Concurrent Jurisdiction of Jurisdictional and Faceless Assessing Officers under Section 148: A Detailed Commentary on Inder Dev Gupta v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Delhi High Court in Inder Dev Gupta v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle‑2, Delhi, along with several connected writ petitions decided on 21 November 2025 by a Division Bench (V. Kameswar Rao, J. and Vinod Kumar, J.).

The case arises against the backdrop of significant structural changes to the income tax assessment machinery:

The introduction of the “faceless” regime through Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), and
The insertion of Section 151A and the CBDT’s “E‑Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022” (“2022 Scheme”), which purport to make reassessment proceedings under Sections 147–151 faceless.

The central controversy is:

After the introduction of Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme, who has jurisdiction to issue reassessment notices under Section 148 – only the Faceless Assessing Officer (“FAO”) functioning under the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), or do the traditional Jurisdictional Assessing Officers (“JAOs”) retain concurrent power?

Various High Courts outside Delhi (notably Bombay, Telangana, Madras, Rajasthan, and Punjab & Haryana) have held that only the FAO can initiate reassessment by issuing a notice under Section 148. The Delhi High Court, however, in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO has taken a contrary view, recognising concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and FAO. The present judgment is significant because:

It reaffirms the TKS Builders doctrine for the Delhi jurisdiction; and
It clarifies the legal effect of Supreme Court orders dismissing Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) in limine, particularly in the context of conflicting High Court views on the reassessment regime.

2. Brief Overview of the Case

2.1 Parties and Petitions

The court decided a batch of writ petitions, the principal ones being:

W.P.(C) 16937/2025 – Inder Dev Gupta v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi
W.P.(C) 16939/2025, 16949/2025, 16985/2025, 17082/2025 – All India Kataria Educational Society v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi
W.P.(C) 16986/2025 – Sumanglam Sewa Aivam Education Samiti v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi
Other connected petitions by the same individuals/entities

In all cases, the respondent was the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle‑2, Delhi (“Central Circle JAO”), i.e., the assessing officer in the centralised charge.

2.2 Core Relief Sought

The petitioners challenged:

Notices issued under Section 148 of the Act by the Central Circle JAO; and
All consequent reassessment proceedings;

on the ground that, after the enactment of Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme, such notices could only be issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer under the NFAC, not by the local JAO.

2.3 Common Legal Issue

The Division Bench centralised the issue to be decided as:

Whether, in light of Section 151A and the E‑Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022, a Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (including those in Central Circles) lacks jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, such that only a Faceless Assessing Officer can do so?

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Delhi High Court dismissed all the writ petitions. The principal holdings are:

Concurrent Jurisdiction Upheld: The court reaffirmed its earlier ruling in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, holding that both:
- the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), and
- the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO)
possess concurrent jurisdiction to initiate reassessment by issuing notices under Section 148.
Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme Do Not Exclusively Vest Power in FAO: The insertion of Section 151A and the notification of the 2022 Scheme do not divest JAOs of jurisdiction; they only provide an additional faceless mode. The traditional jurisdiction of JAOs survives.
Effect of Supreme Court’s Dismissal of SLPs: Dismissal of SLPs by the Supreme Court in limine (without detailed reasons) – including in cases such as:
- ADIT (International Taxation)-2 v. Deepanjan Roy, and
- Prakash Pandurang Patil v. ITO (SLP stage)
does not:
- create a binding precedent under Article 141;
- cause the doctrine of merger to operate; or
- negate or read down the Delhi High Court’s own earlier judgment in TKS Builders.
Interim Orders of the Supreme Court Not Equivalent to Staying TKS Builders: In related SLPs (e.g., All India Kataria Educational Society v. ACIT, Yukti Export v. ITO, and PC Jeweller Ltd. v. ACIT), the Supreme Court:
- issued interim stays of reassessment proceedings, or
- directed that adverse orders shall not be given effect;
but it did not stay the underlying High Court judgments. Hence, TKS Builders and subsequent Delhi decisions remain fully binding within the Delhi High Court’s jurisdiction.
Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedent within the High Court: So long as TKS Builders stands and is neither overruled by a larger Bench nor set aside by the Supreme Court, a coordinate Division Bench is bound to follow it, notwithstanding:
- conflicting judgments of other High Courts, or
- non‑speaking SLP dismissals by the Supreme Court.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory and Regulatory Framework

4.1.1 Reassessment Provisions: Sections 147–151

Section 147 permits the Assessing Officer to reassess income that has escaped assessment. Section 148 authorises the issuance of a notice to the assessee as a gateway to such reassessment. Post-2021 amendments, Section 148A prescribes a structured pre‑notice procedure (show‑cause notice, opportunity of hearing, speaking order, etc.).

