In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0674
Alexzandria G. Mardell v.
The State
On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fayette County No. 2020R0048
Decided: October 27, 2026
COLVIN, Justice.
On December 23, 2019, Appellant Alexzandria Mardell beat her husband, John Mardell, with the shaft of a broken golf club, smashed a glass jar on his head, fracturing his skull, and stabbed him 20 times, killing him. 1 At trial, the jury rejected her claim of self-defense and found her guilty of malice murder and
1 On February 26, 2020, a Fayette County grand jury returned an in - dictment charging Mardell with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). At the conclusion of a jury trial held from March 14 to March 18, 2022, the jury found Mardell guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Mardell to life in prison without parole for malice murder, vacated her conviction for felony murder by operation of law, and merged the aggravated assault charge into her conviction for malice mur - der.
On March 23, 2022, Mardell timely filed a motion for new trial, which she subsequently amended through new counsel. Following a hearing on Sep - tember 4, 2025, the trial court denied Mardell's motion by written order on November 3, 2025. Mardell filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, which was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court's reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the "Final Copy," will replace any prior version on the Court's website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
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other crimes. She now appeals her convictions, arguing that the trial court plainly erred by admitting into evidence written state - ments John made in his prior ex-parte petition for a temporary protective order against her. Mardell contends that the admission of these statements violated her confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIV of the Georgia Constitution. Mardell further argues that her counsel was constitutionally ineffective in several ways and that the combined prejudicial effect of the trial court's error and her counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of her trial, even if no single error did so. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. On the morn - ing of December 23, 2019, John filed a petition for a temporary protective order (a "TPO petition") against Mardell, which the court granted that morning by issuing a "family violence ex-parte protective order" (a "TPO"). Under the terms of the TPO, Mardell was required to stay at least 300 yards away from John and John was awarded "sole and exclusive use" of their shared home. These requirements were to remain in place at least until the court held a hearing on John's petition at which both parties could be pre - sent, which was scheduled for early January.
After obtaining the TPO, John met with Sergeant Brent Lonkert of the Fayette County Sheriff's Office at about 11:00 a.m. and requested that he serve Mardell with copies of John's TPO petition, the TPO itself, and a petition for divorce that John had filed earlier in December. Sergeant Lonkert accepted John's re - quest, informed him that it would take about 30 minutes for his papers to be processed by the clerk's office, and told John that he would call him when he was en route to serve Mardell. At about 11:30 a.m., Sergeant Lonkert called John but received no answer.
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Sergeant Lonkert then left the courthouse to attempt ser - vice on Mardell at her home, which was only about three miles away. Because the TPO required Mardell to vacate her property, Sergeant Lonkert called for the assistance of an additional officer in accordance with standard departmental practice. While Ser - geant Lonkert was waiting in his vehicle a short distance from Mardell's home for backup to arrive, he observed a black Dodge pickup truck leaving Mardell's subdivision at a high rate of speed. Investigator Kevin Zaj, who was responding to Sergeant Lonk - ert's request, also observed the same vehicle as he drove through Mardell's neighborhood. A few minutes later, the two met and at - tempted service on Mardell by knocking on her door several times but received no response.
Shortly after leaving, they each received a high-priority no - tification that a woman had called 911 and reported that she may have killed her husband and that her vehicle had broken down about two to three miles from Mardell's neighborhood. Both Ser - geant Lonkert and Investigator Zaj responded.
As Investigator Zaj arrived, he observed Mardell's truck parked partially in the roadway with Mardell standing beside it. His body-worn camera captured their interaction, and the corre - sponding recording was entered into evidence at trial and played for the jury. The video shows Investigator Zaj handcuffing Mardell. While he did so, Mardell said, "I didn't mean to" several times without prompting. Investigator Zaj then read Mardell her Miranda rights, 2 after which the following exchange occurred:
INVESTIGATOR ZAJ: So what's going on? You said this was your husband?
MARDELL: Yes, I was in the house watching TV. He
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
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came in the house, and he threw some papers at me. He said that they were coming to kick me out of the house. I said, "Can you please just leave me alone?"
He said, "Oh you think you're about to watch my TV, well, you're not supposed to be in my house so" — He drugged the remote control out of my hand. When he drugged it out of my hand, we started fighting. INVESTIGATOR ZAJ: You started fighting?
MARDELL: Yes. He started winning. So I picked up something by the fireplace and hit him. INVESTIGATOR ZAJ: Do you know what it was?
MARDELL: It was like a stick, like a, like a golf club, 'cause I be in the house by myself.
