Once a Comparative Advertisement is Found Disparaging, Deletion of Isolated Words Cannot Save It: A Commentary on Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd. v. Dabur India Limited

I. Introduction

This Division Bench judgment from the Calcutta High Court deals with a dispute between two major Ayurvedic product manufacturers, Dabur India Limited and Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd., over allegedly disparaging advertisements relating to the popular health supplement Chyawanprash.

The judgment is significant principally for one clear doctrinal clarification:

• If an advertisement is found to be disparaging, merely deleting a few offending words— without changing the overall disparaging thrust—does not cure its illegality.

The Division Bench:

• Dismissed Baidyanath’s appeal (APO/39/2022) owing to its conduct and failure to argue the matter, and
• Allowed Dabur’s appeal (APO/27/2022) to the extent of granting a broader injunction against specific advertisements (Annexures J and K) which the Single Judge had found disparaging but had permitted to be broadcast with a minor modification.

At the heart of the controversy lay Baidyanath’s advertisements (Annexures J and K) that made claims involving the expression “42 ingredients”, in the context of Chyawanprash whose manufacture, as both sides accepted, is regulated by statutory and classical Ayurvedic standards.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The parties and product

Both Dabur and Baidyanath are long-established and well-known manufacturers of Ayurvedic products. The product in issue is Chyawanprash, a traditional Ayurvedic formulation, marketed as a health supplement.

Two background points, evident from the judgment:

• Statutory regulation: The manufacture of Chyawanprash is “guided by statute”. There are recognised formulations and standards which manufacturers must follow. The Court notes, prima facie, that Dabur is following such statutory requirements.
• Competitive advertising: The dispute centres on comparative advertising where Baidyanath, in promoting its own Chyawanprash, allegedly denigrated or misrepresented the quality or ingredients of Dabur’s Chyawanprash.

2. The suit before the Single Judge

Dabur filed a suit for injunction (CS/232/2021) complaining of disparagement of its product by Baidyanath’s advertisements. Along with the suit, Dabur moved an injunction application supported by several annexures (including Annexures J and K) containing the impugned advertising material.

From the appellate judgment, we can reconstruct the following essential points about the Single Judge’s decision (dated 8 February 2022):

• The Single Judge found several advertisements/materials to be disparaging towards Dabur’s Chyawanprash and granted injunctions.
• Regarding Annexure J:
  • The Single Judge found “an element of disparagement” and “an element of false statement”.
  • However, instead of completely stopping the advertisement, the Single Judge allowed it to continue if the words “42 ingredients” were removed.
• Regarding Annexure K:
  • The same approach was adopted: the Single Judge permitted the advertisement to continue if the expression “42 ingredients” was excised.

Thus, the Single Judge effectively crafted a conditional injunction: the advertisements in Annexures J and K were to be restrained in their existing form but could survive in a modified form without the “42 ingredients” reference.

3. The cross-appeals

• APO/39/2022 – filed by Baidyanath, challenging aspects of the Single Judge’s decision adverse to it.
• APO/27/2022 – filed by Dabur, challenging the limited nature of the injunction in respect of Annexures J and K, particularly the permission to run those advertisements after deleting the words “42 ingredients”.

Both appeals arise from the same impugned judgment and were heard analogously.

4. Events at the appellate hearing

On the appellate side, the conduct of Baidyanath became a separate procedural issue:

• The matters appeared in the monthly list and were repeatedly called on “from time to time on a number of days”.
• On the day of hearing (11 December 2025):
  • At the first call, there was no adjournment prayer on behalf of Baidyanath.
  • At the second call, counsel for Baidyanath sought adjournment on the ground that their senior advocate was not available and asked the Court to fix a specific later date.
• The Bench refused this request, emphasising:

  “Cause lists are published. Matters are taken up serially. Nothing special is drawn to our attention to fix a date specifically earmarked for hearing the appeal.”

• When called upon to argue, the advocate present for Baidyanath “did not do so”.

