Pre‑Existing Disputes Under IBC Section 9: Supreme Court Elevates Ledger Confirmations and Post‑Demand Payments Over “Moonshine” Defences

Pre‑Existing Disputes Under IBC Section 9: Supreme Court Elevates Ledger Confirmations and Post‑Demand Payments Over “Moonshine” Defences

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in M/s. Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 12261 of 2024 (decided on 10 December 2025), has delivered a significant judgment on the contours of “pre‑existing dispute” in applications filed by operational creditors under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

The decision deals with:

  • What qualifies as a genuine “pre‑existing dispute” under Section 8/9 of the IBC;
  • Whether a reply by a suspended director during an ongoing CIRP can create or evidence such a dispute;
  • The evidentiary value of the corporate debtor’s own ledger accounts and post‑demand payments in testing such a defence; and
  • How earlier winding‑up jurisprudence on “moonshine defences” and bona fide disputes continues to inform the IBC regime.

The Supreme Court set aside the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), New Delhi’s judgment which had rejected the Section 9 application on the ground of a supposed pre‑existing dispute, and restored the admission order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai Bench-IV.

II. Background and Parties

  • Operational Creditor / Appellant: M/s. Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries – a registered partnership firm supplying pipes and cables.
  • Corporate Debtor (CD): Dhanlaxmi Electricals Private Limited – a licensed engineering company executing works contracts, maintaining a running account with the firm.
  • Respondent before Supreme Court: Mohammad Moinuddin Khan – a suspended director of the corporate debtor, who had filed the appeal before the NCLAT against the NCLT’s admission order.

The relationship between the parties was based on a running account: Dhanlaxmi Electricals placed purchase orders; Saraswati supplied cables/pipes and raised invoices; payments were made periodically and recorded in ledgers maintained by both sides.

III. Procedural History

  1. Ledger confirmation (31.07.2021 – 04.08.2021)
    The firm emailed its ledger to the CD on 31.07.2021 for confirmation. The CD’s Accounts Manager responded on 04.08.2021, raising only three small differences (two debit notes: ₹6,490 and ₹15,340; and one voucher: ₹1,37,210 – all of November 2018) and annexed the CD’s ledger of the firm, showing:
    • Closing debit balance (01.04.2017 – 01.04.2021): ₹2,49,93,690.80, and
    • After recording payments of ₹70 lakh in June–August 2020, a closing balance of ₹1,79,93,690.80 as on 30.03.2022.
  2. Demand notice under Section 8 IBC (25.08.2021)
    The firm issued a demand notice claiming:
    • Principal: ₹1,79,93,691 (matching the ledger’s debit balance);
    • Interest: ₹85,27,110;
      Aggregate claim: ₹2,65,20,800;
    • Based on seven invoices dated 29.05.2019 to 06.10.2019 totalling ₹2,07,69,341.
  3. Separate CIRP already in progress (from 06.09.2021)
    Independently of this dispute, another operational creditor, M/s. Central Investigation and Security Services Ltd, had already initiated CIRP against the same corporate debtor:
    • CIRP commenced by NCLT order dated 06.09.2021 in C.P.(IB)/244/MB‑V/2020;
    • An Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) had taken over management;
    • Directors, including respondent Khan, stood suspended under the IBC.
  4. Reply to Section 8 notice by suspended director (20.11.2021)
    Despite suspension, the Technical Director of the CD replied to the notice alleging:
    • No supply against two key invoices:
      • Invoice No. 203 dated 29.09.2019 – ₹33,42,527; and
      • Invoice No. 205 dated 06.10.2019 – ₹23,81,417, with ₹50 lakh allegedly paid “as advance”;
    • Supply of sub-standard material and short supply;
    • Financial losses and risk of blacklisting by MSEDCL; and
    • Counter‑claims:
      • ₹67,96,800 for 80 km of “faulty cable”, and
      • ₹50 lakh towards non-supply under Invoices 203 and 205.
  5. IRP’s communication (19.11.2021)
    The firm lodged its claim with the IRP on 09.11.2021. The IRP replied on 19.11.2021, stating, by reference to an email of 24.12.2018, that there had been sub-standard and short supply and asking the firm to “accept debit charges” – but did not quantify or detail those charges.
  6. Post‑demand payments
    Crucially, even after the Section 8 demand notice and the above replies, the CD continued to pay the firm. In all, ₹61 lakh was paid towards outstanding dues.
  7. Withdrawal of earlier CIRP and fresh Section 9 petition
    • IRP moved an application (IA No. 2597/2021) under Section 12A IBC to withdraw the first CIRP (C.P.(IB)/244/MB‑V/2020) on settlement;
    • NCLT allowed withdrawal on 22.06.2023;
    • The firm (having sought to lodge its claim in the first CIRP) filed its own Section 9 application on 10.02.2023: C.P.(IB) No. 398/NCLT/MB/C‑IV/2023.
  8. NCLT order (06.12.2023)
    • The CD failed to file a reply in the Section 9 proceedings; its right to do so was forfeited on 11.09.2023;
    • NCLT admitted the petition, relying on:
      • The CD’s own ledger acknowledging dues of ₹1,79,93,690.80; and
      • Post‑demand payments of ₹61 lakh negating any genuine pre‑existing dispute.
  9. NCLAT judgment (13.03.2024)
    On appeal by the suspended director, NCLAT:
    • Set aside the NCLT’s admission order;
    • Held that there was a “pre‑existing dispute” based on:
      • 2018–2019 correspondence alleging short/faulty supplies; and
      • Alleged disputes about Invoices 203 and 205;
    • Heavily relied on the “delay” between the Section 8 notice (25.08.2021) and filing of Section 9 petition (10.02.2023) to infer subsisting disputes;
    • Was apparently not informed of the prior CIRP and consequent legal impossibility of initiating another CIRP simultaneously.
  10. Supreme Court judgment (10.12.2025)
    The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the NCLT’s admission order, and directed the CIRP to continue from the stage of admission.

