Order: "While there has been no official assignment of claims, the parties have an agreement that if Consul collects any money on his bad faith claim, the money will [be] used to satisfy the underlying judgment against him in favor of Choisser."
Should Consul prevail in this bad faith claim, he will remit all payment to satisfy Choisser's judgment. Should Progressive pre- vail in this bad faith claim, Consul will bear the cost of his attor- neys' fees and will be taxed for the Court's costs. Because it is un- disputed in this record Consul is judgment proof, he would seem to have little to gain and much to lose in bringing this third-party claim. It is true that he would avoid future collection efforts by Choisser on the underlying judgment, but, given Consul's
23
2 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 judgment proof status, Choisser appears aware that those collec- tion efforts would be doomed from the start. Perhaps, considering these facts, it's unsurprising Consul would not know "why [he] sued Progressive." Nonetheless, Consul has standing to appear be- fore us so that he can get Choisser's unpaid judgment "off of the books," so to speak.
On the other hand, Choisser and his attorney, Matthew Posgay, have much to gain from Consul's bad faith claim. The Amended Final Judgment in the underlying tort suit includes $388,505.00 in attorney's fees, $76,000.00 in taxable costs, and $790,000.00 in damages.
As the District Court noted at the hearing on Progressive's motion for summary judgment, there are often assignments in- volved in third-party bad faith claims. It continued, "[where] there are assignments involved, the real parties in interest are less clear."
I would emphasize that statement.
As named in this suit, Consul is the plaintiff in this action against his insurer, Progressive. As reflected in this record, Consul signed a written agreement with Choisser and Posgay agreeing that any damages recovered in this case would pass through to Choisser. When asked about this agreement, Choisser testified
"[he] didn't recall any signed agreement. We may have one, but I don't recall it." Choisser's attorney, Posgay, testified to the exist- ence of this agreement: "There have been documents or a docu- ment signed, but I don't recall the specifics of it. But there was -- if I recall correctly, there's not been an agreement to never collect,
24
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 3 but my understanding is to let this case take its course before efforts are taken to collect."
Consul's personal attorney in the underlying action, Chris- topher Campione, described the agreement as an assignment of rights:
Q: Did you enter into any kind of an agreement with anyone on behalf of Charbel Consul that would either limit or forestall collection of the judgment obtained by Dr. Choisser in the Consul case
A: I think this—other than the assignment of the
rights for Mr. Choisser to pursue this claim, I don't believe so.
While the content of this agreement is outside the record on ap- peal, the finer points of the agreement may remain relevant to the eventual disposition of this case. In Clement v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., this Court sounded a note of caution in rejecting a similar agreement.
We assume without deciding that the assignment of the insured's claim may serve as consideration for the injured party's release of the insured from any fur- ther liability without at the same time extinguishing the bad faith claim. It is clear as a matter of Florida law, however, that if, prior to any valid assignment of the insured's bad faith claim, the injured party re- leases the insured from any further liability for the ex- cess damages that are alleged to have resulted from the bad faith of the insurer, the bad faith claim is ex- tinguished.
25
4 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458
790 F.2d 1545, 1548. As Posgay described the agreement, Choisser agreed not to collect the judgment against Consul until "this case takes its course." Under those terms, assignment or not, Consul has not been completely released from the excess judgment and thus meets our standing requirements under Article III. But even where Choisser has not formally extinguished Consul's liability, it remains unclear (to Consul himself, apparently) what Consul may practi- cally gain by bringing this lawsuit.
Indeed, there are strange incentives at play here. Where Consul neither (1) understands whether he is suing Progressive,
(2) understands why he is suing Progressive, nor (3) can state any details about what he feels Progressive did wrong in handling his claim, I feel our warning in Clement bears repeating:
In the real world of litigation, it is sometimes thought more desirable for one particular person or entity ra- ther than another to prosecute or defend a claim. Some might consider a jury in a bad faith case more likely to sympathize with the wronged insured than an assignee of his claim. Perhaps the situation was so perceived in this case, for the agreement executed to release the insured from further exposure was care- fully drafted so that the insured would appear as the plaintiff in the case against his insurance carrier. To that end, it was clearly provided that whatever claim the insured may have against the insurance company was not yet assigned, but remained then the property of the insured.
