No Stop‑Gap Temple Administrators Without Statutory Authority:
Commentary on Bhagwat Sopan Bankar & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors
(Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, 12 December 2025)

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1. Introduction

This judgment from the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) in Writ Petition No. 12208 of 2025 concerns the management of the renowned Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan at Shani Shingnapur (District Ahilyanagar, formerly Ahmednagar). The case raises a fundamental question:

• Can the State Government, in the absence of express statutory authority, appoint a “temporary” Administrator to take over a religious/public trust when a special temple Act has been enacted, but the statutory Management Committee under that Act has not yet been constituted?

The petitioners are the elected office‑bearers and trustees of Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan Trust, a public trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (“MPT Act”). Their elected term was to run till 31 December 2025. The State, acting under the Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan Trust (Shingnapur) Act, 2018 (“Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018”), issued:

1. a notification dated 22 September 2025 bringing the 2018 Act into force; and
2. on the same date, a Government Resolution (“GR”) appointing the Collector, Ahilyanagar as Administrator of the Devasthan, “until” a statutory Management Committee was constituted.

The Collector then, by communication dated 30 September 2025, appointed an 11‑member “Management Committee/Committee of Administrators” to assist him and purportedly took charge of the Trust’s properties and administration.

The petitioners challenged:

• the Government Resolution dated 22.09.2025 appointing the Collector as Administrator; and
• the Collector’s communication dated 30.09.2025 constituting a committee under him.

Broadly, they alleged that:

• The Act does not empower the State to appoint an Administrator in the absence of a Management Committee under Section 5.
• Their elected term under the MPT Act could not be cut short without following statutory procedure and without hearing them.
• The State was effectively taking over a wealthy temple trust by an executive shortcut, driven by political considerations and relying on alleged mismanagement that was already the subject of pending Charity Commissioner proceedings under Section 41D of the MPT Act.

The State justified its action by citing:

• the overriding clause (Section 44) of the Shingnapur Trust Act, which gives the Act primacy over the MPT Act;
• the “removal of difficulties” provision (Section 48); and
• the power to appoint an Administrator under Section 36, read with the alleged mismanagement reported by the Charity authorities.

The Division Bench (Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi and Hiten S. Venegavkar, JJ.) delivered a detailed judgment examining the statutory scheme, constitutional constraints, and the limits of executive power in the governance of religious and charitable trusts.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Core Holding

The High Court held that:

• The State Government had no power under the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018 to appoint the Collector, Ahilyanagar as a “stop‑gap” Administrator before a statutory Management Committee under Section 5 was constituted.
• Section 36, which allows appointment of an Administrator, is triggered only where a duly constituted Committee under Section 5 exists and is found incompetent or persistently defaulting. It cannot be invoked where no Committee has yet been constituted.
• Sections 44 (overriding effect) and 48 (removal of difficulties) cannot be used to create new powers or override the clear scheme of the Act.
• There is no automatic cessation of the elected managing committee under the MPT Act on the mere notification of the 2018 Act. Cessation occurs only when a Management Committee is actually constituted under Section 5 and the statutory transfer/vesting under Sections 3 and 4 is lawfully completed.
• The take‑over of control and property of the Trust by an Administrator without statutory authority amounts to deprivation of property/control contrary to Article 300A of the Constitution and is arbitrary under Article 14.

2.2 Orders Passed

1. The Writ Petition was partly allowed.
2. The Government Resolution dated 22.09.2025 appointing the Collector, Ahilyanagar as Administrator of Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan Trust was quashed and set aside.
3. The Collector’s communication dated 30.09.2025 constituting a “Management Committee/Committee of Administrators” was also quashed and set aside.
4. Status quo ante was directed: the Collector and the committee he appointed were ordered to hand over all movable and immovable properties of the Trust to the erstwhile elected Trust within seven days.
5. It was clarified that, till the State properly implements the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018 (including framing rules and constituting a Management Committee), the erstwhile Trust shall operate the Bank accounts.
6. The State was given liberty to proceed in accordance with the 2018 Act (after framing rules).
7. Intervention applications by (a) a complainant devotee and (b) UCO Bank were disposed of; intervention by the complainant was rejected.
8. A post‑judgment oral request by the State to maintain status quo for eight weeks was rejected, as that would perpetuate an illegality.

