Judicial Limits on Interference with Disciplinary Penalties for Bigamy in Disciplined Forces: Commentary on The Director General, CISF v. Kudipudi Suri Babu (AP High Court, 07.11.2025)

Judicial Limits on Interference with Disciplinary Penalties for Bigamy in Disciplined Forces: Commentary on The Director General, CISF v. Kudipudi Suri Babu

I. Introduction

The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in The Director General, CISF & Ors. v. Kudipudi Suri Babu (W.A. No. 48 of 2025, decided on 07.11.2025) revisited two important themes in service law:

  • The gravity of bigamy (second marriage during subsistence of the first) as misconduct in a disciplined force such as the CISF, and
  • The limited scope of judicial review over the quantum of punishment in disciplinary proceedings, particularly the impermissibility of a High Court “capping” the penalty while remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority.

The case arose out of disciplinary proceedings against a CISF constable, Kudipudi Suri Babu, who contracted a second marriage with a fellow woman constable, Prameela Pativada, during the subsistence of his first marriage with K. Nagalakshmi. This conduct was found to be in violation of:

  • Rule 21(2) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and
  • Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001.

The disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement with 2/3rd gratuity. The appellate and revisional authorities upheld this punishment. The respondent/writ petitioner challenged it before a learned Single Judge, who, while maintaining the finding of misconduct, held the penalty to be excessive and remanded the matter to the disciplinary authority with a specific direction to impose “any penalty other than compulsory retirement”.

The CISF authorities appealed. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set aside the order of the Single Judge, and restored the original punishment of compulsory retirement. In doing so, it clarified important principles governing:

  • How courts may (and may not) interfere with the quantum of punishment in service matters; and
  • How bigamy by a member of a “disciplined force” is to be treated within service jurisprudence.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background

  • The respondent, a CISF constable, was charged under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001 with:
    • Charge I: Contracting a second marriage with CISF Mahila Constable Prameela Pativada while his first marriage with K. Nagalakshmi was subsisting.
    • Charge II: Suppressing and concealing the fact of his earlier marriage while contracting the second marriage.
  • After a departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority (5th respondent in the writ petition) imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement with 2/3rd gratuity by order dated 11.01.2017.
  • The appeal (to the 4th respondent) and revision (to the 3rd respondent) were both rejected, confirming the punishment.
  • The constable challenged these orders by a writ petition (W.P. No. 14766 of 2018), invoking Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution, alleging violation of natural justice and disproportionate punishment, and seeking reinstatement with all consequential benefits.

2. Writ Petitioner’s Contentions

The writ petitioner broadly contended that:

  • His first marriage to K. Nagalakshmi was performed under parental pressure, even though he had already married or was in a long-standing relationship with Prameela Pativada, who was not accepted by his family.
  • The first marriage had broken down; criminal cases had been initiated by the first wife; and he had allegedly initiated and obtained divorce by mutual consent from her.
  • The allegations related to his personal life and had no nexus with his official duties in CISF.
  • Considering his family responsibilities, financial condition, and allegedly good service record, the penalty of compulsory retirement was harsh and disproportionate.

3. Department’s Stand

The CISF authorities contended that:

  • The respondent, as a member of a disciplined paramilitary force, was clearly bound by Rule 21(2) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules and Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, which categorically prohibit contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of the first, except in limited, legally permissible circumstances that were not present here.
  • No decree of divorce from a competent court had been produced showing that the first marriage had legally ended when the second marriage was contracted.
  • Adequate opportunity of hearing was given; the enquiry was conducted in compliance with procedural and natural justice; and the respondent failed to rebut the charges.
  • Given the nature of misconduct and the status of CISF as a disciplined force, the penalty of compulsory retirement with 2/3rd gratuity was justified and not disproportionate.

