PER CURIAM:
Cyrille Kouambo Beckodro, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his second motion requesting reconsidera- tion of the order dismissing his civil complaint. After careful re- view, we affirm, as we can discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Beckodro relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2024, Beckodro filed a complaint against multiple John Doe defendants, alleging that he had been harassed and dis- criminated against in violation of various state and federal laws. As relevant here, his complaint included allegations that (1) he was subjected to stalking and cyberstalking; (2) his neighbors were loud and disruptive; (3) the United States Postal Service ("USPS") dis- criminated against him by delaying the delivery of packages; and
(4) the Georgia Southern University bursar's office "alleged that [he was] an international student," denied his application to waive mandatory insurance, cancelled his summer course registration, and billed him at a higher rate than other students. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. When Beckodro did not file any objections, the dis- trict judge adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation. After the district court entered final judgment, Beckodro re- quested leave to file untimely objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation and moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). In his
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25-12140 Opinion of the Court 3 submitted objections, Beckodro argued, in relevant part, that the district court erred by failing to allow limited discovery so that he could uncover the identities of the John Doe defendants, improp- erly dismissed his complaint at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, and misap- plied substantive law. He also submitted several pieces of evidence with this filing, including e-mail correspondence with a Georgia Southern administrator and screenshots of package tracking up- dates. The district judge accepted Beckodro's out-of-time objec- tions, overruled them, and denied his reconsideration motion as moot.
Beckodro then moved to supplement the record, asserting that he "now possesse[d] reliable evidence" to support his claims of
"ongoing interference with federal mail" and "targeted harass- ment" in the form of "individuals operating loud vehicles and co- ordinating disruptive noise." He argued that "[f]ailure to consider these newly acquired facts would result in manifest injustice—par- ticularly in a case involving a pro se litigant asserting civil rights violations." Beckodro also filed a separate motion for discovery and argued, as relevant, that (1) discovery was necessary to ensure evi- dence was preserved, (2) dismissal was premature because he
"lacked discovery to name unknown defendants," and (3) he was improperly denied the "opportunity to be heard" because his com- plaint was dismissed before discovery or trial. Beckodro then filed another motion for reconsideration. He asserted that he had newly discovered video footage demonstrat- ing that he was the target of "noise-based harassment," documents
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12140 showing that various legal filings and packages were misdelivered by USPS, and correspondence from Georgia Southern evidencing
"[d]iscrimination and [r]etaliation by [s]chool [o]fficials." He fur- ther contended that (1) the district court's dismissal was premature because he was denied the opportunity to engage in limited discov- ery to uncover the defendants' identities, (2) the court ignored his request to preserve evidence, and (3) the court did not construe his complaint liberally or "consider the cumulative and cross-jurisdic- tional impact of the factual allegations." He also alleged that he continued to be subjected to noise-based harassment, surveillance, and discriminatory retaliation. In concluding his motion, Beckodro requested relief "pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) and (6)."
The district court denied Beckodro's Rule 60(b) motion and denied as moot his evidentiary motions. The court found that Beckodro failed to show that any of his newly discovered evidence would be material to his claims of discrimination or would alter the court's ultimate reasons for dismissing the complaint. Beckodro thereafter filed his notice of appeal, which desig- nated the orders dismissing his complaint and denying his first and second motions for reconsideration. Our Court dismissed much of Beckodro's appeal as untimely, concluding that we were limited to considering the district court's order denying his second motion for reconsideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which is "limited and deferential."
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25-12140 Opinion of the Court 5 BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2025) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). "Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law." Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA,
432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Further, "we can affirm for any reason supported by the rec- ord, even if the district court did not rely on that reason." Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, Beckodro indicated that he filed the instant motion for reconsideration "pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) and (6)," and he maintains on appeal that he is entitled to such relief. We will address each subsection in turn.
Rule 60(b)(2) permits a court to relieve a party from final judgment if the party presents "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). For the court to grant relief based upon newly discovered evidence, a movant must meet a five-part test: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered since the dispositive ruling; (2) due diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new evidence must be shown; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the ev- idence must be material; and (5) the evidence must be such that it would probably produce a different result than the one achieved in
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12140 the dispositive ruling. Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). Beckodro contends that he satisfied each of these factors and that the district court failed to "meaning- fully address" this five-part test. We disagree.
As the district court correctly found, Beckodro's motion failed to address how any of his alleged newly discovered evidence would be material or alter the court's ultimate reasons for dismiss- ing his original complaint with prejudice. Rather, Beckodro broadly asserted that his newly discovered evidence would help es- tablish that he was the target of "noise-based harassment" and re- peatedly experienced delayed or misdelivered packages. Because he failed to explain how the outcome of his civil proceedings would have been different if this newly discovered evidence was consid- ered, the district court correctly determined Beckodro was not en- titled to Rule 60(b)(2) relief. See id.
We now turn to Beckodro's arguments related to Rule 60(b)(6), which is a catch-all provision authorizing the district court to relieve a party from a final judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). "Rule 60(b)(6) motions must demonstrate that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief." Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
Beckodro argues that he alleged such "extraordinary circum- stances" in the form of ongoing post-judgment harm, and the court failed to "meaningfully evaluate" his arguments. He is cor- rect that the district court did not explicitly address Rule 60(b)(6) in
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25-12140 Opinion of the Court 7 its order denying relief. But Beckodro did not plainly raise a sepa- rate claim under that subsection. And it is not clear whether any of Beckodro's claims fall under Rule 60(b)(6)'s catch-all provision be- cause they are largely duplicative of the arguments contained in his motions to supplement the record and for discovery, all of which were premised upon purportedly new evidence.
Indeed, to the extent Beckodro's arguments were an exten- sion of his broad request for reconsideration based on newly dis- covered evidence, such a claim could not be raised under Rule 60(b)(6). See BLOM Bank SAL, 145 S. Ct. at 1619-20; Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1998) (stating that Rule 60(b)(6) "grants federal courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment . . . provided that the motion is . . . not prem- ised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5)"). And insofar as Beckodro raised a discrete argu- ment under Rule 60(b)(6), we can discern no "extraordinary cir- cumstances" warranting reconsideration of the district court's dis- missal order. See Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342 (explaining that, even if ex- traordinary circumstances have been shown, "whether to grant the requested relief is a matter for the district court's sound discretion"
(citation modified)).
In short, while courts are required to afford pro se filings lib- eral construction, we do not require courts to act as "de facto coun- sel" or "rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Therefore, even though the district
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12140 court did not explicitly address each of Beckodro's arguments, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or (b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court's denial of Beckodro's second Rule 60(b) motion.
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