Quashing Stale CBI Prosecutions Against Low‑Rank Police Officers: Media-Based Identification, Article 21 Speedy Trial and Institutional Reconciliation under Section 528 BNSS – A Commentary on S. Palanivel Rajan v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI (Madras High Court, 27.11.2025)

Quashing Stale CBI Prosecutions Against Low‑Rank Police Officers: Media-Based Identification, Article 21 Speedy Trial and Institutional Reconciliation under Section 528 BNSS

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the common order of the Madras High Court in Crl.O.P.Nos. 9679, 9652, 9651 & 9646 of 2025, decided on 27 November 2025 by M. Nirmal Kumar, J., in which the Court:

  • Quashed five CBI prosecutions arising out of the infamous 19.02.2009 violence in the Madras High Court campus, and
  • Articulated an important composite principle on:
    • the right to speedy trial under Article 21,
    • the use and limits of media-based identification in riot-type prosecutions,
    • the treatment of low-rank police personnel acting under superior orders, and
    • the role of institutional reconciliation in deciding whether continuation of a criminal case is an abuse of process.

The petitions were filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (the post-2023 successor to Section 482 CrPC in substance, conferring inherent powers on the High Court), seeking quashing of:

  • C.C.No.622 of 2025 – against S. Palanivel Rajan, Police Constable, Tamil Nadu Commando Force;
  • C.C.No.623 of 2025 – against P. Vijay Babu (since deceased);
  • C.C.No.624 of 2025 – against R. Rajendran, Police Constable;
  • C.C.No.625 of 2025 – against J. Suresh, Police Constable;
  • C.C.No.626 of 2025 – against A. Vinayagamurthy, Police Constable/Driver.

All these cases arose from RC 2(S)/2009, registered by the CBI’s Special Crime Branch, Chennai, pursuant to directions of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Suo Motu W.P. (PIL) No.3335 of 2009 regarding:

  • the assault on advocates and damage to property allegedly caused by police on 19.02.2009, and
  • parallel proceedings in RC 1(S)/2009 against advocates for their alleged violence, including setting fire to the B‑4 High Court Police Station and vehicles.

The order is noteworthy not merely because it closes a dark chapter in the institutional history of the Madras High Court, but because it blends:

  • technical grounds (delay, evidentiary weaknesses), and
  • larger considerations of fairness, proportionality and institutional peace.

II. Background and Factual Context

1. Security build‑up and tensions (2007–January 2009)

The judgment gives a compressed but significant historical account:

  • In W.P.No.3197 of 2007, the High Court directed that the B‑4 High Court Police Station should have a sanctioned strength of 252 police personnel, including 132 Armed Reserve staff.
  • After national concerns on court security, the Government of India issued guidelines on 31.05.2007, followed by a direction to the Tamil Nadu Chief Secretary on 17.11.2008 to review security in courts.
  • The High Court Security Committee adopted an extensive security scheme including:
    • Static armed guards at all entrances,
    • A fully armed Quick Reaction Team,
    • Provision for reinforcements during sensitive hearings, and
    • Declaration of the High Court Zone as a High Security Zone.

A major deployment of 451 police personnel was approved on 28.01.2008. The security scheme became fully operational by January 2009, with:

  • entry checks of advocates (ID cards, luggage, vehicles), and
  • armed policemen within the campus.

This inevitably generated resentment among portions of the Bar and heightened lawyer–police friction.

2. The 17.02.2009 incident: Dr. Subramanian Swamy episode

On 17.02.2009, a serious incident occurred in Court Hall No.3:

  • Dr. Subramanian Swamy, appearing as party‑in‑person in a Chidambaram temple case, was allegedly abused and assaulted; eggs were thrown at him in the very presence of the Bench.
  • The Judges recorded the misbehaviour in their order dated 17.02.2009 and sent a copy to the Acting Chief Justice and to the Chief Justice of India.
  • The Additional DGP (Law & Order) wrote to the Registrar General seeking concurrence to register a case against the advocates. The Registrar General replied on 18.02.2009 that police need no judicial concurrence to register FIRs.
  • On 18.02.2009, Crime No.13 of 2009 was registered at B‑4 High Court P.S. under several IPC sections and TNPPDL, naming 14 advocates and 6 others, on complaint by the Assistant Commissioner, High Court Range.