At this point, Mardell was sobbing, and stated, "I bet he was try - ing to have somebody come kill me for the past couple days. I been telling my family. I called you guys."
After officers retrieved Mardell's driver's license, Investi - gator Zaj noted, "I see blood on your cheeks and hands," and asked, "Where did that come from?" Mardell responded, "Probably Johnny." While Investigator Zaj was putting his gloves on, Mardell continued to sob and stated, "I hope he's okay, I hope he's okay." Investigator Zaj then relayed some of the information he had received over the radio, and Mardell informed him that the house was locked and stated, "Please go in the patio door. Tell them to kick the door in." Investigator Zaj acknowledged her ad - vice, then removed Mardell's hat and asked, "Are you hurt any - where? Are you injured?" Mardell responded, "I don't think so."
In response to subsequent questions about her truck, Mardell stated, "It won't move anymore." Investigator Zaj then placed her in the back seat of his SUV, she gave him permission to search her truck, and their conversation ended.
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While Sergeant Lonkert and Investigator Zaj responded to Mardell, other officers were dispatched to Mardell's home. Ser - geant Alan Stapp testified that he ran to the back of Mardell's house, kicked open the back door, and found John on the floor in a small hallway between the kitchen and the garage, lying in a
"pool of blood." Though John was still alive when Sergeant Stapp found him, he later succumbed to his injuries. Photos admitted into evidence at trial show large amounts of blood splatter and pooling throughout the kitchen and hallway. Subsequent investigation revealed disheveled furniture and the shaft of a broken golf club, a broken bar stool chair and glass jar in the kitchen, and a bloody serrated knife with an eight-inch blade in the bathroom of the master bedroom. Investigators also noted the presence of a pot in the sink sitting in water with other dirty dishes. Water stains on the pot suggested to investigators that "it'd been there for a long time."
After Mardell was transported to the Sheriff's Office, she was examined for injuries. Photographs show that she had dried blood on the side of her face, a cut on one of her fingers, a broken thumbnail, a scratch on her right arm, a quarter-inch abrasion on her knee, and a small scratch on the back of her head. Mardell was otherwise uninjured.
Investigator Zaj transported Mardell to the county jail for booking later that day. While en route, Mardell asked him if John was dead, and he responded that he was unsure. Investigator Zaj then heard her say, "I hope so." At trial, Investigator Zaj testified as to the subsequent exchange, stating:
I asked what she hoped for, and she told me that she hoped he was dead. So to clarify, I asked her again. I said, "You hope he's dead?" And at that point, she told me, "Yes." She said she was tired of being
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treated that way and if she was going to jail, it would at least be worth it.
Dr. Colin Hebert performed John's autopsy. At trial, Dr. Hebert testified at some length about John's wounds, cataloging 20 sharp force injuries to John's head, chest, back, and extremi - ties, as well as additional blunt-force injuries to his head. Of the sharp force injuries, five wounds to his torso were the most "se - vere." John had three penetrating stab wounds to the front of his chest, which collectively penetrated both of his lungs, his dia - phragm, his pancreas, and his liver. John also had two penetrat - ing stab wounds to his back. One of these wounds went between his ribs and into both the upper lobe of his right lung and the right atrium of his heart. The second wound to his back entered the upper lobe of his left lung. John also had lengthy wounds to both of his hands, deep enough to sever his tendons. The medical ex - aminer opined that these injuries were consistent with defensive wounds. John sustained multiple blunt-force injuries to his head, as well as a large wound extending diagonally from his hairline to the middle of the top of his head. This injury went through his scalp and fractured his skull, which, according to the medical ex - aminer, would have required "significant" force. Ultimately, the medical examiner concluded that John's cause of death was the multiple stab wounds to his torso that entered or injured his lungs, pancreas, liver, and heart.
Mardell testified in her own defense as follows. Mardell and John met in late August 2018, and got married only a few months later, on December 7, 2018. Their relationship was ini - tially "pleasant" but quickly became "very difficult" and "chaotic."
John was "cold" and living in the house with him was "[s]cary."
The doors to their house required keys not only to enter, but also to exit, and she was never given a copy of the keys. Mardell had
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no bank account of her own, no access to John's bank account, and no vehicle. John would only let her use his "card" when he was in the mood to do so, which was usually "when [Mardell] had sex with him." The "house never had food," and the cabinets and the refrigerator "stayed empty." On the occasions where John would allow Mardell to buy groceries, "he would take all the groceries and throw them in the trash" the next day. John "would leave for days and leave [Mardell] in the house," and he "would cut the power on and off at his discretion."