IV. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court held:

  1. The alleged “pre‑existing dispute” raised by the corporate debtor was mere moonshine – i.e., illusory, unsubstantiated and inconsistent – and could not bar initiation of CIRP under Section 9 IBC.
  2. The CD’s own ledger accounts, admitted via email dated 04.08.2021 and showing a clear debit balance of ₹1,79,93,690.80, coupled with payments of ₹61 lakh made after the Section 8 demand notice, strongly negated the existence of any genuine dispute.
  3. The reply dated 20.11.2021 by the suspended Technical Director had no legal authority, as management of the CD had already vested in the IRP from 06.09.2021. Such an unauthorised reply could not form the basis of a “pre‑existing dispute”.
  4. The claims of non‑supply under Invoices 203 and 205 were prima facie disproved by contemporaneous documentary evidence (delivery challans, e‑way bill, transport bill mentioning a “full trailer”), making it implausible that supplies had not been made.
  5. Allegations of short/faulty supply were vague and inconsistent (progressing from no clear figure, to “about 20,000 meters” to “80 kilometres”) and unsupported by any explanation or quantification of supposed losses or corresponding deductions.
  6. The “delay” between the Section 8 notice and Section 9 filing was satisfactorily explained by the existence of an earlier CIRP; the firm was legitimately pursuing its claim through that CIRP and could not have initiated another one simultaneously. Hence, delay could not be treated as evidence of dispute.
  7. NCLAT erred in:
    • Overemphasising the unauthorised reply of the suspended director;
    • Ignoring crucial documents like the ledger confirmation and post‑demand payments;
    • Overlooking the prior CIRP and the legal context of the firm’s conduct.

Consequently, the Supreme Court:

  • Set aside the NCLAT judgment dated 13.03.2024; and
  • Restored the NCLT Mumbai Bench‑IV’s admission order dated 06.12.2023 in C.P.(IB) No. 398/NCLT/MB/C‑IV/2023.

V. Key Legal Issues

  1. What is the proper test for determining whether there is a “pre‑existing dispute” under Sections 8 and 9 of the IBC in the context of an operational creditor’s application?
  2. Can a reply by a suspended director, during an ongoing CIRP where control is vested in the IRP, be relied upon to establish such a dispute?
  3. What weight should be accorded to:
    • The corporate debtor’s confirmed ledger accounts; and
    • Post‑demand payments made to the operational creditor
    when evaluating the genuineness of alleged disputes?
  4. Can mere “delay” between Section 8 notice and Section 9 application, especially in the presence of an ongoing CIRP, be construed as evidence of disputes?

