..., 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989). Third, any doubts in the interpretation of a contract must be resolved against the.... We now turn to BSR's assertion that the Agreement requires arbitration of both of Choice's claims. Because this appeal involves a matter of contract interpretation, we review the decision of the...according to the ordinary rules of contract interpretation, as augmented by a federal policy requiring that all ambiguities be resolved in favor of arbitration...

...if it were ambiguous. Another fundamental rule of contract interpretation is that where language is ambiguous the court should construe the language against the drafter of the contract...: [the] Buyer and Seller expressly agree that the laws of the State of California shall govern the validity, construction, interpretation and effect of this contract. The courts of California, County...of Orange, shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action at law relating to the subject matter or the interpretation of this contract. Supreme contended...

...means of contract interpretation, including the consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence, have been applied and found wanting. This view of the rule of construing against the drafter of...contract whose language is ambiguous. However, if, after the jury has applied all other conventional means of contract interpretation and considered the relevant extrinsic evidence, the jury is still unable to determine what the parties intended, the jury should then construe the ambiguity against the drafter. That...considered all conventional means of contract interpretation and all relevant extrinsic evidence, it is still unable to determine what the parties intended, the jury should then construe the ambiguity against the drafter. Therefore...

...inconsistent with the standard principles of contract interpretation. The handbook was issued by Brandeis unilaterally. As such, any ambiguities in the contract should be construed against the drafter, especially....2d 529, 532-533 (8th Cir. 1984) (interpreting terms in university handbook by rules of standard contract interpretation, court construed terms against drafter). However, even interpreting the..., Disciplinary matter. In an action brought by a student against a university seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages for alleged breach of a contract to provide education in...

...clauses do not mandate that Utah was the exclusive forum. In response, the borrowers contend that whether a forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive is a matter of contract interpretation, and therefore, the clauses are ambiguous and must be construed against the credit union as the contract drafter. Whether..., the contract will be enforced as written.” Id. An ambiguous contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and “[a]ny ambiguity, moreover, should be construed against the...intent of the contracting parties. Traditional rules of contract interpretation are employed to accomplish that result.” Davis v. Beling, ––– Nev...

...intent of the parties. When contract language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, the ambiguous contract terms are to be construed against the drafter...appropriate for the district court to instruct the jury to construe any ambiguous terms against the drafter. Id. Fundamentally, we said, the goal of contract interpretation is to "allow the intent of the parties to prevail." Id. "Where there are ambiguous terms or the intent is doubtful, it is axiomatic that the contract will be construed against the drafter." Id...contract terms should be construed against the drafter only if the fact-finder cannot otherwise determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, the parties' intent. Affirmed...

... contract interpretation, the agreement is to be construed against its drafter. See...Justice CAPPY. Appellant, The Insurance Adjustment Bureau, Inc. ("IAB"), filed a complaint against Appellee Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") for breach of contract... were terminated, could not support an action for breach of contract or assignment against Allstate. The Superior Court stated: Instantly, IAB references two...

...( see, e.g., Young v Hunter, 6 N.Y. 203, 207), resort should not be had to the secondary contract interpretation principle of resolving a perceived ambiguity against the drafter. ...provision, the rule would apply only if the seller and the broker's prospective buyer had already entered a sales contract, and the seller's "fault" or "default", within the meaning of the rule, would have...reference solely to a breach of that sales contract. Indeed, such were precisely the circumstances in the cases adverted to by the dissent in support of the rule...