Clement, 790 F.2d at 1548.
26
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 5 Today's majority correctly notes some of the oddities in this case. It "[is] not blind to the fact that Posgay provided no reason as to why he could not provide his client's wife's name and failed to even alert Progressive that the release listed the wrong person,"
Maj. Op. at 12 n.4, and it notes, "[o]nce again, the record reflects that Posgay may have contributed to the problem" when he re- fused to provide information regarding how he reached his valua- tion of the car. Maj. Op. at 15 n.6. Rather than confronting those oddities, it retreats to our duty in reviewing a grant of summary judgment to "tak[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to Consul." See Maj. Op. at 12 n.4 ("Yet, while we factor in the claim- ant's behavior, we focus on the actions of the insurer and, at this stage, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to Consul."). The majority is correct in applying this standard. Indeed, a claimant's "actions can[not] let the insurer off the hook when the evidence clearly establishes that the insurer acted in bad faith in handling the insured's claim." Harvey v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 259 So. 3d 1, 11 (Fla. 2018). Even so, I pause to highlight that gamesman- ship in bad faith claims seems to have proliferated within our Dis- trict Courts' dockets. See, e.g., Ellis v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 541 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2021) ("A court should not allow a claimant to manufacture a claim for bad faith for the purpose of creating insurance coverage."); Cosola v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4854516, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2013) ("The Court will not permit Plaintiff to manufacture a claim of bad faith for the purpose of cre- ating unlimited insurance coverage where no bad faith exists."); Shin Crest PTE, Ltd v. AIU Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243
27
6 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (recognizing the Court's "responsibility to reserve bad faith damages, which is limitless, court-created insurance, to egregious circumstances of delay and bad faith acts." and reiterat- ing "[t]he Court likewise has a responsibility to not allow contrived bad faith claims that are the product of sophisticated legal strate- gies and not the product of actual bad faith.") (quoting Berges v. In- finity Ins. Co., 896 So.2d 665, 685-86 (Fla. 2004) (Wells, J., dissent- ing)).
In light of such concerns, and in light of Choisser's (and, by extension, Posgay's) position as the practical "party in interest"
here, I caution against the potential for the majority's proper regard for Consul's nominal interest to swallow due concern about Choisser and Posgay's continued gamesmanship throughout the settlement process in this case. There can be no question Choisser and Posgay are materially interested in the subject of this action, and, if this action is remanded to the District Court, I would in- struct the Court to properly join Choisser and Posgay under Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 19.1
28
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 7 I would also instruct the Court to enter an order to show cause as to why Richardson and Thompson should not be sanc- tioned for their conduct. When filing a pleading in federal court, an attorney certifies that he or she has conducted a reasonable inquiry and that the pleading is well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and
"is not being presented for any improper purpose." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Consul cannot state with certainty whether he is bringing a claim against Progressive, why he is bringing a claim against Pro- gressive, or which actions by Progressive led to his claim. An order to show cause under Rule 11(c) would clarify what steps, if any, Richardson and Thompson took to inform Consul of the risks (such as bearing costs and expenses of litigation) Consul exposed himself to in pursuing this claim; an order would also clarify whether
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the per- son's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incur- ring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
The commentary to Rule 19 continues: "Whenever feasible, the persons ma- terially interested in the subject of an action should be joined as parties so that they may be heard and a complete disposition made." Id. (emphasis added). See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.").
29
8 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 Thompson and Richardson "presented [this action under Consul's name] for any improper purpose" as proscribed by Rule 11(b)(1).2 Questions of gamesmanship aside, I would still find sum- mary judgment appropriate here as a matter of law because no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and, accordingly, no reason- able jury could return a verdict for Consul as the non-moving party.