4. Findings of the Learned Single Judge (in the Writ Petition)

The Single Judge held, in essence, that:

  • The doctrine of proportionality applies to disciplinary punishments, and courts can interfere when the penalty is grossly excessive (relying on Supreme Court decisions such as Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri).
  • By citing decisions including Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh and certain Gauhati High Court judgments involving second marriage and dismissal, the Single Judge considered dismissal/removal from service as an extreme penalty and found parallels in the instant case.
  • Noted that the petitioner had, according to him, obtained mutual consent divorce from his first wife, and that compulsory retirement would severely affect his dependants.
  • Consequently, the matter was remanded to the disciplinary authority with a specific direction to impose any punishment other than compulsory retirement.

5. Core Issues Before the Division Bench

The Division Bench framed, inter alia, the following key points:

  1. Whether the respondent’s second marriage during subsistence of his first marriage constituted serious misconduct, and whether compulsory retirement was disproportionate or excessive.
  2. Whether, while remanding a disciplinary matter, a court can direct the disciplinary authority to impose only a capped range of punishments (e.g., “any penalty other than compulsory retirement”).
  3. Whether the original penalty order dated 11.01.2017 and the consequential appellate and revisional orders were proper, or whether the Single Judge’s order required interference.

6. Final Decision

The Division Bench held that:

  • The respondent’s second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage was undisputed and constituted a grave misconduct in violation of Rule 21 CCS (Conduct) Rules and Rule 18(b) CISF Rules.
  • The penalty of compulsory retirement with 2/3rd gratuity was not disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, particularly in the context of a disciplined force and the conscious, deliberate nature of the bigamous conduct.
  • The Single Judge exceeded the permissible bounds of judicial review by:
    • Interfering with the quantum of punishment without the penalty being so extreme as to “shock the conscience” of the court, and
    • Remanding the matter with a cap that the disciplinary authority must impose a penalty less than compulsory retirement.
  • The approach of “capped remand” was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncements, particularly B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, which emphasise that:
    • The choice of penalty lies primarily with the disciplinary/appellate authority, and
    • Court interference is confined to cases where punishment is shockingly disproportionate, in which case either a fresh decision is to be sought from the authority without capping, or in rare cases the court itself may substitute a lesser penalty with cogent reasons.

Accordingly, the writ appeal was allowed, the Single Judge’s order dated 05.03.2024 was set aside, and the disciplinary authority’s order dated 11.01.2017 (and consequential appellate and revisional orders) imposing compulsory retirement on the writ petitioner were restored and confirmed.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Judgment

1. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749

This landmark Supreme Court decision was central to the Division Bench’s articulation of the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters.

Key principles extracted and relied upon:

  • Judicial review is concerned with the fairness and legality of the decision-making process, not with the merits of the decision itself (i.e., not an appeal on facts).
  • The disciplinary authority (and, where provided, the appellate authority) are exclusive judges of fact regarding:
    • The appreciation of evidence, and
    • The determination of the appropriate penalty, keeping in view the magnitude and gravity of the misconduct.
  • The High Court or Tribunal can interfere with findings of fact only if they are:
    • Based on no evidence,
    • Perverse, or
    • Suffer from patent legal error.
  • As to punishment, the court can interfere only when the penalty is such that it “shocks the conscience”. In such a case, two options are available:
    • Remit the matter to the disciplinary/appellate authority for reconsideration of the penalty, or
    • In exceptional and rare cases, substitute a lesser penalty directly, with cogent reasons.

The Division Bench used these principles to underscore that the Single Judge’s direction effectively usurped the discretion of the disciplinary authority by prescribing that only a punishment less than compulsory retirement could be imposed, despite no demonstration that the original penalty was so harsh as to shock the conscience of the court.

2. D.K. Nanjundaiah v. Chief Quality Assurance Officer, (2008) 2 AIR Kant R 390 : 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 616

The Karnataka High Court decision, as cited and discussed in the judgment, reiterates:

  • Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be equated to an appellate review. The writ court cannot re-appreciate evidence to arrive at a different factual conclusion merely because another view is possible.
  • In disciplinary proceedings, charges can be established on a preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
  • If there is “some legal evidence” to support the findings of the enquiry officer/disciplinary authority, the court will not interfere simply because it might have come to a different conclusion.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court drew on this precedent to reinforce its conclusion that the writ petitioner’s plea on facts (parental pressure, family disputes, alleged divorce) could not justify a re-appreciation of evidence or interference with concurrent factual findings of three departmental authorities.

3. Raebareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bholanath Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 657 : AIR 1997 SC 1908

This Supreme Court judgment, cited in D.K. Nanjundaiah, reinforces that:

  • Judicial review over findings of fact in disciplinary matters is very limited.
  • The High Court must not act as if it were hearing a regular appeal on facts.

While not independently analysed at length, its principles are blended into the Division Bench’s understanding of the caution required in disturbing disciplinary findings or penalties.

4. Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 677

This is a major Supreme Court authority on the limits of judicial review over the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench quoted it extensively, particularly paragraph 19, to summarise the law as follows:

  • When charges of misconduct are proved, the determination of quantum and nature of punishment lies primarily within the jurisdiction of the departmental/disciplinary authorities.
  • The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary authorities and prescribe the specific penalty.
  • Judicial review is available on the quantum of punishment only when it is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
  • Even in such cases, the norm is:
    • Set aside the penalty and remit the matter to the disciplinary/appellate authority for reconsideration, and
    • Not for the court to directly fix the quantum of punishment, except in very exceptional situations, such as parity with a co-delinquent.

The Division Bench used this authority to demonstrate that the Single Judge’s approach—ordering a remand with a fixed upper limit (“any penalty other than compulsory retirement”)— was contrary to Supreme Court guidance. Proper remand must either:

  • Leave the entire question of penalty open to the authority, or
  • In rare cases, the court may itself fix a substituted penalty, with reasons, without remand.

5. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5110

This recent Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court concerned a similar context of second marriage and Rule 18 of the CISF Rules, 2001. The Andhra Pradesh High Court quoted paragraph 3 of that judgment, which, relying on the earlier case of Ex. Head Constable Bazir Singh v. UOI (BSF context), held that:

  • Though Rule 18 of the CISF Rules is located in a chapter dealing with “Recruitment” and superficially appears to address only eligibility at the stage of appointment, it must be given a purposive and pragmatic interpretation.
  • If a person with two spouses is ineligible even for appointment, it would be “totally absurd” to suggest that after appointment, he can freely enter into a second marriage without consequence.
  • The underlying rationale is that a person who would not be eligible for appointment because of bigamy should also be treated as ineligible to continue in service if he resorts to bigamy after appointment.

By invoking this authority, the Division Bench underscored that marital disqualification in the CISF Rules is not confined to the entry point, but also has consequences for continued service, thereby treating post-appointment bigamy as a serious continuing disqualification and misconduct.

6. J. Bernard Philip Leo v. Assistant Director of Survey & Land Records (Madras High Court)

The Division Bench referred to this decision of the Madras High Court, which, in the context of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, held:

  • A second marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first wife, without dissolution of the first marriage, constitutes a grave misconduct.
  • Such bigamous conduct is a continuing wrong, warranting the penalty of removal from service, which need not be interfered with.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court adopted the same characterization of bigamy—as grave, continuing misconduct— to justify treating the respondent’s conduct as sufficiently serious to sustain compulsory retirement.

7. Authorities Relied Upon by the Single Judge and Distinguished

The Single Judge had placed reliance on decisions such as:

  • Trilok Singh Rawat v. Union of India (2000 (3) GLT 558), and
  • The Gauhati High Court Division Bench decision in Union of India v. Pranab Kumar Nath (W.A. No. 357 of 2022, decided 18.01.2023).

Those decisions involved dismissal from service on the ground of second marriage, and the courts there had considered lesser penalties to be more appropriate. The present Division Bench distinguished those cases, emphasising that:

  • They dealt with the most extreme punishment of dismissal/removal, resulting in complete loss of livelihood and future employability, whereas the instant case involved compulsory retirement with partial gratuity, a comparatively lesser penalty.
  • The Single Judge’s reliance on “dismissal” cases to dilute a penalty of compulsory retirement was therefore misplaced.

