Per Curiam [*1]
Respondent Michael B. Wolk was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on June 1, 1992, under the name Michael Bryan Wolk. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent has maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Department.
In June 2024, the Attorney Grievance Committee (AGC) received a complaint from an individual (A.A.) that respondent, as an escrow agent tasked with holding a total of $75,000 paid to A.A. as part of a 2016 settlement agreement resolving a series of litigation, refused to dispense to A.A. the funds that were supposed to be held in escrow, despite three orders of Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), dated December 22, 2020, December 1, 2021, and December 12, 2023, directing the turnover of the funds. Respondent was initially brought onto the litigation in 2016 by Sanny Barkats (Barkats), principal of JS Barkats PLLC (JS Barkats), at Barkats's expense.
The court orders stemmed from an action that respondent's sole-practitioner law firm, the Law Offices of Michael B. Wolk, P.C. (the MBW Firm), JS Barkats, and Justicebacker Inc. (Justicebacker)FN1 commenced against A.A. in January 2017, alleging, among other things, causes of action for breach of contract and quantum meruit for unpaid legal fees. In August 2017, A.A. commenced a third-party action against respondent and Barkats, alleging, inter alia, causes of action for legal malpractice and breach of contract. Shortly after, A.A., respondent, and the MBW Firm entered into a partial stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice (the 2017 stipulation), agreeing to discontinue all claims, counterclaims, and third-party claims against each other.
Following years of litigation, Justicebacker moved for summary judgment against A.A. in February 2020, and A.A. cross- moved for summary judgment against Justicebacker. By decision and order dated December 22, 2020 (the December 2020 order), Supreme Court denied Justicebacker's motion and granted A.A.'s cross-motion, dismissing Justicebacker's claims and ordering the escrow funds "be tendered forthwith to [A.A.]." Respondent did not move to vacate, reargue, or appeal the court's order.
On March 23, 2021, after respondent failed to disburse the escrow funds, A.A. moved to compel the turnover of the funds. By decision and order dated December 1, 2021 (the December 2021 order), Supreme Court granted A.A.'s motion and directed that respondent turn over the funds within 30 days. The court noted that if respondent failed to comply, A.A. could bring a motion for contempt against respondent. Again, respondent did not move to vacate, reargue, or appeal the court's order.
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On January 12, 2022, A.A., having yet to receive any of the escrow funds, moved by order to show cause to hold respondent in contempt.FN2 On December 12, 2023, Supreme Court held oral argument, at which respondent argued
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that because of the 2017 stipulation, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the contempt motion. In an exchange with the court, respondent asserted, as relevant here, "I established my rights to [the funds]. It's sitting in escrow pending resolution of disputed claims." He further stated, "I always believe[d] that I had a superior right to the funds. That's why it's been sitting in escrow." By decision and order dated December 12, 2023 (the December 2023 order), the court granted A.A.'s motion, adjudged respondent to be in contempt, and gave him three days to tender the escrow funds. The court noted that if respondent failed to comply with its order, A.A. could file a motion for sanctions. On December 21, 2023, respondent moved to amend the Supreme Court's December 2023 order and to vacate its December 2020, 2021, and 2023 orders, arguing that the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. A.A. opposed and moved for costs and sanctions against respondent. By decision and order of Supreme Court (David B. Cohen, J.) dated July 8, 2024, the court denied respondent's motion, holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the escrow funds since the start of the litigation and that the 2017 stipulation "only altered [respondent's] status as a plaintiff and a third-party defendant, [but] contained no mention of his status as escrow agent and had no impact on the escrow account." Thus, the court stated, the funds "remained subject of this action and [respondent] remained a party . . . as escrow agent." The court granted A.A.'s motion for sanctions and costs, awarding a judgment against respondent for the $75,000 in settlement funds, plus $10,000 in sanctions, to be deposited with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (LFCP), and $42,550 in attorney's fees. The court found that the action was "replete with instances of [respondent's] dilatory tactics" and that, viewing his conduct collectively, "it is clear that [he] had an obvious motive to delay dispensing the escrow funds, and his failure to purge the contempt was part of his relentless campaign to prolong this litigation" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Respondent appealed Supreme Court's July 8, 2024 order, and this Court unanimously affirmed, holding that the court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over respondent, as respondent remained the escrow agent, and thus, notwithstanding the 2017 stipulation, the court was permitted to order respondent to turn over the escrow funds, hold him in contempt, and sanction him (see Justicebacker Inc. v Abeles, 243 AD3d 503 [1st Dept 2025]). [*3]
On January 6, 2026, respondent satisfied the judgment entered against him on July 8, 2024, depositing $10,000 with the LFCP and paying $132,570 to A.A.
Based on the complaint that A.A. filed with the AGC in June 2024, the AGC on March 28, 2025 directed that respondent submit bank records from January 1, 2016 to present. On June 9, 2025, in response to the AGC's demands, respondent stated that the $75,000 in settlement funds were paid by wire to respondent's firm, as the escrowee for A.A., in installments starting in November 2016, deposited into his non-Interest on Lawyer Account (IOLA) business operating account, and then transferred in his IOLA account. Respondent admitted that as of the time of his response to the AGC's demands, the settlement funds were no longer in his IOLA account. Respondent claimed that because of the 2017 stipulation, he "began exercising [his] legal rights to disburse portions of the $75,000, pursuant to [his] statutorily- protected attorney charging-lien under Section 475 of the Judiciary Law, commencing in February 2019." Respondent admitted and provided a ledger confirming that portions of the settlement funds were disbursed to his non-IOLA account starting in 2019, such that the funds were reduced to zero by December 2021.
