Calibrating Death Penalty and Defining “Harassment”: Madras High Court’s Sentencing and Harassment Jurisprudence in The Inspector of Police v. Sathish, 2025 MHC 2712

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madras High Court in The Inspector of Police v. Sathish, 2025 MHC 2712 (R.T. No.1 of 2025 & Crl.A. No.1744 of 2025, decided on 27.11.2025) is a significant contribution to:

• the evolving Indian sentencing jurisprudence for capital offences, and
• the interpretation of “harassment” under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998 (“TNPHW Act”).

The case arises out of a brutal killing of a young college student, Sathya, by her former lover, Sathish, at the St. Thomas Mount railway station, where she was deliberately pushed onto the tracks in front of an incoming suburban train. The Sessions Court (Mahalir Neethimandram, Allikulam, Chennai) convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC (murder) and Section 4 TNPHW Act, imposed a death sentence for the murder, and awarded compensation to the victim’s sisters.

Before the High Court:

• The death sentence was referred for confirmation under Section 366 CrPC (Referred Trial No.1 of 2025); and
• The accused filed a criminal appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) challenging his conviction and sentence.

The central issues were:

• Whether the homicidal act constitutes murder under Section 302 IPC or falls within any Exception to Section 300 IPC;
• Whether his acts attracted Section 4 of the TNPHW Act;
• Whether this was a “rarest of rare” case warranting confirmation of the death penalty, or whether a lesser, calibrated sentence was appropriate; and
• How the Supreme Court’s recent guidelines on sentencing in capital cases (especially Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat) are to be implemented at the High Court level.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Findings on Guilt

The Division Bench (N. Sathish Kumar, J. and M. Jothiraman, J.) upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The Court found:

• On 13.10.2022, at St. Thomas Mount railway station, when a Tambaram–Beach suburban train was entering the platform, the accused, pretending to be on a phone call, moved towards Sathya and intentionally pushed her onto the tracks.
• The deceased fell on the tracks and was run over almost instantaneously, resulting in “traumatic decapitation” and complete fragmentation of the body.
• The act was premeditated, deliberate, and committed with full knowledge of its “imminently dangerous” character and the high probability of causing death, thereby squarely attracting Section 300 IPC (murder).

An important aspect of the Court’s fact-finding was the robust reliance on:

• the eyewitness account of P.W.1 (Dharani), the deceased’s close friend and classmate; and
• CCTV footage from the railway station, authenticated and corroborated by forensic and anthropological expert evidence.

2.2 Acquittal under TNPHW Act

The High Court, however, set aside the conviction under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 1998, holding that:

• On the evidence post–May 2022, there was no clear proof that the accused’s conduct amounted to “indecent conduct or act” causing intimidation, fear, shame, or embarrassment as required by Section 4.
• Mere following or attempts to revive a past romantic relationship, without proof of the statutorily required elements of “harassment”, would not by itself attract Section 4 in the circumstances of this case.

2.3 Sentencing: Commutation of Death Penalty

On sentencing, the Court:

• Held that though the crime was grave and brutal, it did not fall in the “rarest of rare” category;
• Commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment with a minimum non-remittable term of 20 years;
• Directed that the appellant “shall not be entitled for any statutory remission or commutation until he serves incarceration for a period of twenty (20) years”;
• Maintained the compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- to the deceased’s younger sisters under Section 357A CrPC; and
• Ordered refund of any fine paid in respect of the set-aside conviction under Section 4 TNPHW Act.

In doing so, the Court explicitly applied the Supreme Court’s sentencing framework in Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh, Shankar Khade, Santosh Bariyar, Chhannu Lal Verma, Manoj, Md. Mannan, and Sambhubhai Padhiyar, among others, emphasising reformation and calibrated punishment.

3. Factual and Evidentiary Matrix

3.1 Relationship Background and Motive

The deceased Sathya and the accused Sathish:

• Were long-term lovers (about six years),
• Lived in the same police quarters at Alandur, as family members of both sides were in the police department, and
• Were well known to each other’s families and friends (P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and relatives).