This FIR and subsequent police action – including attempts to arrest named advocates – escalated tensions further.

3. The build‑up to 19.02.2009

Key events leading to the violence include:

  • On 18.02.2009, the Commissioner of Police met the Acting Chief Justice. The Police were instructed to act firmly against erring lawyers.
  • Intelligence inputs indicated that the advocates involved in the 17.02.2009 incident might create serious problems on 19.02.2009, when Dr. Swamy was scheduled to appear again.
  • Consequently, heavy police deployment was arranged in the High Court campus on 19.02.2009.
  • Dr. Swamy attended court and left the campus around 11.30 a.m., and an uneasy calm persisted thereafter.

4. The flashpoint on 19.02.2009

The Court reconstructs the critical developments:

  • Advocates involved in Crime No.13 of 2009 indicated a willingness to surrender. Two advocates approached B‑2 Esplanade P.S. to negotiate this.
  • Meanwhile a large group of lawyers went to B‑4 High Court P.S. within the campus. A counter‑FIR in Crime No.14 of 2009 was registered against Dr. Swamy under the SC/ST (PoA) Act and Section 506(ii) IPC.
  • Lawyers demanded the arrest of Dr. Swamy as a precondition to their own surrender and allegedly resisted being taken into custody.
  • The crowd became increasingly hostile; slogans were raised, chappals and stones were allegedly thrown at police. Mild force was initially used.
  • Stone‑pelting escalated. A High Court Judge who attempted to intervene was injured. Tear gas, and eventually lathi charge, were ordered. Quick Reaction Teams, Riot Police and Armed Reserve units moved in.
  • Police forces were eventually withdrawn from inside the campus to B‑2 Esplanade P.S. On their withdrawal, B‑4 High Court Police Station was set on fire; fire tenders were attacked and prevented from effectively dousing the flames.
  • The net result: injuries to a Judge, subordinate judicial officers, advocates, court staff, police, media personnel and others, and extensive damage to vehicles and court property.

Multiple criminal cases (Crimes 15, 16, 17 of 2009 and Crime No.113 of 2009 at B‑2 Esplanade) were registered in relation to arson, assault and obstruction of fire‑fighting operations.

5. The Full Bench PIL and CBI investigation

Recognising the gravity of the institutional crisis, a Suo Motu PIL (W.P. (PIL) No.3335 of 2009) was initiated. By its final order dated 29.10.2009 (running to 744 pages), a Full Bench:

  • Analysed the events and responsibilities of lawyers and police,
  • Constituted a One‑Man Commission, and
  • Directed the CBI to investigate:
    • RC 1(S)/2009 – against lawyers; and
    • RC 2(S)/2009 – against police personnel.

The directions extracted by the present judgment are categorical:

“(a) We direct CBI to proceed with the investigation in R.C.No.1(s)/2009… registered against the lawyers in accordance with law.
(b) In so far as, R.C.No.2(s)/2009… registered against the Police, CBI is directed to proceed with the investigation in accordance with law.
(c) The CBI shall proceed with the investigation in both the cases expeditiously and file the final report within three months…”

Pursuant thereto, RC 2(S)/2009 was registered on 09.03.2009 against “unknown police officers and others” for offences under:

  • Sections 144, 147, 148, 323, 325, 326, 427, 436, 450 IPC, and
  • Sections 3(1) and 4 of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992 (TNPPDL).

On completion of investigation, the CBI filed five separate final reports on 12.01.2010 against five individual constables (the present petitioners and one deceased co‑accused).

6. Procedural trajectory: 2010–2025

A striking feature of the case is temporal:

  • FIR in RC 2(S)/2009 – registered on 09.03.2009;
  • Final reports – filed on 12.01.2010;
  • Cognizance by the Magistrate – only in 2025, i.e. roughly 15–16 years after the incident and about 15 years after charge‑sheet;
  • Trial – had not even commenced by 2025.

The petitioners invoked this delay, along with questions on evidence and their role as low‑rank constables acting under orders, to seek quashing.

III. Summary of the Judgment

The Madras High Court:

  1. Allowed all four Criminal Original Petitions under Section 528 BNSS;
  2. Quashed proceedings in:
    • C.C.No.622 of 2025,
    • C.C.No.623 of 2025 (against deceased accused P. Vijay Babu),
    • C.C.No.624 of 2025,
    • C.C.No.625 of 2025, and
    • C.C.No.626 of 2025,
    pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai;
  3. Declared that the petitioners are “acquitted of all charges”;
  4. Closed all connected miscellaneous petitions.

