PER CURIAM:
Courtney Robinson, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this civil rights case against Chaplains William Gault and Jeremy Martinez, who are employees of the Florida Depart- ment of Corrections ("FDOC"). Robinson's complaint alleged that the chaplains violated his First Amendment rights by failing to pro- vide him religiously compliant foods during two Hebrew Israelite religious holidays and by denying his request to be reenrolled in the prison's alternative meals program on the basis that he did not demonstrate sincerity in his religious exercise. On appeal, Robin- son challenges the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chaplains Gault and Martinez on his First Amendment claims. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court's ruling on summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Summary judgment is proper if the movant can es- tablish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for sum- mary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.
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25-11159 Opinion of the Court 3 For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record." Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1325-26 (citation modified). Once the movant shows no genuine dispute of material fact, "[t]he burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond the pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a gen- uine issue of material fact exists." Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
Although a pro se party's pleadings are liberally construed,
"a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under sum- mary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine is- sue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judg- ment." Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus,
"mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations, as well as affidavits based, in part, upon information and belief, rather than personal knowledge, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1327. Similarly, where a litigant fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, the issue is aban- doned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). "A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it," by, for instance: (1) failing to devote a discrete section of his argument to that claim; (2) making only passing reference to the claim; (3) raising it in "a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority"; (4) refer- ring to it only in the "statement of the case" or "summary of the argument"; (5) referring to it as mere background to his main ar- gument; or (6) raising it for the first time in his reply brief. Sapuppo
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11159
v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014) (ci- tation modified).
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against per- sons acting under color of state law for violations of constitutional rights and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amend- ment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I. To sustain a First Amend- ment claim concerning the exercise of his religion, a plaintiff must establish that his exercise of his religious faith was substantially burdened. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007). "[A]n individual's exercise of religion is 'substantially bur- dened' if a regulation completely prevents the individual from en- gaging in religiously mandated activity, or if the regulation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion." Midrash Se- phardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). We've clarified that the substantial burden test does not re- quire that the religious adherents wholly abandoned their beliefs, only that they were forced to modify their behavior. Thai Medita- tion Ass'n v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821, 831 (11th Cir. 2020). We added that courts should look to whether the policy or regulation
"effectively" deprives the adherents of any means by which they could practice their religion. Id. at 832. However, in considering what qualifies as a substantial burden, a plaintiff must "demon- strate that the government's denial of a particular religious item or observance was more than an inconvenience to one's religious
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25-11159 Opinion of the Court 5 practice." Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007), abro- gated on other grounds by, Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). In Smith, we declined to find that the denial of a requested religious item substantially burdened a prisoner plaintiff, based solely on the fact that he sincerely believed the items were neces- sary to his practice. See id. We concluded that, since Smith had attempted to prove a substantial burden based on only his "own assertion and his scant sources," he had not met his burden of es- tablishing a substantial burden. Id. at 1278-79.
"[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitu- tional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to le- gitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). "A prison regulation, even though it infringes the inmate's constitutional rights, is an actionable constitutional violation only if the regulation is unreasonable." Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). To determine whether a prison regulation is reasonable, we consider: (1) the connection between the prison regulation and a legitimate, neutral government interest, (2) the presence or absence of alternatives for the prisoners to exercise their claimed right, (3) the effect of the exercise of the right on other inmates, guards, and the allocation of the prison's resources, and (4) the presence or absence of ready alternatives. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; see also Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying a modified version of Turner's test for reviewing prisoner's constitutional claims to a civil detainee's claims).
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11159 As for the second factor, the relevant inquiry is whether the inmate has been denied "all means of [religious] expression," not whether a particular religious practice was allegedly violated. O'Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92). As for the fourth factor, "the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns."
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (citation modified). "[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id. at 91.
Here, the court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the chaplains on Robinson's First Amendment claims. First, the court properly found no genuine dispute of material fact concerning Robinson's claim that his religious exercise was sub- stantially burdened by Chaplain Gault's failure to contact food ser- vices on Robinson's behalf to ensure he received a kosher Religious Diet Program ("RDP") meal for Passover in April 2020.1As the un- disputed record shows, when Robinson filed his first grievance
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25-11159 Opinion of the Court 7 about the issue -- a week before Passover was to occur -- Chaplain Gault responded within two days that Robinson himself must
"contact food serv[ices] about a vegan tray" if he was concerned that he would not receive religiously compliant meals during Pass- over. After Passover, Robinson filed another grievance, reporting that he had received noncompliant, leavened meals during Passo- ver. Chaplain Gault responded the same day that he had placed Robinson on FDOC's list of inmates who could receive kosher meals for Passover and reiterated that Robinson -- not Gault -- bore the responsibility of contacting FDOC's food services department to ensure he received a compliant meal.