II. FAILURE TO SETTLE THE LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM
Today's majority reasons that summary judgment was im- proper because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Progressive was reasonable in "conditioning the settlement on the waiver of the consortium claim." Maj. Op. at 13. At bottom, the majority reasoning rests on three grounds:
(1) Progressive never communicated with Choisser's wife inde- pendently, and had it done so, it would have discovered Choisser's wife did not intend to pursue a loss of consortium claim; (2) "Pro- gressive never asked Campione or Consul directly whether Consul
30
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 9 wanted to settle without waiving the consortium claim"; and (3)
"[a]lthough Progressive offered to amend the release's language or correct the name if it was incorrect, it refused to remove the waiver requirement even when it became clear that it was one of the pri- mary impediments to settling the case." Maj. Op. at 12. While we assess the totality of the circumstances in deter- mining whether an insurer has met its duty of good faith to an in- sured, Cadle v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 838 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2016), it is nonetheless helpful to address each of the majority's grounds in turn to demonstrate that no dispute of material fact ex- ists with regard to Progressive's attempt to settle the consortium claim.
A. Progressive Did Not Attempt to Independently Contact Choisser's Wife
In determining bad faith, we focus on the actions of the "in- surer in fulfilling its obligations to the insured." Ilias v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 61 F.4th 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). By beginning its analysis with the statement, "the evi- dence suggested that Choisser's wife was not interested in pursuing a claim in the first place," the majority focuses on the hypothetical actions of Choisser's wife in determining the reasonableness of Progressive's actions. Maj. Op. at 11. Instead, I find it proper to begin by focusing on Progressive's actions to determine whether it acted in bad faith in attempting to settle the consortium claim. As I will later discuss, the majority's assertion that, had Progressive contacted Choisser's wife, "it would have discovered that she never
31
10 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 intended to pursue a consortium claim" is complicated by the tes- timonies of Choisser and Choisser's wife that, though Choisser's wife did not intend to pursue a claim, she would not have accepted a waiver had she been offered one.
B. Progressive Attempted to Identify Choisser's Wife
Before addressing the waiver issue, I note that the testimony of Progressive's agent clearly establishes she did not make an at- tempt to contact Choisser's wife directly before sending the No- vember 15 settlement offer. The record also reflects that the agent reached out to claimants' spouses in the past, even when the claim- ants were represented by attorneys.3The majority's analysis, how- ever, overlooks the agent's five previous attempts to request Choisser's wife's name from Posgay, glosses over the details of the agent's "flawed investigation," Maj. Op. at 11, and fails to credit the agent's frank admission in her November 15 letter that her investi- gation was "unsuccessful."
By summarily concluding that Progressive initiated a
"flawed investigation," the majority makes no attempt to identify what additional steps it would have asked Progressive's agent to
32
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 11 undertake after she failed to learn Choisser's wife's name. Maj. Op. at 11.
The undisputed facts tell the story of Progressive's investiga- tion: After repeated attempts to determine Choisser's wife's name by contacting Posgay, the agent "[g]oogled [Choisser] for any infor- mation on him or his family," and searched a third-party database Progressive uses to "identify relatives in a household." When searching the internet and the private database for Choisser's wife's name, she "recall[ed] seeing a name 'Mary' come up quite often"
though she "wasn't able to tell if that was his wife or a daughter or someone else." The agent said the goal of her investigation was to
"get [Choisser's wife's] name for the release for any potential loss of consortium claim," and, when asked whether her search of the database revealed contact information for Choisser's wife, the agent said she did not believe "[the third-party database] would have given her emails or phone numbers." The agent noted her failure to establish Choisser's wife's identity in her November 15 settlement offer to Posgay:
In reference to our proposed release, I have made sev- eral attempts to secure your client's wife's name for the release, but have been unsuccessful. Our investi- gation shows that Dr. Choisser's wife's name is Mary and we have added her, as such. If this is not correct, please advise me at your earliest convenience so we can change it, accordingly. Should the language on the drafts or proposed release not meet your specifi- cations, please call me immediately . . . to discuss.