The Court’s decision rests on an integrated set of reasons:

  • Inordinate delay between FIR, charge‑sheet, cognizance and the non‑commencement of trial, violating the right to speedy trial under Article 21 and triggering the limitation provisions in Sections 514 & 519 BNSS (successors to Section 468 CrPC);
  • Weakness and unreliability of identification and electronic evidence:
    • identification of constables based primarily on blurred media photographs and TV clippings,
    • no test identification parade,
    • no certificate under the Information Technology Act (65‑B equivalent) for the electronic material; and
    • subjective identification by witnesses without adequate safeguards.
  • Status of the accused as low‑rank constables who merely executed orders of superior officers in a “war‑like” and chaotic situation, with no suggestion of personal animosity against any advocate or individual;
  • Lack of interest on the part of either the prosecution or the affected parties to press the prosecution;
  • Institutional considerations:
    • fifteen years had elapsed,
    • “blaming game is over,”
    • police and lawyers have largely “buried their hatchet”, and
    • continuation of the case would now be an “abuse of process” and “an exercise in futility”.

The Court emphasises that this outcome does not justify either the excessive police action or the conduct of the agitating advocates, but recognises the futility and unfairness of selectively prosecuting a few constables in 2025 for events of 2009, on weak evidence and after extreme delay, in a context where institutional peace has been restored.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The petitioners relied on a strong line of Supreme Court cases on speedy trial and delay‑based quashing. The High Court does not analyse each at length, but expressly adopts the core doctrinal thread.

1. Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225

Though not quoted directly, this Constitutional Bench decision forms the bedrock. It held that:

  • Speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21, applicable to all criminal prosecutions;
  • Relief for violation is case‑specific (including quashing proceedings, reduction of sentence, etc.), rather than fixed statutory time limits.

The present judgment’s repeated reliance on Article 21 and the “inalienable right to speedy trial” traces back to Antulay.

2. Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507

In Raj Deo Sharma, the Supreme Court, building on Antulay, laid down guidelines prescribing outer time limits for conclusion of trials (subject to later re‑assessment). The petitioners cited this for the proposition that if trials are not concluded within prescribed periods, termination/quashing of proceedings may be appropriate.

While the Madras High Court does not rest its decision on rigid timelines, it uses the same logic: a prosecution that remains in limbo for 15–16 years, with no contribution by the accused to the delay, becomes inherently oppressive and contrary to Article 21.

3. Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 4 SCC 525

This decision, along with other limitation‑related cases, was cited to emphasise that:

  • for offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years, cognizance must normally be taken within three years from the date of offence (Section 468 CrPC; now Sections 514 & 519 BNSS);
  • taking cognizance beyond this period is ordinarily barred, absent legally sustainable extension or exclusion of time.

Here, many of the offences ultimately charge‑sheeted against the constables (e.g. Sections 323, 352, 427 IPC) fall in this lower punishment bracket. Thus, the petitioners argued that cognizance in 2025 was time‑barred.

The High Court acknowledges this argument (noting the application of Sections 514 & 519 BNSS), but instead of a purely technical limitation analysis, folds it into a broader Article 21 speedy‑trial inquiry.

4. Mahendra Lal Das v. State Of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 149

In Mahendra Lal Das, the Supreme Court quashed proceedings where:

  • a case remained stalled for over 13 years due to the non‑grant of sanction, and
  • the accused was kept under a continuous cloud of prosecution without progress.

The petitioners drew an analogy: here, though charge‑sheets were filed in 2010, the cases were not taken on file until 2025, leaving them under prolonged uncertainty and stigma.

The Court finds this analogy persuasive and notes that:

  • the delay in taking cognizance was largely institutional or procedural, not attributable to the petitioners, and
  • the resulting prejudice to their careers and reputation is undeniable (one accused died in harness with terminal benefits apparently withheld).

5. P. Rama Chandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 3 SCR 16

This later Constitutional Bench revisited Raj Deo Sharma, clarifying that:

  • no hard and fast statutory time‑limits can be prescribed by judicial fiat for trials; but
  • Article 21 continues to guarantee a speedy trial, enforceable through case‑specific remedies, including quashing in appropriate situations.