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirusa Software Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353

This is the foundational authority on “pre‑existing disputes” for operational creditor applications under Section 9.

The Supreme Court in Mobilox held that the adjudicating authority must examine:

  • Whether there is an operational debt;
  • Whether evidence shows that such debt is due and unpaid; and
  • Whether there is any dispute in existence or a suit/arbitration pending relating to such dispute on the date of receipt of the Section 8 notice.

Crucially, Mobilox emphasised:

  • The need to “separate the grain from the chaff” and reject “spurious defence which is mere bluster”;
  • The IBC is not a debt enforcement or recovery mechanism for disputed claims; and
  • The adjudicating authority does not decide the dispute on merits – it only checks if the dispute is real, not “spurious, hypothetical or illusory”.

In Saraswati Wire, the Supreme Court explicitly invoked this standard, treating the CD’s assertion of disputes as “mere bluster” and “moonshine” – squarely within the category of spurious defences contemplated in Mobilox. The Court highlighted that:

  • No meaningful quantification or documentary support existed for the alleged losses, short supply or faulty cables; and
  • The CD’s own conduct (ledger confirmation, continued payments) contradicted the claim of dispute.

2. Pre‑IBC Winding‑Up Jurisprudence on “Bona Fide Disputes”

The Court revisited the established line of cases under the Companies Act, 1956:

These cases consistently held that:

  • A winding‑up petition is not a legitimate tool to enforce payment of a debt that is bona fide disputed;
  • Using winding‑up as a pressure tactic in the face of genuine dispute is an abuse of process, sometimes “scandalous”;
  • The debtor’s defence must be “substantial and not mere moonshine” (Mediquip); and
  • If the debt is bona fide disputed, there is no “neglect to pay” for purposes of winding‑up.

The Supreme Court in Saraswati Wire draws on this continuum of jurisprudence, transplanting the “moonshine defence” doctrine firmly into the IBC context. It reiterates that:

  • Merely labelling something as a dispute is insufficient; and
  • A dispute must be genuine, supported by contemporaneous material, and not concocted as an afterthought to defeat CIRP.

3. Indus Biotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund, (2021) 6 SCC 436

Though dealing with Section 7 (financial creditor applications), Indus Biotech articulated that the adjudicating authority must:

  • Examine the material placed by the financial creditor;
  • Record satisfaction on the existence of “default”; and
  • Consider the corporate debtor’s defence to see whether there is “substance” in it.

The Supreme Court in Saraswati Wire applied this principle by analogy to Section 9:

  • NCLT must meaningfully engage with the record and the debtor’s defence;
  • But it must not be driven off course by facially implausible or unsubstantiated allegations.

4. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels Pvt. Ltd., Resolution Professional, Vishal Ghisulal Jain, (2022) 2 SCC 583

This case reiterated and refined the duty of NCLT under Section 7 IBC:

  • To advert to the material filed with the application;
  • To consider the corporate debtor’s stand; and
  • To prevent the IBC process from being stalled by “moonshine defences” raised merely to delay the statutorily time‑bound process.

In Saraswati Wire, the Court underscored that this logic equally applies to Section 9 petitions:

  • The process is designed to be swift; and
  • Tribunals must vigilantly screen out contrived disputes meant only to avoid or delay CIRP initiation.

VII. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Authenticity and Weight of Corporate Debtor’s Ledger Accounts

A central feature of the decision is the reliance placed on the corporate debtor’s own ledger accounts and their confirmation.

The sequence is telling:

  • On 31.07.2021, the firm shared its ledger for confirmation;
  • On 04.08.2021, the CD:
    • Raised only three minor discrepancies relating to 2018 (low-value debit notes and a voucher); and
    • Communicated its own ledger, signed as on 04.08.2021, certifying a debit balance of ₹2,49,93,690.80;
  • The subsequent ledger (01.04.2020 – 30.03.2022) incorporated payments totalling ₹70 lakh (June–August 2020) and showed a closing balance of ₹1,79,93,690.80.