The relationship broke down when:

• Sathya’s family refused to accept Sathish as a prospective groom, citing:
  • different caste,
  • ten-year age gap,
  • his alleged alcohol/drug abuse, and
  • lack of stable employment;
• Her marriage was arranged with one Rahul on 16.05.2022.

Despite this, the accused continued to:

• Follow her to college and to the railway station,
• Visit her college, create ruckus, and even beat her,
• Display a WhatsApp/Instagram DP claiming “Sathish loves Sathya – we are married”,
• Prostrate and plead with P.W.1 and family members to get Sathya to resume the relationship.

These acts led to:

• A complaint at St. Thomas Mount Police Station (Ex.P.7) in May 2022, leading to CSR No. 243/2022 and undertakings by the accused and his relatives (Exs. P.9–P.12), and
• A further complaint at R-1 Mambalam Police Station, resulting in a case under Section 75 of the Madras City Police Act, fine, and release.

These antecedent incidents established motive: persistent obsession, inability to accept rejection, and animus developing as Sathya moved on towards an arranged marriage.

3.2 The Incident at St. Thomas Mount Railway Station

On 13.10.2022:

• P.W.1 and Sathya, as usual, travelled by suburban train to college and back.
• At around 12.40 p.m., P.W.1 reached St. Thomas Mount station; Sathya arrived shortly thereafter with her face covered by a mask.
• The accused was seen sitting near the staircase; as the Tambaram–Beach train approached, he moved closer, apparently talking on a mobile phone.
• When Sathya gestured “why have you come?”, he suddenly pushed her onto the tracks at the precise moment of the train’s arrival. She fell and, before she could get up, was run over.
• The accused immediately ran from the scene; P.W.1 and others tried but failed to catch him.

3.3 Eyewitness and Electronic Evidence

The prosecution evidence was unusually strong and multi-layered:

• Eyewitness: P.W.1 (Dharani) – a close friend who daily accompanied Sathya to college – gave a detailed, natural, and consistent account. She knew the accused well and had no reason to falsely implicate him.
• CCTV footage: P.W.13 (RPF Sub-Inspector) downloaded CCTV footage (11.10.2022–13.10.2022) to a pendrive (M.O.9) and DVD (M.O.12), furnished a Section 65B Evidence Act certificate (Ex.P.22), and explained the 43-minute time discrepancy in the recording device.
• Forensic validation of CCTV: P.W.22 (Assistant Director, Forensic Science Dept.) verified there was no digital manipulation (Ex.P.44).
• Anthropological facial comparison: P.W.24 (Assistant Director, Anthropology) compared still images from the CCTV (M.O.9) with photographs of Sathish (Ex.P.46) using specialised software (Amped-Five) and concluded that the male seen pushing the girl was “possibly” the same individual (Ex.P.48).
• Train crew evidence: P.W.11 (Loco Pilot) and P.W.12 (Train Manager) corroborated the timing, sudden application of brakes, and the body being run over.

The High Court itself viewed the CCTV footage and found that it fully corroborated P.W.1’s narrative, showing the accused’s presence, movements, act of pushing, and subsequent flight.

3.4 Medical and Forensic Evidence

P.W.21 (Forensic Medical Officer) conducted the post-mortem (Ex.P.36) and found:

• Traumatic decapitation at the C7 level,
• Multiple lacerations, abrasions and fractures consistent with being run over by a train, and
• No signs of sexual assault (hymen intact; no genital injuries; confirmatory reports Ex.P.39–P.41).

The cause of death was opined as “traumatic decapitation” (Ex.P.38), with all injuries being antemortem. DNA and serological reports confirmed identity and linkage of body parts.

4. Legal Analysis

4.1 Murder under Section 302 IPC: Rejection of “Sustained Provocation”

The defence did not dispute that the accused pushed Sathya or that she died as a result. Instead, it argued:

• The accused acted under a “fit of rage” or “sustained provocation” due to being rejected after a six-year relationship;
• He suffered a “momentary loss of sanity and reasoning” when he saw her moving on towards another marriage;
• Therefore, the act should fall within an Exception to Section 300 IPC, or at least call for leniency in sentence.