This led to the dismissal of Baidyanath’s appeal on account of its conduct and failure to advance arguments.

III. Issues Before the Division Bench

From the brief but focused appellate judgment, the following key issues emerge:

1. Procedural issue – Adjournment and non-prosecution:
   Whether Baidyanath’s request for adjournment, made on the ground of non-availability of its senior advocate, should be granted, and if not, what consequence follows when the party’s counsel present refuses or fails to argue the appeal.
2. Substantive issue – Disparaging advertisements and scope of injunction:
   Once a particular advertisement is held to be disparaging and/or containing false statements, can the court permit that advertisement to continue in a “sanitised” form by merely removing certain words (here, “42 ingredients”), or should the entire advertisement be injuncted?
3. Interaction with statutory standards:
   What is the relevance of Dabur’s prima facie compliance with statutory requirements for Chyawanprash to the question whether Baidyanath’s comparative claims are disparaging and false?

IV. Summary of the Judgment

1. Dismissal of Baidyanath’s appeal (APO/39/2022)

The Court dismissed Baidyanath’s appeal on the following grounds:

• The appeals had been appearing in the monthly list and called out repeatedly; yet Baidyanath was not represented on at least some earlier occasions.
• On the hearing date, there was no adjournment request at the first call.
• At the second call, the adjournment plea, based merely on the non-availability of the senior advocate and a request for a specially fixed date, was rejected as unjustified.
• Upon being invited to argue, the advocate who was present for Baidyanath declined to address the Court.

In these circumstances, the Division Bench recorded the “conduct of Baidyanath” and dismissed APO/39/2022.

2. Allowing Dabur’s appeal (APO/27/2022) – the main holding

The central part of the judgment concerns Dabur’s challenge to the Single Judge’s conditional treatment of Annexures J and K.

The Division Bench held:

• The Single Judge had already found Annexures J and K to be disparaging, and in the case of Annexure J, also found an element of false statement.
• The order of the Single Judge allowed these advertisements to continue after removing the expression “42 ingredients”.
• The Division Bench rejected this approach, stating:

  “Removal of the two words ‘42 ingredients’ will not render Annexures J and K which are otherwise disparaging to be not disparaging… Once the material is held to be disparaging the removal of the two words would not alter the situation. Annexures 'J' and 'K' would continue to remain disparaging with or without those two words.”

• It further noted that prima facie Dabur appears to be following statutory requirements for manufacture of Chyawanprash, which undercuts the legitimacy of any contrary claims in Baidyanath’s advertisements.

Consequently, the Division Bench modified the Single Judge’s order and:

• Granted injunction in respect of Annexures J and K as part of the injunction petition, without the permissive carve-out that would allow them to continue after deleting “42 ingredients”.
• Specifically, paragraph 17 notes:

  “So far as paragraphs 21, 22 and 26 are concerned, we grant interim injunction in respect of Annexures-J and to the injunction petition.”

  (There appears to be a minor typographical omission in this sentence; but it clearly intends to bring Annexure J (and, contextually, K) within the injunction ambit of specified paragraphs of the Single Judge’s order.)

Dabur’s appeal (APO/27/2022) was accordingly disposed of.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Aspect: Adjournment, Cause Lists, and Dismissal of Appeal

1. Court’s stance on adjournment

The Court’s refusal to grant adjournment is grounded in basic principles of judicial administration:

• Cause lists are published, and counsel are expected to be ready. Appeals on the monthly list are to be taken up as per serial order.
• The Court emphasised that no “special” reason was shown for fixing a date specifically for the convenience of a particular counsel.
• The Court’s language suggests concern about docket management and party conduct: once a matter is repeatedly listed and parties fail to appear or seek adjournment at the last minute without compelling grounds, the Court is entitled to proceed.

2. Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution

After rejecting the adjournment plea, the Bench directly invited Baidyanath’s appearing advocate to argue. The recorded fact is:

“On our calling upon learned advocate appearing for Baidyanath to address the Court, learned advocate did not do so.”