... FIRST NATIONAL BANK of Izard County v. Boyd Wayne GARNER, Phillip Garner, and Janet Garner, CA 03-1156 Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division III. Opinion delivered May 12, 2004 Appeal from Izard Circuit Court; Tim Weaver, Judge; affirmed. Blair Stroud, by: Robert D. Stroud, for appellant. Hance Law Firm, by: C. Eric Hance, for appellee. 1. APPEAL ERROR — BENCH TRIAL — STANDARD OF REVIEW. — The standard of review of a circuit court's findings of fact after a bench trial is whether those findings are clearly erroneous; a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 2. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — CONSTRUCTION OF FUTURE-ADVANCE CLAUSES — INTENTION OF PARTIES GOVERNS. — The Uniform Commercial Code, in Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-204(c) (Repl. 2001), provides, in part, that "[a] security agreement may provide that collateral secures . . . future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment"; in construing future-advances clauses, the intention of the parties governs and is to be determined by considering all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the mortgage. 3. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — FUTURE-ADVANCE CLAUSES — APPLY ONLY TO THOSE ADVANCES CONTEMPLATED BY PARTIES AT TIME SECURITY AGREEMENT WAS EXECUTED. — Future-advances clauses cover only advances shown to have been within contemplation of the parties at the time the security agreement was executed; in determining intent, the appellate court looks to whether the later loan is related to or within the same class as the original debt, which allows an inference that it was covered by the earlier agreement; this is called the "relatedness" rule. 4. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — FUTURE-ADVANCE CLAUSES — "RELATEDNESS" RULE. — The "relatedness" rule does not defeat future-advances clauses; rather, it helps determine the parties' intent by looking at the relationship between the original security agreement and the later debt. 5. CONTRACTS — CONSTRUCTION — AMBIGUITY CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST DRAFTER. — One of the rules of contract construction or interpretation is that any ambiguities will be construed strictly against the drafter of the contract; ambiguity will be found when a provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 6. APPEAL ERROR — ARGUMENT RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL — ARGUMENT NOT ADDRESSED. — Where appellant did not make the argument to the trial court, the appellate court would not address it on appeal; the appellate court will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. 7. SECURED TRANSACTIONS — CONSTRUCTION URGED BY APPELLANT WENT AGAINST PLAIN LANGUAGE OF NOTE SECURITY AGREEMENT — TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT JUNE 2001 NOTE WAS NOT SECURED BY COLLATERAL USED IN MAY 1993 SECURITY AGREEMENT. — The trial court was correct in concluding that the future-advance clause in the May 1993 note and security agreement that had been signed by the three appellee debtors did not extend to cover a later, separate note, signed by only one of the original debtors; the construction of the May 1993 security agreement urged by appellant would have resulted in two of the three appellees intending to grant a security interest for an obligation that they did not owe and for which they were not responsible, which construction went against the plain language of the note and security agreement; further, the collateral belonged to the first debtor prior to his marriage to the third debtor, the third debtor may not have had any right to pledge it to secure her sole debt, appellant offered no proof that the first debtor had any knowledge that the third debtor was pledging the collateral or that he agreed to her doing so, and the transaction also took place after the final separation of these two debtors'; the trial court was correct in concluding that the third debtor's June 2001 note was not secured by the tractor. ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge. This appeal concerns the interpretation and construction of a promissory note and security agreement signed by three debtors, the appellees, and containing a future-advances clause. The trial court held that the future-advances clause did not extend to cover a later, separate note signed by only one of the original debtors, and the appellant, First National Bank of Izard County (FNBIC) appeals. We affirm. The parties submitted this case to the trial court on stipulated facts. On May 6, 1993, appellees Boyd Garner, Janet Garner, and Phillip Garner executed a promissory note in favor of FNBIC in the principal amount of $51,890.12, for the stated purpose of purchasing real estate. As security for the note, appellees executed a mortgage on certain real property in Izard County. In addition, appellees executed a financing statement and security agreement granting FNBIC a security interest in a Ford tractor. At the time the note, mortgage, and financing statement and security agreement were executed, Boyd Garner and Janet Garner were husband and wife. Phillip Garner is the son of Boyd Garner but not the son of Janet Garner. The Ford tractor referenced in the security agreement was owned by Boyd Garner prior to his marriage to Janet Garner. The promissory note contained the following provisions: Definitions — "I" means each borrower who signs this note and each other person or legal entity (including grantors, endorsers, and sureties) who agrees to pay the note. The term `note total' means the total amount I am obligated to pay on the note. . . . . Secured Obligations — This agreement secures the payment of the note and any additional amount I am or will become obligated to pay to you under the terms of the note (including all extensions, renewals, refinancing and modifications of the note) and the security agreement. This agreement also secures all other debts I may now or later owe you (including notes, insurance premiums, overdrafts, letters of credit, guarantees, and all extensions, renewals, and modifications of such debts). . . . In June 2001, Janet Garner executed a promissory note to FNBIC in the original principal amount of $17,021.54. As security, Janet Garner granted FNBIC a security interest in a new Chevrolet Cavalier automobile and in the Ford tractor listed in the original May 1993 note. In January 2002, the Chevrolet automobile was damaged, and insurance on the automobile paid $9,000 toward the satisfaction of the promissory note. As of May 10, 2002, there was a balance owed on the note of $7,232.14, plus late charges of $178.65. FNBIC attempted to take possession of the Ford tractor under the security agreement granted in connection with the May 1993 note, but the Garners refused to allow FNBIC to do so. At the time the May 1993 note was executed, Boyd Garner and Janet Garner were living together as husband and wife. They separated in 2000, reconciled, and separated again in February 2001. They were divorced later that year, and Boyd Garner received the Ford tractor in the divorce decree. Neither Phillip Garner nor Boyd Gardner signed any of the loan documentation in connection with the June 2001 note executed by Janet Garner. FNBIC filed suit seeking a judgment against Janet Garner for the unpaid balance of the note, interest, and attorney's fees. FNBIC sought an order requiring Boyd Garner and Phillip Garner to make the Ford tractor available so FNBIC could take possession and sell the tractor and apply the proceeds to the 2001 Janet Garner note. Boyd Garner and Phillip Garner answered, denying the allegations of the complaint. The answer was submitted on behalf of Boyd Garner and Phillip Garner. Likewise, the brief to this court is submitted only on behalf of Boyd and Phillip Garner. The trial court found that FNBIC's claim hinges on the meaning of "I" as defined in the stipulated facts. The court referred to the definition of "each" provided by the dictionary as meaning "each one; every individual one." The trial court reasoned that, in order for FNBIC to have an interest in the tractor, it would have been necessary for "every defendant" to have signed the Janet Garner note dated June 2001. The court ruled that, because that did not happen, FNBIC had no security interest in the tractor and was not entitled to take possession of this tractor and dispose of and apply the proceeds to the June 2001 note. This appeal followed. FNBIC raises... against the drafter of the contract. Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 977 S.W.2d 217.... [5] Moreover, one of the rules of contract construction or interpretation is that any ambiguities will be construed strictly...

