Bypassing the High Court’s Own Statutory Jurisdiction via Writ Petitions: A Commentary on Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1337

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6719 of 2012 (judgment dated 12 November 2025), addresses a specific but increasingly significant aspect of the alternative remedy doctrine: what happens when the alternative statutory remedy lies before the same High Court whose writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is invoked?

The case arises from confiscation of alleged smuggled silver and the subsequent levy of penalty under the Customs Act, 1962. After the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) partly modified the order, the appellant did not pursue the statutory remedy of reference/appeal to the High Court under Section 130 / 130A of the Customs Act within limitation. Instead, years later, he invoked the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The writ petition was dismissed; the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether that refusal was justified.

The judgment is important for at least three reasons:

• It reinvigorates and applies two Constitution Bench authorities – Thansingh Nathmal and A.V. Venkateswaran – that had, in the Court’s own words, “faded into obscurity,” but are of continuing relevance.
• It lays down with clarity that where the alternative remedy is before the High Court itself in another statutory jurisdiction (such as reference or appeal), refusal to entertain a writ petition should be the norm and entertainment the exception.
• It connects the idea of a “reasonable period” for filing a writ petition with the statutory limitation period for the alternative remedy, and underscores that a litigant who disables himself by delay cannot then claim writ relief on the strength of that very default.

This commentary examines the judgment’s reasoning, its reliance on precedent, its contribution to the law of writs and alternative remedies, and its practical impact on customs and tax litigation as well as administrative law more broadly.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Seizure and Original Adjudication

• On 27 September 1992, alleged smuggled silver weighing 252.177 kg was seized by customs authorities.
• By order dated 7 May 1996, the Commissioner, Customs and Central Excise (respondent no. 3) ordered:
  • Confiscation of the seized silver; and
  • Imposition of a penalty of ₹ 50,000 on the appellant, Rikhab Chand Jain.

2.2 Appeal before CEGAT

• The appellant filed Appeal No. C/225/96 NB before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) under Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
• By order dated 23 June 2000, the CEGAT:
  • Did not interfere with the confiscation of the silver; and
  • Reduced the penalty from ₹ 50,000 to ₹ 30,000.

Note: The Supreme Court (para 16) later notes that, on a reading of the memorandum of appeal, the confiscation order was indeed challenged before the CEGAT, even though CEGAT’s order itself noted that confiscation was “not under challenge”. This discrepancy becomes relevant when considering the writ petition’s pleadings.

2.3 Statutory Remedy to the High Court and Writ Petition

• Against a CEGAT order, the Customs Act (as it then stood) provided a further remedy to the High Court:
  • A reference/appeal under Section 130/130A, to be made within 180 days.
• The appellant did not invoke this remedy within limitation.
• Instead, on 18 March 2003, nearly three years after the CEGAT order, the appellant filed a writ petition (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6203 of 2009) before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, challenging:
  • the confiscation and penalty order dated 7 May 1996; and
  • the CEGAT’s order dated 23 June 2000.

2.4 Parallel Criminal Proceedings

• Before a Special Magistrate, an order dated 12 February 2002 appears to have directed return of the seized silver.
• In criminal revision, by order dated 14 May 2003, the Additional Sessions Judge set aside this direction to return the silver.
• That revisional order was never challenged by the appellant.

The High Court, in dismissing the writ petition, treated this as another reason why relief could not be granted: when there was no subsisting order directing return of silver, a writ seeking such relief was untenable.

2.5 High Court’s Decision

The High Court dismissed the writ petition on two broad grounds:

1. Non-exhaustion of alternative statutory remedy:
   • The High Court held that against the CEGAT order, the appellant had a statutory remedy of appeal/reference to the High Court under Section 130A of the Customs Act, which was not pursued.
   • The High Court viewed the confiscation order as having attained finality because, on its reading, the appellant had challenged only the penalty before CEGAT, not confiscation.
   • Consequently, the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground of availability of an alternative efficacious statutory remedy.
2. On merits / absence of surviving relief:
   • The criminal revisional court had already set aside the Magistrate’s order directing return of silver, and that revisional order remained unchallenged.
   • With no operative order for return of silver, the High Court held that the relief prayed for in writ jurisdiction was untenable.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave. The key question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellant did not pursue the alternative statutory remedy, especially where that remedy lay before the very same High Court.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court (Dipankar Datta, J. and Aravind Kumar, J.) dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s refusal to entertain the writ petition. The Court’s reasoning may be summarised as follows:

1. Alternative Remedy and Writ Jurisdiction:
   • While reiterating that the availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust a High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court emphasised that writ jurisdiction is discretionary.
   • The Court recalled the familiar exceptions – breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to the constitutionality of a statute – where writ interference may still be justified.
2. Where the Alternative Remedy Is Before the Same High Court:
   • Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, the Court held that when a party has a remedy before the High Court itself in another jurisdiction (e.g., statutory appeal/reference), the High Court should normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction.
   • In such cases, refusal to entertain the writ should be the rule and entertainment the exception (para 9).
3. Self-created Disability and Writ Relief:
   • Banking on another Constitution Bench decision, A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, the Court held that where a litigant disables himself from availing a statutory remedy by his own fault (e.g., by not filing within limitation), he cannot use that as a ground to seek writ relief.
   • The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be exercised to rescue a litigant from self-created procedural default (para 12).
4. Reasonable Time for Invoking Article 226 and the Role of Statutory Limitation:
   • While Article 226 is not subject to any specific limitation period, a writ petition must be filed within a “reasonable period” (para 13).
   • The statutory limitation for the alternative remedy (here, 180 days under Section 130A) can be a guide to what constitutes a reasonable time.
5. Condonation of Delay under the Customs Act and Limitation Act:
   • The Court noted that the Customs Act, 1962, does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
   • By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, an application under Section 130A could have been filed with a plea for condonation of delay.
   • Instead of adopting this lawful route, the appellant “indulged in the (mis)adventure” of invoking writ jurisdiction (para 15).
6. Pleadings and the Challenge to Confiscation:
   • The Supreme Court accepted that, as a matter of record, the appeal before CEGAT had indeed challenged confiscation.
   • However, the writ petition before the High Court lacked proper, verified pleadings asserting that:
     • the confiscation issue was raised before CEGAT, and
     • CEGAT failed to decide that issue.
   • Without such foundational pleadings, the appellant could not legitimately complain that the confiscation issue had not been adjudicated; the High Court was justified in concluding that the writ petition lacked merit on this score (para 16).
7. Conclusion:
   • The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the High Court’s reasoning, either in its refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction or in its assessment on merits.
   • The appeal was accordingly dismissed (para 17).

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1.1 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Md. Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86)

Md. Nooh is one of the early landmark cases on the relationship between writ jurisdiction and alternative remedies. It is often cited to emphasise that:

• There is no inflexible rule that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked when a statutory alternative remedy exists; and
• Circumstances such as violation of natural justice, or where the decision is a nullity, may justify direct recourse to Article 226.

In Rikhab Chand Jain, the judgment cites Md. Nooh indirectly – via the discussion in A.V. Venkateswaran – to highlight a specific nuance: in Md. Nooh the petitioner had lost his right of appeal “through no fault of his own”. That fact is used in A.V. Venkateswaran (and reiterated here) to distinguish cases where the loss of the statutory remedy is self-inflicted. In the latter category, courts are significantly less inclined to exercise writ jurisdiction.

4.1.2 Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433

Titaghur is a leading authority on the doctrine that where a complete statutory machinery of appeal and revision exists (particularly in tax matters), writ courts ordinarily should not be approached at the first instance. It underlined:

• The principle of exhaustion of remedies within a statutory scheme; and
• The undesirability of writ courts supplanting specialised statutory forums designed by the legislature.

In the present case, Titaghur is one of the decisions that inform the Court’s general restatement of the alternative remedy rule (para 7), though the more specific force of the decision lies in customs/tax matters where elaborate appellate hierarchies exist.

4.1.3 Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95

This recent decision is cited in para 7 and serves two chief purposes:

1. It reaffirms that availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust jurisdiction under Article 226; rather, it is a factor bearing on the exercise of discretion.
2. It clarifies the conceptual distinction between:
   • “Maintainability” of a writ petition – whether the court has jurisdiction in law to entertain it; and
   • “Entertainability” – whether, in its discretion, the court ought to exercise that jurisdiction in the particular case.

By invoking Godrej Sara Lee, the Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain aligns itself with the contemporary doctrinal framework but then moves the analysis one step further, turning to older Constitution Bench authorities that speak specifically to situations where the alternative forum is the High Court itself.

4.1.4 Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419

This Constitution Bench decision is central to the present judgment. The Court extracts (para 10) a key passage that encapsulates the longstanding, but sometimes under-invoked, principle:

“[W]here it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.”