Mardell testified regarding the April 2019 incident refer - enced in John's TPO petition. She explained that John had locked her out in the rain, that he refused to let her in, and that when she "kicked the door in," he "beat [her] up with a skillet."
John informed Mardell that he wanted a divorce on Decem - ber 6, 2019, the same day that he filed (but did not serve) his di - vorce petition. Initially, they tried to reconcile, but on the morn - ing of December 8, 2019, Mardell woke to John standing over her, which "scared the crap out of" her. John left the house later on December 8 and did not return until December 21, 2019. Mardell was out when he returned, and when she got back to the house, he refused to let her in. According to Mardell, John "was walking around the house with a pan in his hand," saying that when Mardell came in, she was "either going to the hospital" or "to jail."
Mardell called the Fayette County Sheriff's Office, who then
"made" John let her in. John left again on December 21, and did not return until December 23, the day that he died. On the morning of December 23, Mardell was watching TV in an armchair in the living room. She kept a chef's knife with an eight-inch blade with her because she was "scared" and "didn't know when Johnny was going to come home and hurt" her. As she was watching TV, the house's alarm system alerted her that a
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door had been opened. John then came through the garage door, threw copies of the TPO petition and the TPO order at her and said, "Ho. Ho. Ho. Ho. You got to get the f**k out of my house."
Mardell picked up the papers and put them on the back of the couch, but after she sat back down to watch TV, he "jerked the TV remote control out of [her] hand." John then "tried to quickly jerk the TV out of the wall," "but he couldn't," "tripped," and "fell back." Mardell then "started laughing at him[ ] and mocking him." John "took about two large steps" toward Mardell and
"jerked [her] up by [her] clothes, and [they] started fighting."
While they were fighting, John told Mardell that "the police were coming," to kick her out of the house and they "fell into the fire - place." John was "kicking" and "hitting" her, and she was kicking and hitting him back. She then grabbed the shaft of a broken golf club and hit him with it, but he "pulled it out of [her] hand and threw it on the ground."
As the two continued to fight, Mardell backed into the kitchen. John grabbed her jacket and began to pull it over her head, forcing her to bend over, such that she could only see his legs and feet. As she was bent over, John hit her on the back of the head with "what [Mardell] assume[d] were his fists" but he may have also "picked up a pan and hit [her]" with it. As Mardell was bent over, she pulled a serrated knife with an eight-inch blade out of the knife block on the counter and "started trying to get him at bay." John continued to hold and kick her, but she
"overpowered him with the knife." Mardell could not get away, however, until she picked up a glass pickle jar and "slammed it … into his head."
After Mardell hit John with the pickle jar, she ran out of the kitchen but "paused" and "looked back." When she saw John's condition, she "knew that [they] needed to call the police," so she
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asked John for his phone. John walked down the hallway, stood there for a moment, and said, "I'm going to die." Mardell re - sponded, "No, you're not because I'm going to get you some help."
She then ran to the bathroom, "washed all the blood off [her] hands," and left the knife in the sink. She put on a pair of sweat - pants and "started jerking clothes off of the hangers and throwing them in [a] bag." Mardell then returned to John, got his car keys out of his pocket, and left because she "knew [she] was in trouble."
As she was driving John's truck out of their subdivision, she "saw the police truck sitting on the corner" but did not stop because
"she didn't want to get in trouble." Using John's phone, which she found on the center console of his truck, she called her brother, aunt, mom, and a friend. Mardell then called 911 but could not recall whether she did so before or after John's truck broke down. At trial, Mardell described her conversation with police while standing next to John's truck. As part of her testimony, she explained that the house was locked in part because she closed the garage door, which she did "intentional[ly]" because she
"didn't want the neighbors or anybody to see [John] like that on the floor." She further testified that if John had stopped fighting, she would have stopped too.
2. In her first claim, Mardell argues that the trial court plainly erred by admitting into evidence the allegations contained in John's ex-parte TPO petition. Mardell contends that because those statements were testimonial, John was unavailable at trial, and John had not been previously cross-examined about them, their admission was barred by the Sixth Amendment's Confron-
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tation Clause and similar language in Paragraph XIV of the Geor - gia Constitution. 3 Though Mardell is correct that John's allega - tions were testimonial, their admission did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause because they were not hearsay, as they were not admitted to establish the truth of what they asserted. Accordingly, Mardell's Confrontation Clause claim fails, as ex - plained further below.
