O R D E R
Trevor Young, a pretrial detainee, sued Lieutenant Rodgina Jones and Officer Jacob Martin for using excessive force when they tased him at the Milwaukee * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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County Jail. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Young appeals the district court's entry of judgment on the jury verdict in the officers' favor. We affirm.
In January 2022, Young was detained at the Milwaukee County Jail, awaiting trial on criminal charges. Officer Marisol Rodriguez worked in Young's pod, and during lunch tray distributions on January 8, Rodriguez intentionally skipped Young's cell. Rodriguez called for assistance from other officers, explaining that Young had covered his cell window in paper and threatened to commit suicide. Jones and Martin arrived at Young's cell and handcuffed him through the cell's trap. The officers brought Young out of his cell and Jones explained that because Rodriguez reported that Young said he was suicidal, Young had to be placed on suicide watch. The officers uncuffed Young and brought him back into his cell, where Young argued that he should not be placed on suicide watch and an altercation ensued. The altercation ended when Martin, at Jones's direction, used his taser on Young, activating it at least twice.
Young sued Jones and Martin for using excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the claim proceeded to trial, where Young was represented by pro bono counsel.
Ruling on pretrial motions in limine, the district court determined that Young could not introduce the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office's policies and procedures related to the use of force. The court explained that the policies were not relevant to whether the officers used excessive force under the Constitution and that they posed the danger of needlessly confusing the jury and introducing unfair prejudice to the defendants.
At trial, the parties disputed why Rodriguez skipped Young's lunch delivery and called for assistance from other officers. Young testified that Rodriguez skipped him due to preexisting hostility between them and that he then violated the jail's safety rules by covering his cell window with paper to force Rodriguez to call her supervisors. He denied saying at any point that he was suicidal. Rodriguez, on the other hand, testified that she could not deliver Young's lunch because he had already intentionally flooded the cell and covered its window in paper. She testified that Young then yelled that he was suicidal, so she called for assistance.
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The parties also disputed the nature of the altercation after Jones and Martin returned Young to his cell. Young testified that he argued with the officers but did not threaten them in any way. He said that Jones then re-cuffed his hands behind his back and instructed Martin to tase him. Young says that Martin tased him twice, causing him to fall over, then continued to tase him, activating the taser a third time. Young introduced the taser's activation log, which showed three activations during the incident.
Martin testified that after he and Jones returned Young to his cell, Young argued that he should not be placed on suicide watch and assumed a boxing stance with clenched fists. Jones then instructed Martin to tase Young. Martin testified that he activated the taser twice because one prong from the first shot missed (a taser requires contact with at least two prongs to work), and that Young collapsed after the second shot succeeded. Jones then attempted to handcuff Young, and another officer, Lieutenant Hannah Alexander, entered the cell to assist Jones. Martin testified that it would never be reasonable to tase someone who posed no safety risk, and said that the taser's third activation, if it happened, was unintentional. Jones's testimony was substantially the same as Martin's.
Alexander testified that she arrived at Young's cell moments after Young was tased and he was actively resisting the defendants' efforts to handcuff him. She also testified—over Young's objection—that, in her experience, taser activation logs were sometimes inaccurate, but noted that she only checked the logs for accuracy after obvious taser malfunctions.
During the defendants' cross-examination of Young, they introduced medical records to attack Young's credibility. Young objected, and outside the presence of the jury, the district judge discussed with the parties whether the records were admissible. Young argued that the records should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 (relevance), 403 (confusion of the issues), and 404 (character evidence). The judge raised sua sponte Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), initially explaining that the defendants could not introduce the records if they constituted extrinsic evidence of Young's character for untruthfulness. Yet Young made no argument related to Rule 608, and the judge ultimately concluded that because Young's "credibility [was] key to the case," the defendants could "show whatever documentation" they had to challenge his credibility. Then, back in the presence of the jury, the defendants showed on a screen, and repeatedly questioned Young about, excerpts of his medical records suggesting that on prior occasions he had lied to prison officials to get attention from their supervisors. In
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one instance, Young was placed on suicide watch because an officer said he threatened self-harm, but there was no evidence of self-harm and Young later denied making such a threat. And in the other instance, Young reported chest pain and spitting up blood but refused to allow a full medical assessment, and prison officials did not see blood in his spit. Young's credibility also may have been undermined by his history of five felony convictions.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, Young challenges three of the district court's evidentiary rulings and asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We need not dwell on Young's challenge to the weight of the evidence: Young waived that issue by failing to file a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Stegall v. Saul, 943 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 2019). But Young's challenges to the district court's evidentiary rulings require closer review.