4.1.2 Faceless Assessments: Section 144B

Section 144B introduced the “faceless assessment” mechanism for regular assessments, where:

assessment work is divided into several units (Assessment Unit, Verification Unit, etc.), and
the process is digitally managed through the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC).

4.1.3 Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme

Section 151A (inserted via the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2022 (“TOLA”)) empowers the Central Government to notify a scheme to:

make reassessment under Sections 147–151 faceless;
eliminate personal interface between the assessee and the assessing officer;
utilise technology and team-based assessment.

Pursuant to this, the CBDT issued Notification S.O. 1466(E) dated 29 March 2022, notifying the E‑Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022, which stipulates, inter alia, that:

assessments, reassessments, and recomputations under Section 147; and
issuance of notices under Section 148;

shall be conducted in a faceless manner in the manner provided under Section 144B.

The key interpretive question is: Does this framework exclude the jurisdiction of JAOs to issue Section 148 notices, or does it merely add a parallel faceless procedure?

4.2 Petitioners’ Arguments

4.2.1 Exclusive Jurisdiction of Faceless Assessing Officer

The petitioners argued that:

With Section 151A in place, and the 2022 Scheme making all reassessments and notices under Section 148 “faceless”,
only an Assessment Unit (i.e., FAO) functioning under the NFAC can legally issue a Section 148 notice.

Therefore, any notice issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), including Central Circle officers, is void ab initio, i.e., a nullity from the outset and without jurisdiction.

4.2.2 Reliance on Other High Court Decisions

Counsel for the petitioners placed heavy reliance on several decisions from other High Courts that had accepted this theory of exclusive FAO jurisdiction. These included, among others:

Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT, [2024] 162 taxmann.com 225 (Bombay HC)
Prakash Pandurang Patil v. ITO, 2024:BHC-AS:32759-DB (Bombay HC)
Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola v. DCIT, (Telangana HC)
Deepanjan Roy v. ADIT (International Taxation)-2, (Telangana HC)
Jatinder Singh Bhangu v. Union of India, (Punjab & Haryana HC)
Royal Bitumen (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT, [2024] 164 taxmann.com 606 (Bombay HC)
Everest Kanto Cylinder Ltd. v. DCIT/ACIT, [2024] 165 taxmann.com 192 (Bombay HC)
Sundaram Multi Pap Ltd. v. ACIT, [2024] 164 taxmann.com 608 (Bombay HC)
Venus Jewel v. ACIT, [2024] 164 taxmann.com 414 (Bombay HC)
Dadha Pharma LLP v. DCIT, (Madras HC)
Arene Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. v. Assessment Unit, (Telangana HC)
Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap v. ACIT, Central Circle‑5(3), Mumbai, (Bombay HC)
Rajesh Todwal v. DGIT (Inv.), Rajasthan & Ors., 2025:RJ-JP:35259-DB (Rajasthan HC)

These decisions, especially from the Bombay and Telangana High Courts, have consistently held that:

the faceless reassessment scheme is mandatory, and
central circles are not exempt from this regime.

4.2.3 Reliance on Supreme Court’s Dismissal of SLPs

The petitioners contended that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Revenue’s SLP in:

ADIT (International Taxation)-2 v. Deepanjan Roy, SLP(C) Diary No. 33956/2025 (dismissed on 16.07.2025),

effectively affirmed the view that only FAOs have jurisdiction under Section 148. They argued that:

By dismissing the SLP “on merits” (or stating “no merit”), the Supreme Court had indirectly approved the Bombay/Telangana line of authority; and
This, by necessary implication, undermined or read down the Delhi High Court’s ruling in TKS Builders.

4.2.4 Critique of Delhi High Court’s TKS Builders Line

The petitioners submitted that:

TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (2024) 167 taxmann.com 759 (Delhi HC) wrongly conceived of concurrent jurisdiction between JAO and FAO;
Subsequent decisions of the Delhi High Court – such as Mala Petrochemicals and Polymers v. ITO and Mehak Jagga v. ITO – which followed TKS Builders, were per incuriam because they failed to consider the Supreme Court’s dismissal of SLPs affirming contrary views from other High Courts; and
Given the later Supreme Court orders granting interim protection (e.g., in All India Kataria Educational Society and Yukti Export), the Delhi High Court should align itself with the “Faceless‑only” line or at least grant similar interim relief on the basis of parity.