The Court firmly rejected this and held:

• The accused’s conduct – waiting at the station, watching Sathya from a distance, feigning a phone call, and pushing her exactly as the train approached – showed planning and deliberation, not loss of self-control.
• He had been following her persistently even after the relationship ended, had earlier created ruckus and violence, and even then gave undertakings not to repeat such conduct – indicating a pattern of obsessive behaviour, not sudden provocation.
• “Sustained provocation” of the sort claimed does not fall within the classic “grave and sudden provocation” Exception to Section 300 IPC, particularly where there is evidence of premeditation.

Crucially, the Court emphasised:

“It is the choice of the deceased to marry a person of her choice. The right to marry a person of one's choice is a fundamental right. Merely because the deceased did not like to marry the accused will not give a licence to the accused to commit such an act of murder.”

On the ingredients of murder, the Court held that the accused:

• Knew the train was approaching;
• Knew that pushing a person onto the tracks in front of a moving train was “so imminently dangerous” that it must, in all probability, cause death;
• Had no legal excuse for incurring that risk.

This squarely fits within the fourth clause of Section 300 IPC (knowledge that the act is imminently dangerous and will, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, done without any excuse for incurring the risk), justifying conviction under Section 302 IPC.

4.2 Interpretation of “Harassment” under Section 4 TNPHW Act

The trial court had convicted the accused under Section 4 TNPHW Act. The High Court examined the ingredients:

Section 4 covers “any indecent conduct or act by a man which causes or is likely to cause intimidation, fear, shame or embarrassment to a woman, including abusing, causing hurt, nuisance, assault, or use of force.”

The Court reasoned:

• While there was an earlier incident in May 2022 where the accused came to the college, created a ruckus, and beat Sathya (leading to police complaints and undertakings), this had already been dealt with under Section 75 of the City Police Act and had not led to a prosecution under the TNPHW Act.
• For the period closer to the incident of murder, the evidence primarily showed:
  • that the accused followed the deceased and attempted to restore the relationship, and
  • was present at the railway station on the dates immediately preceding the incident;
• There was insufficient evidence that, post-May 2022, he engaged in separate “indecent conduct” causing intimidation, fear, shame, or embarrassment in a manner prosecutable under Section 4.

Therefore, the Court held:

“In the absence of any evidence with regard to harassment, it cannot be said that the offence under Section 4 … has been made out. The accused has just followed her and … wanted to restore the relationship… it cannot be said that there was some harassment to bring the offence within the ambit of Section 4.”

This is an important, albeit case-specific, clarification: mere following in an attempt to revive a known relationship, without more, does not automatically amount to “harassment” under Section 4 TNPHW Act, though it may still attract provisions like Section 354D IPC (stalking) if its elements are proved.

4.3 Electronic Evidence and Section 65B Compliance

On the admissibility of CCTV footage, the Court:

• Accepted P.W.13’s Section 65B certificate (Ex.P.22) as adequate, since he was in charge of the CCTV system and extracted the data.
• Relied on forensic (P.W.22) and anthropological (P.W.24) expert reports confirming:
  • no digital manipulation, and
  • identity linkage between the accused and the person seen in the footage.
• Viewed the footage directly and found it corroborated P.W.1’s testimony.

Thus, the Court reinforced the now-settled position under Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (though not expressly cited) that proper Section 65B certification and demonstrable integrity of the electronic record are sufficient for admissibility, with expert evidence bolstering reliability.

5. Sentencing: Death Penalty, Rarest of Rare, and Reformation

5.1 Application of the “Rarest of Rare” Doctrine

The Court’s sentencing analysis is a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, particularly:

• Bachan Singh v. State Of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684;
• Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470;
• Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State Of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546;
• Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State Of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498;
• Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 12 SCC 438;
• Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 353;
• Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar, Review Petition (Crl.) No.308/2011 (2019);
• Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat, (2025) 2 SCC 399; and
• Navas v. State of Kerala, (2024) 14 SCC 82.