In appellate practice, where a party:

• has due notice,
• is represented by counsel present in Court, and
• declines to argue without sufficient cause,

the Court may dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution or on account of the party’s conduct.

That is what occurred here: the Bench expressly records the conduct and dismisses APO/39/2022. While the judgment does not label this as “dismissal for default” or “dismissal on merits”, the context indicates that it is effectively a dismissal for non-prosecution, albeit with the conduct expressly noted on record.

Practical implication: Appellants cannot assume that the absence of a particular counsel (e.g., a senior) will automatically secure an adjournment, especially where the matter has been repeatedly listed and other counsel are present.

B. Substantive Aspect: Disparagement and Comparative Advertising

1. The Single Judge’s approach and its flaw

The Single Judge accepted two critical propositions:

• Annexure J: There is “an element of disparagement” of Dabur’s product, and also an “element of false statement”.
• Annexure K: Similar disparaging effect was present.

Yet, the Single Judge allowed these advertisements to continue, subject only to the removal of the words “42 ingredients”. Thus, the underlying audio-visual theme, imagery, and comparative narrative presumably remained intact.

The Division Bench finds this logically unsustainable. Its core reasoning is:

“Once the material is held to be disparaging the removal of the two words would not alter the situation. Annexures 'J' and 'K' would continue to remain disparaging with or without those two words.”

In effect, the Bench is stating that:

• Disparagement is a holistic assessment. It is not confined to a specific phrase alone; it depends on the overall impression conveyed to an average consumer.
• If the tenor, tone, visuals, or comparative claims in the advertisement inherently convey that the competitor’s product is inferior, substandard, or non-compliant, cutting out a single phrase does not change the gist.

2. Relevance of statutory standards and “42 ingredients”

The advertisements apparently revolved around the notion of a particular number of “ingredients”—the figure “42” being highlighted. Counsel for Dabur, as recorded, emphasised that:

• Chyawanprash manufacture is governed by statutory standards or codified Ayurvedic texts;
• Dabur adheres to those statutory standards;
• Any claim or insinuation that Dabur’s product is substandard or non-compliant is thus not merely opinion; it is false.

The Division Bench explicitly notes:

“Prima facie, it appears that Dabur is following the statutory requirement while producing the Chyawanprash.”

This prima facie finding has two key consequences:

• It lends strong support to Dabur’s complaint that Baidyanath’s comparative claims were false and thus actionable.
• It underscores that where statutory standards define product composition, advertisers cannot freely allege non-compliance or inferiority about competitors without firm factual basis.

Against this backdrop, even after excising “42 ingredients”, the advertisement’s overall narrative could still suggest to an average viewer that:

• Dabur’s Chyawanprash is somehow deficient in ingredients; or
• Baidyanath’s product alone is truly authentic or complete, implying the competitor’s is not.

That continuing disparaging message is what the Division Bench refuses to permit.

C. Legal Reasoning Consolidated

1. Core principle articulated

The central legal proposition emerging from the judgment can be stated as:

Once a court concludes that an advertisement is disparaging (and/or contains false statements) in relation to a competitor’s product, the remedy cannot ordinarily be limited to cosmetic editing of a particular phrase if the overall disparaging tenor of the advertisement remains unchanged. In such cases, the entire advertisement should be injuncted.

This principle is especially cogent in the context of television or audio-visual advertisements, where:

• The message is conveyed by visuals, tone, comparisons, and storylines, not just by a single phrase.
• Average consumers do not dissect advertisements word by word; they take away an overall impression.

2. Alignment with broader Indian jurisprudence (contextual, not cited)

Although the Division Bench does not cite precedents in this short order, its approach coheres with established Indian case law on comparative advertising and disparagement. For contextual understanding, some well-known principles from earlier decisions (across High Courts) include:

• A trader is allowed to “puff” his own goods and even state that they are the best, but he cannot disparage a rival’s goods. (This principle was elaborated in cases such as Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. v. M.P. Ramachandran, Calcutta High Court, among others.)
• Comparative advertising is permissible to the extent that:
  • it is truthful;
  • it fairly compares material and verifiable features;
  • it does not cross the line into denigration, ridicule, or assertion of inferiority of the competitor’s product.
• Courts often examine:
  • the overall impression created;
  • the intention behind the advertisement;
  • whether an average consumer would be led to think less of the competitor’s product in a way that is unjustified or untrue.

