputes, a permanent injunction generally requires the plaintiff to establish:

• lawful possession over the suit property, and
• clear identity and description of the property.

If the defendant seriously disputes the plaintiff’s title or if the property itself is not properly identified (e.g., conflicting survey numbers, unclear boundaries), a court will hesitate to grant a permanent injunction without resolving these foundational issues.

4.4 Appointment of Commissioner and Surveyor

In property cases, the court can appoint a Commissioner—often with a Government Surveyor—to:

• visit the property,
• measure and identify it with reference to revenue records, survey maps, and boundaries, and
• prepare a report and sketch to assist the court.

When there is confusion or dispute about the exact location or extent of the land (as with Site No. 66 here), such a Commission is often essential. The Supreme Court faults the plaintiffs for not seeking such a measure, especially given the evident ambiguity and conflicting survey descriptions.

4.5 “Gunta” as a Unit of Measurement

The judgment refers to land extents of “4 and 3 guntas” in Survey Nos. 350/9, 350/10 and 350/11. A gunta is a traditional unit of land measurement used in parts of India:

• 1 acre = 40 guntas.
• Thus, 4 guntas is 1/10 of an acre; 3 guntas is 3/40 of an acre.

These references help understand that the lands in question are small plots, but precise metes and bounds are still critical for legal identification.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Obalappa v. Pawan Kumar Bhihani reinforces several key propositions of property and procedural law:

• Allotments by development authorities are only as strong as the underlying acquisition. When an acquisition is quashed, derivative allotments cannot be pressed against original landowners as if the authority had good title.
• Rectification deeds have a narrow role. They are for correcting expression of an existing intention, not for re‑engineering conveyances to substitute entirely different parcels of land decades later, especially after a judicial invalidation of the original basis.
• Clarity of property identity is a precondition for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs must provide coherent, consistent descriptions and, where necessary, support their claim with a court‑supervised survey. Ambiguity in survey numbers and boundaries is fatal to a suit for bare injunction.
• Evidence must be properly proved. Letters and surveys from public authorities cannot be accepted uncritically; authors must be examined or documents must be duly certified and proved.
• Procedural integrity matters. Filing successive suits over the same property with shifting descriptions, and relying on unproved, one‑sided surveys, will weigh against a plaintiff’s claim.

By restoring the trial court’s dismissal of the suit, the Supreme Court underlines that permanent injunctions cannot be granted on equivocal titles, dubious rectifications, and unproven surveys. The decision thus serves as an important warning both to development authorities engaging in belated “corrections” of allotments and to litigants who seek injunctive relief without first securing a firm and clearly identified foundation in title and possession.