Key principles reiterated include:

• Death penalty is constitutionally permissible only in the “rarest of rare” cases, where life imprisonment is “wholly inadequate” and the alternative is “unquestionably foreclosed”.
• Courts must undertake:
  • a “crime test” (aggravating factors),
  • a “criminal test” (mitigating factors relating to the offender), and
  • the “R–R test” – whether society’s sense of justice demands death penalty.
• The possibility and probability of reformation and rehabilitation must be seriously considered; it is the State’s duty to show that the convict is beyond reform.

The High Court held the “crime test” was clearly satisfied – the murder was brutal, public, and motivated by possessive rage. But the “criminal test” and R–R test did not justify death:

• The accused was 34 years old;
• He had no prior criminal antecedents of a serious nature;
• He was found to be a “situational offender”, not a habitual criminal;
• There were realistic prospects of reformation, as reflected in his prison conduct and psychological assessments.

5.2 Implementation of Manoj Guidelines: Collection of Mitigating Material

Crucially, the Court noted that the trial court had not followed the Manoj guidelines on sentencing in capital cases. Manoj directed that, before imposing death, the State must place before the sentencing court a structured dossier on the accused, including:

• psychiatric and psychological evaluation proximate to the offence,
• family background, education, socio-economic status,
• criminal antecedents, and
• jail conduct and behaviour.

To cure this deficiency at the appellate stage, the High Court called for:

• A Probation Officer’s report (15.11.2025);
• Reports from the Superintendent of Central Prison-I, Chennai (17.11.2025);
• Fresh psychiatric and psychological evaluations from the Institute of Mental Health, Kilpauk (15.11.2025).

5.3 Mitigating Circumstances Found

The combined reports revealed:

• Background: Sathish (34) is the youngest child and only son of a retired Sub-Inspector of Police; two married sisters; middle-class family; no prior major criminal history.
• Education and employment: School dropout after 8th standard; attempted private X standard; worked at airport loading; then odd jobs (electrician, mechanic), food and meat business, and online garment sales.
• Character and social behaviour (pre-offence): Neighbours and family described him as generally quiet, introverted, nonviolent in social life, and helpful, though he occasionally consumed alcohol. He was not seen as a habitual troublemaker.
• Mental health history:
  • Post-breakup, for about six months before the incident, he was “abnormal” – depressed, yelling, isolated, talking of suicide, indicating emotional disturbance.
  • During remand, he was briefly prescribed Diazepam for sleep issues and observed at the prison hospital.
  • As of 2025, psychological testing (BDI, SSI, NEO-FFI-3, Emotional Intelligence Test, Rorschach) showed no current psychiatric symptoms, adequate intellectual functioning, average emotional intelligence, and underlying “immediate gratification” needs but no psychosis or severe personality disorder.
• Prison conduct: Good behaviour; no violent incidents; engaged in book-binding work; reported feelings of regret that he should have been “more patient”.

The Probation Officer categorised him as a “situational offender”, not a habitual or professional criminal. The prison psychologist and IMH doctors found “no psychopathology at present”.

5.4 Reference to Chhannu Lal Verma and Sambhubhai Padhiyar

The Court quoted extensively from:

• Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) – emphasising:
  • the need to consider possibility of reformation,
  • the relevance of good jail conduct, and
  • the impropriety of imposing death without proper sentencing hearing and mitigating material.
• Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat (2025) – a case of rape and murder of a 4-year-old child, where despite horrific facts, the Supreme Court:
  • declined to affirm death penalty,
  • held that the possibility of reformation was not ruled out,
  • imposed a “special category” sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment without remission.

These cases underscored that:

• Even very brutal crimes do not automatically qualify as “rarest of rare”; and
• Courts may calibrate sentences within the wide space between “14 years” life imprisonment and death, by prescribing specific minimum non-remittable terms (as in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka and Union of India v. V. Sriharan).

