Counter-Prosecutions against Sexual Harassment Complainants: Delhi High Court on Section 195 CrPC, Data Entrustment and Defamation in Rajan Sareen v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors.

I. Introduction

The decision of the Delhi High Court in Rajan Sareen v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2025 DHC 11361 (15 December 2025), addresses a legally sensitive and socially important situation: an employer/Director facing multiple FIRs for sexual harassment from ex-employees, who in turn seeks to prosecute those ex-employees for offences such as giving false information, instituting false criminal proceedings, criminal breach of trust (data theft), defamation and criminal intimidation.

The petitioner, Rajan Sareen, a Director of M/s Crescore Wealth Management (P) Ltd. and M/s Unor Exim Pvt. Ltd., filed a criminal complaint against four former female employees (Respondent Nos. 2–5), alleging:

Theft/misappropriation of confidential business data and documents;
Conspiracy to file false sexual harassment and molestation complaints, leading to four FIRs;
Defamation in business and social circles; and
Criminal intimidation by threats to file false cases.

He sought their summoning for offences under Sections 182/211/406/500/506/34/120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The learned Metropolitan Magistrate (MM) declined to summon them (except for subsequent modification by the Sessions Court for S. 506), and the learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) substantially upheld that view, summoning only Respondent No. 2 (Sangeeta Nagpal) under Section 506 IPC.

The petitioner invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to challenge the ASJ’s order, contending that the Magistrate and the ASJ had disregarded material evidence and had mechanically refused to summon the respondents for multiple offences.

The High Court, per Neena Bansal Krishna, J., dismissed the petition, upholding the limited summoning under Section 506 IPC alone. This judgment clarifies:

The bar under Section 195 CrPC in relation to offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC;
The ingredients of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) vis-à-vis employees handling confidential business data;
The limits of defamation (Section 500 IPC) when based merely on filing complaints/FIRs; and
The appropriate scope of summoning at the pre-cognizance stage, especially where criminal complaints may operate as a counterblast to sexual harassment allegations.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court held:

No cognizance can be taken under Sections 182 and 211 IPC on a private complaint: Both offences fall within the bar of Section 195 CrPC; only a complaint in writing by the concerned public servant or by a court can sustain such prosecution. As no such complaint existed, proceedings under Sections 182/211 IPC were barred.
No prima facie offence under Section 406 IPC (criminal breach of trust) was made out: The confidential data and documents were in the possession of the ex‑employees in the course of their employment. There was no sufficient prima facie material to show “entrustment” coupled with dishonest misappropriation or conversion as required under Sections 405/406 IPC.
No prima facie offence under Section 500 IPC (defamation) was made out: Mere filing of complaints/FIRs – even if later found to be untrue – does not by itself amount to defamation, particularly when such complaints are made to lawful authorities in the ordinary course of seeking redress. No specific defamatory imputation outside that context was shown.
Prima facie offence under Section 506 IPC was made out only against Respondent No. 2 (Sangeeta Nagpal): On the pre‑summoning evidence, there was sufficient material that she threatened the petitioner on 28.04.2014, in the presence of office staff, to file false complaints of molestation and sexual harassment if he pursued legal action against another ex‑employee (Respondent No. 4, Tanu Malik). The ASJ’s order summoning her under Section 506 was upheld. No such case was established against the other respondents.
No case was made out under Sections 34 or 120B IPC: In the absence of a primary offence made out against Respondent Nos. 3–5, the allegations of common intention or criminal conspiracy could not stand.
The High Court declined to interfere under Section 482 CrPC: Finding no perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the orders of the MM and ASJ, the Court dismissed the petition and maintained the limited summoning under Section 506 IPC against Respondent No. 2 alone.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural History and Scope of the Petition

The procedural trajectory is important to understand the limited scope of the High Court’s intervention:

Initially, the petitioner moved an application under Section 156(3) CrPC on 20.11.2014 asking the Magistrate to direct registration of an FIR against the respondents for various offences.
The Magistrate declined the Section 156(3) request on 24.11.2014 but treated it as a complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceeded to pre‑summoning evidence.
The petitioner examined himself (CW‑3) and two employees (CW‑1 Preet Kaur and CW‑2 Sonia Gupta) as pre‑summoning witnesses.
By order dated 02.03.2016, the MM dismissed the complaint, essentially holding that no prima facie case was made out for the alleged offences.
In revision, the ASJ (16.03.2017) confirmed the MM’s findings, except that he held there was sufficient material to summon Respondent No. 2 under Section 506 IPC.
The present petition under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court challenged the ASJ’s order insofar as it upheld the non‑summoning of the respondents on the other offences.