(a) As recounted above, the State's first witness, Sergeant Lonkert, testified that John requested he serve Mardell with his TPO petition, the TPO itself, and his petition for divorce. Each of those documents was admitted into evidence without objection, but they were not published until after Sergeant Lonkert had un - dergone cross-examination and was excused. At the time John's TPO petition was admitted, the prosecutor did not ask — and Ser - geant Lonkert did not testify — about the allegations John made therein.
During Sergeant Lonkert's cross-examination, however, Mardell's counsel asked Sergeant Lonkert about each of John's allegations. Sergeant Lonkert responded affirmatively when asked whether the petition "reference[d] … an incident that hap - pened in April of 2019" and whether the petition further alleged that in "December 2019, [Mardell] stole [John's] laptop[,] video game[,] and two flat screen TVs," "[s]tole all [the] funds from
3 Mardell does not argue that her confrontation rights under the Geor - gia Constitution differ in any regard from her confrontation rights under the federal constitution. We therefore consider only her claim that the trial court violated her rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu - tion, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Elling - ton v. State, 324 Ga. 335, 342 n.6 (2022) (declining to consider whether Geor - gia's Confrontation Clause should be construed differently than the federal Confrontation Clause where the appellant cited both in his brief but did not argue that the two provisions should be construed differently).
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[John's] bank account," and "[s]tole two lawnmowers, [a] trimmer, [an] edger, and [a] leaf blower." Mardell's counsel then asked Ser - geant Lonkert if there was anything in the petition "about recent violence by" Mardell, and Sergeant Lonkert indicated that there was not. In response to further questions, Sergeant Lonkert con - firmed that Mardell and John resided together in their marital home, and so Mardell had access to and control over the items John alleged she stole in his petition.
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Lonkert to read Paragraph 4 of the petition, which concerned the "incident" in April 2019 that he had referenced during his cross-examination. Complying, Sergeant Lonkert read the following: "[o]n or about April 2019, Respondent committed the following acts of family vi - olence against Petitioner[:] … domestic violence, simple battery. She kicked in the back door of my home and came into the home and assaulted me." After Sergeant Lonkert was excused, the TPO petition, the TPO, and the divorce petition were published to the jury.
(b) "The Confrontation Clause provides that '[i]n all crimi - nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con - fronted with the witnesses against him.'" Smith v. Arizona, 602 US 779, 783 (2024) (quoting US Const., Amend. VI). See Ohio v. Clark, 576 US 237, 243 (2015) ("The Sixth Amendment's Confron - tation Clause … is binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."). Affording criminal defendants this right requires courts to "bar[ ] 'admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examina - tion.'" Davis v. Washington, 547 US 813, 821 (2006) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36, 53-54 (2004)). The United
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States Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Clause's prohibi - tion 'applies only to testimonial hearsay.'" Smith, 602 US at 784 (quoting Davis, 547 US at 823). As a result, "a Confrontation Clause claim can succeed only if the challenged statement was:
(1) testimonial, meaning that it was made with the primary pur - pose of establishing evidence that could be used in a future pros - ecution, and (2) hearsay, that is, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 70 (2026) (cleaned up). See also Crawford, 541 US at 59 n.9 ("The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 US 409, 414 (1985))). Because Mardell did not object to the admission of John's TPO petition or the statements therein at trial on the grounds that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause, we re - view her claim for plain error only. See Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 547 (2019) (applying plain error review to an unpreserved Confrontation Clause claim). To establish plain error, an appel - lant "must show that the trial court committed a clear or obvious error, that he has not affirmatively waived the error, and that the error affected his substantial rights, which means that it likely affected the outcome of his trial." Dennis v. State, 324 Ga. 440, 444 (2026). If the appellant fails to establish one prong of the plain error test, his claim fails, and we need not review the other prongs of the plain error test. Denson, 307 Ga. at 547.