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3. Statutory Framework and Key Issues

3.1 The Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018

The Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018 is a special enactment “to reconstitute the Public Trust registered under the name Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan at Shingnapur and to provide for better administration of Shree Shanaishwar Temple and control of the State Government on the Trust and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

Key provisions considered:

• Section 1: The Act comes into force on such date as notified in the Official Gazette. This notification was issued on 22.09.2025.
• Section 2(b): “Committee” or “Management Committee” means the Committee constituted under Section 5.
• Section 2(d): “Devasthan Trust” means the public trust as reconstituted under the Act.
• Section 2(e): “Erstwhile Trust” means the public trust registered under the MPT Act with Registration No. A/587.
• Section 3 – Reconstitution and Vesting:
  • (1) On and from the “appointed day,” the Act applies to the erstwhile trust and it “shall be re‑constituted” as provided in the Act.
  • (2) On the appointed day, all properties of the erstwhile trust “stand transferred to, and vested in, the Management Committee” and the Executive Officer (for the Committee) is entitled to possession and management.
  • (3) The existing Committee/Board of Trustees of the erstwhile trust “shall cease to function,” and all its powers vest in the Management Committee.
• Section 4 – Transfer of Possession: Directs the Board of Trustees of the erstwhile trust to hand over properties and valuables to the Executive Officer on behalf of the Management Committee, along with inventory, within a stipulated time.
• Section 5 – Constitution of Management Committee: Empowers the State Government to appoint a Chairman, Vice‑Chairman, Treasurer and up to eight members as the “Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan Trust Management Committee”. The Committee becomes a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal.
• Section 18: Only the State Government can appoint the Chief Executive Officer (Executive Officer) of the Temple Trust.
• Section 36 – Appointment of Administrator: Authorises the State Government to appoint an Administrator if it is of the opinion that the Committee appointed under this Act is not competent to perform or makes persistent default in performing its duties, etc.
• Section 44 – Overriding effect: The provisions of this Act have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the MPT Act or any other law, scheme, judgment, order or custom to the contrary.
• Sections 46 and 47: Provide for framing of rules (by the State) and regulations (by the Committee) to carry out the purposes of the Act.
• Section 48 – Removal of difficulties: Permits the State Government, by order in Official Gazette, to “do anything not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act” to remove difficulties in giving effect to the Act.

3.2 Core Legal Issues

1. Does the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018 permit the State Government to appoint a temporary Administrator (Collector) before the Management Committee under Section 5 is constituted?
2. Does the mere notification bringing the Act into force automatically terminate the elected Board under the MPT Act and vest property in the State‑appointed Administrator?
3. Can Sections 44 (overriding effect) and 48 (removal of difficulties) be used to justify an executive arrangement that has no explicit basis in the Act?
4. What is the status of the erstwhile Trust’s control over property and management in the interregnum between notification of the Act and constitution of the Management Committee?
5. Are the State’s actions consistent with constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 300A?

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4. Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 No Power to Appoint a Stop‑Gap Administrator Before Committee Exists

The fulcrum of the Court’s reasoning is Section 36. It expressly provides that:

“…the State Government may appoint an Administrator if it is of the opinion that the Committee appointed under this Act is not competent to perform or makes persistent default in performing the duties imposed on it by or under this Act…”

The Court held:

• The opening words “the Committee appointed under this Act” clearly presuppose the existence of a Management Committee constituted under Section 5.
• The power to appoint an Administrator is, therefore, conditional and post‑Committee. It is a remedial measure against a failing Committee, not a mechanism to bypass the Committee altogether.
• Since no Committee had yet been constituted under Section 5, Section 36 was not attracted at all. Any appointment of an Administrator in such circumstances is ultra vires the Act.

Thus, the Government Resolution dated 22.09.2025 could not be traced to Section 36, nor to any other provision of the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018.

4.2 No Automatic Cessation of MPT Act Committee Without a Section 5 Committee

The Court agreed with the petitioners that there is no automatic cessation of the erstwhile Committee under the MPT Act merely because the special Shingnapur Trust Act is notified.