The High Court correctly framed the core question (para 36): whether the respondents had been rightly discharged for the alleged offences, and whether any interference was warranted with the concurrent findings of the MM and ASJ, except for the Section 506 IPC summons already issued against Respondent No. 2.

B. Offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC and the Bar of Section 195 CrPC

The petitioner alleged that the FIRs (Nos. 294/14, 295/14, 296/14, 297/14 – all under Sections 354/354A/509 IPC) lodged by the respondents against him constituted:

Section 182 IPC – giving false information to a public servant to cause him to misuse his lawful power to another’s injury; and
Section 211 IPC – instituting criminal proceedings falsely with intent to cause injury.

The Court’s reasoning has two distinct limbs:

1. Lack of finding that the FIRs were false/malicious

At para 37, the Court notes that the allegations under Sections 182 and 211 are “essentially in the context of the aforementioned FIRs.” Those FIRs had been investigated, charge‑sheets filed, and cases were pending trial. There was nothing on record, at this stage, to conclude that those FIRs were false, malafide or instituted with an intent to cause injury. That issue would be decided in the respective trials, not in this collateral proceeding.

2. Absolute procedural bar under Section 195 CrPC

More fundamentally, and this is the key legal principle, the Court relies on Section 195 CrPC (para 38–39). Section 195 restricts the Magistrate’s power to take cognizance for certain offences, including:

Offences under Section 182 IPC (false information to a public servant); and
Offences under Section 211 IPC (false charge of offence, with intent to injure).

For such offences, cognizance can be taken only upon a written complaint by the:

Public servant concerned (in the case of Section 182 IPC); or
Court concerned (in the case of offences relating to judicial proceedings, such as Section 211 in certain contexts).

In the present case:

No public servant (e.g., the SHO or investigating officer) had filed any written complaint alleging that the respondents had given false information;
No court had initiated any complaint under Section 195 CrPC on the basis of the FIRs lodged by the respondents.

Thus, irrespective of the underlying facts, the MM was barred in law from taking cognizance of offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC on a private complaint by the petitioner. The High Court affirms this legal bar, holding that “no offence under Section 182/211 IPC was made out” (para 39) in the sense that cognizance itself was impermissible in the absence of the special complaint mandated by Section 195 CrPC.

This is a critical reaffirmation: private parties cannot directly prosecute alleged “false” complainants for Sections 182/211 IPC; only the State/public servant or court can initiate such prosecution via Section 195 CrPC.

C. Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 406 IPC) and Employee Access to Data

The petitioner alleged that Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5, in their capacity as employees, were entrusted with confidential client data, documents and files, and that their failure to return these upon resignation constituted criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC.

The Court’s analysis (para 40–41) turns on the constituent elements of Sections 405/406 IPC:

Entrustment of property (or dominion over property);
Dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion to own use or use/disposal of such property in violation of any legal direction or contract; and
The requisite mens rea (dishonest intention) at the time of misappropriation or violation.

The High Court endorses the ASJ’s view that:

The data and documents were in the possession of the respondents by virtue of their normal duties “during the course of their employment”;
They held such data “in connection with their official duties” and there was no sufficient evidence to show that they dishonestly converted it for personal use or gain;
There was insufficient “entrustment” in the sense required by Section 405 IPC — i.e., an entrustment attracting a fiduciary obligation, followed by dishonest misappropriation or violation of a legal direction.

While the petitioner argued that:

Employment agreements and bonds were executed;
The respondents were bound not to misuse or retain confidential information;
E‑mails showed that Respondent No. 3 acknowledged having the data and that certain data had been deleted from systems,

the Court held that these assertions, even assuming them at face value, did not adequately establish dishonest entrustment and misappropriation for the purpose of criminal prosecution. Breach of confidentiality clauses or non‑return of office material after resignation may well give rise to civil claims (as evidenced by the civil suit the Company filed against Respondent No. 3), but this alone does not transform the dispute into a criminal breach of trust.

The Court therefore agrees with the ASJ that no prima facie offence under Section 406 IPC was made out on the pre‑summoning material.

D. Defamation (Section 500 IPC) and Complaints to Authorities

The petitioner claimed that the respondents damaged his reputation by spreading false allegations and filing multiple FIRs, thereby causing him mental agony, business loss and social stigma. He sought to prosecute them for defamation under Section 500 IPC.

