People v. Hassett

People v Hassett

2026 NY Slip Op 06354 October 29, 2026 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Michael Hassett, Appellant.

Decided and Entered:October 29, 2026

CR-23-1335

Calendar Date: September 9, 2026

Before: Garry, P.J., Aarons, Pritzker, Mcshan And Mackey, JJ.

Mitchell S. Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Gary M. Pasqua, Canton (Matthew L. Peabody of counsel), for respondent. [*1]

Aarons, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Craig Carriero, J.), rendered December 7, 2022, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal obstruction of breathing, aggravated criminal contempt and criminal contempt in the first degree.

Stemming from allegations that defendant violated an order of protection issued against him in favor of a victim and strangled the victim during a domestic violence incident, defendant was charged by indictment in November 2021 with strangulation in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt and criminal contempt in the first degree. Defendant was represented by a succession of assigned counsel and, at his request, briefly represented himself with stand-by counsel. Defendant's subsequent request to appoint stand-by counsel to represent him was granted, and the matter proceeded to trial in October 2022. Following trial, defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, aggravated criminal contempt and first-degree criminal contempt. County Court sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to 3½ to 7 years in prison for the aggravated criminal contempt conviction and to lesser concurrent terms of incarceration for the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Turning first to defendant's challenge to the weight of the evidence, "[a] person is guilty of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation when, with intent to impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person, he or she . . . applies pressure on the throat or neck of such person" (Penal Law § 121.11 [a]). Moreover, "[a] person is guilty of aggravated criminal contempt when[,] . . . in violation of a duly served order of protection, or such order of which the defendant has actual knowledge because he or she was present in court when such order was issued,

. . . he or she intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury or serious physical injury to a person for whose protection such order was issued" (Penal Law § 215.52 [1]). Finally, "[a] person is guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree when[,] . . . in violation of a duly served order of protection" and "with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm a person for whose protection such order was issued, [he or she] strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact" (Penal Law § 215.51 [b] [v]).

The victim testified that, on the day of the incident, defendant was living at her residence despite the existence of the order of protection. That morning, the victim did not comply with defendant's attempt to wake her up, and, as told by the victim, defendant dragged her out of bed, slammed her head onto the floor, threw her back onto the bed and put his hands around her neck while threatening to kill her. The victim screamed for defendant to stop, and, with his hands still around her neck, defendant asked if she [*2]could breathe; the victim testified that she could not. The victim also testified that, after the incident, she experienced pain and discomfort in her neck and throat, and had difficulty eating and drinking for over a week resulting in weight loss and a hospital visit. When defendant released the victim, she went outside and spoke to her neighbor, who testified for the People that she heard yelling from the victim's apartment that morning. The victim and the neighbor called the police, who arrived a short while later, took the victim's statement and photographed injuries on the victim's face and neck allegedly sustained during the incident. According to the neighbor, the victim's face was red and scratched the day of the incident, but the next day, a large bruise appeared on the victim's head.

In his own testimony, defendant admitted to his awareness of the order of protection as well as to yelling at the victim that morning, but he denied the victim's account. Defendant further asserted that one of the victim's alleged injuries

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was a birthmark and the rest were not fresh, and he claimed that the victim and the neighbor made up the alleged incident to frame him.