4.2.5 Supreme Court Interim Orders in Related Delhi Cases

The petitioners pointed to the following Supreme Court orders in appeals arising from Delhi High Court decisions that had followed TKS Builders:

All India Kataria Educational Society v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi, SLP (C) No. 29723/2025:
- Arising from Delhi HC order dated 15.09.2025 in W.P.(C) 14225/2025 (which had followed TKS Builders);
- The Supreme Court issued notice and stayed assessment proceedings till the next date.
Yukti Export v. ITO, SLP (C) No. 31818/2025:
- Arising from Delhi HC order dated 26.09.2025 in W.P.(C) 15024/2025 & connected matters;
- The Supreme Court similarly stayed the assessment proceedings.
PC Jeweller Ltd. v. ACIT, SLP(C) Diary No. 13266/2025:
- Arising from Delhi HC order dated 23.01.2025 in W.P.(C) 13229/2024 (which had relied on TKS Builders);
- The Supreme Court permitted reassessment to proceed but directed that any adverse order shall not be given effect to till further orders.

On this basis, the petitioners argued that the Supreme Court had, at least implicitly, cast doubt on the correctness of TKS Builders, warranting protection for similarly‑situated assessees.

4.3 Revenue’s Response

Counsel for the Revenue emphasised three main points:

Binding Effect of TKS Builders within Delhi: Within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, the law declared in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO is binding:
- It recognises concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and FAO to issue Section 148 notices;
- Several subsequent Delhi decisions (e.g., PC Jeweller, Mala Petrochemicals, Mehak Jagga, All India Kataria Educational Society, Empire Fasteners) have followed this line.
SLP Dismissals Not Binding Law: The dismissal of SLPs, such as in Deepanjan Roy or Prakash Pandurang Patil, is:
- a dismissal in limine without a speaking order; and
- does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 nor cause the doctrine of merger to operate.
No Stay on TKS Builders: Although SLPs against TKS Builders and other Delhi judgments are pending, no stay of those judgments has been granted by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Delhi High Court must continue to apply its own precedent.

4.4 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.4.1 Reaffirmation of TKS Builders and “Concurrent Jurisdiction”

The Division Bench unequivocally held that TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO “holds the fort” for the Delhi High Court. The essential proposition from TKS Builders, as reinforced here, is:

Both the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the Faceless Assessing Officer possess concurrent jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 148. Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme do not exclude or divest the JAO’s power.

While this judgment does not reproduce the detailed reasoning from TKS Builders, its significance lies in:

Affirming that TKS is still good law within Delhi;
Rejecting the petitioners’ contention that subsequent developments (contrary High Court decisions, SLP dismissals) have implicitly overruled TKS; and
Insisting that the issue of concurrent versus exclusive jurisdiction is now squarely before the Supreme Court, and the Delhi High Court must await its determination.

4.4.2 Effect of Supreme Court’s Dismissal of SLPs in Limine

A key part of the judgment is devoted to explaining the limited legal effect of the Supreme Court’s dismissals of SLPs without detailed reasons. The court draws on a line of Supreme Court authorities:

Fuljit Kaur v. State Of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455
State Of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270
Kunhayammed v. State Of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376

From these cases, the court extracts and applies the following propositions:

Dismissal of SLP ≠ Affirmation of Reasoning of High Court:
As per Fuljit Kaur and Dhirendra Sundar Das:
- Dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine (at the threshold) merely means that the Supreme Court did not find the case fit for exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction;
- Such a dismissal:
  - does not signify affirmation of the High Court’s reasoning;
  - does not operate as res judicata; and
  - does not constitute a “declaration of law” under Article 141.
Doctrine of Merger Not Attracted at SLP Stage:
Relying on Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries, the court notes:
- Only when the Supreme Court grants leave and decides an appeal does the doctrine of merger apply.
- At the SLP stage:
  - even if the order says “dismissed on merits”,
  - the Supreme Court is still deciding whether to grant leave, not the appeal itself;
  - hence, the High Court’s order does not merge into the Supreme Court’s dismissal order.
- Where leave is refused:
  - there is no merger,
  - and no binding precedent arises unless the Supreme Court has explicitly declared law in a speaking order.
Speaking vs Non‑Speaking Orders at SLP Stage:
The court highlights the distinction:
- A non‑speaking order (“Dismissed”, “No merit”, etc.) does not lay down any law and cannot dislodge existing High Court precedent;
- Even a speaking order that refuses leave may contain a declaration of law that binds courts under Article 141, but:
  - it still does not cause merger; and
  - it binds only to the extent of the law actually stated.