The present judgment aligns with this flexible approach: it refuses to reduce the issue to mere arithmetic of years, but considers nature of offence, conduct of parties, source of delay and surrounding circumstances, culminating in a conclusion that the continuum of delay has rendered the prosecution oppressive and purposeless.

6. Pankaj Kumar, Vakil Prasad Singh, Niranjan Hemchandra Shashittal, Lokesh Kumar Jain

These four Supreme Court decisions collectively reinforce the following propositions:

  • The right to speedy trial is:
    • inalienable under Article 21,
    • extends to all stages – investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, and retrial, and
    • is not confined to any particular class of offences.
  • Pre‑trial delay, including protracted investigation or inaction by the prosecution or court machinery, can itself justify quashing, especially if:
    • the accused is not responsible for the delay, and
    • prejudice – mental, social, professional – is clear.

The Madras High Court expressly cites these cases to affirm that:

“Right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecution is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution… [It] is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well.”

The Court then applies this principle to a scenario where:

  • investigation was completed relatively promptly (2010), but
  • no effective prosecutorial progress occurred for 15 years thereafter.

7. Sirajul v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 9 SCC 201

Sirajul is particularly important because it tempers the doctrine:

  • It holds that mere delay cannot, by itself, justify quashing serious offences;
  • Courts must weigh:
    • nature and gravity of the offence,
    • conduct of the accused,
    • reasons for delay, and
    • wider public interest.

The petitioners relied on Sirajul for the converse proposition: where delay is accompanied by other factors, quashing is appropriate. The High Court essentially follows this approach:

  • The underlying 2009 incident was undoubtedly serious and of high institutional concern.
  • However, by 2025:
    • only a few low‑rank constables were being selectively prosecuted,
    • evidentiary foundations were weak and contestable,
    • neither victims nor CBI showed a pressing interest to actively pursue the case, and
    • institutional reconciliation between Bar and Police had substantially occurred.

Thus, while acknowledging the seriousness of the 2009 events, the Court finds that in the fact‑specific matrix – delay plus evidentiary fragility plus changed institutional context – quashing is warranted “in the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of process”.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS

The petitions were filed under Section 528 BNSS, 2023, which corresponds functionally to the old Section 482 CrPC:

  • preserving the inherent powers of the High Court to
  • prevent abuse of the process of any court or
  • secure the ends of justice.

Though the judgment does not elaborate on Section 528 textually, its structure clearly follows the classic Bhajan Lal / Section 482 approach:

  • examining sufficiency of material to proceed to trial,
  • assessing whether continuing the prosecution would be futile or oppressive, and
  • balancing public interest in prosecution against individual rights and institutional concerns.

2. Identification evidence: media photos and video clippings

A central plank of the Court’s reasoning concerns the quality of identification evidence. According to the CBI:

  • the petitioners were identified from:
    • photographs in newspapers and magazines,
    • TV news clippings of the 19.02.2009 events, and
    • police photographs and video recordings.
  • Witnesses – including advocates, police officers, journalists and even the Secretary of the Madras High Court Advocates’ Association – allegedly identified the constables as persons wielding lathis and damaging cars or assaulting advocates.

The Court, however, highlights critical weaknesses:

  • During lathi charge, almost all policemen wore helmets with visors covering their faces, making specific facial identification highly unreliable;
  • The photographs and video clippings are described as “blurred” with “unclear facial features”;
  • No Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted to objectively test witness memory and identification;
  • The process of putting names to faces in the photographs is not explained with any verifiable method; it appears subjective and retrospective;
  • No certificate under the Information Technology Act was obtained:
    • implying non‑compliance with the equivalent of Section 65‑B Evidence Act for electronic evidence,
    • which the Court uses to hold that the photographs and videos cannot constitute “primary evidence”.

Given these infirmities, the Court concludes:

“It is seen in this case the identification of the persons who are facing prosecution are primarily by photographs published in media, by some Advocates and Police Personnel which is only subjective… the photographs are blurred and the latti wielding Police all wearing helmet with visor. Added to it, no identification parade conducted… There is no certificate under Information Technology Act, hence the photos and videos cannot be taken as primary evidence.”

This effectively undercuts the factual substratum of the prosecution case against the specific constables. Even assuming that excesses occurred in general, the Court is not persuaded that these particular individuals have been reliably identified as responsible for specific acts of assault or damage.