...); Rudman v. Dupuis, 206 La. 1061, 20 So.2d 363 (La. 1944). Contract interpretation of ambiguous terms requires construction against the contract's drafter. See...to file suit against Melton unless he complied with the agreement within five days of the letter. When Melton failed to do so, the Campbells instituted suit for breach of contract and specific...interpreting contracts, we are guided by the general rules contained in articles 2045-2057 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of...

...contract language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, the ambiguous contract terms are to be construed against the drafter. Both...interpretation is to "allow the intent of the parties to prevail." Id. "Where there are ambiguous terms or the intent is doubtful , it is axiomatic that the contract will be construed against the drafter." Id...against the drafter. The district court overruled the objection of TMS and denied its later motion for a new trial. The jury found for Staffing on its breach-of-contract claim and...

...Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165). When ambiguities in a standardized contract, like the account agreement involved here, cannot be dispelled by application of the other rules contract interpretation, they are resolved against the drafter. (Civ...other rules of interpretation, a contract must be interpreted most strongly against the party who prepared it. (Civ. Code, § 1654; Jacobs v. Freeman (1980..., the validity of the ADR clause cannot be properly assessed. In order to make that determination, we must apply the standard statutory rules of contract interpretation in order to ascertain the mutual...

...axiom of contract interpretation law that an ambiguous contract be interpreted against its drafter. "Any ambiguity resulting from th[e] deliberate choice of language will be interpreted most strongly...require a lump sum payment because the lease contains no specific language to that effect. Debtor contends that any ambiguity in the meaning of the lease must be construed against its drafter, GE. It is an...against the party who wrote it. . . ." In re F.H. McGraw Co., 473 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1973). "Insofar as contract language may be deemed...

...arbitration on a classwide basis. But even if the Court is right to view the agreement as ambiguous, a plain-vanilla rule of contract interpretation, applied in California as in every other State, requires reading it against the drafter—and...employment." Ibid. The Ninth Circuit followed California law to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, a rule that "applies with peculiar force in the case of a contract of adhesion" such as...California's rule that ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter, a doctrine known as contra proferentem . The rule applies "only as a last resort" when the meaning of a...

...interpretation is inconsistent with a holistic reading of the contract, particularly when construing it against Celadon as its drafter. With respect to Section 5.05 of the contract, the Class states...strictly on their own terms. Second, although purporting to apply Indiana law, the Walker opinion is devoid of any mention of well-settled contract interpretation principles under Indiana law. One of those principles is that any ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter of...ambiguous contract against Celadon as its drafter, we conclude that it is more accurate to state that what Celadon "advanced" to truckers when they used a Comdata card at Pilot Flying J was the...

...contract against AOL as the drafter and adopt plaintiffs' reasonable interpretation of the phrase to mean the state courts of Virginia. See...of contract interpretation, we review the district court's interpretation de novo. Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75.... (internal citation omitted). We apply the "primary rule of interpretation . . . that the common or normal meaning of language will be given to the words of a contract unless circumstances show that in...

...language is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation it is ambiguous, and ambiguous contract terms must be construed against the drafter — here, Cargill. Current Tech. Concepts, Inc...respondent. We again turn to the well-established principle of contract law requiring ambiguities be interpreted against the drafter. Turner...became apparent in 1996 that there were problems with the Granite investment, and Cargill claims respondent should have recommended a reserve be taken against losses in that year...

...interpretation that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter of a contract when the contract is susceptible of two meanings. 2 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 206. This maxim has long been...drawn against Lewis with respect to the ambiguity in the contract. The trial court also held that Lewis's refusal to let Patrick, his former attorney, testify before the court by invoking his attorney..., 71 (Ky.App. 2009). The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and is reviewed by the Court de novo. Money, supra, at 71...