IV. Legal Reasoning of the Division Bench

1. Nature and Gravity of Misconduct: Bigamy in a Disciplined Force

The Bench first emphasised that the respondent’s second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage was not in dispute. The defence was essentially one of mitigation (parental pressure, family dispute, alleged mutual consent divorce), not of factual denial.

Key legal conclusions:

  • Contracting a second marriage while the first is legally subsisting is:
    • A violation of Rule 21(2) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and Rule 18(b) of CISF Rules, 2001.
    • Not merely a matter of “private morality” but also an offence under criminal law (bigamy), though no criminal prosecution was actually launched.
    • A grave act of indiscipline, especially in a paramilitary/armed-style force, where higher standards of integrity and obedience are expected.
  • The absence of a prosecution or conviction under the Indian Penal Code does not insulate the employee from disciplinary consequences. Service law and criminal law operate in separate spheres.
  • The contention that the misconduct “has nothing to do with official duties” was rejected. For a government servant in a disciplined force, serious personal misconduct that violates binding conduct rules has a direct bearing on service discipline and institutional integrity.

2. Assessment of Proportionality of the Penalty

Applying the jurisprudence from B.C. Chaturvedi and Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank, the Court analysed whether compulsory retirement was so excessive as to warrant judicial interference.

Factors the Court considered:

  • The disciplinary authority explicitly recorded that, considering the respondent’s 10 years of service and family responsibilities, a lower penalty than dismissal/removal was chosen, i.e., compulsory retirement with 2/3rd gratuity, by invoking Rule 32 read with Rule 34(iii) of the CISF Rules.
  • The appellate and revisional authorities agreed that this penalty was “well commensurate” with the gravity of the misconduct.
  • Evidence from the statement of the first wife, K. Nagalakshmi, was highlighted: she categorically denied any agreement for mutual separation, contradicting the respondent’s plea that there was mutual consent separation/divorce at the material time.
  • The sequence of events showed a conscious, deliberate choice to maintain two marital relationships. The relationship with Prameela existed before, but the respondent nonetheless married Nagalakshmi under “parental pressure” and later formalised a second marriage with Prameela while the first was legally subsisting.

In this context, the Court held that:

  • The misconduct was grave and “conscious” bigamy, not a technical or minor lapse.
  • Compulsory retirement (with partial gratuity) was not so harsh as to shock the conscience, particularly when compared to the more severe penalties of dismissal/removal which other courts have sometimes upheld for similar misconduct.
  • The fact that dependants would suffer is a common consequence of major penalties and cannot be a determinative ground for judicial dilution of an otherwise proportionate punishment in cases of serious legal and disciplinary violations.

3. Impermissibility of “Capped Remand” on Penalty

A major doctrinal contribution of the judgment is its clear disapprovalany penalty other than compulsory retirement”.

The Division Bench reasoned that:

  • Under the law laid down by the Supreme Court, while courts may:
    • Set aside a punishment that is shockingly disproportionate and remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for fresh decision on penalty, or
    • In rare cases, substitute a lesser penalty directly,
    they cannot both:
    • remand the matter, and
    • simultaneously impose an upper cap on the permissible punishment.
  • When a matter is remitted for reconsideration of penalty, the full spectrum of legally permissible penalties should ordinarily remain open to the disciplinary authority, unless the court itself replaces the penalty with a specific, final alternative.
  • Fixing a cap (e.g., “anything other than compulsory retirement”) effectively amounts to the court substituting its own view on proportionality, while still formally leaving the decision to the authority, which is inconsistent with the separation of functions clearly delineated by the Supreme Court.

The Division Bench therefore held that:

  • Interfering with the findings on guilt while leaving penalty to the authority is one option; interfering with penalty alone (by direct substitution) is another in rare cases; but an intermediate “capped remand” is not sanctioned by precedent.
  • In the present case, since the penalty was not shockingly disproportionate, no interference was warranted at all.