5.5 Final Sentencing Decision: Life with 20-year Non-remittable Term

Drawing on this jurisprudence, the High Court concluded:

• The crime is extremely serious and brutal but does not cross the “rarest of rare” threshold in light of the offender’s background, age, absence of prior grave criminal record, and realistic prospects of reformation.
• However, a conventional life sentence – which often results in effective incarceration of about 14 years with remission – would be “grossly disproportionate and inadequate” considering the gravity of the offence.
• A calibrated sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum 20-year non-remittable period is an appropriate “just desert”, ensuring:
  • adequate punishment and deterrence,
  • protection of societal confidence in the justice system, and
  • retention of a meaningful possibility of eventual reformation and reintegration.

Thus, the Court adopted the “special category” life sentence model of Swamy Shraddananda (2), V. Sriharan, and Sambhubhai Padhiyar, but tailored the non-remittable period to 20 years given the specific facts and mitigating factors in this case.

6. Simplification of Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Section 302 IPC and Section 300 IPC (Murder)

Under Indian law:

• Section 300 IPC defines what constitutes “murder”—essentially, causing death:
  • with intention to cause death, or
  • with intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
  • with knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death.
• Section 302 IPC prescribes the punishment for murder (death or life imprisonment, plus fine).

The accused’s act here—pushing someone onto live railway tracks in front of a moving train—is a textbook example of an “imminently dangerous” act that must, in all probability, cause death. The Court had no difficulty holding that this was murder under Section 302 IPC.

6.2 “Rarest of Rare” Doctrine

The “rarest of rare” doctrine, laid down in Bachan Singh and refined in subsequent cases, means:

• Death penalty should be imposed only in very exceptional cases;
• Courts must:
  • consider the gravity and nature of the crime, and
  • equally consider the circumstances and character of the offender;
• If there is any realistic possibility of reforming the offender, death penalty should ordinarily be avoided.

Thus, “brutality” of the crime alone is not enough; the Court must be satisfied that life imprisonment is plainly inadequate and the offender is practically beyond reform.

6.3 “Special Category” Life Sentences (No-remission Terms)

Traditionally, “life imprisonment” in India often worked out to around 14 years because of executive remission powers. However, the Supreme Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2), V. Sriharan, and later cases held that:

• Court can specify that life imprisonment shall extend to a fixed minimum period (e.g., 20, 25, 30 years) without remission;
• This provides a middle path between death and an effectively short life term.

The Madras High Court’s direction that the accused should serve a minimum of 20 years without statutory remission is an application of this “special category” life sentence.

6.4 Section 4 TNPHW Act (Harassment of Women)

Section 4 punishes:

“any indecent conduct or act by a man which causes or is likely to cause intimidation, fear, shame or embarrassment to a woman, including abusing or causing hurt or nuisance or assault or use of force.”

Essentially, to prove an offence under Section 4, prosecution must show:

• An indecent act or conduct by the accused;
• Such act causes or is likely to cause:
  • intimidation,
  • fear,
  • shame, or
  • embarrassment,
• Often coupled with elements like abuse, nuisance, or use of force.

In this case, while there was some evidence of past misbehaviour (May 2022 incident at the college), there was insufficient evidence of fresh, prosecutable harassment under Section 4 in the time immediately leading up to the murder. Hence the acquittal under Section 4.

6.5 Electronic Evidence and Section 65B Evidence Act

Electronic records (like CCTV footage) are admissible in court if:

• They are accompanied by a Section 65B certificate from a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the device (e.g., system administrator, CCTV in-charge), certifying:
  • the manner in which the record was produced,
  • integrity of the device and process, and
  • that the information is a faithful reproduction.

Here, P.W.13 provided such a certificate, and forensic experts confirmed there was no tampering, so the Court was fully entitled to rely on the footage.