33
12 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 Posgay responded, "I do not represent Dr. Choisser's wife and I am writing to clarify whether you and your company are conditioning the $10,000.00 bodily injury policy limits tender on Dr. Choisser's wife being included in the release?" The agent wrote back on De- cember 7:
We include both parties on the release due to loss of consortium. If you do not wish for Dr. Choisser's wife's name to be on the release, we need a letter stat- ing you will not be pursuing a loss of consortium claim on her behalf. We can then remove her name.4 On December 13, 2016, Posgay responded that "[he did] not repre- sent Mrs. Choisser and [he] cannot waive claims on her behalf " and wrote that his client was unable to resolve the claim on Progres- sive's terms.
Focusing on the actions of the insurer, Progressive's agent acted in good faith by requesting Choisser's wife's name from Posgay, investigating the identity of Choisser's wife in good faith by making searches of the internet and a third-party database, and taking reasonable steps to inform Posgay of her confusion in case her identification was mistaken.
34
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 13 Posgay's responses gave Progressive's agent reason to be confused. In his December 13 response to the agent's December 7 letter, Posgay identified Choisser's wife as "Mrs. Choisser."
Whether this wording was intentional or not, Posgay's reference to
"Mrs. Choisser" could only describe Choisser's first wife: who went by Mary Hoffman Choisser during their marriage. Choisser's cur- rent wife is named "Dana Marie Merritt."5The majority, in a foot- note to its "flawed investigation" assertion, acknowledges "Posgay provided no reason as to why he could not provide his client's wife's name and failed to even alert Progressive that the release listed the wrong person." Maj. Op. at 12 n.4. It disposes of this detail away in the same footnote: "Yet, while we factor in the claimant's behavior, we focus on the actions of the insurer and, at this stage, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to Consul." Id. In doing so, the majority moves too quickly. Posgay's actions are relevant here because they informed Progressive's course of action. See Pelaez v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 13 F.4th 1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2021) ("In a bad faith action there's a difference between focusing on a claimant's ac- tions, which would be improper, and factoring a claimant's actions into the totality of the circumstances analysis, which is not im- proper.") (emphasis in original).
Where, as discussed above, Choisser and Posgay are the functional parties in interest, I would properly factor their actions into the totality of the circumstances analysis in determining
35
14 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 whether Progressive acted in good faith when conducting its inves- tigation and communicating with Posgay.
When Posgay (1) refused to identify Choisser's wife in re- sponse to the agent's first five communications, (2) failed to alert the agent that she listed the wrong person, and (3) referred to a
"Mrs. Choisser" that cannot be understood to reference Choisser's wife, Posgay set into action the series of events that necessitated the agent's investigation, failed to cure her mistake, and eliminated any reasonable opportunity to correctly identify Choisser's wife thereafter.
The question here is whether Progressive acted reasonably in pursuing a release from Choisser's wife and by failing to inde- pendently contact her. There's no indication in the record that Pro- gressive's agent ever learned Merritt's name, much less learned of contact information at which she could reach her. Failing to iden- tify Meritt as Choisser's wife, the agent undertook the steps availa- ble to her in working to protect Consul's interests.
C. Whether Choisser's Wife Would Have Waived Her Claim
Perhaps more importantly, the majority's next assertion overlooks a gap in Consul's causation claim: "If Progressive had contacted her, it would have discovered that she never intended to pursue a consortium claim, so a reasonable jury could conclude that she would have waived the claim." Maj. Op. at 11. While the record suggests Choisser's wife never intended to pursue a claim,
36
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 15 the undisputed evidence here establishes Choisser's wife would not have waived her claim, had Progressive contacted her. At his February 1, 2022, deposition, Choisser testified that he
"never considered" asking his wife whether "she was going to pur- sue a loss of consortium claim arising from [his] accident." When asked whether, if requested, his wife "would have signed a release of her consortium claim back at or about the time the parties were trying to settle this case in the fall and winter of 2016," Choisser replied "I don't think she would have signed a release." When asked whether his wife would have been unwilling to relinquish her claim, Choisser continued "She just doesn't trust lawyers. She doesn't want to sign an agreement she doesn't have to sign. And so just knowing her personality, she would say no." On the same day, Merritt testified "[she] did not want to become involved in doing a lawsuit." When asked if Choisser knew of her position at the time, she responded: "He probably [knew] that I don't like to deal with lawyers." Finally, when asked whether she "would . . . have been willing to sign" a release "waiving any consortium claim or any claim [she] may have had . . . for the amounts [her] husband was demanding," Merritt responded, "I have no idea. That never came up."