Robinson argues that Chaplain Gault had a duty to corre- spond with FDOC's food service department on his behalf, but he presented no evidence below to establish that the chaplain had this affirmative duty. Instead, the unrefuted evidence indicated the op- posite -- that Robinson himself needed to contact food services to receive unleavened meals during Passover and failed to do so. Moreover, FDOC's requirement that prisoners communicate their dietary needs to the food services department to ensure they re- ceive religiously-compliant meals did not "effectively" deprive Rob- inson of the means by which he could practice his religion and amounted to, at most, a mere "inconvenience to [Robinson's] reli- gious practice." Smith, 502 F.3d at 1278; see also Thai Meditation Ass'n, 980 F.3d at 832; Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1227. Nor did the court err in granting summary judgment on Robinson's claim that he had not received a double-portion bagged
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11159 lunch to break his fast at the end of the Day of Atonement in Sep- tember 2020. Robinson concedes that he was offered meal trays at breakfast, lunch, and dinner on that day, but argues on appeal that they were provided at the incorrect time and he was not provided with a bagged lunch to break his fast as requested. Nevertheless, Robinson does not dispute that he was offered three meals nor that he could have retained one or all of these meals and consumed them after sundown to break his fast. On this record, we cannot say that the FDOC's actions amounted to a substantial burden on Robinson's religious exercise. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. At most, the failure to provide him a break-the-fast meal at the end of Atone- ment amounted to an "inconvenience to [Robinson's] religious practice" rather than a deprivation of the means by which he could practice his faith. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1278; see also Thai Meditation Ass'n, 980 F.3d at 832; Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1227. Robinson also challenges Chaplain Martinez's decision to deny his reenrollment in the RDP in December 2020 -- after he had removed himself from the RDP in 2013 or 2014 -- because, says Robinson, "Martinez openly admitted on the dorm's audio system that he disapproved [Robinson's] request for RDP Re-enrollment because of his [Disciplinary Report] History & Canteen Pur- chases." However, Chaplain Martinez's decision did not amount to a First Amendment violation because, based on the undisputed record, it was made in accordance with FDOC's reasonable policy for assessing admittance to the program. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
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25-11159 Opinion of the Court 9 As for the first prong of the Turner test, there is a rational relationship between FDOC's policy of assessing the sincerity of inmates' religious beliefs and the neutral need to limit the cost and administrative burden of providing alternative meal options to in- mates. Id. As for the second prong, denying Robinson's applica- tion to reenter the RDP did not deny him of "all means of [reli- gious] expression." Id. at 92. For starters, Robinson did not argue, and the evidence does not suggest, that the sole means of Robin- son's Hebrew Israelite religious expression was the receipt of a re- ligiously-compliant diet. Rather, the FDOC Chaplaincy Services guide lists many other forms of exercise for the Hebrew Israelite faith, involving work proscription days, clothing, and worship. Further, the undisputed evidence shows that Robinson was permit- ted to participate in Hebrew Israelite holy days requiring diet re- strictions or fast despite not being part of the RDP. In particular, the record contains a FDOC memorandum requiring inmates to submit a request for kosher meals for Passover between January 19 and February 8, 2020; and Robinson's informal grievance from April 14, 2020, indicates that Chaplain Gault completed the paper- work for Robinson to receive kosher meals during Passover. As for the third prong of the Turner test, providing kosher meals to Robinson and other inmates without a vetting process in place could impact the administration of FDOC's meal program and increase its administrative costs. Id. at 92. And as for the fourth prong, there is no evidence that the criteria used to evaluate the sincerity of Robinson's religious practice is "an exaggerated re- sponse," especially since Robinson does not point to an alternative
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11159 means of determining whether inmates should be placed in the RDP that would fully accommodate inmates' rights at a de minimis cost to FDOC's valid penological interests. Id. at 91-92. In short, Martinez's denial of Robinson's application to rejoin the RDP was based on a legitimate prison policy and the court did not err in con- cluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether this decision amounted to a First Amendment violation. Accordingly, because we affirm on the ground that Chaplain Martinez's decision was taken in accordance with FDOC's reason- able policy for assessing admittance to the program, we need not address whether Martinez properly determined that Robinson's be- lief was not sincerely held. Likewise, because we hold that the court did not err in its determination that denying Robinson's re- quest to re-enroll in the RDP was not a First Amendment violation, we also need not assess whether Martinez was properly granted qualified immunity on this claim.
AFFIRMED.2
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