The Supreme Court held that these documents:

  • Demonstrated continuous dealings and payments despite any earlier correspondence;
  • Reflected that minor accounting issues did not interrupt supplies or payments;
  • Constituted compelling evidence of an uncontested operational debt exceeding the statutory threshold; and
  • Should not have been “brushed aside lightly” by NCLAT while focusing on a later, unauthorised reply of the suspended director.

2. Post‑Demand Payments as Evidence Against Genuine Dispute

A particularly important aspect of the reasoning is the Court’s view that: continued payments after receipt of the Section 8 demand notice strongly indicate that there is no real dispute about the underlying debt.

Here:

  • After the Section 8 demand notice (25.08.2021) and even after the November 2021 replies,
  • The CD paid an aggregate of ₹61 lakh towards the firm’s dues.

The Court inferred:

  • If there were indeed genuine pre‑existing disputes and substantial counter‑claims, the CD would likely have withheld payment, not continued to pay;
  • Post‑demand payments thus undermined the plea of dispute and supported the conclusion that the defence was a post‑hoc tactic.

3. Lack of Authority of the Suspended Director

By the time the Technical Director issued his reply (20.11.2021):

  • A separate CIRP had already commenced on 06.09.2021; and
  • An IRP had taken over management, with the board of directors suspended as per Section 17 of the IBC.

The Court held:

  • The Technical Director was a suspended director with no authority to bind the CD or to issue a reply on its behalf;
  • His reply, laden with allegations and counter‑claims, could not be treated as a legitimate or authoritative expression of the CD’s stance;
  • NCLAT erred gravely in relying upon this communication while ignoring the context of the ongoing CIRP.

This has a broader doctrinal implication: communications issued by former management post‑CIRP, absent IRP’s authority, cannot ordinarily be relied upon to manufacture “disputes” under Section 8/9.

4. Implausibility of “No Supply” Under Invoices 203 and 205

The CD alleged non‑supply under:

  • Invoice 203 (29.09.2019) – ₹33,42,527; and
  • Invoice 205 (06.10.2019) – ₹23,81,417.

The firm, however, produced:

  • Delivery challan dated 29.09.2019 (for Invoice 203) with corresponding e‑way bill, showing the value of goods as ₹33,42,527; and
  • Tax invoice dated 06.10.2019 for Invoice 205, and a contemporaneous transport bill dated 06.10.2019 showing transport of pipes from Palghar to Uttar Pradesh, with the truck registration number and the remark “full trailer”.

The CD, in its written submissions before the Supreme Court, belatedly raised an argument about the maximum load capacity of the vehicle purporting to carry both consignments. The Court rejected this as:

  • Answered by the “full trailer” notation on the transport bill; and
  • Unacceptable as a credible line of attack years after the documents were generated.

The Court further noted the improbability that the firm would have fabricated delivery and transport documents in 2019 “in anticipation” of a future insolvency dispute. Accordingly, the non‑supply allegation was found prima facie untenable.

5. Vague, Inconsistent and Unquantified “Short/Faulty Supply” Claims

Allegations regarding quality and quantity were similarly found wanting.

  • The 24.12.2018 email contained no clear quantification of short supply;
  • A later email dated 03.07.2019 mentioned “approximately 20,000 meters” short supply;
  • The November 2021 reply by the suspended director suddenly escalated this to “80 kilometres” of faulty cable, with a counter‑claim of ₹67,96,800, without any explanation as to how that figure was derived.

The Court underscored:

  • No material was placed to substantiate claims of financial loss or blacklisting threats by MSEDCL;
  • The sudden inflation of the short supply figure, and the absence of any coherent calculation, rendered these claims inherently suspect;
  • Such assertions clearly fell into the category of “spurious, hypothetical or illusory” disputes envisaged in Mobilox.

6. Effect of an Earlier CIRP on “Delay” and Creditor’s Conduct

NCLAT inferred that the gap between:

  • Section 8 notice (25.08.2021); and
  • Section 9 application (10.02.2023)

indicated a subsisting dispute.