Reading Sections 3 and 4 together:

• Section 3(2) provides that on the appointed day, all properties “stand transferred to, and vested in, the Management Committee”.
• Section 3(3) states that the erstwhile Committee shall cease to function, and its powers vest in the Management Committee.
• Section 4 mandates that the Board of Trustees of the erstwhile Trust must hand over property and valuables to the Executive Officer for the Management Committee, with inventory, within the prescribed time.

On this scheme, the Court reasoned:

• Vesting and cessation logically presuppose the existence of a duly appointed Management Committee and an Executive Officer to take possession.
• In the absence of a Section 5 Committee and Executive Officer, the mechanisms under Sections 3 and 4 cannot operate.
• Therefore, until such constitution and lawful transfer occur, the erstwhile Trust continues to manage the affairs and hold property.

Consequently, the attempt to treat the elected trustees as automatically ousted, and to treat the Collector as the lawful successor, was rejected.

4.3 Section 44 (Overriding Effect) and Section 48 (Removal of Difficulties) Cannot Create New Powers

The State argued that:

• Section 44 gives the Shingnapur Trust Act overriding effect over the MPT Act.
• Section 48 allows the State to remove difficulties by orders “not inconsistent” with the provisions of the Act.
• There would have been an “administrative vacuum” on 22.09.2025 if the Collector was not appointed as Administrator.

The Court rejected this line of reasoning on multiple grounds:

1. No pleaded or proven “difficulty”:
   • No affidavit from the State (respondent no. 1) explained what precise “difficulty” arose in implementing the Act.
   • Mere administrative inconvenience or delay in framing rules/constituting a Committee is not the kind of “difficulty” contemplated by Section 48.
2. Non‑inconsistency clause:
   • Even if a difficulty existed, Section 48 only permits the State to make orders “not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act”.
   • An order appointing a Collector as Administrator in the absence of a Committee directly contradicts Section 36, which only contemplates an Administrator after a Committee exists and defaults.
   • It also bypasses the carefully crafted vesting and transition scheme in Sections 3 and 4.
3. Overriding effect is not a source of power:
   • Section 44 merely clarifies that where the Act applies, its provisions prevail over conflicting provisions of other laws.
   • It does not confer additional substantive powers on the executive nor authorise it to ignore other provisions of the same Act.

The Court therefore characterised the appointment of the Collector as Administrator as inconsistent with the Act itself and beyond the permissible scope of the removal of difficulties power.

4.4 Literal and Purposive Interpretation Harmonised

The Bench drew on established principles of statutory interpretation:

• Literal rule: From Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank and B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, the Court reaffirmed that where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain meaning, even if it causes hardship.
• Purposive construction within statutory boundaries: Referring to Reserve Bank Of India v. Peerless General Finance, the Court emphasised that:
  • The statute must be read as a whole, in its text and context.
  • The purpose of the Act (better administration by a statutory Committee) does not allow the executive to create procedures the Act itself does not permit.
  • Administrative convenience cannot override the intention of the legislature.

The Court thus combined:

• a literal reading of crucial provisions (Sections 3, 4, 5, 36, 44, 48); and
• a purposive reading of the Act’s overall scheme and preamble,

and concluded that the only lawful path was:

1. frame rules and necessary subordinate legislation under Sections 46 and 47;
2. constitute a Management Committee under Section 5; and
3. then undertake transition and, if needed, later invoke Section 36 on defaults.

4.5 Article 300A and Property of the Trust

The Court noted that the Trust’s properties, donations and funds are “property” within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution, which states:

“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

By displacing the elected trustees and assuming custody and control of Trust property through an executive Government Resolution that is contrary to the statutory scheme, the State in effect attempted to deprive the Trust (and its management) of property and control:

• without valid authority of law (since the action was ultra vires the Act), and
• by an executive instrument (a GR), which cannot, as per Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, constitute “law” for the purposes of Article 300A.

The Court thus declared the take‑over unconstitutional in terms of Article 300A.

4.6 Article 14 and Arbitrariness in State Action

Relying on the settled principle from E.P. Royappa and Maneka Gandhi that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality, the Court observed:

• The State, and all public bodies, are trustees of the power vested in them (State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal and Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi).
• Their acts must be fair, reasonable, non‑discriminatory and objective.
• Appointments made in an arbitrary fashion, without any transparent method of selection or without statutory basis, are amenable to judicial review and liable to be quashed.