(c) Mardell is correct that John's allegations were testimo - nial. John's TPO petition was verified (John attached a verifica - tion swearing that his allegations were "true and correct"), and alleged that Mardell had committed crimes against him. John also submitted his petition to a judge with the primary purpose of securing a temporary protective order that removed Mardell from
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their home. As such, John's statements were quintessentially tes - timonial. See Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404, 408 (2010) (holding that the victim's statement in her verified petition for a tempo - rary protective order was testimonial in nature). See also Miller
v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 857 (2011) (same). But John's allegations were not obviously hearsay because they do not appear to have been offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. "'Hearsay' means a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
OCGA § 24-8-801(c). "Thus, an out-of-court statement is not hear - say if it is offered for some purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Carter v. State, 302 Ga. 200, 204 (2017). In the context of the direct examination, it was not clear or obvious that the State introduced the TPO petition into evidence to establish the truth of the statements contained therein because the prosecutor only asked Sergeant Lonkert about John's allega - tions during redirect examination, and it did so only to the extent necessary to correct his potentially misleading testimony about whether John's TPO petition contained allegations of "recent vio - lence." The record shows that the prosecutor initially solicited Sergeant Lonkert's testimony about John's court filings, together with the documents themselves, to explain why Sergeant Lonkert went to Mardell's home before she called 911 and to explain how he ultimately encountered Mardell on Inman Road shortly after his failed service attempt. It was Mardell's counsel — not the State — who first explored the specific nature of John's allega - tions during Sergeant Lonkert's cross-examination. Mardell's counsel was the first to ask Sergeant Lonkert about the "incident"
in April, and it was Mardell's counsel who asked Sergeant Lonk-
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ert whether there was anything in John's petition regarding "re - cent violence by Ms. Mardell." As noted above, Sergeant Lonkert's response indicated that there was not, and so when the prosecutor asked Sergeant Lonkert during his re-direct examination to read John's allegations, she did so to correct Sergeant Lonkert's mis - leading testimony. Accordingly, the prosecutor solicited testi - mony concerning whether the petition contained an allegation of violence but not about whether that allegation was true. Because the record supports that the prosecutor did not tender John's statements to establish the truth of what he as - serted, it was not clear or obvious that those statements were hearsay. See Carter, 302 Ga. at 204 (holding that, even if the dis - puted statements were testimonial, there was no Confrontation Clause violation because the statements were not hearsay, as they were used for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted). And because it was not clear or obvious that those statements were hearsay, their admittance did not violate Mardell's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. As such, the trial court did not plainly err by admitting John's allegations.
3. Mardell claims that her trial counsel provided constitu - tionally ineffective counsel in three ways, arguing that her coun - sel: (a) failed to object to the admission of John's hearsay state - ments in his TPO petition and adduced evidence about those statements herself; (b) failed to object to the State's golden rule argument in its closing argument; and (c) failed to introduce cer - tain exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence. We address each claim individually below.
As we have explained, "[t]o prevail on an ineffective-assis - tance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show deficient perfor - mance by trial counsel and resulting prejudice." Bryant v. State,
324 Ga. 273, 287 (2026). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
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668, 687 (1984). To establish that his trial counsel performed de - ficiently, "a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney per - formed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms." Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). "The law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant bears the bur - den of overcoming this presumption." Id. (quotation marks omit - ted). Overcoming this presumption requires "a defendant [to] show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did[ ] or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not." Id. "To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reason - able probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different." Evans v. State, 322 Ga. 652, 662- 63 (2025). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 634 (2025) (quoting Strickland, 466 US at 694 (quotation marks omitted)). Because an appellant must establish both his counsel's deficient performance and prejudice resulting therefrom, "[i]f a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or preju - dice, we need not address the other part of the Strickland test."
Cooper v. State, 321 Ga. 349, 351-52 (2025).
(a) In her first ineffective-assistance claim, Mardell faults her counsel for failing to object to the admission of John's TPO petition and the allegations therein on the grounds that John's statements were hearsay and that their admission violated the Confrontation Clause, and she further faults her counsel for elic - iting testimony about those allegations herself. As explained be - low, this two-part claim fails because Mardell has not established that her counsel's performance was deficient in the ways claimed. Though Mardell's counsel initially testified at the motion-
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for-new-trial hearing that she did not have a strategic reason for failing to object to the admission of John's allegations in his TPO petition, she agreed during cross-examination that John's TPO petition could be used to show that John was abusing the court system to remove his wife from his home. And counsel further agreed that, as part of her strategy of establishing Mardell was defending herself from an abusive relationship, "it would make sense" to explore the contents of John's TPO. Counsel also agreed that it would be consistent with such a strategy to highlight that John's petition focused on items of financial value being removed from the home, rather than prior violence toward him. Though counsel could not initially recall a strategic reason for declining to object to the admission of John's TPO petition and for cross-examining Sergeant Lonkert as she did, she acknowl - edged on cross-examination that her questions to Sergeant Lonk - ert were consistent with her strategy of showing that John was abusing the legal system to put his wife out of the home. Moreo - ver, by introducing John's allegations to the jury, Mardell's coun - sel demonstrated that John was more concerned about his re - cently lost property than Mardell's violence, which occurred about seven months earlier. And introducing those statements also could have dispelled the notions of any jurors who may have im - agined or attributed worse actions to Mardell had this evidence not been introduced. Because there were multiple possible strate - gic reasons for declining to object to the TPO petition and for in - troducing John's statements, we cannot say that Mardell's coun - sel performance was deficient. See Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 223 (2023) (explaining that "[i]f a reasonable lawyer might have done what the actual lawyer did — whether for the same reasons given by the actual lawyer or for different reasons entirely — the actual lawyer cannot be said to have performed in an objectively unrea - sonable way").