The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying:

  • From 06.09.2021, a separate CIRP was already ongoing against the same CD;
  • During that period, a parallel CIRP could not have been validly initiated by the firm;
  • The firm’s conduct in:
    • Lodging its claim before the IRP; and
    • Only moving under Section 9 upon learning of an application to withdraw the earlier CIRP
    was procedurally appropriate under the IBC framework;
  • Thus, delay was not indicative of unresolved disputes but of respect for the earlier CIRP process.

The NCLAT’s failure to consider this context (apparently because it was never apprised of the earlier CIRP and Section 12A withdrawal) was a serious factual and legal oversight.

7. Application of the “Moonshine Defence” Doctrine

The Court synthesised the principles from Mobilox and pre‑IBC winding‑up cases to articulate:

A corporate debtor’s defence in a Section 9 proceeding:

  • Must be bona fide, substantial, and grounded in real controversy over liability;
  • Cannot rest on vague allegations, inconsistent figures, or unsubstantiated claims of loss; and
  • Should be rejected as “moonshine” if it appears contrived or an afterthought, especially where:
    • The debtor has unequivocally acknowledged the debt in its own books; and
    • Has made significant payments even after demand notice.

On the facts, the defence was held to be “mere moonshine” and incapable of defeating the Section 9 application.

VIII. Impact and Significance

1. Strengthening Operational Creditors’ Position Under Section 9 IBC

This judgment meaningfully clarifies that:

  • Ledger confirmations by the corporate debtor, coupled with post‑notice payments, are powerful indicators against the existence of any genuine pre‑existing dispute;
  • Operational creditors who obtain and preserve such acknowledgments are placed in a significantly stronger position when facing belated or engineered disputes.

Practically, operational creditors should:

  • Seek periodic ledger confirmations from corporate debtors;
  • Preserve all emails and accounting exchanges in the normal course of business;
  • Highlight subsequent payments received post‑demand when confronting a Section 9 “dispute” defence.

2. Limits on Debtors’ Ability to Engineer Disputes

The ruling sends a clear message to corporate debtors:

  • They cannot safely rely on last-minute, unsupported allegations of defects or non-supply;
  • They cannot use communications from suspended management during CIRP to retroactively manufacture disputes; and
  • They must credibly substantiate any alleged disputes with:
    • Contemporaneous documents;
    • Consistent quantification; and
    • Plausible explanations of how losses or deductions arise.

3. Guidance to NCLT and NCLAT on Evaluating “Pre‑Existing Disputes”

The decision reinforces and particularises the duty of the adjudicating authority:

  • To consider the entire factual matrix, including:
    • Debtor’s ledgers;
    • Patterns of payments (especially post‑notice);
    • Authority of persons issuing replies; and
    • Existence of parallel CIRP or Section 12A applications;
  • To avoid being swayed by selective or incomplete presentations of the record;
  • To consciously weed out “moonshine” defences in line with Mobilox, Mediquip, and TCS v SK Wheels.

For NCLAT in particular, the judgment is a reminder to:

  • Refrain from lightly overturning NCLT admissions on the basis of fragmentary material;
  • Ensure that all material facts (including prior CIRP) are accounted for when assessing alleged disputes.

4. Clarifying the Role and Authority of IRP vs. Suspended Management

The Court’s explicit observation that the suspended Technical Director lacked authority to reply on behalf of the CD is significant for insolvency practice:

  • Once CIRP commences and an IRP/RP takes over, communications by former or suspended directors cannot be treated as definitive statements of the corporate debtor’s position;
  • Where the IRP’s or RP’s communication is itself generic and unquantified, it may be insufficient to establish a genuine dispute.

This will influence:

  • How tribunals treat replies issued by prior management during CIRP;
  • How IRPs/RPs structure their communications to operational creditors so as to avoid inadvertently contributing to “engineered disputes”.

5. Interaction Between Multiple CIRPs and Timing of Section 9 Filings

The judgment clarifies a procedural nuance:

  • A creditor’s decision not to file a separate Section 9 petition while a CIRP is already ongoing – but instead to lodge its claim in that CIRP – cannot later be held against it as evidence of a subsisting dispute;
  • Once the earlier CIRP is withdrawn (Section 12A), creditors are free to invoke their independent remedies;;
  • Delay in filing Section 9 in such circumstances is legally justified, not indicative of lack of clarity or agreement about the underlying debt.