3. Role and status of the accused: low‑rank constables acting under orders

An equally important – and somewhat distinctive – element of the reasoning is the Court’s treatment of the petitioners’ institutional position:

  • All accused were constables or constable‑drivers, the lowest operational rung of the police hierarchy;
  • They were present in the High Court campus under orders of superior officers;
  • The Court notes that multiple higher‑rank IPS officers (including four senior officers) were present and commanded the operation on 19.02.2009;
  • The lathi charge and use of force were not spontaneous initiatives of individual constables but institutionally commanded measures to disperse what had been declared an “unlawful assembly”.

The Court observes:

“The petitioners are in the lowest rank in the Police formation and the service motto in the Police Department is to obey the orders… It is not the case that there was pick and choose assault on a particular person or particular group. This confirms that the petitioners acted as per the directions of the superiors and they had no personal animosity against anyone. Hence for obeying the orders of the superiors the petitioners now facing prosecution.”

While the judgment does not articulate a full‑fledged doctrine of command responsibility or “superior orders” defence, it clearly suggests a reluctance to:

  • allow junior personnel to be singled out as scapegoats,
  • especially where systemic and command‑level decisions contributed to the excessive use of force, as already noted by the earlier One‑Man Committee and the 2009 Full Bench.

Combined with the evidentiary doubts, this leads the Court to characterise the prosecution as selective and unfair.

4. Inordinate delay, limitation and Article 21

The Court’s analysis of delay operates on two levels: procedural limitation and substantive Article 21 prejudice.

(a) Limitation under Sections 514 & 519 BNSS (ex‑Section 468 CrPC)

The petitioners argued:

  • FIR – 2009; charge‑sheet – 2010; cognizance – 2025;
  • For offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years (e.g. Sections 323, 352, 427 IPC), the limitation period for taking cognizance is three years under the old Section 468 CrPC, now reflected in Sections 514 and 519 BNSS;
  • Hence, cognizance in 2025 is facially barred.

The Court notes this contention and explicitly records that by the time of taking cognizance:

“…a bar under Sections 514 and 519 of BNSS (erstwhile Section 468 Cr.P.C.) attracted.”

However, rather than entirely rest on limitation – which might involve further technical analysis of which specific offences and periods apply – the Court moves to the broader constitutional guarantee of speedy trial.

(b) Article 21 – Right to speedy trial and prejudice

Citing the line of Supreme Court authorities, the Court reiterates:

  • Speedy trial is an “inalienable right” under Article 21;
  • It extends to investigation and trial stages alike;
  • Long delay not attributable to the accused, particularly where trial has not begun, can justify quashing, particularly for lower‑level offences.

The Court also emphasises the real‑life prejudice caused:

  • the petitioners’ careers and promotions have been adversely affected for over a decade and a half;
  • one accused constable died in harness, and his terminal benefits have apparently been withheld due to the pending case;
  • they have remained under the stigma of being accused in a case involving assault on advocates and a Judge within the High Court campus.

The Court notes:

“Due to the pendency of the prosecution, they are black marked and their career and service prospects, moving forward all affected. In fact one of the Police Personnel against whom charge sheet filed died in harness and his terminal benefits are put on hold.”

Given that:

  • the incident is now in oblivion for the public at large,
  • no meaningful trial has commenced, and
  • institutional bridges between police and lawyers have been largely rebuilt,

the Court finds that continuing the prosecution now would be punitive by process, not by adjudication. This clearly offends Article 21.

5. Institutional reconciliation and public interest

A distinctive feature of this judgment is its candid recognition of the institutional dimensions. The Court quotes extensively from the Full Bench’s 2009 order, especially paragraph 603:

“We wish that Police and lawyers would bury their differences and rift in the interest of the public at large and in the interest of the Institution… Functioning of Courts and carrying on business of administration of justice depends upon the harmonious relation between the Police and lawyers… We hope that Police and lawyers work hand in hand and promote better relationships…”

Building on that, the present judgment notes:

  • “Blaming game is over” and “long time passed by”;
  • “The incident of 19.02.2009 is now in oblivion”;
  • “Now it is the time after a decade and half both of them buried their hatchet and moving forward.”