If, as Choisser believed, and as his wife's testimony seems to agree, his wife would not have signed a waiver of the consortium claim, then it can hardly follow that Progressive acted in bad faith by pursuing a waiver, and, after Posgay rejected Merritt's inclusion, offering to remove the language if Posgay confirmed Merritt
37
16 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 would not pursue a claim. In an exchange with Consul's counsel, the District Court specifically considered a scenario where Progres- sive settled the personal injury claim without receiving a release for Merritt's potential loss of consortium claim:
THE COURT: So if Mr. Posgay, who was saying "I
don't represent the wife" and—and "I'm trying to
make the consortium claim a—an issue," for lack of a better term—so what if Progressive had said to Mr. Posgay, "All right. You're right. Don't worry about the consortium claim. Cross that out. Sign the—have
Mr.—have Dr. Choisser sign the release, send it back, and we're done," and then that happens and the next day either Mr. Posgay or another lawyer files a con- sortium action against Mr. Consul, the insured.
Would the insurance company be at risk for having settled the personal injury claim without taking into account the consortium claim?
MR. RICHARDSON: That's a really good question,
Judge. I think that there's a possibility yes. But in this case I think the wife's deposition testimony, when read in our favor, was that she wouldn't actually have done that.
THE COURT: Well, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. That doesn't—
MR. RICHARDSON: Of course.
THE COURT: Progressive wouldn't have known
that, right? That's why they kept asking. What about
38
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 17 the wife, right? They wouldn't—they wouldn't have known—I mean, if—if she would have said that at the time, or if Mr. Posgay would have said to them,
"Don't worry, there's no consortium claim," then they would have gone through with it, right?
MR. RICHARDSON: Yes. Well, let me see if I can re- frame my answer, hopefully in a more satisfying way. Yes, I think the insurance company could have been at risk because of a filing of a consortium claim, but it would only have been because it insisted it didn't reach out earlier to the wife to resolve the consortium claim, which they could have done; they could have contacted her directly. And it sounds—and I know that you say they wouldn't have known this. But when you're looking at causation, it looks like she would have waived any kind of consortium claim. As the District Court noted in its subsequent order, Consul admit- ted that Progressive would open itself to a possible bad faith claim by settling the personal injury claim without a waiver. Under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the details of Pro- gressive's agent's investigation and her subsequent communica- tions with Posgay, I would affirm the District Court's finding that
"the undisputed evidence shows that Progressive was reasonably trying to ensure that its insured did not get sued post-settlement on a consortium claim." Whatever "flaw" existed in Progressive's in- vestigation of Choisser's wife's name, see Maj. Op. at 11, it can hardly be said the agent acted in bad faith by failing to
39
18 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 independently communicate with a person she could not iden- tify—especially where the record reveals no evidence she ever ob- tained any address, phone number, or email address attached to Merritt, and her subsequent decision to insist on either a waiver of the claim or an assurance that a claim would not follow was emi- nently reasonable given the impact of even a small judgment on Consul's personal finances.6
III. TRANSFER OF VEHICLE TITLE
Consul next contends the District Court erred in finding, "[e]ven if Progressive was not legally required to take title under Florida law (about which the court expresses no opinion), Progressive had a good-faith interpretation of the law." As I understand the District Court's reasoning, the Court's conclusion as cited by Consul is best read within the context of the sentences immediately preceding it. Here is the District Court's discussion following its citation of Flor- ida law:
Neither Choisser nor Posgay ever conceded that the vehicle was a total loss; however, Choisser and Posgay also never stated that Choisser wanted to repair the vehicle and never offered any evidence to Progressive of their valuation of the vehicle. There is a scenario where Progressive did not have to take title to the
40
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 19 vehicle, but it was reasonable for Progressive to re- quest the title given its determination that the vehicle was a total loss and Choisser's silence regarding re- pairing the vehicle. In response to Choisser's objec- tion, Progressive agreed to pay Choisser's full $5,000 demand for the property damage in addition to allow- ing Choisser to retain salvage rights to the vehicle. But Progressive continued to request the title because it believed it was required by law to take the title. Even if Progressive was not legally required to take title under Florida law (about which the Court ex- presses no opinion), Progressive had a good faith in- terpretation of the law.