The MM – and the ASJ concurring – held, and the High Court affirms (para 42–44), that no prima facie defamation case was made out. The key reasoning is:

Defamation requires intention or knowledge that the imputation will harm reputation: Under Section 499 IPC, the prosecution must show:
- An imputation concerning a person;
- Publication of that imputation to a third party;
- Intention, knowledge, or reason to believe that the imputation will harm reputation;
- That none of the statutory exceptions applies (e.g., good faith, public interest, complaint to authority).
Mere filing of complaints/FIRs is not per se defamation: The Court emphasises that when individuals approach lawful authorities to complain of alleged wrongdoing, this is ordinarily done in the course of seeking redress, and may fall within the protective ambit of good faith/public interest. The mere act of lodging a complaint – even if later found to be untrue – does not automatically translate into a defamatory act giving rise to criminal prosecution.
No specific independent defamatory publication was shown: The petitioner did not demonstrate that the respondents had circulated defamatory statements about him in business circles, media, or social fora beyond the FIRs and complaints to authorities. Absent clear evidence of malicious publication beyond the legal process, the ingredients of Section 500 IPC were not satisfied.

Thus the Court accepts the lower courts’ appreciation of evidence as non‑perverse and declines to interfere: no offence under Section 500 IPC is made out on the present record.

E. Criminal Intimidation (Section 506 IPC)

The complaint alleged that on 28.04.2014, Respondent No. 2 (Sangeeta Nagpal) came to the petitioner’s office and “indirectly threatened” him in the presence of office staff. The threat was allegedly that if the petitioner pursued legal action against Respondent No. 4 (Tanu Malik), the respondents would “join hands” and file false complaints of molestation and sexual harassment to “teach him a lesson.”

On this aspect, the High Court endorses the ASJ’s finding (para 45) that there is sufficient prima facie material:

All three pre‑summoning witnesses (the petitioner as CW‑3, and CW‑1 and CW‑2) deposed consistently about this incident;
The alleged threat, if believed, is capable of causing alarm and is directed to dissuade the petitioner from exercising his legal right to pursue a civil suit or other action;
Such a threat falls within the contours of Section 506 IPC, which penalises criminal intimidation – threatening another with injury to reputation, person or property with the intent to cause alarm or to compel them to do or omit an act they are legally entitled or obliged to do.

The Court therefore holds that the ASJ “rightly summoned only Respondent No. 2 for offence under Section 506 IPC” (para 45–46), and finds no basis to extend liability to the other respondents on this count, in the absence of clear prima facie evidence of their participation in the alleged threat.

F. Common Intention (Section 34 IPC) and Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120B IPC)

The petitioner alleged that all respondents had “joined hands” to conspire against him and that their acts were in furtherance of a common intention, invoking Sections 34 and 120B IPC.

However, both provisions are parasitic in nature: they attach liability only where a substantive offence is shown, and where common intention or agreement to commit that offence is demonstrably shared.

Section 34 IPC requires a common intention and an act done in furtherance of that common intention.
Section 120B IPC punishes agreement to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means (criminal conspiracy).

Once the Court concluded that:

No cognizable offence was made out under Sections 182/211/406/500 IPC against Respondent Nos. 3–5; and
Only Respondent No. 2 was prima facie liable under Section 506 IPC for her individual act of threatened false complaint,

the foundation for invoking Sections 34 and 120B in respect of a group offence largely disappeared. Without a sustainable primary offence involving the group, the allegations of common intention or conspiracy necessarily failed.

G. Precedents Cited by the Petitioner and Their Role

The petitioner relied on the following decisions (para 29):

Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, 1976 Lawsuit (SC) 189;
M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2037;
Balraj Khanna & Ors. v. Moti Ram, AIR 1971 SC 1389;
Tata Motors Ltd. v. State, Crl. Rev. P. No. 16/2008 (Delhi High Court).

These authorities broadly lay down that:

At the stage of summoning under Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is only to see whether a prima facie case is made out, not to conduct a detailed trial of facts or weigh evidence as in a final adjudication.
Minor contradictions in witness testimony should not ordinarily be magnified to discard the complaint at the threshold.

The petitioner argued that the MM had exceeded this limited remit by disbelieving his witnesses and by not giving due weight to the documents and e‑mails produced.

While the High Court does not discuss these precedents extensively, its reasoning implicitly reconciles them:

Even applying the low threshold of prima facie view prescribed in Nagawwa, M.N. Damani and Balraj Khanna, the Court finds that crucial statutory ingredients for the alleged offences are absent:
- For Sections 182/211 – an absolute bar under Section 195 CrPC;
- For Section 406 – no clear entrustment plus dishonest misappropriation;
- For Section 500 – no defamatory publication beyond lawful complaints to authorities.
As regards Tata Motors Ltd. v. State, the principle that the Magistrate must only see if a prima facie case exists is not disputed. The Court simply finds that even on that standard, the evidence led at pre‑summoning falls short in respect of the contested offences.