Applying these principles, the court concludes that:

The dismissal of the SLP in Deepanjan Roy or Prakash Pandurang Patil does not amount to a Supreme Court ruling that only FAOs can issue Section 148 notices;
These dismissals cannot be used to argue that the Delhi High Court’s doctrine in TKS Builders has been impliedly overruled or negated; and
The issue of JAO vs FAO jurisdiction remains open and is now sub judice before the Supreme Court in pending SLPs (including against TKS Builders).

4.4.3 No Implicit Overruling of TKS Builders

The court explicitly rejects the petitioners’ argument that the Supreme Court’s order in Prakash Pandurang Patil (SLP stage) – where the SLP was dismissed noting lack of merit and possibly delay – should be read as:

affirming the Bombay High Court’s exclusive FAO jurisdiction view; and
impliedly overruling TKS Builders.

The Delhi High Court holds that:

Since the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the correctness of TKS Builders in a speaking appellate judgment, and the SLP against TKS Builders is still pending without any interim stay, TKS Builders continues to bind all Benches of the Delhi High Court.

4.4.4 Effect of Supreme Court Interim Stays in Related Matters

Regarding the Supreme Court’s interim stay orders in:

All India Kataria Educational Society v. ACIT (SLP (C) No. 29723/2025);
Yukti Export v. ITO (SLP (C) No. 31818/2025); and
PC Jeweller Ltd. v. ACIT (SLP(C) Diary No. 13266/2025),

the court emphasises:

These are case‑specific interim directions at the SLP stage;
The Supreme Court has not stayed the operation of the Delhi High Court’s underlying judgments which relied on TKS Builders;
Therefore:
- They do not render TKS Builders bad law;
- They do not justify treating TKS Builders as per incuriam; and
- They cannot be mechanically extended to grant blanket interim relief to all similarly‑situated assessees.

4.4.5 Judicial Discipline within the High Court

The court also implicitly reinforces the principle of judicial discipline:

A Division Bench of a High Court is bound by the decision of a coordinate Division Bench. If it disagrees, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger bench, not to depart from the existing precedent on the strength of divergent views of other High Courts or non‑speaking SLP dismissals.

Accordingly, the Bench holds that it is bound by TKS Builders and the chain of subsequent Delhi decisions (PC Jeweller, Mala Petrochemicals, Mehak Jagga, All India Kataria Educational Society, Empire Fasteners), and cannot accept the petitioners’ plea that those were wrongly decided.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Delhi High Court Decisions

TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, (2024) 167 taxmann.com 759 (Delhi HC)

This is the foundational Delhi precedent on the present issue. TKS Builders held that:
- Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme introduce a faceless mode of reassessment; they do not abolish the territorial JAO;
- Consequently, both JAO and FAO can issue Section 148 notices – i.e., there is purported concurrent jurisdiction.
The present judgment does not re‑examine the merits of that interpretation but affirms its binding force pending Supreme Court’s review.
PC Jeweller Ltd. v. ACIT, W.P.(C) 13229/2024 (Delhi HC, 23.01.2025)

In PC Jeweller, a co‑ordinate Bench:
- followed TKS Builders,
- rejected the challenge to Section 148 notice by JAO, and
- dismissed the writ petition.
The subsequent Supreme Court order in the SLP (allowing reassessment to proceed but restraining giving effect to adverse orders) was discussed here to show that:
- the Supreme Court did not stay or set aside the High Court’s reasoning; and
- therefore, PC Jeweller remains a valid precedent alongside TKS Builders.
Mala Petrochemicals and Polymers v. ITO & Ors., W.P.(C) 12011/2025 (Delhi HC, 19.08.2025)
Mehak Jagga v. ITO, W.P.(C) 13149/2025 (Delhi HC, 28.08.2025)
All India Kataria Educational Society v. DCIT, W.P.(C) 14225/2025 (Delhi HC, 15.09.2025)
Empire Fasteners v. ACIT, W.P.(C) 14754/2025 (Delhi HC, 23.09.2025)

All these decisions:
- applied and reinforced the TKS Builders doctrine;
- dismissed similar challenges to JAO‑issued Section 148 notices; and
- served as immediate precedents for the present Bench.