Young preserved two of his evidentiary challenges, which we review for abuse of discretion, reversing "only if no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected the outcome of the trial." Hernandez v. City of Peoria,
135 F.4th 517, 524 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Young first challenges the district court's decision to bar evidence related to the jail's use-of-force policies and procedures. To win at trial, Young needed to show that
"the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable."
Raddant v. Douglas Cnty., 170 F.4th 583, 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). Young argues that evidence that the defendants violated the jail's policies would have helped show that they used objectively unreasonable force. But we have explained that whether an officer violated department policy is immaterial to whether an officer's force was unreasonable under the Constitution. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2017). Expert testimony about policy could still be admissible to help the jury determine reasonableness by understanding "nationally or widely used policy" or
"factual complexity" concerning tools of law enforcement. Id. at 538. But the policies here would not have served that role: Young sought to introduce only local policy, and multiple officers described the function and effect of the taser Martin used. We therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the
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policies on the grounds that they would needlessly confuse the jury and their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Young next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Alexander to testify about her experience with malfunctioning tasers and inaccurate taser logs. Young argues this constituted expert testimony inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. But Alexander's testimony was factual, not opinion testimony: it concerned only her personal experiences with malfunctioning tasers and inaccurate logs, without offering an opinion on the taser log generated after this incident. Because Alexander's testimony was based on her personal knowledge, the "district court's decision to admit 'such testimony [was] not problematic'" under Rule 701. United States
v. Bowling, 952 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Giovanetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1990)). And because Young did not raise any other objection to Alexander's testimony at trial, he may not do so now on appeal. See United States v. Echols, 104 F.4th 1023, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2024).
Finally, Young asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the defendants to impeach him with his prison medical records, extrinsic evidence of his character for truthfulness that should have been excluded under Rule 608(b). But Young failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Although he objected to introduction of the records on other grounds—and the trial court suggested that Rule 608 might apply— Young did not pursue this issue or request a formal ruling on it. And "when a party in a civil case exercises judgment by advancing certain arguments at the expense of others in the district court, he waives the arguments not raised." Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 168 F.4th 483, 491 (7th Cir. 2026). That waiver precludes our review.
Yet even if Young had merely forfeited the argument, we would not reach its merits. In the civil context, we rarely review forfeited issues because litigants generally should be bound by their counsel's actions, especially in civil cases where the dispute does not implicate substantial liberty interests and the litigant can seek recompense through a malpractice suit. Id. We therefore correct plain error only if: "(1) exceptional circumstances exist; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur if plain error review is not applied." Id. at 490 (citation omitted). Young has not suggested that his case meets this threshold. Perhaps Young's counsel could have invoked Rule 608(b) to prevent the defendants from introducing evidence of his prior untruthfulness. See United States v. Dawson, 434 F.3d 956, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Rule 608(b) … [is] about presenting extrinsic evidence, not about
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asking questions."). But even debatable arguments and errors by counsel do not constitute exceptional circumstances. Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc.,
168 F.4th at 492-93. Young failed to raise this objection at trial and has not demonstrated on appeal an exceptional circumstance affecting his substantial rights such that refusing to review and correct the error would cause a miscarriage of justice. See Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020). This, therefore, is not among the rare civil cases in which we will apply plain error review to unpreserved arguments.
AFFIRMED
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