The District Court places its conclusion about Progressive's "good faith interpretation" of the law within the broader context of Pro- gressive's actions following Choisser's objection to Progressive's ti- tle request. As to the interpretation of the law itself, the District Court stated at the hearing,
"[W]e read that title law. And, you know, you could read it the way you're reading it. You could read it the way they're reading it.
You could also guess that getting the title on a totaled car is standard practice, and so it wasn't beyond the pale for them to be asking for that.
And, again, those things, to me, sound like somebody, at most, who might not be doing it quite right or— but the bottom line is they sent you the $15,000.
41
20 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 I guess I'm not quite understanding where the bad faith is coming from.
MR. RICHARDSON: Yes, sir. And so I do understand in her deposition testimony she repeatedly said that all she was doing was acting to protect her insured. But the—the—we would say that it's—that the facts are reasonably susceptible to a different conclusion based on some of these baffling decisions that she made. Again, for example—and it's not just the stuff that I've already talked about. There are other really inexplicable decisions that she made that I think place this above your negligence into bad faith territory. So in addition to that—the other stuff I've talked about, she insisted on communicating with Attorney Campione instead of Mr. Consul. She talked to Mr. Consul just the one time and allegedly sent him the excess letter.
In response to direct questioning, Mr. Richardson declined to di- rectly address the reasonableness of Progressive's interpretation of the statute and instead focused on the separate issues of Progres- sive's investigation, Progressive's client communication, and the excess letter.
While the majority notes "there are not many cases address- ing this portion of the statute," Maj. Op. at 14 n.5, it ultimately con- cludes:
42
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 21 Given how clear the statute is, Progressive "dropped the ball in its handling of this case," Berges, 896 So. 2d at 682. Florida generally doesn't recognize ignorance or misunderstanding of the law as excusable, so there's no reason why we should assume that Florida would permit insurers to claim lack of bad faith when making this sort of basic error.
Maj. Op. at 16. I disagree that the statute is so clear that Progres- sive's actions can be described as "basic error." The District Court noted its uncertainty in interpreting the statute at the hearing, the majority opinion itself notes a lack of case law on the topic, and the record reflects Consul's counsel shifts the focus away from inter- pretation when questioned at the summary judgment hearing. After Choisser objected, Progressive both (1) agreed to pay Choisser's full demand and (2) allowed Choisser to retain salvage rights to the vehicle. Under Progressive's understanding of the law, this was all it could legally do to settle Choisser's claim.
IV. CAUSATION ISSUES REGARDING THE EXCESS LETTER
The Majority also finds a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the level of diligence Progressive exercised in communi- cating with Consul. Maj. Op. at 18. The District Court summarizes
Consul's two arguments on this topic in its Order:
First, Consul states that Progressive did not directly contact Consul about the settlement of Choisser's claims because it incorrectly assumed Campione was Consul's attorney handling Choisser's claims, a
43
22 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 position which, according to Consul, is "directly con- trary" to [Progressive]'s notes and Campione's letter of representation. Second, Consul asserts there is ev- idence that Progressive did not send an excess letter to Consul, which traditionally warn insureds of the possibility of an excess judgment.