In this case:

• The State selectively implemented some parts of the Act (notification, appointment of Collector) while ignoring mandatory preconditions (constitution of Committee, framing of rules).
• There was no transparent process or statutory framework governing the choice of Administrator or the committee constituted by him.

Such conduct, the Court held, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

4.7 Executive Power Cannot Override or Supplement a Field Covered by Statute

Drawing upon cases like:

• P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. P. Veldurai,
• A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab,
• Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan,
• State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh, and
• DDA v. Joint Action Committee,

the Court underlined the doctrine that:

• When the legislature has occupied the field with a detailed statutory framework, the executive cannot use its general power under Article 162 (or otherwise) to issue directions in the same field that are inconsistent with the statute.
• Where the Act prescribes that a particular body must exercise a power, that power must be exercised by that body alone, unless validly delegated and the statute expressly permits such delegation (Marathwada University).

Applied here:

• The Shingnapur Trust Act specifies that:
  • the Management Committee is to be constituted by the State (Section 5);
  • the Executive Officer is to be appointed by the State (Section 18); and
  • an Administrator can be appointed only on failure of that Committee (Section 36).
• There is no provision authorising the State to create any alternative management structure in substitution of the Committee, or authorising the Collector to appoint a parallel committee.
• Therefore, the State’s action amounted to executive legislation, which is impermissible in a constitutional democracy.

4.8 Charity Commissioner Proceedings and Allegations of Mismanagement

The State pointed to:

• A Calling Attention Motion in the Legislature and complaints about alleged irregularities in the Trust’s management;
• Fact‑finding reports by the Deputy Charity Commissioner and Joint Charity Commissioner about inflated staff numbers and mismanagement;
• Suo motu proceedings under Section 41D of the MPT Act initiated by the Charity Commissioner.

The Court consciously refrained from examining or commenting on the merits of these allegations, noting that the Section 41D proceedings are still pending and would continue even after the 2018 Act’s notification.

The crucial legal point the Court made is:

• Even if mismanagement existed and even if that prompted the State to notify the Act, the State must act within the four corners of the statute.
• Allegations of mismanagement cannot justify the use of powers that the Act does not confer.

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5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 2 SCC 230

This case reinforces the literal interpretation rule: where the language of the statute is clear, courts must give effect to it even if it appears harsh or causes hardship.

Influence here:

• The Court applied a literal reading of Section 36 (Administrator), holding it applicable only when a Committee “appointed under this Act” exists and defaults.
• This prevented reading into Section 36 any broader, textually unsupported power to appoint an Administrator in the absence of a Committee.

5.2 B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266

This authority reiterates that when legislative words are unequivocal, there is no scope for importing extraneous interpretive devices.

Influence:

• It strengthened the Court’s refusal to “stretch” Section 36, or to treat Section 48 (removal of difficulties) as a carte blanche to create new powers.

5.3 Reserve Bank Of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424

This is a leading decision on contextual and purposive interpretation. It emphasises:

• Statutes must be read as a whole, in context and with regard to their purpose.
• Interpretation must harmonise text and context, not rewrite the statute.

Influence:

• The Court acknowledged the purpose of the 2018 Act — better administration through a Management Committee — but held that this purpose must be realised by following the mechanisms the Act itself provides, not by executive shortcuts.
• Administrative convenience cannot justify deviating from the statutory design.

5.4 Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995 Supp (1) SCC 596)

This case clarifies that “law” under Article 300A means a validly enacted statute or subordinate legislation, not mere executive instructions.

Influence:

• It underpins the Court’s holding that a Government Resolution that is itself ultra vires the parent statute cannot serve as “authority of law” to justify deprivation of property.

5.5 Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan (1989) 3 SCC 132

This decision lays down that where a statute prescribes that a particular body must exercise a specified power, only that body can do so, unless the statute authorises delegation.

Influence:

• The Court used this to emphasise that:
  • Appointment of the Management Committee must be done by the State under Section 5.
  • Appointment of the Executive Officer must be by the State under Section 18.
  • No provision allows the Collector to appoint his own Management Committee or to assume those statutory powers.