The Court is careful to state that:

  • Police are duty‑bound to enforce law and public order, and
  • “Excessive force can never be justified or approved.”

Yet, the Court simultaneously recognises:

  • the natural friction between the roles of police and lawyers,
  • the exceptional nature of the 19.02.2009 violence, and
  • the fact that reopening those wounds via selective prosecutions of a handful of constables would not serve either public or institutional interest.

This leads to the conclusion that continuation of the case now would amount to:

“…nothing but abuse of process of law an exercise in futility. Kindling the acrimonious incident again, will do no good for both.”

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the limits of stale prosecutions under BNSS

This decision is one of the early high‑profile applications of BNSS 2023 to legacy prosecutions:

  • It explicitly recognises the role of Sections 514 & 519 BNSS (successors to Section 468 CrPC) in limiting cognizance for older, lower‑punishment offences;
  • It confirms that even where limitation is arguable or complex, Article 21’s speedy trial guarantee independently empowers courts to quash stale proceedings via Section 528 BNSS (inherent powers).

Future courts can rely on this decision to:

  • scrutinise long‑dormant charge‑sheets that suddenly surface after years of administrative inaction,
  • especially where no substantial prosecutorial step has been taken, and
  • the accused have clearly suffered prejudice in personal and professional life.

2. Media‑based identification and electronic evidence safeguards

The judgment sends a clear signal about the use of:

  • press photographs, and
  • television/video clippings

as the sole or primary basis for identifying individual accused persons in mass‑violence situations. It underscores:

  • the necessity of objective procedures: Test Identification Parades, proper documentation, and independent corroboration;
  • the importance of compliance with electronic evidence norms (IT Act / Section 65‑B certificate) to treat such material as admissible evidence;
  • the dangers of retrospective, subjective identification of accused from blurred or incomplete visual material, particularly where many persons are similarly dressed and wearing helmets or protective gear.

This will likely:

  • influence how investigative agencies structure their reliance on media footage in future riot or protest cases,
  • encourage early forensic preservation and certification of digital evidence, and
  • discourage over‑reliance on post‑hoc identifications risking scapegoating of lower‑rank personnel.

3. Treatment of low‑rank officers in command‑driven operations

While the judgment does not formally reshape the law on “obedience to superior orders”, it practically:

  • acknowledges that systemic failures and command decisions should not result in selective criminal blame on only a few constables;
  • signals that, especially in cases of state‑sanctioned action like lathi charge, courts will examine whether:
    • the actual decision‑makers are called to account, or
    • only operational foot‑soldiers are being prosecuted.

This has important implications for:

  • police accountability models (ensuring responsibility at the appropriate level), and
  • morale of lower‑rank officers who may otherwise fear being uniquely exposed for carrying out commanded operations.

4. Institutional healing as a legitimate factor in criminal process

The judgment also stands out for formally recognising institutional reconciliation (bar–police relations and the functioning of the High Court) as a relevant factor in deciding whether further prosecution serves the “ends of justice”.

This does not mean that:

  • serious offences can always be forgiven merely because time has passed, or
  • institutional harmony alone can override accountability.

But in a case where:

  • fifteen years have elapsed,
  • both sides (lawyers and police) bear blame as acknowledged by a prior Full Bench,
  • victims are no longer pressing the matter, and
  • evidence against specific low‑rank accused is infirm,

the Court treats the broader health of the justice system as a legitimate consideration in assessing “public interest” in continued prosecution.

5. CBI cases and High Court’s power to terminate them

Finally, the judgment is significant because:

  • the CBI investigation against police personnel in RC 2(S)/2009 was itself mandated by the High Court (Full Bench order of 29.10.2009);
  • yet, a coordinate bench in 2025 holds that the resulting prosecutions have, over time, become an abuse of process and must be quashed.

This affirms that:

  • a High Court’s earlier decision to direct investigation does not preclude its later use of inherent powers to quash proceedings;
  • what matters is the current justice of the situation, not only the initial justification for investigation.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Cognizance” of an offence

When a charge‑sheet is filed, the Magistrate must first decide whether to “take cognizance” of the offence. In simple terms:

  • It is the formal act by which a court decides to register the case and proceed against the accused;
  • Only after cognizance can the court:
    • summon or issue process to the accused,
    • frame charges, and
    • conduct trial.