Accordingly, these precedents do not assist the petitioner because they do not permit a Magistrate to ignore statutory bars like Section 195 CrPC or to create an offence where core ingredients are missing. They instead reinforce the principle that while the threshold is low, it is not illusory: the fundamental ingredients of the offence must still be evident.

H. Standard at Summoning Stage and Scope of Section 482 CrPC Review

A recurring theme in the judgment is the limited scrutiny permissible:

At the pre‑summoning stage (Section 200 CrPC), the Magistrate is to see whether:
- the complaint and supporting evidence, if taken at face value, make out the ingredients of the alleged offences; and
- the complaint is not inherently improbable, vexatious or barred by law.
At the revisional/inherent jurisdiction level, the High Court intervenes only if:
- there is a jurisdictional error;
- material illegality or perversity in appreciating evidence; or
- an abuse of process of law is evident.

The High Court repeatedly notes there is “no perversity” in the appreciation of evidence by the MM and ASJ (e.g., para 44–47). Thus, even if a different view were hypothetically possible, the High Court will not substitute its own assessment so long as the lower courts’ view is a possible, reasonable view grounded in law.

This approach is consistent with the narrow compass of Section 482 CrPC, which is meant to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice, not to conduct a second‑guessing of factual determination at the threshold.

I. Interplay with Pending Sexual Harassment FIRs

Four FIRs (Nos. 294/2014, 295/2014, 296/2014, 297/2014), all under Sections 354/354A/509 IPC, were lodged by the respondents as ex‑employees accusing the petitioner of outraging their modesty/sexual harassment. The Status Report notes that:

Statements under Section 164 CrPC were recorded;
Evidence such as CDRs and CCTV footage was collected;
Charge‑sheets were filed and the cases were pending trial.

The petitioner claimed these FIRs were false and a counterblast to civil/legal actions initiated by him (e.g., suit against Tanu Malik, legal notices to Ketaki Chawla). The High Court, however, takes a clear position (para 35):

“Whether the four FIRs registered against the Petitioner were malafide or not, is not the subject matter of the present complaints”;
Therefore, “his contentions in respect of the FIRs is not relevant for the purpose of present Petition.”

This separation is important. The High Court refuses to allow the petitioner’s private criminal complaint to operate as a collateral trial on the correctness or mala fides of the pending sexual harassment FIRs. Those FIRs will be assessed on their own merits in the criminal trials; their truthfulness cannot be pre‑judged in this Section 482 proceeding.

Coupled with the Section 195 CrPC bar and the limited approach to defamation, the practical effect is to:

Prevent immediate criminalisation of complainants merely because the accused alleges that their complaints are false;
Ensure that sexual harassment complainants are not easily chilled or silenced by swift counter‑prosecutions under Sections 182/211/500 IPC; and
Still permit action where there is clear evidence of threats to fabricate complaints (as under Section 506 IPC, here against Respondent No. 2).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Section 195 CrPC – Why Can’t a Private Party Prosecute Under Sections 182/211 IPC?

Section 195 CrPC is a procedural safeguard that:

Prevents private vendettas from turning into prosecutions for offences that closely affect the administration of justice or the functioning of public servants;
Reserves the decision to prosecute such offences (false information to public servant, false charges, perjury, etc.) to the public servant or the court directly affected.

In practical terms:

If someone gives false information to the police, only the concerned police officer (or a higher authority) can decide to initiate prosecution under Section 182 IPC.
If someone falsely accuses you in court and lies on oath, you cannot directly file a complaint under Sections 193/211 IPC; the court itself must initiate the process.

This case reaffirms that accused persons cannot short‑circuit this mechanism by filing their own criminal complaints under Sections 182/211 IPC, even if they honestly believe the original complaint is false.

2. “Entrustment” and Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 406 IPC)

For criminal breach of trust:

“Entrustment” means handing over property to someone in a manner that creates a duty to deal with it in a particular way;
The offence occurs if that person, dishonestly, misappropriates it, converts it to his/her own use, or violates the direction with intention to cause wrongful gain/loss.

In workplace scenarios:

Employees routinely handle confidential data, client lists, and company documents;
Breach of such obligations is often contractually regulated and enforceable through civil suits, injunctions or damages;
To cross the threshold into criminal breach of trust, there must be evidence of dishonest misappropriation – not just non‑return or misuse, but a culpable intent to wrongfully convert or cause loss.

The Court here emphasises that possession of data in the course of employment, by itself, does not prove such dishonest misappropriation.