The emphasized phrase “or even itself in another jurisdiction” is pivotal. The Court in Rikhab Chand Jain relies on this to articulate the core rule that when the statute designates the High Court itself as the appellate/reference forum, it becomes especially inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction so as to bypass its own statutory jurisdiction.

Thus, Thansingh Nathmal operates here not merely as a general alternative remedy case, but as the specific authority that addresses the High Court’s dual capacity – as a constitutional court under Article 226 and as a statutory appellate/reference court under special laws.

4.1.5 A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506

The Court extracts (para 12) the crucial passage from the majority judgment:

“If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the Court dealing with his petition under Article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour.”

This principle is directly transposed to the facts of Rikhab Chand Jain:

• The appellant’s failure to file a reference/appeal under Section 130/130A of the Customs Act within the statutory period (or even to file one with a plea for condonation) is a self-created disability.
• He cannot then invoke the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and rely on the absence of a subsisting statutory remedy as a basis to seek discretionary relief.

In other words, the Court uses A.V. Venkateswaran to reinforce a critical fairness premise: writ jurisdiction should not reward procedural inaction or negligence that has led to the forfeiture of remedies which the law otherwise provided.

4.2 Legal Reasoning in Depth

4.2.1 The Structure of the Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning unfolds logically in several steps:

1. Identification of the central issue (para 6):
   Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellant did not pursue his alternative remedy of appeal/reference under the Customs Act.
2. Restatement of the general doctrine of alternative remedy (paras 7–8):
   The Court recapitulates the well-known approach: alternative remedy is not an absolute bar but a rule of prudence; there are recognised exceptions.
3. Introduction of a “different perspective” (para 8):
   The Court focuses on the specific context where the alternative remedy lies before the same High Court in another jurisdiction.
4. Reliance on Constitution Bench authorities (paras 9–12):
   Thansingh Nathmal and A.V. Venkateswaran are revived and applied to the facts.
5. Application to the facts: limitation and delay (paras 13–15):
   The Court examines the appellant’s delay and his failure to even seek condonation under the statutory mechanism.
6. Consideration of the merits-related argument about confiscation (para 16):
   The Court addresses whether the confiscation challenge was properly in issue and whether there were adequate pleadings.
7. Conclusion and dismissal of the appeal (para 17).

4.2.2 When the Alternative Forum Is the High Court Itself

A key conceptual move in the judgment is the emphasis in paras 9–11 that the identity of the alternative forum matters. The Court notes:

• Where the alternative forum is an ordinary statutory functionary or tribunal, the rule of self-imposed restraint is well known but allows greater flexibility in exceptional cases.
• Where, however, the alternative forum is the High Court itself (e.g., in its statutory appellate/reference jurisdiction), permitting a litigant to ignore that statutory route and directly invoke Article 226 would:
  • Allow the statutory machinery to be bypassed; and
  • Undermine legislative design that specifically conferred a specialised jurisdiction on the High Court.

This leads to the articulated rule (para 9):

“if the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the high court itself ... refusal to entertain the petition should be the rule and entertaining it an exception.”

This proposition is not entirely new – it is grounded in Thansingh Nathmal – but it is articulated here with renewed force, and in contemporary terms, as a guiding standard for High Courts handling large volumes of writ litigation in tax and customs matters.

4.2.3 Self-created Default and Discretion under Article 226

The Court then brings in A.V. Venkateswaran (para 12) for a related but distinct proposition:

• The writ jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary.
• That discretion should not be exercised to aid a party who has, “by his own fault,” lost the opportunity to invoke the statutory remedy.

Applying this, the Court notes:

• The appellant allowed the 180-day limitation for Section 130A to lapse.
• He failed to attempt to file a delayed reference/appeal accompanied by an application for condonation.
• Only later did he turn to the writ jurisdiction, thereby attempting to convert his own procedural default into a justification for extraordinary relief.

The Court treats this as a paradigmatic case in which writ relief should be withheld.

4.2.4 “Reasonable Period” for Writ Petitions and the Role of Limitation Law

Although Article 226 contains no explicit limitation period, courts have long insisted that writ petitions must be filed within a “reasonable time”. The difficulty has always been how to concretely assess what is “reasonable”.

The Court here (para 13–14) provides useful guidance:

• What is reasonable cannot be uniform; it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
• However, the limitation prescribed by the statute for the alternative remedy (here, 180 days) is a helpful indicator. If a litigant waits significantly longer to invoke writ jurisdiction, his delay demands scrutiny.