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(b) In her second ineffective-assistance claim, Mardell faults her counsel for failing to object to what she contends was a
"golden rule" violation, which occurs "when a party asks the ju - rors to place themselves in the position of the victims." Smith, 323 Ga. at 254. Because Mardell has not established deficient perfor - mance in this regard, her claim fails.
In closing, the prosecutor argued:
You know domestic violence, it's a serious problem. Y'all are adults. I don't have to tell you anymore about that. I don't have to say any more about it. You know it all already. But I have to say this. It needs to end here, now, today, in this case. And there's only 12 people in Fayette County who can do something about it.
This argument does not ask the jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim and so does not run afoul of the golden rule. See Smith, 323 Ga. at 254. As such, an objection on the grounds that the State violated the golden rule would have been meritless, and Mardell's counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a meritless objection. Id.
(c) In her third and final ineffective-assistance claim, Mardell contends that her counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that Mardell told a responding officer that she
"hope[d] [John] isn't dead." Because such evidence would have been cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, Mardell has failed to establish that her counsel's allegedly deficient perfor - mance prejudiced her.
(i) At the hearing on Mardell's motion for new trial, her ap - pellate counsel called Lieutenant Dan Thamert of the Fayette County Sheriff's Office to the stand. Lieutenant Thamert did not
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testify at Mardell's trial and recounted his encounter with Mardell for the first time at the motion-for-new-trial hearing. Lieutenant Thamert testified that he was on patrol when he ob - served Mardell's pickup truck parked in the roadway. He acti - vated his lights, pulled behind her truck, and exited his vehicle. As he did so, Mardell approached him and stated, "I hit him in the head" and "I hope he isn't dead." Investigator Zaj (who did testify at trial, and whose bodycam footage was played for the jury) then arrived and spoke with Mardell while Lieutenant Thamert handled impounding her vehicle.
Lieutenant Thamert memorialized his encounter with Mardell in a written report, which was consistent with his testi - mony and was admitted into evidence at the motion-for-new-trial hearing. Lieutenant Thamert further explained that neither the District Attorney's Office nor Mardell's trial counsel contacted him prior to Mardell's trial.
Mardell's trial counsel testified that she "recognize[d]"
Lieutenant Thamert's report "as something [she] got in discovery"
but that she did not remember it well enough to state whether she previously saw anything in it that she wanted to use as excul - patory or impeachment evidence. In its order denying Mardell's motion, the trial court ruled that Mardell had not established that her trial counsel was ineffective because she had not demon - strated that her counsel's failure to call Lieutenant Thamert at trial was prejudicial.
(ii) Pretermitting whether counsel's performance was defi - cient, Mardell has failed to establish prejudice. As noted above, Investigator Zaj's body camera recorded Mardell sobbing and stating, "I hope he's okay. I hope he's okay." This recording either captured the statement Mardell made in Lieutenant Thamert's presence (in which case he was incorrect that Mardell's statement
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occurred before Investigator Zaj arrived), or it was duplicative of it. In either case, the jury saw Mardell make the same type of emotional plea she now faults her counsel for omitting. Because the jury saw and heard Mardell state "I hope he's okay" in Inves - tigator Zaj and Lieutenant Thamert's presence, further testimony from Lieutenant Thamert would have been cumulative. And
"[t]rial counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for not introduc - ing … cumulative evidence." Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 70 (2014). Because Mardell has failed to show that the admission of Lieu - tenant Thamert's testimony prejudiced her, her ineffective-assis - tance claim fails.
4. In her final claim of error, Mardell contends that the combined effect of the trial court's errors and her counsel's defi - cient performance denied her a fair trial, even if no single error or instance of deficient performance did so. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (2020) (explaining that we must "consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel"). But because we have concluded that the trial court did not err and have assumed only one instance of deficient performance (which we concluded was not prejudicial), there is no prejudice to aggre - gate.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.