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Calvin Mayfield v. Ryan Woods

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 27, 2026* Decided November 6, 2026

Before

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge No. 26-1401

CALVIN MAYFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

RYAN WOODS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 25-cv-04234

John F. Kness,

Judge.

O R D E R

Calvin Mayfield, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the dismissal at screening of his claims alleging that prison officials retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and singled him out * The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately presents the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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for punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We accept as true the factual allegations in Mayfield's complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Wilson v. Castaneda, 143 F.4th 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2025). In August 2024, Mayfield, then incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, was accepted into Northwestern University's Prison Education Program (NPEP). NPEP is an in-person bachelor's degree program at Sheridan Correctional Center open to prisoners who have gone 12 months with no serious disciplinary infractions. The Illinois Department of Corrections approved Mayfield's transfer from Pinckneyville to Sheridan so he could participate in the program. When Mayfield arrived at Sheridan in September 2024, he was placed in a cell with another inmate.

Mayfield immediately expressed concern about his double-cell assignment. At Pinckneyville, Mayfield had a single-cell assignment because of an incident years earlier where his cellmate attacked him. Mayfield, acting in self-defense, killed his cellmate. As a result of the attack, Mayfield was diagnosed with and treated for post-traumatic stress disorder. At Sheridan, Mayfield alerted Crystal Latigo, the wing officer, that he had a single cell at his last two facilities and asked her to check with internal affairs and the mental health unit to confirm that the designation was in his file. He also told her he did not feel safe in the cell with another person. Mayfield alleges that raising the issue first with Latigo before filing a formal grievance is consistent with prison policy. Latigo told Mayfield to wait in the dayroom while she checked and allowed him to go to dinner with the rest of the cell house. Shortly after dinner, Lieutenant Booker arrived and handcuffed Mayfield. Booker told Mayfield he was being restrained because he refused housing. When Mayfield said he had not refused housing, Booker responded, "I know," and explained that Warden Ryan Woods told Booker to put Mayfield in "restrictive housing."

The next day, Latigo issued Mayfield a disciplinary ticket for "disobeying a direct order essential to safety and security" and for "unauthorized movement." The report alleged that Mayfield approached Latigo and said, "Hey c/o, I'm not taking a cellie, I've murdered a cellie before. It's a security risk." Mayfield alleges that a different officer told him that Latigo was ordered by a lieutenant to write the report even though she knew the charges were false, and that Latigo said, "Mayfield got screwed."

Five days later, on September 17, Craig Carlock, the chairperson of the Adjustment Committee, came to Mayfield's cell to conduct a disciplinary hearing.

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Carlock read Latigo's disciplinary report. Mayfield responded, "[i]t's a misunderstanding, I'm a single cell, but I never refused housing, I'm just not comfortable with a cellie." Carlock then told Mayfield that Woods "could make it all go away" and that Woods wanted to know whether Mayfield was stable enough to have a cellmate. Carlock found Mayfield guilty of the alleged violations, recommended seven days' segregation, thirty days of "C Grade" housing, and a disciplinary transfer to another facility. Woods approved the disciplinary actions the same day. A month later, Mayfield filed a grievance seeking to have the disciplinary ticket expunged. As a result, on October 31, Woods told Mayfield that he never should have been transferred to Sheridan because Mayfield had killed his former cellmate. Mayfield responded that the incident had been expunged from his file, but Woods said he investigated it anyway. Mayfield alleges that Woods then admitted the disciplinary report was false and told him the ticket would be expunged, but that Mayfield would be transferred because he had killed his former cellmate.

The next day, a grievance officer reviewing Mayfield's grievance recommended without explanation that the disciplinary ticket be expunged. But Woods did not approve the expungement until November 6, the same day Mayfield was transferred back to Pinckneyville. Because of the transfer, Mayfield could not participate in NPEP. Mayfield sued Booker, Latigo, Woods, and Carlock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted that they retaliated and conspired to retaliate against him in violation of the First Amendment after he complained to Latigo about his cell assignment. Mayfield also asserted that Latigo, Woods, and Carlock violated his right to due process related to the disciplinary hearing. Finally, Mayfield asserted that Woods violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by treating him differently from other similarly situated inmates.

The district court screened and dismissed Mayfield's complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court concluded that Mayfield had not stated a due-process claim related to the disciplinary hearing because he was not deprived of a protected liberty interest. The court also reasoned that Mayfield had not sufficiently alleged that the defendants conspired against him, explaining that Mayfield provided no more than "vague and conclusory allegations." The court did not address whether Mayfield had stated a claim under the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The court denied as moot all pending motions, including Mayfield's request for counsel, and then entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.