The Court then moves to a more specific point on limitation:

• The Customs Act, 1962, does not exclude, expressly or by necessary implication, the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (para 14).
• Under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, this means that, for a special law like the Customs Act, general provisions of the Limitation Act are attracted unless expressly excluded.
• Consequently, an application under Section 130A could have been made to the High Court, accompanied by a request to condone delay.

By reminding litigants of this possibility, the Court implicitly conveys that:

• The proper course for a litigant who misses the statutory deadline is to move the statutory forum itself with a condonation plea, rather than bypass the entire statutory mechanism by invoking Article 226.

4.2.5 Pleadings, Grounds, and the Challenge to Confiscation

The appellant attempted to argue before the Supreme Court that:

• The confiscation order had been challenged before CEGAT; and
• CEGAT erroneously noted that confiscation was “not under challenge”.

The Supreme Court accepts, as a factual matter, that the appeal memorandum before CEGAT did indeed challenge confiscation (para 16). However, the Court then turns to the more technical, but crucial, question of pleadings before the High Court:

• The writ petition lacked clear, verified averments stating that the challenge to confiscation had been argued before CEGAT and that CEGAT had failed to consider it.
• Merely putting a ground under a “GROUNDS” heading in a writ petition does not suffice. Someone with direct knowledge of the proceedings must specifically state on oath that the ground was raised, argued, and not dealt with.
• Drawing from “judicial experience”, the Court notes that “not all points raised or grounds urged in a petition are advanced in course of hearing.” (para 16)

Thus, to mount a sustainable grievance that a tribunal failed to decide a particular issue, a litigant must:

1. Plead clearly that the point was indeed raised and argued; and
2. Aver that it was not dealt with in the impugned order.

Since such basic pleadings were missing, the Supreme Court finds no error in the High Court’s decision even on the merits.

4.3 Impact and Broader Significance

4.3.1 Strengthening the Alternative Remedy Doctrine Where the High Court Is the Statutory Forum

The most immediate impact of the judgment is in clarifying and strengthening a specific branch of the alternative remedy doctrine:

• Where a statute provides a right of appeal/reference to the High Court itself (as under many tax, customs, and excise laws), litigants cannot legitimately bypass that route by filing writ petitions as a matter of course.
• For High Courts, this decision offers clear backing to decline writ petitions when the litigant has or had recourse to a statutory route before the same court, particularly where the statutory period has been allowed to lapse.

In practical terms, this will:

• Discourage forum “hopping” within the High Court (from statutory to constitutional jurisdiction);
• Promote use of correctly designated appellate/reference procedures; and
• Reduce pressure on writ dockets where statutory mechanisms remain underutilised or deliberately bypassed.

4.3.2 Consequences for Tax and Customs Litigation

The case specifically arises under the Customs Act, 1962, but its reasoning is apt for other revenue statutes with similar architectures (e.g., income tax, GST, state tax laws where appeals lie to High Courts).

Key practical takeaways for such areas:

• Counsel and litigants must be vigilant about limitation periods for statutory appeals/references to the High Court.
• Where limitation has expired, the first recourse should be to the statutory forum itself with a condonation application, not to the writ court.
• High Courts can now confidently rely on Rikhab Chand Jain to reject writ petitions that represent an attempt to circumvent statutory appellate designs.

4.3.3 Interaction with Limitation Act and Special Statutes

The judgment’s observation that the Customs Act does not exclude Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act has broader implications:

• It reaffirms the approach that, unless a special law expressly or necessarily excludes the operation of the Limitation Act, its general provisions (including condonation) apply.
• This may influence interpretation in other special statutes where similar silence exists on the applicability of the Limitation Act.

4.3.4 Procedural Rigor: Pleadings and Verification

The Court’s insistence (para 16) on concrete pleadings regarding issues allegedly not decided by a tribunal serves to:

• Raise the standard of drafting and verification in writ petitions challenging quasi-judicial orders; and
• Curb vague or unsubstantiated claims that tribunals failed to consider important grounds.

This is significant for all litigants who seek to overturn orders of tribunals or authorities on the ground of “non-consideration” or “non-application of mind”.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Writ of Certiorari under Article 226

A writ of certiorari is a judicial order from a High Court quashing a decision of a lower court, tribunal, or authority. Under Article 226, a High Court can issue such a writ to:

• Correct errors of jurisdiction (acting without or beyond legal authority);
• Rectify violations of natural justice (e.g., no hearing given); or
• Address errors apparent on the face of the record in certain situations.