7. Impact and Broader Significance

7.1 Sentencing Jurisprudence in Tamil Nadu

This decision is likely to influence future capital sentencing in Tamil Nadu in several ways:

• It operationalises the Supreme Court’s directions in Manoj by insisting on:
  • probation reports,
  • psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and
  • prison conduct reports,
  before deciding on death penalty.
• It strengthens the trend away from routine imposition of death penalty in murder cases, even where the crime is horrific, if there is a realistic possibility of reformation.
• It endorses and applies the Supreme Court’s “special category” life sentence model at High Court level, specifying a non-remittable term (20 years), enabling proportionate yet non-capital punishment.

7.2 Women’s Autonomy and “Love Failure” Homicides

The Court’s candid affirmation that:

“The right to marry a person of one's choice is a fundamental right. Merely because the deceased did not like to marry the accused will not give a licence to the accused to commit such an act of murder.”

is an important reiteration in the context of:

• “Love failure” homicides and acid attacks;
• Patriarchal notions of male entitlement over women’s choices.

The judgment draws a clear line: emotional distress from rejection may be relevant at sentencing, but cannot justify the act or reduce its classification from murder.

7.3 Interpretation of TNPHW Act and Stalking-Related Offences

By narrowing the circumstances in which Section 4 TNPHW Act is attracted, the judgment:

• Emphasises that specific statutory ingredients—indecent conduct plus intimidation/fear/shame/embarrassment—must be proved separately and clearly.
• Implicitly suggests that, in future cases of persistent following after breakup, prosecution may be better structured under Section 354D IPC (stalking), which has its own defined elements.

However, given the facts here (prior complaints, admitted ruckus and beating, repeated following), one can also argue that the decision sets a relatively high evidentiary threshold for Section 4, which may require careful application in future cases to avoid under-protection of women.

7.4 Electronic Evidence Practice

The Court’s approach reinforces:

• the importance of proper Section 65B certification;
• the utility of forensic and anthropological analysis to corroborate CCTV footage;
• the practice of courts themselves viewing CCTV footage as part of appreciation of evidence.

This supports robust, technologically informed fact-finding, especially in public-space crimes like those in railway stations.

7.5 Transitional Use of BNSS

Procedurally, the appeal was filed under Section 415(2) BNSS, 2023, the successor provision to Section 374(2) CrPC. Though the Court did not dwell on the BNSS transitional scheme, this case exemplifies how appeals against sessions convictions (including capital sentences) are now formally routed under BNSS provisions, even when the trial itself proceeded under the CrPC/IPC framework.

8. Conclusion

The Inspector of Police v. Sathish, 2025 MHC 2712, is an instructive judgment at multiple levels.

On the merits, it rests on a solid evidentiary foundation—eyewitness testimony fortified by CCTV footage, forensic validation, and medical evidence—to uphold a conviction for murder in a glaringly public, pre-planned killing committed in the name of wounded romantic ego.

On the sentencing front, the Court:

• Recognises the sheer brutality and social impact of the offence; yet
• Faithfully applies the Supreme Court’s “rarest of rare” and reformation-centric jurisprudence;
• Insists on adherence to Manoj by calling for structured mitigating material;
• Ultimately rejects the death penalty and imposes a calibrated life sentence with a minimum 20-year non-remittable term.

On the statutory interpretation side, the judgment:

• Affirms women’s fundamental right to marry a person of their choice and expressly decouples love-rejection from any legal justification for homicide;
• Clarifies that Section 4 TNPHW Act requires explicit proof of indecent conduct and resultant intimidation/fear/shame/embarrassment, and that mere following to revive a known relationship may not suffice, at least on the evidentiary record of this case.

In sum, the decision:

• Strengthens the move towards principled, evidence-based, and reformative sentencing in capital cases;
• Offers guidance on the careful use of special-category life sentences as an alternative to death penalty; and
• Signals a nuanced, ingredient-focused approach to offences under the TNPHW Act, while unambiguously denouncing violence provoked by romantic rejection.

It is likely to be cited in future:

• whenever Tamil Nadu courts weigh death vs. life sentences in murder cases, and
• in interpreting the scope of “harassment” under state-specific women-protection statutes.