...have certain legal obligations. First, they must purchase standard, basic, or special insurance coverage for their automobiles. N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1; see also...accident. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, -3.1(a), -3.3(b)(1); see also Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 466.... Caviglia, supra, 178 N.J. at 466, 842 A.2d 125; see also N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. Third...

...counseling and treatment services for the victims of certain sex offenses and their families. N.J.S.A. 52:4B–43.2. To fund the services, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10, which...factors that a sentencing court should consider when imposing an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. This appeal requires the Court to determine whether a sentencing court may...defendant in any amount between a nominal figure and the upper limit prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10(a) for the degree of the offense at issue. In setting an SCVTF penalty, the sentencing court...

...this Court is whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29 provides immunity to the Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in.... We now reverse the dismissal of the wrongful-death/survival claims against the Rescue Squad. Although N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29 states that the “officers and members” of a rescue...-language reading of N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29 leads to the conclusion that on the summary-judgment record before us, the Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence. Plaintiffs...

...reviews a sentencing judge's application of the aggravating and mitigating factors prescribed in N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a) and (b). Defendant Reinaldo Fuentes admitted to killing his roommate, Adrian...guilty to aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(c), and the other charges pending against him were dismissed. Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced...to a twenty-year term of incarceration. The sentencing court initially found only one statutory aggravating factor, the need to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(9) (aggravating...

...whether defendant could assert a defense to the action under N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2 based on its good-faith reliance on certain determinations by...provides that an employer shall "pay each employee not less than 1 ½ times such employee's regular hourly rate for each hour of" overtime. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4(b...)(1). The WHL, however, creates an exemption from that overtime compensation requirement for employees of a "trucking industry employer." N.J.S.A. 34:11...

..., N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a); and whether the same mailings constitute violations of a final domestic violence restraining order. The trial court held that the act of mailing the torn-up support order violated...argument. On September 24, 1991, a temporary restraining order was issued against defendant pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-1 to -16, which was repealed and...replaced by the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -33 ("1991 Act"). Those charges were dismissed on November 19, 1991, with Mary's consent. Five days...

.... Justice PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. When it enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:44...committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner[.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(1) (aggravating factor one). The second aggravating factor addresses “[t]he gravity and seriousness of harm...inflicted on the victim[.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(2) (aggravating factor two). In determining whether aggravating factor two applies, the sentencing court considers whether “the defendant knew or...

...in the law. N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21(c). The statute in question addresses harm to a child, not a fetus. If an expectant mother's drug use causes actual harm to the physical, mental, or emotional..., 2012, the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) was renamed the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. See L. 2012, c. 16, § 20 (amending N.J.S.A. 9:3A...: (1) the Division can offer services to expectant and new mothers under certain circumstances, with their consent, see N.J.S.A. 30:4C–11; and (2) the Division can seek a court order to...

...N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, as well as aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. Officer Kelly turned State's witness and testified under a grant of immunity.... N.J.S.A. 2A:81-17.3. The other officers were acquitted of all charges, and defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault. The jury was unable to agree on the charge of official misconduct against...potential hardship defendant would face in prison. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(7) and -(11). Because of O'Donnell's boastful attitude about the beating administered to Burns, the court specifically rejected arguments...

....2d 239. It was the panel's view that the transfer of physical custody to a non-custodial parent was not a "placement" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54. Id. at 41-44...the health and welfare of the children of this state. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-4. The procedures for accomplishing those obligations are set forth in Title Nine, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73, and...Title Thirty, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11 to -14. We are largely concerned in this case with the statutory framework of Title Nine, and therefore we summarize the main requirements of that title...

...save the young woman's life. The trial court granted the City of Newark's (City) motion for summary judgment, finding that the City was immune from liability under N.J.S.A. 59:5-4, a section...of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3 (Act or TCA). N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 provides immunity for the failure of a public entity and its employees to provide police protection service...ministerial duties, and accordingly reverse the grant of summary judgment to the City. We do not address the City's alternate immunity claim under N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10(d), and permit the parties...

.... Later, Dalziel also admitted to the robbery and to assaulting Vainjoe. Dalziel and DeBlasi were indicted for first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. Dalziel was also...charged with second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), second-degree possession of a weapon (baseball bat) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) and fourth-degree...unlawful possession of a weapon. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). Dalziel agreed to plead guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for truthful testimony against DeBlasi. In return, the State agreed to...

..., Samaad Lather, Samadd N. J.L., Samaad N. Lather), Defendant–Appellant. N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(i) Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the...). Justice SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. Held Unconstitutional...unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(e)(1) , it must find defendants knew they were at an educational facility. The jury convicted defendants of second...

..., the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) concluded that G.S. had committed an act of child neglect within the meaning of N.J.S.A...N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. This Court remanded for a determination of whether the finding of neglect was sustainable under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). The Appellate Division again concluded that...the finding of neglect was improper. DYFS now appeals that decision, urging us to find that accidental injuries can support a finding of neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). We agree and...

...comparative bonding evaluation of the children." The panel also required consideration of the Kinship Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7 (Kinship Act or Act), as an alternative to termination...,'" under the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a (1) through (4). Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the court found that DYFS had satisfied its burden to.... claimed that she had made substantial progress in overcoming her addiction, and that the trial court erred in refusing to consider kinship legal guardianship, authorized by N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1...

...discretionary extended term sentences). This appeal requires the Court to address N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(a)(2), which limits the...mandatory terms of parole ineligibility in same sentence). On the other hand, N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(b)(1) prevents a trial court from imposing a discretionary extended term for an offense when the defendant.... We hold that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(a)(2) bars the imposition of a discretionary extended term when the prosecutor has requested one and the trial court is obliged to impose...

...brief). Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1–1 to 2C:104–9, sets forth...only if the judge clearly and convincingly determines that “the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43–6(b). Central to the success of this process...a bench trial in March 2012, a Superior Court judge convicted defendant, William A. Case, Jr., of five counts of second-degree attempted luring of a minor, N.J.S.A. 2C:13–6; five counts of...

...(Act), N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.4. We are called on to establish the appropriate standard for determining whether the Attorney General or a county prosecutor has properly declined to seek a waiver of forfeiture...of public employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 based on a conviction for a disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. The trial court applied a "heightened standard of review" and held that...the prosecutor's decision not to seek a waiver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2e was an "extraordinary abuse of discretion." The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the "patent and gross abuse of...

...business from a licensed conforming use to a nonconforming use has been "grandfathered" by virtue of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. The trial court and the Appellate...., 2d Sess. (1995). Both bills were enacted into law and became effective on September 15, 1995. L. 1995, c. 230, § 3 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7 and amending N.J.S.A. 2C:34...-2). In language similar to the pertinent language in the Rahway Code,N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7 provides in pertinent part...

...LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.31 prohibits persons from holding a beneficial interest in more.... In June 2005, after reviewing Circus's renewal applications, Middletown discovered that it could not "validly renew all three liquor licenses owned by [Circus]" because N.J.S.A...petitions. The ALJ affirmed Middletown's non-renewal of the license, finding that Circus's ownership of three licenses clearly violated N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.31. Noting that "[t]he use of estoppel to...