As to the issue of communicating with Campione, the insured's at- torney, rather than Consul, the insured, the District Court correctly concluded that "Progressive did not act unreasonably in communi- cating with Campione." Campione sent Progressive a letter on Sep- tember 28, 2016, roughly three weeks after the accident, stating,
"[t]his office represents Charbel Consul in regard to injuries sus- tained in the above referenced accident." Progressive's agent spoke with Campione after receiving his letter and wrote in the claim notes that "[Campione] is representing [Consul] for his injury claim." The District Court correctly rejected Consul's argument that Progressive acted unreasonably in communicating with Cam- pione regarding the settlement of Choisser's claims because "there is no evidence that Campione ever objected to Progressive contact- ing him regarding Choisser's insurance claims and Consul testifies that he expected Campione to handle any communication with Progressive on Consul's behalf."
Progressive's consistent communications with Campione re- garding updates in settling Choisser's claims comported with Con- sul's expectations. When Consul was asked why he didn't reach out
44
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23 to Progressive for an explanation in response to its excess letter,7 Consul testified, "I think that is when I hired a lawyer." Consul's testimony continues as follows:
Q. And you expected the lawyer to deal with all of this?
A. To handle it, yeah.
Q. And to be your representative at least in communi- cating
A. Yes
Q. with Progressive?
A. That is why I didn't -- I didn't pay attention to, you know
Q. All right. Because Mr. Campione was doing that on your behalf ?
A. Right.
45
24 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 Q. And you expected that any communication back and forth from Progressive regarding Dr. Choisser's claim Mr. Campione would deal with?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. And that is because and that is the reason that you didn't ask questions or pay particular atten- tion to it?
A. Uh-huh.
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the insured, the evidence shows Progressive acted reasonably in communicating with Campione. After receiving Campione's letter, Progressive's agent copied Campione on all settlement negotiations between Progressive and Consul.8When Choisser requested a financial affi- davit from Consul as a condition of settlement, Campione helped Consul complete the affidavit, and Campione sent the affidavit di- rectly to Posgay.
Along with copying Campione on all communications, Pro- gressive's agent also spoke with Campione over the phone on
46
23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 25 December 20, 2016, following Posgay's December 13 letter reject- ing Progressive's "counter-offer." Her file notes document the con- versation:
Received return call from [Consul's] Atty, Christo- pher Campione. Explained claims not resolving and read [Posgay's December 13] letter to him. Mr. Cam- pione stated he is concerned that we are exposing [Consul's] personal assets. He went on to mention
"bad faith." Explained we have met [Choisser's] de- mands, monetarily; however, the state of FL requires the title be processed whether [Choisser] or Progres- sive retains [the vehicle's] salvage. Informed Mr. Cam- pione of suit letter sent to him on behalf of client. Requested [Campione] pls discuss same with his cli- ent and let us know if and when [Consul] is served with a lawsuit.
The agent's call with Campione establishes that Campione was aware of Posgay's December 13 letter in its entirety. Focusing on the insurer's actions, Progressive did not act unreasonably in com- municating with Campione where those communications com- ported with Consul's expectations and adequately kept Campione, the insured's attorney, informed of Progressive's settlement nego- tiations with Choisser.
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the majority's conclu- sion that "[t]he record, again viewed in the light most favorable to Consul, adequately suggests that Progressive failed to keep Consul abreast of its settlement negotiations or seek his input on
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26 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 settlement terms, including the imposition of conditions Choisser indicated he did not believe were mandatory" Maj. Op. at 18. The majority next argues that there's a factual dispute over whether Progressive sent an excess-judgment letter to Consul. The District Court laid out the facts in the record:
[Progressive's agent] testifies that in normal course she would have sent Consul an excess letter as soon as she was assigned the claim and saw he carried the minimum insurance limits. Progressive also provides copies of two excess letters, one of which was noted as being sent three days after the accident. Consul tes- tifies that he does not remember whether he received or read an excess letter. Consul also offers the testi- mony of Keith Pelkey, a litigation representative at Progressive, who testified that he searched records of this case and could not find a record that an excess letter was sent. However, Pelkey did not testify that an excess letter was not sent. And [Progressive's agent] later testified that the letters were stored in a separate electronic file, and it is unclear if Pelkey searched that separate file.