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On appeal, Mayfield contends that the district court erred by not considering whether he stated a claim that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. He also argues that his allegations are specific enough to state a claim that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights. Further, he argues that he stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. (Because Mayfield does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his due-process claim, we do not address it further.) We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012).

1. First Amendment

Mayfield argues that the district court erred by overlooking whether his allegations stated a claim against the defendants for retaliating and conspiring to retaliate against him in violation of the First Amendment. At screening, Mayfield needed to plausibly allege only that he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, suffered a deprivation likely to deter future protected activity, and the protected activity was a motivating factor in the defendants' decision to retaliate. Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866.

Here, the district court did not consider Mayfield's allegations that he engaged in protected speech when he told Latigo about his mental health status, asked her to check on his cell status, and said that he did not feel safe in a cell with another inmate. The First Amendment protects an inmate's right "to seek administrative or judicial remedies of conditions of confinement." Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 276 (7th Cir. 1996)); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006) (legitimate complaints do not "lose their protected status simply because they are spoken"). And though a prison may restrict prisoners' speech when it is inconsistent with legitimate penological interests, see Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2023), the district court did not consider Mayfield's allegation that he was following prison procedures when he reported his concerns to Latigo. Neither did the court consider whether Mayfield plausibly alleged that he suffered deprivations that would likely deter future protected activity. Mayfield alleges that after he complained to Latigo, Booker put him in restrictive housing and Latigo issued a false disciplinary report that led to his disciplinary transfer. See Holleman,

951 F.3d at 880-81 (citing Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 1996) (transfer to segregated housing with more restrictions may deter future protected activity)); Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708-09 (disciplinary ticket is adverse response that would chill protected activity).

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Finally, the court overlooked Mayfield's allegations that his complaint to Latigo motivated the defendants' decisions to retaliate. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015). Motivation can be inferred where "the adverse action 'follows close on the heels of protected expression' and 'the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew of the protected conduct.'" FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001)). Mayfield alleged that Booker put him in restrictive housing the same day he complained to Latigo with the explanation that Mayfield had "refused housing," and that Latigo wrote the false disciplinary report the day after he complained to her. Similarly, Mayfield argues that the district court erred by concluding without explanation that his allegations related to conspiracy were too vague to state a claim. To state a claim of conspiracy, Mayfield needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting an agreement among the defendants to achieve a common purpose of violating his constitutional rights. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2017). The district court considered his conspiracy claim as a "stand-alone" one, rather than a conspiracy to violate Mayfield's First Amendment rights specifically. But Mayfield's complaint alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to violate the First Amendment. The district court's dismissal without analyzing Mayfield's First Amendment claims was error. We vacate the judgment and remand so that the court may consider whether Mayfield's allegations stated a claim under the First Amendment.

2. Equal Protection

Mayfield also argues that the district court erred by overlooking his equal- protection claim. We disagree with Mayfield on this point. Mayfield has not alleged facts that would enable us to determine whether he was plausibly treated differently from other similar inmates. To state a "class-of-one" claim, Mayfield needed to allege that he was "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated" and "that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment."

145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 771 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fares Pawn, LLC v. Ind. Dep't of Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 2014)). Mayfield alleged that after he complained about having a cellmate, Woods investigated his expunged file, discovered that he had killed his former cellmate, and orchestrated his transfer out of Sheridan. But these assertions are not sufficient "to overcome the presumption of rationality"

applicable to government action. D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir.

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2008)). It is conceivable that Woods transferred Mayfield because Sheridan could not accommodate his specific mental health needs or housing status. Mayfield points to two inmates who, he says, are similar to him but were treated differently: one participated in an education program after a disciplinary infraction and the other, who had also killed his former cellmate, was allowed to stay at Sheridan in a single cell. But Mayfield has not alleged similarities with these inmates that would plausibly defeat the presumption of rationality. The first inmate participated in a different education program, the details of which are unclear, and Mayfield did not allege any facts about the mental health status of the other inmate, the circumstances surrounding his past violent conduct, or whether he complained about his cell.

3. Motion for Counsel

Finally, Mayfield argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on his request for counsel before dismissing with prejudice his complaint. The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the district court. Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 2025). On remand, Mayfield may renew his request for counsel, and the court should consider it under the factors of Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

* * *

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

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Calvin Mayfield v. Ryan Woods
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