It is not meant to function as a general appeal on facts. The High Court uses it sparingly, particularly when the legislature has already provided an appellate or revisional mechanism.

5.2 Alternative Statutory Remedy

An alternative statutory remedy is a procedure created by law (like an appeal, revision, review, or reference) that allows an aggrieved party to challenge an order. For example:

• An appeal from a Commissioner to an appellate tribunal under a tax or customs statute; or
• A statutory appeal from a tribunal to the High Court on questions of law.

Courts generally expect litigants to first use these statutory remedies before approaching the High Court under Article 226, except in special circumstances.

5.3 Maintainability vs. Entertainability of Writ Petitions

• Maintainability:
  Whether the High Court has the legal jurisdiction to hear the petition at all. For instance, territorial jurisdiction or whether the nature of the order is amenable to writ jurisdiction.
• Entertainability:
  Even if the court has jurisdiction, should it exercise its discretion to hear the case in the circumstances presented? Alternative remedy, delay, disputed facts, etc., are factors here.

Godrej Sara Lee and the present case emphasise that the presence of an alternative remedy is an issue of entertainability, not maintainability.

5.4 “Reasonable Period” for Filing Writ Petitions

Article 226 has no fixed limitation period. However, courts will not entertain stale claims. Therefore:

• Petitions should be filed with “utmost expedition” (para 13).
• Statutory limitation periods for related remedies (like appeals) help courts judge whether a delay is reasonable.

In this case, 180 days was the statutory limit for a reference under Section 130A of the Customs Act. A writ filed significantly beyond this period – especially without compelling justification – is unlikely to be viewed favourably.

5.5 Limitation Act and Section 29(2)

The Limitation Act, 1963 generally governs the time within which legal proceedings must be initiated. Section 29(2) deals with special laws (like the Customs Act) that prescribe their own limitation periods:

• If the special law prescribes different limitation periods but does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, then the general provisions (such as Sections 4 to 24, including condonation of delay) still apply.
• Only if the special law clearly or by necessary implication excludes those provisions will they not apply.

Here, the Court found no such exclusion in the Customs Act, so a delayed reference under Section 130A could, in principle, have been accompanied by a request to condone delay.

5.6 Confiscation and Penalty under the Customs Act

• Confiscation:
  The State’s legal taking over or forfeiture of goods (here, alleged smuggled silver) involved in customs law violations. Confiscation vests the goods in the Government.
• Penalty:
  A monetary punishment imposed on an individual for contravention of customs law. It is distinct from confiscation.

In this case, the Commissioner both confiscated the silver and imposed a penalty. CEGAT retained confiscation but reduced the penalty.

6. Conclusion

Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India is a carefully reasoned reaffirmation of fundamental principles of writ jurisprudence, adapted to a specific modern context. Its key contributions may be distilled as follows:

1. When the alternative remedy lies before the High Court itself in another jurisdiction, refusal to entertain a writ petition should ordinarily be the rule. This ensures respect for legislative schemes and prevents bypassing of carefully crafted statutory procedures.
2. A litigant cannot rely on his own delay or inaction in pursuing statutory remedies as a basis for seeking writ relief. Self-created disability does not attract the court’s discretion under Article 226.
3. Statutory limitation periods guide what counts as a “reasonable time” for approaching a writ court. The presence of condonation mechanisms within the statutory structure (assisted by the Limitation Act) weakens any equity-based plea for bypassing that structure.
4. Pleadings matter. Assertions that a tribunal failed to consider specific grounds must be clearly and properly pleaded and verified; mere inclusion of an unverified ground in a writ petition is insufficient.

In the broader legal context, this decision will likely influence High Courts in managing their writ dockets, particularly in revenue and regulatory matters where statutory appeals to the High Court exist. It also brings back into active use two Constitution Bench decisions – Thansingh Nathmal and A.V. Venkateswaran – emphasising that constitutional remedies under Article 226 are not a vehicle to circumvent statutory discipline, especially where the High Court itself is the designated statutory forum.

For litigants and practitioners, the message is clear: use the statutory remedies provided, use them in time, and, where delay occurs, first seek condonation within that statutory framework. Only where exceptional circumstances exist – such as clear violation of fundamental rights, patent lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or unconstitutionality of a statute – should Article 226 be invoked in preference to, or instead of, these remedies.