3. Prima Facie Case at Summoning Stage

A “prima facie” case means:

If the statements and documents produced by the complainant are taken at face value, without questioning their truthfulness, do they disclose the legal ingredients of the offence?
The Magistrate does not decide whether these facts are ultimately true; only whether, if true, they would constitute an offence.

In this case, even on that assumption:

Cognizance of Sections 182/211 IPC was barred by law (Section 195 CrPC);
The facts did not demonstrate the essential ingredients for Sections 406 and 500 IPC;
There was sufficient material for Section 506 IPC only in respect of Respondent No. 2.

4. Complaints vs Defamation

Filing a complaint or FIR:

Is generally a lawful act seeking redress from competent authorities;
Is often protected under exceptions to defamation if made in good faith or in the public interest;
Does not automatically become defamatory even if the allegations are later disproved.

Defamation requires proof that:

The statement was communicated to others; and
It was made with intent or knowledge to harm reputation, outside the protective sphere of lawful, good‑faith complaint‑making.

This case reinforces that complaints to the police or authorities, by themselves, are not ordinarily to be criminalised as defamation.

V. Impact and Future Implications

1. Protection of Complainants in Sexual Harassment and Related Offences

The judgment has significant implications in the context where employees file complaints of sexual harassment or outraging of modesty against senior officials or employers:

It becomes more difficult for accused persons to immediately launch counter‑prosecutions under Sections 182/211 and 500 IPC on the mere assertion that the complaint is false;
This reduces the risk of secondary victimisation and a chilling effect against reporting sexual offences;
At the same time, threats to fabricate complaints (as alleged against Respondent No. 2) can still be prosecuted under Section 506 IPC if prima facie established.

2. Employer–Employee Disputes Over Data and Confidentiality

The Court draws a careful line between:

Civil disputes over breach of employment contracts, confidentiality and non‑return of documents; and
Criminal offences like breach of trust or theft.

Employers frequently try to invoke criminal law (e.g., Section 406 IPC) when employees leave with client lists or data. This judgment underscores that:

Merely having handled or even retained some data is not enough;
There must be strong prima facie evidence of dishonest conversion/misappropriation to sustain criminal prosecution;
Civil remedies (recovery suits, injunctions, damages) remain the primary channel for such disputes.

3. Clarifying the Reach of Section 195 CrPC

The judgment reaffirms and applies Section 195 CrPC in a straightforward way, serving as a reminder that:

Courts cannot entertain private complaints under Sections 182/211 IPC, even if detailed pre‑summoning evidence is led;
Public servants and courts retain institutional control over whether to prosecute for false information or false charges affecting them.

This will likely be cited in future cases where accused persons seek to prosecute complainants for allegedly false FIRs while those FIRs are pending.

4. Guidance for Magistrates on Summoning Orders

The judgment validates a cautious, ingredients‑based approach at summoning stage:

Magistrates must not be swayed by the volume of evidence or the vehemence of allegations;
They must first identify the specific ingredients of the alleged offence and then see whether the complaint and evidence, even if taken as true, meet those ingredients;
Where specific statutory bars (like Section 195 CrPC) exist, they override everything else.

This will guide trial courts in balancing the right to seek criminal redress with the need to prevent abusive or retaliatory prosecutions.

VI. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Rajan Sareen v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. stands at the intersection of criminal procedure, employment law and the law relating to sexual offences and defamation. Its key contributions are:

Reaffirming the mandatory bar of Section 195 CrPC against private prosecution under Sections 182 and 211 IPC;
Clarifying that employment‑related data disputes typically do not amount to criminal breach of trust absent clear evidence of dishonest misappropriation;
Restating that filing complaints or FIRs is not ordinarily defamation, even if subsequently challenged as false, especially when those complaints are before lawful authorities;
Recognising and upholding a narrowly tailored criminal intimidation charge (Section 506 IPC) where there is prima facie evidence of threats to initiate false complaints;
Maintaining a principled, limited role for the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, intervening only where there is clear illegality or abuse of process.

In the broader legal context, the judgment sends a nuanced message: while the criminal justice system must be vigilant against false and malicious allegations, it must also not be weaponised as an instrument of retaliation against those who approach authorities with complaints of serious misconduct, including sexual harassment. At the same time, threats to fabricate such complaints are themselves criminally culpable and can be addressed under appropriate provisions like Section 506 IPC.

Thus, the case reinforces foundational procedural safeguards, clarifies the limits of criminalisation in employment and defamation disputes, and seeks to strike a balance between deterring abuse of process and protecting the right to seek lawful redress.

Counter-Prosecutions against Sexual Harassment Complainants: Delhi High Court on Section 195 CrPC, Data Entrustment and Defamation in Rajan Sareen v. State (NCT of Delhi)