In that broader doctrinal context, the Division Bench’s insistence that Annexures J and K must be restrained in toto once found disparaging is fully consistent with the emphasis on overall impression and consumer perception.

3. Nature of relief: interim vs “permanent” injunction in the appellate order

One segment of the judgment reads:

“So far as the appeal of Dabur being APO/27/2022 is concerned, we find that, learned Single Judge considered Annexures J and K and granted permanent injunction thereon in its present form. However, learned Single Judge permitted such advertisement to continue if, the words ‘42 ingredients’ are removed.”

And then:

“In such circumstances, we modify the impugned judgment and order. So far as paragraphs 21, 22 and 26 are concerned, we grant interim injunction in respect of Annexures-J…”

The use of the phrase “permanent injunction” here must be read in context:

• The underlying suit was still pending; the Division Bench is dealing with appeals against an order dated 8 February 2022. Thus, in strict procedural terms, the Single Judge’s order is more accurately described as an interlocutory or interim order.
• The Bench’s own language, when granting relief, clearly styles its modification as an interim injunction.

Accordingly, the practical meaning is:

• Pending trial and final disposal of the suit, Annexures J and K are now fully restrained; they cannot be run in any form.
• Any limited permission earlier carved out by the Single Judge is overridden by the Division Bench’s order.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is “disparagement” in advertising?

Disparagement refers to advertising or statements that unfairly or falsely denigrate a competitor’s product, harming its reputation or goodwill. In the context of commercial advertising:

• It is different from ordinary puffery. Saying “Our chyawanprash is the best” is puffery and is normally permissible.
• Disparagement occurs when an advertisement:
  • States or implies that a named or identifiable competitor’s product is inferior, unsafe, substandard, fake, or non-compliant;
  • Does so by using false, misleading, or incomplete information;
  • Is designed to create a negative impression about the competitor’s product, beyond fair comparison.

The key question courts ask is: What impression does the advertisement leave on an average customer? If it leads that viewer to think less of the competitor’s product in an unjustified way, there is disparagement.

2. Comparative advertising versus disparaging advertising

Comparative advertising is where an advertiser compares its product with a competitor’s, often naming the competitor or making it obvious whom they refer to.

Indian law allows comparative advertising, but with safeguards:

• Comparisons must be based on true, verifiable facts (e.g., price, quantity, specific ingredients).
• They should not misrepresent or exaggerate the competitor’s weaknesses.
• They cannot assert or insinuate that the competitor’s product is harmful, fake, or non-compliant unless that assertion is demonstrably true and fairly presented.

When comparative advertising crosses these lines and becomes untrue or unfairly negative, it becomes disparagement.

3. Role of statutory standards in product-comparison claims

Chyawanprash, as the Court notes, is “guided by statute”. This usually means:

• There is a statutory or regulatory framework which:
  • Defines the standard formulation or minimum ingredients;
  • Specifies quality, safety, and labeling requirements;
  • Requires compliance by all manufacturers.

When making comparative claims tied to such standards (e.g., implying that only one brand adheres to the full classical or statutory recipe), advertisers must be extremely careful:

• If the competitor actually complies with the same statutory standard, any claim suggesting otherwise is false and misleading.
• Citing numbers like “42 ingredients” can mislead consumers if it is presented as a unique virtue when, in reality, multiple compliant manufacturers include the same or equivalent ingredients.

The Division Bench’s reference to Dabur’s prima facie compliance stresses this point: mischaracterising a competitor’s statutory compliance is a serious form of disparagement.

4. Injunctions: interim versus final

An injunction is a court order restraining a party from doing a particular act—or sometimes requiring a positive act.