On this record, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable in light of the conflicting accounts of the alleged incident (see People v Zakrzewski, 249 AD3d 1314, 1320 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied & dismissed 45 NY3d 1042 [2026]; People v Holmes, 227 AD3d 1184, 1189 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 971 [2024]). The victim's account, however, was fully explored on cross-examination, resulting in her admission that she visited the hospital for an "unrelated issue." Despite that admission, we cannot say the victim's testimony was incredible as a matter of law, or that it was unreasonable for the jury to believe the victim's description of the incident and reject defendant's denials (see People v Whitbeck, 248 AD3d 1512, 1515 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 46 NY3d 930 [2026]; People v Al-Shimari, 266 AD2d 586, 587 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 916 [2000]).^FN1 As such, we defer to the jury's credibility determinations and, examining the trial evidence in a neutral light and weighing the relative probative force of the conflicting testimony and the relative strength of the conflicting inferences to be drawn therefrom, we are satisfied that each of defendant's convictions is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Smith, 210 AD3d 1297, 1299 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1080 [2023]; People v Peasley, 208 AD3d 1466, 1470 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1074 [2023]). We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in denying his request to represent himself. The right to self- representation is not absolute, and "a defendant may proceed pro se if '(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition [*3]of the issues' " (People v Lewis, 44 NY3d 350, 358 [2025], quoting People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17 [1974]). Here, on the first day of trial, the court admonished defendant to refrain from speaking on his own behalf because he was represented by counsel, to which defendant replied, "Well, how about we just go pro se then, how's that?" Given the context, the court reasonably understood defendant's request as a reaction to the court's admonishment rather than "a purposeful decision to relinquish the benefit of counsel and proceed singularly" (People v Silburn, 31 NY3d 144, 150-151 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Moreover, the court had already granted defendant's previous requests to proceed pro se, and each time the court granted defendant's subsequent request for assigned counsel. "Because defendant repeatedly changed his position regarding pro se representation, his request to proceed pro se cannot be deemed unequivocal," and thus the court's summary denial of his third request did not violate his qualified right to self- representation (People v Williams, 181 AD2d 995, 995 [4th Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1055 [1992]; see People v Glover, 90 AD2d 776 [2d Dept 1982]; compare People v Spohn, 43 AD2d 843, 843 [2d Dept 1974]). County Court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the People, on redirect, to elicit testimony from the victim that defendant made phone calls encouraging her to send notarized letters seeking to lift the order of protection.^FN2 "A trial court has the discretion to decide door opening issues by considering whether, and to what extent, the evidence or argument said to open the door is incomplete and misleading, and what if any otherwise inadmissible evidence is reasonably necessary to correct the misleading impression" (People v George, 199 AD3d 1064, 1066 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 37 NY3d 1146 [2021]; accord People v Heiserman, 212 AD3d 949, 950 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 NY3d 1141 [2023]). Defendant opened the door by questioning the victim, on cross-examination, about the letters she sent to the District Attorney. The victim attempted to explain that she "had a reason" for doing so but was unable to elaborate, and the People's redirect inquiry completed the incomplete picture left by cross-examination (see People v Riddick, 242 AD3d 1438, 1443 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1054 [2025]). Defendant advances several other contentions in his pro se brief. First, defendant's argument that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated was raised initially in a pro se motion, but his assigned counsel at the time did not adopt the motion, and, under the circumstances, County Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to entertain the motion (see People v Rodriguez, 95 NY2d 497, 503 [2000]). Accordingly, his speedy trial contention is unpreserved, and we decline to take corrective action as a matter of discretion in [*4]the interest of justice (see CPL

470.15 [3] [c]; compare People v Session, 206 AD3d 1678, 1679 [4th Dept 2022]). Contrary to defendant's view, nothing in the record suggests the People engaged in pervasive prosecutorial misconduct, much less that defendant "suffered substantial prejudice, resulting in a denial of due process" (People v Mayette, 233 AD3d 1097, 1102 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 945 [2025]). Furthermore, County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's oral recusal request, as defendant failed to substantiate his claim that, when the trial judge was a prosecutor, he handled one of defendant's cases; in any event, nothing in the record calls into question the judge's conclusion that he could remain fair and impartial (see People v Lee, 129 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]).

Alleging multiple deficiencies in his representation, defendant also claims in his pro se brief that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree, as counsel cannot be held ineffective for declining to pursue arguments with little to no chance of success (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Zayas-Torres, 143 AD3d 1176, 1179 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 30 NY3d 984 [2017]). Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the People's failure to turn over the police officers' body-worn camera video in light of the prosecutor's assurances that such evidence did not exist. Further, counsel was not ineffective for failing to submit evidence of the victim's purported recantation of the facts supporting the underlying order of protection during a preliminary hearing in an unrelated matter. "Obedience to the lawful mandate of the court is required even though it is later held that the order was erroneous, improvidently made, or granted by the court under misapprehension or mistake" (People v Brown,

189 AD3d 701, 701 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1095 [2021], citing Ketchum v Edwards, 153 NY 534, 538-539 [1897]). As such, the victim's recantation was irrelevant to defendant's guilt because undermining the factual predicate of the order would not have rendered it jurisdictionally defective or void on its face (see id.; State of New York v Congress of Racial Equality [C.O.R.E.], 92 AD2d 815, 817 [1st Dept 1983]).

Counsel also will not be deemed ineffective unless there is a demonstrated absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's allegedly deficient conduct (see People v LaDuke, 204 AD3d 1083, 1088 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1072 [2022]; People v Savoy, 165 AD3d 1498, 1499 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 34 NY3d 937 [2019]), and defendant has not made such a showing with respect to counsel's failure to object to certain questioning about

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