Limitation provisions, like Section 468 CrPC (now Sections 514 & 519 BNSS), generally regulate how long after the offence a court may take cognizance, particularly for less serious offences.

2. Right to speedy trial

The right to speedy trial means that:

  • the State cannot keep an accused under a cloud of prosecution indefinitely without moving the case forward;
  • unreasonable delay, not caused by the accused, can violate the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21;
  • Courts may then quash proceedings, reduce sentences, or grant other relief.

In this case, the Court considered a 15–16 year lapse without trial commencement as clearly unreasonable and oppressive, especially where the accused were lower‑level constables and the delay was institutional.

3. Test Identification Parade (TIP)

A TIP is a procedure where:

  • witnesses are asked to identify the suspect from a lineup of similar‑looking people;
  • it tests whether their ability to recognise the accused is genuine or influenced by later exposure (e.g. photographs, media coverage, police suggestions);
  • while TIP is not substantive evidence itself, it is an important investigative safeguard; absence of TIP can weaken the reliability of identification in court.

Here, no TIP was conducted, despite the chaotic and crowded nature of the scene and the generic appearance of many policemen (helmets, identical uniforms).

4. Electronic evidence and IT Act / Section 65‑B certificate

Electronic evidence (videos, photos, digital files) usually requires a certificate under the law (commonly referred to as a Section 65‑B Evidence Act certificate), stating:

  • how the electronic record was produced,
  • that it is a reliable copy, and
  • that the system used was functioning properly.

Without such certification, courts often treat the material as inadmissible or unreliable, especially when it is the primary basis for identification or proof. The present judgment applies this principle to the photos and TV clippings used to identify the constables.

5. “Abuse of process” and “ends of justice”

When courts use their inherent powers (Section 528 BNSS / Section 482 CrPC), they look at:

  • whether continuing the case serves any legitimate legal purpose, or
  • whether it has become a tool of harassment, oppression or futility.

If the latter, continuing the case is said to be an “abuse of the process of the court”. Quashing such a case is then justified to secure the “ends of justice”.

In this judgment, “ends of justice” include:

  • fairness to the individual accused (delay, weak evidence, career impact), and
  • the broader interest of the justice system in not re‑inflaming old institutional conflicts without necessity.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The Madras High Court’s decision in S. Palanivel Rajan v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI establishes a nuanced precedent with multiple strands:

  1. Article 21 and BNSS-based quashing of stale prosecutions
    Long‑pending prosecutions, especially where:
    • charge‑sheets have lain dormant for many years,
    • cognizance is taken far beyond statutory limitation periods, and
    • the accused are not responsible for the delay,
    can and should be quashed under Section 528 BNSS to vindicate the right to speedy trial.
  2. Reliance on media‑based and uncertified electronic identification is inherently fragile
    Identification of accused from:
    • blurred press photographs,
    • television clippings,
    • without test identification parades or proper IT Act certification,
    is insufficient as a standalone basis for prosecuting individuals in large‑scale riot or protest situations.
  3. Selective prosecution of low‑rank officers in command‑driven operations is disfavoured
    Where excess force is used pursuant to institutional orders, courts will be wary of allowing only foot‑soldiers to be prosecuted, particularly in the absence of clear evidence of personal malice or specific unlawful acts.
  4. Institutional reconciliation can inform criminal process decisions
    In rare, historic institutional crises (like the 19.02.2009 High Court violence), where:
    • fault is shared between different institutional actors,
    • time has significantly passed, and
    • institutional relationships have been rebuilt,
    courts may properly consider whether continuing symbolic prosecutions serves any ongoing public or institutional interest.
  5. High Court’s power to revisit consequences of its own earlier directions
    Even where a CBI investigation was originally directed by the High Court itself (as in the 2009 Full Bench order), a later bench can, upon changed circumstances and in the light of Article 21, quash the resulting prosecutions as an abuse of process.

Taken together, the judgment is a significant contribution to evolving jurisprudence under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, particularly on the interplay between:

  • procedural limitation,
  • digital evidence standards,
  • police accountability, and
  • the constitutional guarantee of a fair and speedy trial.

It closes, at least at the criminal law level, one of the most turbulent chapters in the recent history of the Madras High Court, while articulating principles that will guide future courts in balancing accountability with fairness and institutional stability.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Madras High Court

Judge(s)

Honourable Mr.Justice M.NIRMAL KUMAR

Advocates

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