IX. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP)

CIRP is the process under the IBC by which:

  • Control of a financially distressed company shifts from its board of directors to an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) and then a Resolution Professional (RP);
  • Creditors collectively decide on a “resolution plan” to revive or restructure the company; failing that, the company may go into liquidation.

2. Operational Creditor vs. Financial Creditor

  • Operational Creditor – A creditor to whom an operational debt is owed (e.g., suppliers of goods, service providers, employees). They initiate CIRP under Section 9.
  • Financial Creditor – A creditor to whom a financial debt is owed (typically banks, NBFCs, bond-holders). They initiate CIRP under Section 7.

3. Section 8 Demand Notice and Section 9 Application

  • Section 8 – Before filing under Section 9, an operational creditor must send a demand notice of unpaid operational dues; the corporate debtor then has the opportunity to:
    • Pay; or
    • Show existence of a “dispute” or prior suit/arbitration.
  • Section 9 – If the debtor fails to pay or show a genuine pre‑existing dispute, the operational creditor may file an application for initiation of CIRP.

4. “Pre‑Existing Dispute”

A “pre‑existing dispute” is:

  • A real, bona fide disagreement about the existence or quantum of the debt, or about breach of corresponding obligations; and
  • One that exists before the receipt of the Section 8 notice, not one concocted later in reply.

Under Mobilox:

  • The dispute must not be “spurious, hypothetical or illusory”;
  • If it is real and genuine, the IBC route is blocked, and parties must resolve it through usual civil/arbitral proceedings.

5. “Moonshine Defence”

A “moonshine defence” (from older winding‑up cases like Mediquip) refers to:

  • A defence that looks like a dispute on the surface but lacks real substance when scrutinised;
  • It is raised merely to delay or frustrate insolvency or winding‑up proceedings, without factual or legal foundation.

Such defences must be rejected at the threshold.

6. Section 12A IBC – Withdrawal of CIRP

Section 12A permits:

  • Withdrawal of an admitted CIRP upon an application by the original applicant
  • Subject to approval of 90% of the Committee of Creditors.

In this case:

  • The first CIRP (initiated by another operational creditor) was withdrawn under Section 12A on settlement;
  • The appellant firm then pursued its own Section 9 remedy since its claim had not been satisfied.

X. Conclusion

M/s. Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan consolidates and sharpens the law on “pre‑existing dispute” in operational creditor applications under the IBC.

The judgment establishes that:

  • Corporate debtor’s ledger confirmations and payments made even after a statutory demand are powerful evidence that there is no genuine dispute about the debt;
  • Allegations of defects, short supply or non‑supply must be:
    • Consistent with earlier communications;
    • Quantified and documented; and
    • Supported by plausible evidence of loss or deductions;
    otherwise they will be considered “moonshine” defences;
  • Replies by suspended management during CIRP, acting without authority, cannot form a reliable basis to defeat a Section 9 petition;
  • Tribunals must view “delay” in filing Section 9 in the context of ongoing CIRPs and genuine procedural constraints, not reflexively infer disputes from delay alone.

In doctrinal terms, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the “grain from the chaff” test of Mobilox and the “moonshine defence” doctrine from pre‑IBC winding‑up cases, applying them with specificity to factual situations involving ledger entries, post‑demand conduct, multiple CIRPs, and authority questions.

For future cases, this decision will:

  • Guide NCLT and NCLAT in rigorously testing alleged disputes; and
  • Constrain corporate debtors from thwarting the IBC’s objectives through manufactured or exaggerated defences without evidentiary foundation.

The restored admission of CIRP against Dhanlaxmi Electricals Pvt. Ltd. thereby serves as a concrete reminder that the IBC’s insolvency process is not to be derailed by illusory disputes, especially where the debtor’s own records and conduct acknowledge the debt.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Sanjay KumarJustice Alok Aradhe

Advocates

SHRADDHA DESHMUKH

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