5.6 State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (2016) 6 SCC 1

Cited in a prior Bombay High Court PIL (Sachin Gopal Bhanage), this case, along with Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi, lays down important principles regarding:

• Government as a trustee of public power.
• Requirement of fairness, transparency and non‑arbitrariness in appointments.
• Judicial review of arbitrary or politically motivated appointments.

Influence:

• Provided a constitutional framework for examining the State’s appointment of the Collector and the committee he formed.
• Supported the conclusion that such appointments, being without statutory basis and lacking transparency, are liable to judicial interference.

5.7 Other Authorities

The Court also alluded to:

• E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (arbitrariness as antithesis of equality);
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (due process and reasonableness under Article 21, which informs Article 14);
• P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. P. Veldurai and A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (executive action cannot override or supplement legislation where the field is occupied);
• Bombay High Court decisions like Eknath Bayaji Gadkari v. Union Of India and S. Kuldeep Singh v. S. Prithpal Singh, which reinforce the principle that statutory powers must be exercised strictly by or through the authorities designated by the statute.

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6. Impact and Future Implications

6.1 Immediate Impact on Shree Shanaishwar Devasthan, Shingnapur

• Control and management of the Temple and its properties has reverted to the erstwhile elected trustees under the MPT Act, at least until the State properly implements the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018.
• All actions taken by the Collector as Administrator and by the committee appointed by him lack statutory sanctity and are effectively invalidated, subject of course to the practical consequences of day‑to‑day administration.
• Bank accounts are to be operated by the erstwhile Trust; the Bank’s confusion (which led to its civil application) is resolved.
• Proceedings under Section 41D of the MPT Act before the Charity Commissioner continue unaffected; any mismanagement issues will be resolved in accordance with the MPT Act.

6.2 Guidance for Implementation of Special Temple Enactments

Many States, including Maharashtra, have enacted special statutes for prominent temples (e.g., Shirdi Sai Baba, Kolhapur Mahalaxmi, Pandharpur Vitthal, etc.). This judgment sends strong guidance:

• Sequencing matters. The State must:
  1. frame requisite rules and regulations;
  2. constitute the statutory Management Committee as per the Act; and
  3. then effect legal transfer/vesting of properties and management.
• The State cannot:
  • declare the Act in force and simultaneously install an extra‑statutory Administrator merely as a “stop‑gap” measure;
  • bypass the statutory Committee when the legislature has made it the central managerial body.

6.3 Strengthening Rule of Law in Temple Administration

The decision underscores that:

• Governance of religious and charitable institutions, even when regulated by the State, must conform to the rule of law.
• Special temple Acts cannot be treated as mere tools for ad hoc political control; they create structured legal frameworks that must be honoured.
• Courts will closely scrutinise State attempts to take over temple administration and finances where:
  • procedural safeguards are ignored,
  • statutory bodies are bypassed, or
  • executive instructions exceed statutory powers.

6.4 Reinforcing Property and Equality Protections

By explicitly invoking Articles 300A and 14, the judgment:

• Reaffirms that property of public/religious trusts cannot be taken over by executive fiat that is not authorised by valid law.
• Elevates arbitrary or partial implementation of statutory schemes to a constitutional concern (Article 14), not merely a technical illegality.
• Signals that in future takeovers or reconstitutions of trusts, the State must maintain high standards of transparency, fairness and legality.

6.5 Need for Timely Subordinate Legislation

The Court expressly noted that for effective implementation of the Act, the State must frame rules (Section 46) and the Committee must frame regulations (Section 47).

Consequences:

• The judgment pressures the State to expedite rule‑making for the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018.
• It serves as a reminder in respect of other temple Acts (such as the Shree Karveer Niwasini Mahalaxmi (Ambabai) Mandir (Kolhapur) Act, 2018, which the petitioners noted is still not brought into force) that notification, rule‑making and institutional constitution must be planned coherently, not piecemeal.

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7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Non‑obstante” Clause

A non‑obstante clause typically begins with “Notwithstanding anything contained in…”. It means that:

• When there is a conflict between this provision and some other law, this provision will prevail.