Respondent provided bank records from his business operating and IOLA accounts from 2018 to present, and the AGC prepared a spreadsheet, which reflected respondent's transactions pertaining to his IOLA account from May 1, 2018 to December 21, 2021. The spreadsheet, which respondent affirmed at his examination under oath (EUO) fairly and accurately reflected his bank records, showed that although $75,500 was in his IOLA account on January 31, 2019, subsequent transactions took place reducing it to $1,300.29 by December 7, 2021. Additionally, the bank records that respondent provided showed that by December 12, 2023, only $800.29 was in his IOLA account. [*4]
Respondent appeared before the AGC for his EUO between January 8 and March 5, 2026, during which he testified, inter alia, that although it was his understanding that A.A. would pay him directly for his services, there was never a retainer agreement between him and A.A., there was nothing in writing specifying the mode and amount of payment or that A.A. would pay him directly, and he never sent any invoices to A.A. during the time that he represented A.A. Respondent confirmed that he understood that, pursuant to the 2016 settlement agreement that he helped negotiate and draft, it was his duty as the escrow agent to hold the settlement funds in his escrow account "until the matter was resolved with [A.A.] and the other creditors in accordance with law." Respondent further confirmed that the 2017 stipulation contained no language allowing him to retain the settlement funds. Respondent also testified that he told Justicebacker that he believed he had a superior right to the settlement funds and was "going to use this money because I believe it precedes your lien." However, respondent admitted that Justicebacker never conceded that he had a superior right to the funds and never authorized him to take the money. Respondent further stated that he "wanted to be paid" and used the funds on business or personal expenses.
By motion dated June 22, 2026, the AGC seeks an order, pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.9(a)(5), immediately suspending respondent from the practice of the law, based on uncontroverted evidence of serious professional misconduct in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rules 1.15(a), 1.15(b)(4), 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h)
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a), an interim suspension is appropriate "upon a finding by the Court that the respondent has engaged in conduct immediately threatening the public interest. Such a finding may be based upon: . . . (5) other uncontroverted evidence of professional misconduct."
The AGC has met its burden under section 1240.9(a)(5) by presenting sufficient evidence of uncontroverted professional misconduct, namely respondent's substantial admissions under oath and bank records produced during the AGC's investigation, which confirmed that that $75,000 in settlement funds were deposited into his IOLA account and
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thereafter transferred by respondent out of that account and into a non-IOLA account in installments, ultimately resulting in the funds being reduced to zero by December 2021. The AGC's evidence further reflects that the funds, which respondent admitted that he used on business or personal expenses, remained disputed by creditors and that respondent, as escrow agent, was obligated to, and understood that he was under the duty to, keep the funds intact. [*5]
Although respondent maintains that he believed in good faith that he could take the funds based on the 2017 stipulation and his belief that Supreme Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over him, the record identified by the AGC undermines these claims. Respondent admitted during his EUO that the 2017 stipulation contained no language allowing him to retain the settlement funds, and the contemporaneous record reflects his continued recognition that the funds remained in escrow. Additionally, even after the December 2020 and 2021 orders directed the turnover of the funds to A.A., respondent failed to maintain them. His asserted belief that the orders were legally erroneous does not controvert the bank records showing that the entrusted funds were removed from the IOLA account while the dispute remained unresolved.
Respondent's false statements to Supreme Court that the settlement funds remained in escrow pending resolution of the disputed claims provide additional support for an interim suspension. Respondent's various explanations for making these statements fail to controvert the bank records or the fact that the original entrusted funds were no longer maintained in his IOLA account, such that balance of his IOLA was a mere $800.29 on the date that he represented to the court that the funds remained in escrow. This Court has repeatedly treated uncontroverted evidence of misappropriation of client or third-party funds, particularly when coupled with misrepresentations concerning those funds, as conduct warranting an interim suspension (see Matter of Gross, 217 AD3d 18 [1st Dept 2023]; Matter of Schwartz, 214 AD3d 153 [1st Dept 2023]; Matter of Iannuzzi, 207 AD3d 105 [1st Dept 2022]; Matter of Bernstein, 63 AD3d 87 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Wertis, 307 AD2d 15 [1st Dept 2003]). Respondent's lack of prior discipline, pro bono work, and other mitigating circumstances may be presented in mitigation to formal charges, but they are insufficient to avoid an interim suspension (see Gross, 217 AD3d at 20).
Accordingly, the AGC's motion should be granted suspending respondent from the practice of law pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a)(5), effective immediately, and until further order of this Court. All concur.
Wherefore, it is Ordered that the motion by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department for interim suspension, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.9(a)(5), is granted, and respondent, Michael Bryan Wolk, is suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York effective immediately, and until further order of this Court; and [*6]
It is further Ordered that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, during the period of suspension, respondent, Michael Bryan Wolk, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and It is further Ordered that, during the period of suspension, respondent, Michael Bryan Wolk, shall comply with the rules governing the conduct of disbarred or suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 1240.15), which are made part hereof; and It is further Ordered that, within 20 days of the date of service of this order, respondent Michael Bryan Wolk, may submit a request, in writing, to this Court for a post-suspension hearing (see 22 NYCRR 1240.9[c]); and It is further Ordered that if respondent, Michael Bryan Wolk, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith.
Entered: October 29, 2026
Footnotes
Footnote 1 Justicebacker, a commercial litigation finance company, entered into a funding agreement with A.A. in 2015 to provide A.A. $40,000 to be able to continue paying Barkats and his firm in the prior series of litigation. Footnote 2
While A.A.'s motion was pending, respondent filed a notice of removal on February 14, 2022 to remove the contempt case from Supreme Court, New York County to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. By memorandum opinion and order dated May 16, 2022, the Southern District ordered that the action be remanded to Supreme Court, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
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