United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________
No. 25-51051
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Marwan M. Qashou, K.M.Q., a minor child and son of Plaintiff,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of San Antonio; San Antonio Police Department, City of San Antonio; Chief of Police William McManus, San Antonio Police Department; Michael Strickland, San Antonio Police Officer, Badge No. 1460; Michaela Cannard, Police Officer, Badge No.
84,
Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:25-CV-459
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Before Richman, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:*
On May 21, 2023, around midnight, Marwan Qashou was driving with his eleven-year-old child in the car. Qashou was arrested for driving while _____________________
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 3, 2026 Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk
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intoxicated with a minor child in the car after failing a field sobriety test. He alleges that he failed the test because he has a permanent disability due to a back injury, that he informed the officers of his inability to pass the test on those grounds, and that he further informed them that he does not drink al- cohol because of his Muslim faith. After charges against him were dropped, he sued the arresting officers, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and the City of San Antonio ("City"), San Antonio Police Depart- ment ("SAPD"), and SAPD Chief William McManus alleging municipal liability and liability for failure to train the arresting officers. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we
AFFIRM.
I
Around midnight on May 21, 2023, Officers Strickland and Cannard pulled Qashou over. During the stop, the officers conducted a field sobriety test, which Qashou, by his own admission, failed. Qashou asserts that he failed the test because of a permanent disability—a back injury—that he al- legedly disclosed to the officers. Qashou also alleges that he informed the officers that he does not drink alcohol because he is a practicing Muslim. Of- ficer Strickland nonetheless arrested Qashou after he failed the field test. Qashou requested a blood alcohol test and alleges that the test came back as negative. Qashou did not plead any facts about when the test results were returned, nor did he allege that any defendant had knowledge of those results before his arrest.
That afternoon, Qashou appeared before a magistrate judge. The court set a $5,000 bond and two days later, on May 23, 2023, Qashou posted bond and was released. Qashou does not allege that any defendant knew of his blood test results before he appeared before the magistrate judge or was released on bond.
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On August 28, 2023, all charges against Qashou were dismissed. Qashou subsequently sued the defendants in the Western District of Texas for a host of state and federal claims, including a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violating his and his minor child's civil rights "under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and the State of Texas."
The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion. As to Officers Strickland and Cannard, the court found that Qashou pled no facts related to the use of excessive force and that the complaint established that the officers had probable cause to arrest Qashou because he failed the field sobriety test.1As to the SAPD, the court dismissed the claims because the SAPD had not been granted the power to sue or be sued by the City and therefore was not an appropriate defendant. As to the City, the district court dismissed Qashou's Monell and Canton lia- bility claims because Qashou did not plausibly plead any underlying constitu- tional violations. Though not addressed in the district court's opinion, the claims against Chief McManus were redundant of the claims against the gov- ernment employer. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978); Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 373 (2010) ("[certain] allegations against the City of Plano . . . would render any official capacity claim against [an officer] redundant"), and Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023) ("[a] claim against government of- ficials in their official capacity is a de facto suit against the local government entity of which the officials act as agents"). As such, it was proper for the district court to dismiss them.
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Qashou appealed the dismissal of all claims against all defendants.
II
We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Doe 1 v. City View Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 F.4th 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2025). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where a plaintiff failed to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plaintiff must plead enough facts to enable "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that the plaintiff do more than make conclusory statements to sufficiently plead a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021).
Qashou's first amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts to enable this court to reasonably infer that the defendants are liable for violating the Qashous' civil rights and civil liberties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Qashou's amended complaint alleges that Officer Strickland and an "unknown/unnamed female PO" stopped him without probable cause or a warrant. For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must only have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. See United States v. Breeland, 53 F.3d 100, 102 (5th Cir.1995). "Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold; it is not probable cause." United States v. Walker, 49 F.4th 903, 907 (5th Cir. 2022). Qashou's failure to plead any facts supporting reasonable suspicion or its lack means that the only remaining question is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him following the initial stop. Qashou's pleadings demonstrate that the officers did have probable cause to arrest him following Case: 25-51051 Document: 53-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/03/2026
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that stop because he admits that he failed the field sobriety test; such a failure provided a "fair probability on which reasonable and prudent officers could act." Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (citation modified); see also Justice v. Austin Police Dept., A-20-CV-1063-RP, 2021 WL 1930302, at 3 (W.D. Tex. May 13, 2021) ("failure to pass a field sobriety test provides probable cause to arrest an individual"). The fact that Qashou's blood test later came back without evidence of drugs or alcohol does not mean that officers did not have probable cause to arrest him at that moment. Qashou's arrest was therefore not wrongful.
Furthermore, Qashou does not allege that either officer used any force during the interaction, let alone excessive force. In total, Qashou has not plausibly alleged that either officer committed any constitutional violation against him or his minor child.2
Because there are no underlying constitutional violations, Qashou's Monell and Canton claims against the City and Chief McManus must also fail. A Monell claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a constitutional violation was propelled by "an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker." Henderson v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 51 F.4th 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. Qashou's failure to demonstrate a constitutional violation entitles the City to judgment on a Monell claim as matter of law. Windham v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 875 F.3d 229, 243 (5th Cir. 2017). Relatedly, to prove a Canton claim, Qashou must show that the City so failed to train its employees to constitutionally implement a policy that _____________________
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such failure "amounts to deliberate indifference." Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). On Canton claims, "if a city employee violate[d Qashou's] constitutional rights, the [C]ity may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (emphasis added).3With no underlying support for his claims against the City and Chief McManus, the Monell and Canton claims fail. The district court did not err in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the claims brought by Qashou. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
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