O R D E R
Welby Cox appeals the entry of summary judgment for the United States Department of Justice and the United States Attorney on Cox's claim that the Department failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when it referred his restitution debt to the Department of the Treasury. We affirm. In 2010, Cox was convicted in the Western District of Kentucky of interstate transportation of stolen money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The district court imposed a restitution obligation of $285,000 and established an initial payment schedule of $25 quarterly, which would be revised based on Cox's financial circumstances once he was released from prison.
Cox was released from prison in 2012. Two years later, after Cox moved to Richmond, Indiana, his supervised release was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. In 2015, the Department of Justice sent Cox a letter notifying him of its intent to collect his outstanding restitution debt. The letter explained that if he did not pay the debt in full, enter a repayment plan, or demonstrate that the debt had been satisfied, the debt would be referred to the Department of the Treasury's Offset Program, which could then allocate a portion of Cox's monthly Social Security payments to satisfying his debt.
Over eight years later, Cox sued the Department of Justice and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana alleging, as relevant here, that the U.S. Attorney's Office wrongly referred his restitution debt to the Treasury Offset Program and as a result his Social Security payments were improperly reduced. He alleged that he had not received an explanation or calculation to explain the offset. He attached to his complaint a letter he received from the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana in August 2023 informing him that a new payment agreement was needed after his release from prison and that, because Cox had not agreed to a voluntary payment plan, the Office referred his debt to the Treasury Offset Program. At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district court concluded that it did not have the authority to resolve his arguments regarding his restitution payments.
Cox then appealed to this court. We determined that the district court had erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to resolve Cox's claim regarding restitution, because such challenges are permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. We further concluded that Cox had stated a claim that he had
2
received inadequate notice and opportunity for review before his restitution debt was referred to the Treasury Offset Program, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a). Accordingly, we reversed in part and remanded for proceedings on that issue alone. Following remand, the Department moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had, in fact, provided Cox notice and an opportunity for review. In support, the Department submitted its 2015 "Notice of Intent to Offset" letter. In addition to warning him about the potential for his Social Security payments to be reduced if he did not pay his debt, the letter also noted that withholding could be avoided if he entered into a repayment agreement. It went on to detail how he could contact the Department and submit evidence that the debt was not past due or had been satisfied. The district court granted the Department's motion. It observed that Cox had never argued that the Department's notice letter was insufficient under § 3716(a), and therefore he had waived any challenge to the notice. But waiver aside, the court concluded that the Department had provided Cox the notice and opportunity to review required under § 3716(a) to collect the debt through the Treasury Offset Program. On appeal, Cox argues that he was denied due process when the Department served "critical filings" to his former address, preventing him from timely responding to the summary-judgment motion. But he does not argue that any alleged procedural error deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence to the district court, nor does he identify any evidence that, had he properly received process, he would have submitted to avoid summary judgment. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding no reversible error when plaintiff failed to show how procedural deficiency ultimately prejudiced her). Therefore, any procedural error was harmless.
F ED. R. CIV. P. 61.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 147 F.4th 817, 825 (7th Cir. 2025). And our review of the Department's actions is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a federal court may set aside an agency action if the court finds it to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16 (2020). We agree with the district court that the notice letter complied with the requirements set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a). The Department may collect a debt
3
through administrative offset only after it has given the debtor written notice of the claim; an opportunity to inspect the records related to the claim; an opportunity for review of the claim within the Department; and an opportunity to enter into a written agreement to repay the claim. See § 3716(a). Here, it is undisputed that Cox received the Department's letter, which noted the amount of debt due and informed Cox that if he did not pay the balance, the Department could refer the debt to the Treasury Offset Program. The letter also instructed that to avoid referral, Cox would have to pay the debt in full, enter into a repayment agreement, or present evidence that the debt was not past due or had been satisfied. We therefore conclude that Cox received the notice and opportunity for review required under § 3716(a).
We have considered Cox's remaining arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED
4