Today's majority disagrees with the Court's finding of no dispute of material fact regarding the excess letter. It writes:
Given this factual debate and the jury's role in deter- mining credibility, it is more appropriate for a jury to decide whether to believe the claims specialist who said she sent the letter, the litigation manager who said he could not find the letter, or Consul who indi- cated he did not recall receiving it, for purposes of
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23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 27 deciding whether Progressive fulfilled its notice obli- gation.
Maj. Op. at 19.
As the majority later notes, there is a "requirement of a causal connection between the primary insurer's bad-faith actions and the loss or damage suffered by the excess insurer." Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 900-01 (Fla. 2010). The majority seems to overlook this causation requirement in finding a dispute of material fact regarding the excess letter. Even if Progressive failed to send the letter, Consul's claim still fails because he testified that rather than "taking the time to read it," he would have "set the letter to the side" had it been sent to him. See Mesa v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 799 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Perera, 35 So. 3d at 903-04) ("Finally, although Clarendon may have been negligent in failing to keep its insured advised of settlement opportunities, the probable outcome of the litigation, and the possibility of an excess judgment, such negligence was not the cause of the excess judgment, and is therefore immaterial.")
Thus, I agree with the District Court's finding that no dis- pute of material fact exists regarding the excess letter or Progres- sive's communications with Consul.
V. PROGRESSIVE'S LACK OF SETTLEMENT E FFORTS FOLLOWING POSGAY'S DECEMBER 13 REJECTION
Finally, the District Court did not err by concluding that Pro- gressive's failure to engage in settlement negotiations after Decem- ber 13, 2016, could not have caused the excess judgment because
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28 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 Progressive could not have settled within policy limits. "[T]here must be a causal connection between the damages claimed and the insurer's bad faith." Perera, 35 So. 3d at 903-04. As the District Court noted, "Posgay unequivocally testified that the case could not have been settled within Consul's policy limits after Posgay's December 13, 2016 letter declining Progressive's counteroffer."
Posgay testified as follows:
Q: Was this a case that could have been settled, Mr. Posgay, after December [13th,] 2016, for a payment within the policy limits?
A: . . . I'd have to take a look at the correspondence as far as the date, but I think I did send a letter indicating when it could no longer be resolved because Progres- sive refused to accept our settlement offer without a counteroffer.
Q: . . . But whatever the date of that letter is, that would have been the last date that Progressive would have had an ability to settle this case, the Choisser case, within the policy limits; fair?
A: For the bodily injury and for what we offered on the property damage, correct.
Consul argues that the District Court erred because it "failed to give appropriate weight to the other testimony and evidence in the case." As the Court noted in its order:
When asked if Choisser would settle "if Progressive had offered to pay [Choisser] the $10,000 bodily
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23-11458 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 29 injury liability limit without [his] wife having to sign a release and without -- and the $5,000 property dam- age check without [him] having to agree that [his] ve- hicle was a total loss and to surrender the title," he testified "[w]e would have" settled.
The Court properly rejected Consul's argument regarding Choisser's testimony creating a dispute of material fact where,
"upon a full reading of Choisser's testimony, it is clear that [Choisser's] statement merely evidence Choisser's amenability to settlement on his terms laid out in the October 17, 2016 demand letter." Having concluded that Progressive acted reasonably in pur- suing a release of the consortium claim or, in the alternative, insist- ing on an assurance that Choisser's wife would not purse a claim, and that Progressive acted reasonably in adhering to its good-faith interpretation of the vehicle title law, I would affirm the District Court's ruling that "[a]s a matter of law, Progressive's failure to continue settlement negotiations after December 13, 2016, did not cause the excess judgment."
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment where no dispute of material facts exists. Alternatively, I would instruct the District Court on re- mand to join Choisser and Posgay as parties in interest under Rule 19, and I would instruct the District Court to enter an order to show cause as to why Richardson and Thompson should not face sanctions for their failure to investigate the facts of this action, and
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30 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting 23-11458 for their failure to properly inform Consul of the risks inherent in serving as the named plaintiff in this action, where Consul has nothing to practically gain in bringing suit.
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