5.2 Other High Court Decisions Favouring Exclusive FAO Jurisdiction

The petitioners relied on a series of decisions from other High Courts which had upheld the argument that only the FAO may issue Section 148 notices under the faceless reassessment regime. While the present Bench acknowledges the existence of this line of authority, it underscores that:

These decisions are not binding on the Delhi High Court;
At best, they are of persuasive value, which cannot override a binding coordinate Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court itself (TKS Builders); and
The divergence among High Courts is precisely why the issue is now before the Supreme Court.

5.3 Supreme Court Authorities on SLP Dismissal and Merger

The most substantial doctrinal discussion is not about the tax provisions themselves, but about the constitutional doctrine governing the effect of SLP dismissals. The court relies on:

Fuljit Kaur v. State Of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455

Held that dismissal of an SLP in limine:
- does not mean affirmation of the High Court’s reasoning;
- does not result in merger; and
- does not operate as res judicata or a declaration of law under Article 141.
State Of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270

Reiterated that:
- an SLP dismissal at the threshold, without detailed reasons, is not a binding precedent;
- such an order merely indicates the Supreme Court chose not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
Kunhayammed v. State Of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359

A leading judgment which differentiates:
- between SLP stage and appeal stage; and
- between speaking and non‑speaking orders.
Key points relied upon by the Delhi High Court:
- Dismissal of SLP, even “on merits”, without granting leave, does not cause merger;
- Only when leave is granted and an appeal is decided does the appellate order supersede the High Court’s order;
- A non‑speaking SLP dismissal does not amount to a law declared under Article 141.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376

Reaffirms and further clarifies Kunhayammed, specifically that:
- an order refusing special leave to appeal, whether speaking or non‑speaking, does not attract merger;
- a speaking order may contain a declaration of law binding under Article 141, but the High Court’s order still does not merge into it.

These authorities collectively underpin the court’s rejection of the petitioners’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s non‑speaking SLP dismissals in Deepanjan Roy and related cases.

6. Impact and Implications

6.1 Immediate Impact within Delhi

The most direct consequence of this judgment is that, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court:

Assessees cannot successfully challenge a Section 148 notice merely on the ground that it was issued by a Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (including Central Circles) instead of the Faceless Assessing Officer;
Both JAO and FAO are considered to have valid jurisdiction to initiate reassessment under Section 148;
The argument that the faceless regime is the exclusive mode of reassessment is effectively foreclosed at the High Court level, pending Supreme Court determination.

6.2 Inter‑State Divergence and Forum Shopping

There is now a conspicuous jurisprudential divergence between:

Bombay, Telangana, Madras, Rajasthan, and Punjab & Haryana High Courts (exclusive FAO jurisdiction), and
Delhi High Court (concurrent JAO–FAO jurisdiction).

This divergence leads to:

Potential forum shopping by assessees, seeking to litigate in jurisdictions where the law favours the exclusivity of FAO; and
Operational complexity for the Income Tax Department, especially in centralised cases with multi‑jurisdictional footprints.

6.3 Central Circles and Search‑Related Cases

Several of the cited non‑Delhi cases (e.g., Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap, Rajesh Todwal) deal with Central Circles, often handling search and seizure cases. Those courts held that Central Circles are not exempt from the faceless reassessment regime.

In contrast, by reaffirming concurrent jurisdiction without carving out any exception for Central Circles, the Delhi High Court has effectively held that:

Central Circle JAOs in Delhi can validly issue Section 148 notices even post‑Section 151A;
Centralisation of a case, by itself, does not displace the JAO’s jurisdiction nor mandate that only FAO must act.

6.4 Pending Supreme Court Resolution

The judgment underscores that:

The question of whether Section 151A and the 2022 Scheme confer exclusive jurisdiction on the FAO is now pending before the Supreme Court, including via SLPs against TKS Builders and related cases;
Until a definitive ruling is delivered:
- Delhi will continue to apply the TKS Builders doctrine; and
- other High Courts may continue to apply their own contrary positions, sustaining the present patchwork.