• An interim (or interlocutory) injunction is granted before the final trial, usually to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable harm.
• A permanent (or final) injunction is granted at the end of the trial, based on full evidence, and finally determines the parties’ rights.

Here, the Division Bench is dealing with interim relief in an appeal. Its order ensures that the impugned advertisements (Annexures J and K) cannot be aired during the pendency of the suit, as they are prima facie disparaging and falsely suggest non-compliance by Dabur.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

1. On advertising and marketing practices

The judgment sends a sharp message to advertisers, particularly in:

• FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods);
• Health supplements and nutraceuticals;
• Ayurvedic and pharmaceutical products.

Key lessons for advertisers:

• Holistic compliance: You cannot “fix” a disparaging advertisement by merely deleting a single problematic phrase if the overall narrative still denigrates the competitor’s product.
• Statutory-standard claims demand special care: When statutory standards apply (as with Chyawanprash), any comparative claim about “real” vs “incomplete” formulations must be factually correct and not misleading.
• Legal vetting of comparative campaigns: Large brands must ensure robust legal review of comparative or ingredient-based adverts to avoid injunctions that can derail major campaigns.

2. On judicial approach to partial modification of advertisements

The Single Judge’s initial approach—allowing the advertisement with a limited deletion—reflects a judicial tendency in some cases to “surgically remove” problematic elements while salvaging the rest of the campaign.

The Division Bench’s intervention indicates:

• Where the disparaging effect is woven into the structure and theme of the advertisement, not confined to a word or two, the appropriate remedy is total restraint of that advertisement.
• Courts should avoid devising partial fixes that are logically inconsistent with their own finding that the material is disparaging.

This will likely influence future injunction practice, pushing courts towards a more consistent approach:

• Either hold that the advertisement, taken as a whole, is not disparaging (and allow it), or
• Hold that it is disparaging and grant a full injunction against that specific advertisement (subject of course to future modification by the advertiser and fresh scrutiny, if necessary).

3. On litigation strategy and conduct of parties

From a procedural standpoint, the dismissal of Baidyanath’s appeal carries a cautionary note:

• Parties must be diligent in attending and arguing listed matters; repeated absences or last-minute adjournment requests may be viewed adversely.
• The presence of junior or instructing counsel in Court is not a mere formality; if the senior is unavailable, the Court may expect others to be ready.
• Appellants risk losing their right of appeal if they do not prosecute it with due seriousness.

4. On the specific field of Ayurvedic and regulated products

In sectors like Ayurvedic medicine, where:

• traditional formulations are codified in texts, and
• these texts are often incorporated into statutory or regulatory frameworks,

this judgment underscores that:

• A manufacturer cannot build an advertising narrative around “authenticity” or “completeness” of formulation by implying that a rival does not meet the recognised standard, unless there is strong, demonstrable basis for such a claim.
• If the rival is prima facie compliant with the statutory standard, such insinuations are actionable falsehoods, not mere opinions.

VIII. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s Division Bench, in Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd. v. Dabur India Limited, lays down a crisp but potent rule:

Once an advertisement has been judicially found to be disparaging, the advertiser cannot escape injunction by deleting one or two highlighted words if the overall disparaging effect remains intact.

On the facts, the Court:

• Recognised that Chyawanprash is a statutorily regulated product and that Dabur is prima facie compliant with those standards.
• Held that Baidyanath’s advertisements (Annexures J and K) stayed disparaging even without the phrase “42 ingredients”.
• Modified the Single Judge’s order to impose a fuller interim injunction against these advertisements.
• Dismissed Baidyanath’s appeal due to its conduct and failure to argue its case.

In the larger legal landscape, this decision strengthens the law against disparaging comparative advertisements, especially in regulated product sectors, and reinforces the idea that:

• Courts will look at the totality of an advertisement, not isolated words, and
• Advertisers must ensure that their comparative narratives are fair, accurate, and non-disparaging, particularly when statutory norms and consumer health perceptions are involved.