4. Distinction Between Dismissal/Removal and Compulsory Retirement

The Court explicitly distinguished penalties of:

  • Dismissal/Removal – the most extreme punishment, resulting in complete severance of service, loss of all post-retiral benefits, and disqualification from future public employment; and
  • Compulsory Retirement – which, though a major penalty, still allows some retiral benefits (here, 2/3rd gratuity), and does not necessarily bar other future employment.

This distinction served two purposes in the Court’s reasoning:

  • To show that authorities like Trilok Singh Rawat and Pranab Kumar Nath—where courts sought to mitigate from dismissal—were not directly comparable to a case of compulsory retirement.
  • To justify that in the present case the disciplinary authority had already taken a lenient view relative to the maximum possible penalties, thereby undermining the plea for further judicial leniency.

5. Rejection of “Private Life” Defence

The respondent had argued that his marital conduct was a matter of private life and unrelated to his official duties. The Court rejected this argument, holding that:

  • Once conduct rules (Rule 21 CCS, Rule 18 CISF) explicitly proscribe bigamous conduct, violation of those rules ipso facto becomes a service matter.
  • For a disciplined force, standards of personal conduct and legality are themselves integral to the requirements of service. The force’s discipline, image, and public trust justify a stricter view of such misconduct.
  • The fact that criminal law and service law can both address the same conduct does not render either redundant. The absence of criminal prosecution is irrelevant to whether departmental action is justified.

V. Impact and Significance of the Judgment

1. For Service Law and Disciplinary Jurisprudence

The judgment consolidates and clarifies several key aspects of Indian service jurisprudence:

  • Affirmation of Limited Judicial Review Over Punishment: It reinforces that High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be slow to interfere with the disciplinary authority’s choice of penalty, stepping in only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate.
  • Rejection of Capped Remand: The explicit criticism of remanding matters with a specified cap on penalty has important systemic implications. It warns courts not to indulge in hybrid orders that blur the boundary between adjudicatory and administrative roles in disciplinary matters.
  • Deference to Departmental Concurrency: Where the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities all concur on both guilt and penalty, the threshold for judicial interference in writ jurisdiction becomes even higher.

2. For Members of Disciplined Forces (Police, Paramilitary, Armed Forces Analogues)

The judgment sends a clear message to personnel in disciplined and uniformed forces:

  • Bigamy is grave misconduct, not merely a private or moral lapse, particularly where conduct rules explicitly prohibit it. It can result in major penalties like compulsory retirement or even dismissal.
  • The defence that the misconduct is confined to “private life” is untenable when service rules impose standards of personal conduct as a condition of service.
  • Later events—such as a subsequently obtained mutual consent divorce—may have limited mitigating value if, at the time of the second marriage, the first marriage was legally subsisting.

3. For Future Litigation Involving Second Marriage / Bigamy

In cases involving government servants and quasi-military forces:

  • Courts in Andhra Pradesh (and elsewhere, by persuasive value) are likely to treat second marriage during subsistence of the first as a grave, continuing wrong, justifying strong disciplinary measures.
  • Arguments founded heavily on sympathy for dependants or on the private nature of marital disputes will carry limited weight where statutory conduct rules are violated.
  • Counsel will have to frame challenges primarily within the high threshold of “shockingly disproportionate” punishment, supported, for example, by extreme factual disparity or demonstrable discriminatory treatment.

4. Institutional Impact on High Court Practice

Internally, this judgment will likely influence how Single Judges and Division Benches of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh:

  • Approach remand orders in service matters, avoiding “capped remand” that constrains the authority’s discretion beyond what Supreme Court precedent allows.
  • Treat prior High Court decisions from other jurisdictions that have taken a more lenient view in bigamy cases, by emphasising contextual differences (e.g., dismissal versus compulsory retirement, different force structures, differing statutory frameworks).