In Section 3(1), the Act says: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Public Trusts Act or any other law…” This makes the Shingnapur Trust Act prevail over the MPT Act but only within the boundaries of the Act itself.

7.2 Overriding Effect (Section 44)

Section 44 states that the provisions of the 2018 Act override:

• the MPT Act,
• other laws, court orders, schemes, and customs.

This does not mean the government can ignore parts of the 2018 Act itself. It simply gives the 2018 Act priority over other inconsistent legal instruments.

7.3 Removal of Difficulties (Section 48)

A “removal of difficulties” clause allows the State to smoothen the transition when new laws are implemented. But:

• It can only be used to clarify or adjust implementation.
• It cannot be used to create new powers or take steps contrary to the Act.

Thus, Section 48 cannot justify appointing an Administrator where Section 36 does not permit it.

7.4 Status Quo vs Status Quo Ante

• Status quo: Maintain the current state of affairs.
• Status quo ante: Restore the state of affairs to what it was before a particular event.

Initially, the Court ordered status quo on 04.10.2025 (maintain the situation as on that date). After finding the State’s action illegal, it ordered status quo ante, restoring the situation to what it was before the Government Resolution of 22.09.2025.

7.5 Administrator vs Management Committee

• The Management Committee is a statutory, primary governing body under the 2018 Act, with corporate status.
• An Administrator under Section 36 is a temporary replacement of the Committee, to be appointed only if the Committee fails to perform.

The State treated the Administrator as a substitute for the Committee from the outset, which the statute does not permit.

7.6 Article 300A – Property Right

Article 300A of the Constitution protects people (including trusts) from being deprived of their property except by “authority of law.” This means:

• There must be a valid law authorising the deprivation.
• The law must be properly followed.

Here, because the Government Resolution was inconsistent with the Act, there was no valid “lawful authority” for the State to take control of the Trust’s property.

7.7 Article 14 – Arbitrariness and Equality

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court has held that:

• Arbitrary state action is inherently unequal.
• State decisions must be rational, non‑discriminatory and follow fair procedures.

By selectively applying the Act, bypassing statutory bodies and using executive fiat, the State acted arbitrarily and thus violated Article 14.

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8. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

This judgment lays down an important and precise legal principle:

Where a special temple/trust enactment establishes a statutory Management Committee and prescribes a specific mechanism for reconstitution and vesting of management, the State Government cannot appoint a “stop‑gap” Administrator or create alternative management structures without clear statutory authority, and cannot invoke removal‑of‑difficulties or overriding clauses to bypass the statutory scheme.

Key takeaways:

1. No extra‑statutory Administrators: Section 36 of the Shingnapur Trust Act, 2018 permits appointment of an Administrator only after a Committee is constituted and has failed; it cannot justify an Administrator in the absence of a Committee.
2. No automatic ouster of existing trustees: The elected Board under the MPT Act does not automatically cease functioning merely because the special Act is notified; cessation and vesting occur only upon proper constitution of the statutory Committee and compliance with Sections 3 and 4.
3. Removal of difficulties has limits: Section 48 cannot be used to create new powers or to act in a manner inconsistent with the Act’s own provisions.
4. Executive power is subordinate to statute: Once the legislature has provided a detailed mechanism, the executive cannot, in the name of administrative convenience, substitute its own procedures or bodies.
5. Constitutional safeguards apply to temple takeovers: Arbitrary or ultra vires State intervention in temple trusts violates both Article 14 (equality/non‑arbitrariness) and Article 300A (property).
6. Rule‑making is indispensable: Effective and lawful implementation of such Acts requires prompt framing of rules and regulations, and faithful adherence to the Act’s structure.

In the broader legal landscape, Bhagwat Sopan Bankar v. State of Maharashtra serves as a significant precedent on:

• the proper sequencing of statutory implementation in religious and charitable trusts;
• the judicial control over executive overreach in the sensitive domain of temple administration; and
• the continued robustness of constitutional limits on deprivation of property and arbitrary State action.

For future cases involving special temple enactments — in Maharashtra and beyond — this judgment will likely be an important reference point on how far the State can go, and how far it cannot, when intervening in the management of religious institutions.