6.5 Litigation Strategy for Assessees and the Revenue

For practitioners:

Within Delhi: Challenges to Section 148 notices on the limited ground that they were not issued by FAO are now unlikely to succeed. Assessees will need to:
- raise substantive grounds such as lack of “reason to believe”, violation of Section 148A procedures, limitation, change of opinion, or jurisdictional defects other than the JAO/FAO question; and
- rely on interim protection from the Supreme Court where SLPs are already pending.
For the Revenue: Within Delhi, the Department can:
- confidently proceed with JAO‑issued Section 148 notices, including in Central Circle cases; and
- use this judgment to defend reassessments challenged on faceless‑only jurisdiction arguments.

7. Simplifying the Complex Legal Concepts

7.1 Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) vs Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO)

JAO: The traditional local assessing officer, having jurisdiction based on the assessee’s location, PAN, business, etc. This includes specialised wings like Central Circles handling search cases.
FAO: An “Assessment Unit” under the NFAC, which conducts assessments (and, under the 2022 Scheme, reassessments) in a fully electronic, location‑agnostic manner.

The debate in this case is whether the FAO’s powers replace the JAO’s powers, or merely co‑exist with them.

7.2 Faceless Assessment and Reassessment

Faceless assessment under Section 144B aims to:

Eliminate physical interface between taxpayers and officers;
Use technology, data analytics, and team‑based functioning;
Standardise assessment practices nationally.

Faceless reassessment under Section 151A extends the same philosophy to reopened assessments (i.e., where income is believed to have escaped earlier assessment).

7.3 “Void ab initio”

A notice or order is “void ab initio” if it is a nullity from the very beginning – as if it never existed in law. The petitioners argued that JAO‑issued Section 148 notices were void ab initio because, in their view, only FAOs could issue such notices post‑2022.

7.4 Doctrine of Merger

The doctrine of merger means that when a higher court (e.g., the Supreme Court) decides an appeal against a lower court’s order, the lower court’s order merges into the appellate order – so that the latter becomes the operative and binding judgment.

However, the Supreme Court has clarified (and the Delhi High Court reiterates) that:

Merger applies only when:
- the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal; and
- then decides the appeal (affirming, reversing, or modifying the lower court’s order).
It does not apply when the Supreme Court simply dismisses an SLP at the threshold.

7.5 Special Leave Petition (SLP) and Its Dismissal in Limine

SLP: A petition filed before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution seeking permission (“leave”) to file an appeal against a judgment or order of a lower court.
Dismissal in limine: When the Supreme Court declines to grant leave at the very outset – often using brief expressions like “Dismissed” or “No merit” – without entering into a full appellate examination of the case.

As clarified in Kunhayammed and followed here:

Dismissal in limine does not amount to the Supreme Court laying down binding law on the issues involved unless the order is a detailed, speaking order that declares legal principles;
Therefore, such dismissals cannot be used to argue that a High Court’s earlier precedent has been impliedly overruled.

7.6 Article 141 and “Law Declared” by Supreme Court

Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India.

The present judgment clarifies, consistent with Supreme Court case law, that:

Only those Supreme Court orders which actually declare law (i.e., contain a reasoned exposition of legal principles) fall within Article 141;
Non‑speaking SLP dismissals, even if mentioning lack of merit, generally do not qualify as such law‑declaring orders.

8. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Inder Dev Gupta v. ACIT, Central Circle‑2, Delhi is less about re‑interpreting the faceless reassessment regime, and more about:

affirming judicial discipline within the High Court;
clarifying the limited legal effect of SLP dismissals; and
preserving the existing Delhi doctrine on concurrent JAO–FAO jurisdiction until the Supreme Court definitively rules otherwise.

The core legal position established (or reaffirmed) is:

In the Delhi High Court’s jurisdiction, notwithstanding Section 151A and the E‑Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022, a Jurisdictional Assessing Officer – including those in Central Circles – retains jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148. The Faceless Assessing Officer’s powers are concurrent, not exclusive. Dismissals of SLPs in limine by the Supreme Court, and interim stay orders in specific cases, do not override or dilute this position.

Eventually, the Supreme Court’s decision in the pending SLPs (including those against TKS Builders and related matters) will settle the conflict among different High Courts. Until that happens, this judgment stands as a clear restatement of Delhi’s stance on reassessment jurisdiction under the faceless regime and a precise exposition of the constitutional principles governing the impact of Supreme Court SLP dismissals.