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Judicial Review vs. Appeal in Disciplinary Matters

Judicial Review under Article 226 (writ jurisdiction):

  • Focuses on how a decision was made, not on whether the decision was the best or correct one.
  • Looks at:
    • Whether the authority had jurisdiction,
    • Whether proper procedure and natural justice were followed,
    • Whether the decision is supported by some relevant evidence, and
    • Whether the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have taken it.
  • Does not allow re-hearing the case on facts as if it were a regular appeal.

By contrast, an appeal (where provided by statute or rules) allows the appellate authority to:

  • Reassess the entire evidence,
  • Modify, reduce, or enhance punishment, and
  • Substitute its own view on both facts and law.

2. Doctrine of Proportionality

This doctrine asks whether the severity of the punishment is reasonably proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. In disciplinary cases:

  • Courts do not generally substitute their own sense of proportion for that of the disciplinary authority.
  • They intervene only where the punishment is: “shockingly disproportionate”, meaning so outrageously harsh that it defies logic or standards of fairness.

In this case, the Division Bench held that a constable in a disciplined force, who consciously commits bigamy in violation of conduct rules, can legitimately face compulsory retirement without that punishment being considered shockingly disproportionate.

3. Dismissal, Removal, and Compulsory Retirement

  • Dismissal/Removal:
    • Complete termination of employment on grounds of misconduct.
    • Usually entails loss of all past service benefits.
    • Often disqualifies from future government employment.
  • Compulsory Retirement (as penalty):
    • Premature retirement imposed as punishment.
    • May preserve some retiral benefits (here, 2/3rd gratuity).
    • Does not necessarily create a bar to private or other employment.

The Court emphasised that asking for further judicial leniency after an authority has chosen compulsory retirement instead of dismissal is significantly more difficult.

4. Bigamy as “Continuing Misconduct”

Bigamy refers, in this context, to contracting a second marriage during the lifetime of the first spouse without lawful dissolution of the first marriage. It is:

  • An offence under criminal law (subject to proof and prosecution), and
  • A continuing violation of conduct rules so long as both marital relationships are maintained.

Therefore, even if the second marriage occurred in the past, the ongoing status of dual marital relationships can justify current disciplinary action.

5. Disciplined Force

A “disciplined force” (like CISF, BSF, CRPF, etc.) is a force in which:

  • Higher and stricter standards of personal and professional conduct are demanded, given the nature of duties (security, armed duty, public safety, etc.).
  • Misconduct that might be treated more leniently in non-uniformed civil services may be visited with stricter penalties because of its impact on the morale, discipline, and public image of the force.

VII. Conclusion

The Director General, CISF v. Kudipudi Suri Babu is a significant reaffirmation of two core pillars of Indian service jurisprudence:

  1. That second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage by a member of a disciplined force, in violation of statutory conduct rules, constitutes grave misconduct warranting serious penalties, including compulsory retirement; and
  2. That the power to determine the quantum of disciplinary punishment lies primarily in the hands of the disciplinary and appellate authorities, with courts intervening only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, and even then without resorting to an impermissible device of “capped remand”.

The Division Bench’s decision harmonises with the leading Supreme Court precedents in B.C. Chaturvedi and Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank, and integrates more recent High Court jurisprudence on the post-appointment consequences of bigamy in forces governed by rules such as CISF Rule 18. In setting aside the Single Judge’s order and restoring compulsory retirement, the Court underscores that:

  • Sympathy for dependants cannot override serious breaches of conduct rules in a disciplined force, and
  • Judicial review is a tool to ensure fairness and legality, not a mechanism for courts to recast disciplinary penalties according to their own view of what is lenient or harsh.

As a precedent, the judgment will likely serve as a guiding authority in Andhra Pradesh, and by persuasive value in other jurisdictions, on both the treatment of bigamous conduct in service law and the proper limits of judicial intervention in disciplinary punishment.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Andhra Pradesh High Court

Judge(s)

BATTU DEVANAND A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

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