Kelvin Smith v. Kohler Co.

claims. The district court concluded that Smith failed to articulate a sincerely held religious belief or practice with which the testing requirement interfered, and that he otherwise failed to state a claim against the defendants. After Smith failed to comply with the district court's instructions for filing a second amended complaint, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. We affirm.

We accept the facts alleged in the amended complaint as true and draw all inferences in favor of Smith. See Ruiz v. Pritzker, 162 F.4th 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2025). In November 2021, Kohler notified employees that they must submit proof of a COVID-19 vaccination or seek an exemption on religious grounds. Under the policy, exempted employees were required to submit to regular COVID-19 testing, and employees who failed to comply with these rules would be placed on unpaid leave or terminated. After UAW and Kohler signed a memorandum of understanding extending the policy to union employees, UAW allegedly informed its members that if they failed to comply with the policy, they would be "locked out" under the union's collective bargaining agreement.

Smith applied for and was granted a religious exemption to the vaccine mandate on the grounds that "putting toxic substances in [his] body was against [his] deeply held religious belief." After Smith repeatedly failed to comply with the weekly testing requirement for exempted employees, he was allegedly given an ultimatum: either take a COVID-19 test or be placed on an involuntary leave of absence until the mandate was lifted. After Smith continued to refuse testing, his badge was deactivated and he was unable to return to work. Kohler lifted its testing mandate in May 2022 and allowed union employees placed on involuntary leave to return to work. But by that time, Kohler had replaced him and Smith had to take a new position.

After obtaining a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Smith filed this lawsuit asserting that Kohler and UAW discriminated against him based on his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Smith also styled his amended complaint as a "class action"

and sought relief on behalf of other Kohler employees who had been placed on unpaid leave or discharged for failing to comply with the company's testing requirement.^† † Smith asserted additional claims arising from UAW's collective bargaining agreement with Kohler and an alleged invasion of privacy. Because he does not pursue those claims on appeal, we do not discuss them further.

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The defendants both moved to dismiss Smith's amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Smith did not file a timely opposition to either defendant's motion. Instead, after the deadline passed Smith submitted several filings, including (1) an "objection to hearsay" challenging defense counsel's ability to make arguments on the defendants' behalf and purporting to seek summary judgment; (2) a

"supplement" to his amended complaint; and (3) a motion for default judgment, asserting that the defendants had failed to respond to his complaint. The district court declined to consider Smith's unauthorized filings, and it treated the motions to dismiss as unopposed because Smith never filed a timely, compliant brief in opposition. The court separately denied Smith's motion for default judgment because his motion was defective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, and because the defendants were not in default, having filed timely responsive pleadings in the form of their motions to dismiss.

On the merits, the district court dismissed Smith's Title VII claim against Kohler without prejudice, explaining that he had not plausibly alleged that Kohler's COVID- testing requirement conflicted with a sincerely held religious belief. Although Smith asserted that introducing "toxic substances" into his body violated his beliefs, the court explained, he did not identify a religious basis for that objection or connect it specifically to testing. The district court also dismissed the "class-action" claims with prejudice because Smith, proceeding pro se, could not represent other individuals or maintain a class action on their behalf. The court construed Smith's claims against UAW as alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation, and dismissed those claims with prejudice based on his failure to exhaust and because it determined they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court therefore granted Smith leave to file a second amended complaint as to his Title VII claim against Kohler alone, instructing him to use a pre-printed complaint form. The court warned Smith that if he filed additional noncompliant documents instead of a valid second amended complaint, the court would immediately dismiss the case with prejudice. Smith failed to file a second amended complaint in accordance with the court's instructions, but the court gave him a final opportunity to amend. After Smith failed to do so, the court dismissed the suit with prejudice.

On appeal, Smith first argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim of religious discrimination under Title VII, asserting that the court overlooked the fact that Kohler granted him a vaccine exemption on religious grounds. But as the district court correctly concluded, in his amended complaint Smith did not

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allege facts that connected his objection to the testing requirement to any religious observance, practice, or belief. See Jackson v. Methodist Health Servs. Corp., 121 F.4th 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 2024). And because the district court can dismiss a case if "the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with … a court order," F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), we see no error in doing so here where Smith failed—despite repeated warnings—to comply with the court's order to file a second amended complaint using the pre-printed complaint form. See Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th 507, 520 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming dismissal with prejudice after plaintiff repeatedly failed to follow amendment instructions despite warnings).

Smith next argues that the district court improperly barred him from pursuing claims on behalf of other employees, contending that doing so unlawfully restricts the practice of law and violates the Constitution. But it is well understood that a pro se litigant can represent only himself, not other litigants or a putative class. Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A nonlawyer can't handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself."); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel…"). Smith also asserts that the district court erred by declining to consider his untimely and noncompliant filings, including his "objection to hearsay" and motion for default judgment. But the district court acted within its discretion to enforce strictly its local rules and to disregard Smith's non-compliant filings. See Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 969 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the court's Civil Local Rule 7(b) required that Smith file a brief in opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss within 21 days. Instead, Smith filed his "objection to hearsay" and an unauthorized proposed second amended complaint over a month after the defendants filed their motions to dismiss. Thus the court reasonably declined to consider the filings when ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss. And the court properly denied Smith's motion for default judgment because Smith did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, which requires parties to seek an entry of default based on the opposing party's failure to plead or otherwise defend. Smith did not (and could not) do so because both defendants filed motions to dismiss, which is sufficient to "otherwise defend" under Rule 55(a).

Finally, Smith argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court erred in dismissing his claim against UAW with prejudice without first giving him leave to amend. That argument is waived. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived).

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We have considered Smith's other arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED

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